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H – 1237

International Court of Justice

Dated Jan. 16, 1946
Hbr.

H1237-0002

H-1237

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

"K K"

DOCUMENT BOOK

IN THE CASE

AGAINST

THE DEFENDANT

ARTHUR SEYSS-INQUART

ROBERT H. JACKSON
U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

OF COUNSEL:

MAJOR JOSEPH D. BRYAN, A.U.S.
LT. PAUL JOHNSTON, U.S.N.R.
MR. JOSEPH MICHEL
DR. R.M.W. KEMPNER,
CHIEF, SECTION V.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 102
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

SEC 24-5/C-102

Berlin, 11.3.38.

The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
OKW L I a Nr. 420/38 g.Kdos.

30 Copies
11th Copy

Referring to: Operation OTTO

TOP SECRET

1) If other measures prove unsuccessful, I intend to invade Austria with armed forces to establish constitutional conditions and to prevent further outrages against the pro-German population.

2) The whole operation will be directed by myself.

According to my instructions:

The Ob.d.H. will direct the land operations with the 8th Army in the formation and strength suggested to me, and with the attachments of the Air Force, the SS and police (see appendix).

The Ob.d.L. will direct the air operations with the forces suggested to me.

3) Operational duties:

a) Army
The invasion of Austria must be carried out in the manner explained to me. The Army's first target is the occupation of upper Austria, Salzburg, Lower Austria, the Tyrol, the speedy occupation of Vienna and the securing of the Austro-Czech frontier.

b) Air Force
The Air Force must demonstrate and drop propaganda material, occupy Austrian aerodromes for the use of further possible reinforcements assist the Army upon demand as necessary, apart from that, hold bomber units in readiness for special tasks.

4) The forces of the Army and Air Force detailed for this operation must be ready for invasion and/or ready for action on the 12th March 1938 at the latest from 1200 hours.

I reserve the right to give permission for crossing and flying over the frontier, and to decide the actual moment for invasion.

5) The behaviour of the troops must give the impression that we do not want to wage war against our Austrian brothers. It is in our interest that the whole operation shall be carried out without any violence but in the form of a peaceful entry welcomed by the population. Therefore any provocation is to be avoided. If, however, resistance is offered it must be broken ruthlessly by force of arms

Austrian units who come over to us, immediately come under German Command.

6) On the remaining German frontiers no security measures are to be taken for the time being.

Signed A. HITLER

Translator's Note:- This document bears the initials of Jodl, Keitel and one other which is undecipherable.

H1237-0003

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT C 102

13 November 1945

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, 2nd Lt., O-1332102, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document C 102.

GERARD SCHAEFER
2nd Lt.,
O-1332102

H1237-0004

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-182
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

SEC 24-10/C-182

TOP SECRET

Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
OKW L 1 a No. 427/38 Top Secret

Berlin, 11th March 1938
2045 hours.

C-in-C Navy
(pencil note) has been informed

35 Copies
6th Copy

Re: Operation Otto

Directive No. 2

1) The demands of the German ultimatum to the Austrian government have not been fulfilled,

2) The Austrian Armed Forces have been ordered to withdraw in front of the entry of German troops and to avoid fighting.

The Austrian Government has ceased to function of its own accord.

3) To avoid further bloodshed in Austrian towns, the entry of the German Armed Forces into Austria will commence, according to directive No. 1, at daybreak on 12.3.

I expect the set objectives to be reached, by exerting all forces to the full, as quickly as possible.

signed Adolf HITLER

initialled by JODL
and possibly WARLIMONT

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-182

13 November 1945

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, 2nd Lt., O-1332102, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 269 PS

GERARD SCHAEFER
2nd Lt.,
O-1332102

H1237-0005

D-571

BRITISH NO. D-571
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Further Correspondence Respecting Czechoslovakia

(15869)

[C 3925/7/12] No. 22

Mr. Newton to Viscount Halifax - (Received March 24.)

(No. 129) Prague, March 21, 1939.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform you of an account which I have just received of the events leading up to the declaration of the independence of Slovakia. Hitherto, to me in Prague at any rate, these events have been shrouded in obscurity. The following report, which has been given to me by a reliable friend with excellent sources of information, shows how involuntary was the declaration of independence, and throws a further lurid light on the gangster methods employed by the Reich to obtain its ends in Czecho-Slovakia.

2. On M. Sidor's return to Bratislava, after he had been entrusted with the Government in place of Mgr. Tiso, Herr Buerckel, Herr Seyss-Inquart and five German generals came at about 10 p.m. on the evening of Saturday, the 11th March, into a Cabinet meeting in progress at Bratislava, and told the Slovak Government that they should proclaim the independence of Slovakia. When M. Sidor showed hesitation, Herr Buerckel took him on one side and explained that Herr Hitler had decided to settle the question of Czecho-Slovakia definitely. Slovakia ought, therefore, to proclaim her independence because Herr Hitler would otherwise disinterest himself in her fate. M. Sidor thanked Herr Buerckel for this information, but said that he must discuss the situation with the Government at Prague.

3. Early on the following Sunday morning Mgr. Tiso requested that a meeting of the Cabinet should be held at 8 a.m. M. Sidor agreed, but said that the meeting must not take place in the building ordinarily used because that was guarded by the German Ordner and was also too close to the bridge across the Danube. The Cabinet accordingly met in his private apartment, when M. Sidor proposed that the Government should move to Trnava, since Bratislava was too much under German control. The chief of police, M. Klinovski (who has since been appointed Slovak Minister at Warsaw), thereupon reported that he could not accept responsibility for this move, as the road to Trnava was guarded by the German Ordner. At the same time news was received that an attempt against M. Sidor was in preparation, so the Cabinet went to hold their meeting in the offices of the newspaper Slovak.

4. Mgr. Tiso attended there, and said that he had received a telegram by the hand of Herr Buerckel inviting him to go at once to see the Führer in Berlin. He had to accept this invitation because Herr Buerckel had informed him that otherwise the two German divisions on the other side of the Danube would occupy Bratislava and the Hungarians would be authorised to seize not only Ruthenia, as had already been agreed to by Berlin, but also Eastern Slovakia. Mgr. Tiso explained that he proposed to leave by train early Monday morning and did not, therefore, expect to be back before Tuesday evening. This would have given time for Prague and Warsaw to be consulted, but so soon as Mgr. Tiso arrived in Vienna that day in preparation for an early departure the following morning, he was escorted into an aeroplane and informed that he was to proceed in it to Berlin at once, as Herr Hitler awaited him.

H1237-0006

H1237-0007

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT EC-86
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

(Arbeitsstab Ausland)
(Nr. 02051/44g. Kdos. II. Ang., Wannsee, 10 Oct 44.)
(Extract from the work of the Research Office for Military Economy 'Forschungsstelle fur Weh wirtschaft')

3 drafts
2nd draft

The financial achievements of the occupied areas up to 31 March 44 (Ffw. 182/44g. Rs.)

KK. The individual areas.

1. The Protectorate.

The exchange of goods between Germany and the Protectorate is no longer regarded as foreign trade. For this reason, the extent of the real surplus produced by the Protectorate cannot be evaluated. We can only determine the amount of the tribute (Matrikularbeitrag) paid to the Reich by the Protectorate.

Calendar year	Mil. Cr.	RM-purchasing power rate of exchange 100 Cr.....RM	Mil. RM-purchasing power
1940	3,000	8.73	262
1941	5,000	8.23	412
1942	8,000	8.07	646
1943	10,000	7.95	795
3 Mos. 1944	2,500	7.95	199
Total	28,500		2,314

Of course the Protectorate has furnished much more than this sum of 2.3 bil. RM during the years it has belonged to the Reich. We need only think of the weapons of all kinds that were taken over by the Wehrmacht, the manpower represented by the armament workers assigned to the Reich, the continual goods deliveries, etc. Of these items, it is known only that the value of the arms captured in 1939 amounted to 648 Mil. Crowns, or 77 Mil RM in purchasing power as of that date. For the reason referred to above, the proportions of the other items cannot be assessed.

The total figure of ca. 2400 mil. RM arrived at here is therefore necessarily too low.

2. The Government General.

The Government General, also, pays a fixed sum, the so-called "defense contribution" (Wehrbeitrag), and has been doing so since the fiscal year 1940/41.

	Fiscal year	Mil Zl.	Mil. RM
	1941/42	500	250
	1942/43	700	350
	1943/44	1300	650
Total		2500	1250

H1237-0008

In regard to the exchange of these sums in Zloty, in this case at the official rate of 0.50 RM for 1 Zl., it should be noted that the official prices (retail prices) have scarcely changed since the beginning of 1941. Price increases have occurred only in the cases of certain goods (textiles). The rates of purchasing power resulting from individual prices have approximated, as a rule, the official rate of exchange. In the case of food stuffs, our chief import item from the GG, the purchasing power of the Zl. is rather higher than 50 RPf., whereas for other goods it is considerably less. Black market prices, on the other hand have steadily risen and are many times higher than the official prices. But there is no uniform inflationary (Ueberteurungsfactor) factor such as has been established in the west. The prices range from two to sixty times the normal prices and completely disguise former relationships between goods. For this reason and because the sum of monies expended upon the black market is unknown, the exchange can be calculated only in terms of the official, and not the black-market, rates. But since army supplies, in particular, were apt to be considerably more expensive than in the Reich, we have reckoned, beginning with 1942/43, a tenth of the total demand at a rate one half lower (1 Zl./ equals 0.25 RM), arriving at the following result:

Fiscal year	Official Market Mil Zl.	Mil. RM	Market for special Army purchases.		Total Mil. RM.
1941/42	500	250	'''	'''	250
1942/43	630	315	70	17.5	332.5
1943/44	1170	585	130	32.5	617.5
					1,200.0

In 1940/41 the GG was not held to the payment of a set sum, but it had to permit the transfer of about 580 Mil Zl. Notes of the former Poski Bank from the Reich and other countries to the account of and for the credit of the Reich.

The established clearing debt of the Reich to the GG increased by 28 Mill. RM between the end of Aug 1940 and the end of March 1943. But this low sum is only what remained of the actual clearing debt after a substantial investment of GG.- credits in Reich Treasury bonds. As of 31 March of this year, 3396 mil RM were so invested. The actual clearing debt approximates, then, 3424 mil. RM.

Not all that the GG furnished was through clearing agreements. For instance, the wages sent out by the Polish laborers employed in the Reich and the POW's were carried by ordinary post and did not go through clearing. Up to the end of March 19 (two digits missing), a total of 100.6 mil. RM was sent, 70.8 of it by civilian workers.

H1237-0009

The determined performance of the GG is as follows:

Mil RM

1200 -- Defense contribution
290 -- Return of Zl. notes
3424 -- Clearing debt and Reich Treasury investment
71 -- Sent by laborers
30 -- Sent by POW's
5,015 Total

3. France

With France we come to the group of countries that pay occupation costs in the real sense. From the time France was first occupied until the end of March 1944, she placed the following sums at the disposal of the Wehrmacht, to the account of occupation costs:

Calendar year	Mil RM	Mil Francs
1940	1,759	35,180
1941	5,087	101,740
1942	7,872	157,440
1943	9,798	195,960
1st. Quarter of 1944x	2.275	45,500
Total	26 791	535,820

x figured per fixed daily contributions.

If one converts the above sums in terms of purchasing power, one arrives at considerably higher values for the first three years. The purchasing power and the rate of exchange did not become equalized until the year 1943. But not all goods financed by occupation costs are bought at the official prices; some are paid for at black market prices. One can assume that the black market played a very small role in 1940, since there were still ample stores of supplies available. Only beginning with 1941 is the black market taken into account here, when the inflation (Ueberteurung) factor is placed at 4. In 1942 this figure became 6 (according to Veltjens), and it is estimated at 8 for 1944.

	100 frs. equals ...RM	
	Official	on the black market
1940	9.9	- -
1941	7.7	1.9
1942	6.4	1 1
1943	5.0	0.6
1944 (Beginning of)	5.0	0.6

Exact documentation concerning the extent of black market purchases is available only for the "Veltjens Action", which in France required 1,555 Mil. RM, or 31.1 Bil. francs at the official rate of exchange. The greater part of the purchases were made in 1942, amounting to about 1155 Mil. RM.

H1237-0010

It is estimated that only about 400 Mil. RM were expended in France in 1943. If one converts the 31.1 Bil. francs at the then rate of exchange on the black market, one arrives at the low sum of 318 Mil RM.

It can be assumed that a part of Wehrmacht expenditures still goes into the black market--a particularly large proportion in the case of personnel expenses, which, during the last years in France, constituted between 18 and 25% of total expenditures. Certainly it is not too high an estimate if it is assumed that one half of personnel expenditures, and so perhaps 10% of all expenditures, went to the black market. It is calculated that 5% was expended in the black market in 1941, since the latter was still of slight importance at that time. Certain Wehrmacht expenditures for material (such as supplies for Wehrmacht installations 'Wehrmachtinvestitionen') may have been made at higher than the official prices, if not at the really high black market prices. In this connection it is assumed here that 10% of material expenditures were made at twice the official prices.

Until a short time ago, the French black market was fed from still another source--the importation of Reich credit notes (Reichskreditkassenscheinen) from the other occupied regions. Although the issuance of Reich credit notes in France had practically ceased in Oct. 40, sums of Reich credit notes were currently presented with the accounting of occupation costs (1942: 460 Mil. RM; 1943: 1,180 Mil. RM; 1st. quarter 1944: 25 Mil. RM.) Even though a portion of this was issued in France to begin with, it can be assumed that the greatest proportion--we place it at 75% for 1942 and 1943--comes from the other occupied regions; in 1942: 345 Mil. RM, in 1943: 885 Mil. RM. While it is not likely that the entire sums went into the black market, it is thought that 75% of them did.

We obtain, therefore, for:

1942	-	260 Mil. RM
1943	-	660 Mil. RM
1944	-	19 Mil. RM

Altogether, the following amounts were expended in the black market (in Bil. of Francs):

	1941	1942	1943	1944
Veltjens Action	---	23.1	8.0	---
Soldiers' purchases	5.1	15.7	19.6	4.5
Importing of Reich Credit Notes	---	5.2	13.2	0.4
Total	5.1	44.0	40.8	4.9
in addition, Wehrmacht purchases at higher than official prices	---	12.6	15.7	3.6
Total	5.1	56.6	56.5	8.5

H1237-0011

Wehrmacht expenditures in France were as follows:

Year	Official Market Bil.Fr.	Mil.RM.	Market for special Wehrmacht purchases Bil.Fr.	Mil.RM	Black Market Total Bil.Fr.	Mil.RM	Mil.RM
1940	35.2	3,480	----	----	----	----	3,480
1941	96.6	7,440	----	----	5.1	100	7,540
1942	100.8	6,450	12.6	400	44.0	480	7,330
1943	139.5	6,980	15.7	395	40.8	240	7,615
1944	37.0	1,850	3.6	90	4.9	30	1,970
Total		26 200		885		850	27,935

The real sum of occupation costs amounted to about 28 Bil. RM. The "loss" through the black market, that can be figured by converting the sums spent in the black market to their relative value in purchasing power in the official market and then subtracting from these the real value of the black market purchases, is estimated to approximate 6.4 Bil. RM. In other words, for value of ca. 900 Mil.RM received on the black market, one could have received a value of 7.3 Bil.RM in the official market, had the goods concerned been available in the latter.

In spite of the extent of black market purchasing, the real value of the occupation costs is still above the sum that would be received through conversion at the 5 Pf. rate of exchange (26.8 Bil.RM), since French prices were much lower than German prices at the beginning of the occupation period. The opinion expressed in the recent report of the Military Commander *, namely, that due to black market purchases not even the sum of 26.8 Bil. RM was realized, must therefore be regarded as too pessimistic.

The German clearing debt with France, in which is expressed the value of her external contributions (import surpluses, French workers employed in the Reich), has increased greatly during the occupation years.

Conversion of the clearing debt must be effected at lower rates than at the purchasing power rates referred to above. For, since 1941, the French have levied a duty known as the "prélèvement de péréquation" upon those exports for which higher prices were obtained than could be realized in the domestic market. This shows that export prices were, in part, higher than the French domestic prices. It is of course difficult to estimate the degree of this difference. The mean between the purchasing power rate based upon the domestic price and the rate of exchange is shown here for 1941 and 1942:

1941 - 6.3
1942 - 5.7

From that time when the purchasing power rate approximated the rate of exchange (about 1943), the latter was adopted and it has been retained for the 1st. quarter of 1944. Imports from France have been cheapened to some extent

* "The Contribution of the French Area to the War Economy," Paris, April 1944.

H1237-0012

today, it is true, which might suggest conversion at a rate under the (official) rate of exchange, but the sums expended to that end (Verbilligungsbetrage) are still relatively low. Besides, many goods are still imported from France at less than Reich prices.

The clearing debt was as follows:

	Mil. Frs.	Mil. RM purchasing power.
from Nov 1940-Aug 1941	8,976	565
from Sept 1941-Aug 1942	28,438	1,621
from Sept 1942 Aug 1943	57,718	2,736
from Sept 1943-end of March 1944	44,128	2,206
Total		7,128

The total demonstrable French contribution is in the vicinity, then, of 35 Bil. RM. This sum does not include all of the French contributions, e.g. captured raw materials valued at about 255 Mil. RM, war booty, or the billeting.

4. Belgium.

From the beginning of the occupation period until 31 March 4-(digit missing) Belgium paid about 5.7 Bil. RM in occupation costs.

Year	Mil. Belg. Fr.	RM rate of purchasing power. 100 B.Fr.=....RM	Mil. RM purchasing power
1940	29,500	8.6	2,537
1941			
1942	19,200	8.0	1,536
1943	15,045	7.7	1,197
Jan/Mar 1944	5,481	7.7	422
Total			5,692

The total given here is probably too high, for in Belgium, too, certain sums regularly reached the black market; at the least, this occurred in the case of personnel expenditures. Belgium's price policy has been difinitely more successful than that of France, however, and the extent and prices of the black market accordingly lower. If one reckons with an inflation factor of 3 for 1940 and 1941 and of 6 for the succeeding period and assumes that 1/20 of the amount for the first two years and 1/10 for the remaining period went into the black market, the above figures may be broken down as follows:

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	(Official - Market) Mil. Fr.	Mil. RM pur. pow.	(Black - Market) Mil. Fr.	Mil. RM pur. pow.	Total - Mil. RM pur. pow.
1940)_ 1941)	28,025	2,410	1,475	43	2,455
1942	17,280	1,382	1,920	26	1,408
1943	13,540	1,043	1,505	20	1,063
Jan/Mar 1944	4,933	380	548	7	387
Total		5,215		96	5,311

In comparison with the occupation costs, the clearing debt is very high, at least when regarded from the standpoint of the relationship in France. In Belgium it amounts to about $\frac{3}{4}$ of the occupation costs, whereas it totals only $\frac{1}{4}$ in France.

It increased as follows:

from 12 July 40	- 31 Aug 40 by	21	Mil. RM
" Sept 40	- end of Aug 41 by	383	" "
" Sept 41	- end of Aug 42 "	974	" "
" Sept 42	- end of Aug 43 "	1,898	" "
" Sept 43	- end of Mar 44 "	1,012	" "
	Total	4,288	Mil. RM

These RM sums determined with the aid of the official rate of exchange also must be converted to the rate of purchasing power and there must be taken into account the sum of the official black market purchases (Veltjens Action), amounting to 267 Mil. RM, let us say for the sake of simplicity, that the black market action took place entirely within the 4th year of the war economy, even though it began somewhat earlier (mid-June 42). The increase of the clearing debt may be broken down as follows:

Year of War Economy	(Official - Market) Mil. B.Fr.	Mil. RM pur.pow.	(Black - Market) Mil. B.Fr.	Mil. RM pur.pow.	Total Mil. RM
1939-40	265	24	---	---	24
1940-41	4,789	397	---	---	397
1941-42	12,171	974	---	---	974
1942-43	20,388	1,570	3,338	43	1,613
Sept 43- Mar 44	12,650	974	---	---	974
Total		3,939		43	3,982

The sum total of Belgium's contribution, then, amounts to about 9,300 Mil. RM. (not including Belgium's gold deliveries.)

H1237-0014

5. The Netherlands.

The Netherlands is the only country that not only paid for internal occupation costs, for the subsistence of the troops and other occupation needs, but also contributed to the external costs of occupation. The sums for the latter were paid in part in gold--some time ago the gold reserves were exhausted--and for the rest in Reichsmark. The Reichmark sums probably originated in foreign trade. To the extent of the latter payments it was possible to import goods from Holland without payment, a procedure that calls to mind English imports from Canada.

	Internal Occupation costs 1 hfl. = 1.32 RM Mil. RM	External Occupation Costs Mil. RM	Total Occupation costs Mil. RM
1940-41	1,360	---	1,360
1941-42	1,640	950	2,590
1942-43	1,640	600	2,240
1943-44	1,640	600	2,240
Total	6,280	2,150	8,430

If one evaluates the internal occupation costs by the obtaining rate of purchasing power, one arrives at the following sums:

	Reichsmark-actual purchasing power 1 hfl. = ...RM	Internal Occupation costs. Mil. RM	Total Occupation costs. Mil. RM.
1940-41	1.46	1,030	1,500
1941-42	1.30	1,240	1,610
1942-43	1.26	1,240	1,560
1943-44	1.27	1,240	1,570
Total			6,340

After a considerable initial rise in prices in Holland, the purchasing power was successfully held close to the official rate of exchange. The black market prices, however, are especially high. The inflation factor for 1942 is given as 4, while it is estimated at 8 for 1943 and at 10 for 1944.

Probably one half of the payments made to personnel, which lately constituted ca. 25% of total expenditures, found its way into the black market, and some of the payments for material have been made at higher than official prices (Army purchases of wood, etc.). As in the case with France, we calculate that since 1942-43 10% of expenditures for supplies and equipment made at twice the official prices.

On the basis of the above suppositions, the following accounting can be made:

H1237-0015

	Official Market Mil.Hfl.	Mil.RM.	Wehrmacht Market For Special Pur. Mil.Hfl	Mil.RM.	Black - Market Mil.Hfl.	Mil.RM.	Total RM
1940-41	1030	1500	--	--	---	--	1,500
1941-42	1178	1530	--	--	62	40	1,570
1942-43	992	1248	93	59	156	25	1,332
1943-44	992	1256	93	59	156	20	1,335
Total		5,534		118		85	5,737

Some of the external costs of occupation, too, were connected with the black market. We refer here to the official black market purchases, which were paid for in Holland by Reichsmark and which came to 160 Mil. RM. If we take the black market rate of exchange for 1942 as 32 Rpf, that amounts to the sum of 40 Mil. RM. The Reichsmark remittances for 1942 must therefore be established at 480 Mil. RM instead of 600 Mil. RM. Altogether, we received from Holland the following amounts:

	Internal occupation costs Mil. RM.	External occupation costs. Mil. RM.	Total Mil. RM.
1940-41	1,500	---	1,500
1941-42	1,570	950	2,520
1942-43	1,332	480	1,812
1943-44	1,335	600	1,935
Total	5,737	2,030	7,767

Since the Netherlands has counted as a domestic currency area (Deviseninland) since 1 April 41, the balance of Dutch contributions in external trade with the Reich cannot be exactly ascertained. That part of the total contribution surpluses which is not covered by the external costs of occupation (ausserer Besatzungskosten) accumulates with the Deutsche Reichsbank in the Reichsmark account of the Netherlands Central Bank (as of 31 March 44: 5,120 Mil. RM.). The greater part of this, that is, 4,958 Mil. RM., was invested in Reich Treasury bonds.

Since the acquisition of Gulden through the deposit of Reichmark in Germany was not curbed until recently and the control over goods movements was inadequate, it can be assumed that great sums in Gulden -- we estimate them to equal 1/5 of the entire Reichsmark account of the Dutch National Bank -- were acquired by Germans for buying on the Dutch black market. If this sum is counted with the average inflation factor of 6, the real value amounts to 4,260 Mil. RM.

The total of Dutch contributions, accordingly, comes to 12, 030 Mil. RM.

H1237-0016

6. Denmark.

Denmark is not considered as occupied territory and so pays no occupation costs. The funds needed by the German troops are placed at the disposition of the head administration of the Reichskreditkassen of the Danish Central Bank by way of credits. For the duration of the war, then, at any rate, Denmark made no uniform contribution. The credits so claimed amounted to almost 1.5 bil. RM by 31 March 44.

	Occupation costs Mil. Kr.	RM purchasing power 100 Kr.....RM	Occupation costs Mil.RM pur. pow.
1940-41	531	53.1	282
1941-42	437	47.7	208
1942-43	612	47.5	290
1943-44	1391	47.9	666
			1446

No estimation is made of the sums going into the black market. It can be assumed, to be sure, that members of the Wehrmacht buy butter and other products at increased prices in Denmark, too, but it is impossible to make any accurate statement concerning this. For the black market seems less widespread and less well organized than in the occupied western regions and more similar to the German black market, with its irregular price structure. As a rule, certainly, the Danish black market prices were far below the German. Therefore, one can not speak of a uniform over-charge or inflation factor, as in France, Belgium and Holland.

Our clearing debt to Denmark amounts to about 1,100 Mil.RM It increased as follows:

	Mil. Kronen	Mil. RM purchasing power
from 9 April 40 - 31 Aug 40	297	158
from 1 Sept 40 - 31 Aug 41	358	171
from 1 Sept 41 - 31 Aug 42	416	198
from 1 Sept 42 - 31 Aug 43	560	268
from 1 Sept 43 - 31 Mar 44	612	293
Total		1,088

Denmark's total contribution; then, amounted to ca. 2,530 Million RM.

7. Norway.

The Norwegian economy has borne an especially heavy burden of occupation demands. For this reason the occupation charges had to be limited to only a portion of the Wehrmacht expenditures. The remainder is being financed, for the time being, by credits of the Central Bank, placed at the disposition of the head administration of the Reichskreditkassen.

H1237-0017

	Occupation Charges Mil. Kr.	Credit with the Norges Bank Mil. Kr.	Total
1940-41	353	2,132	2,485
1941-42	1,292	1,845	3,137
1942-43	981	942	1,923
6 months 1943 to March 44	ca.750	ca. 750	ca. 1,500

Expressed in Reichsmark, this equals for the following amounts;

	Mil. Kr.	RM Purchasing Power 100 Kr.....RM	Mil. RM Purchasing power
1940-41	2,485	63.9	1,588
1941-42	3,137	52.8	1,656
1942-43	1,923	52.6	1,011
1943-44	1,500	52.6	789
			5,044

This sum of over 5 bil. RM is indeed a large amount, taking into consideration the state of Norwegian economy. Countries with much greater economic resources, such as Belgium, paid little more, and Denmark furnished not even half as much. These large contributions were made possible only through German subsidies (Zuschusse). It is not surprising, therefore, that German-Norwegian foreign trade is balanced in Germany's favor, i.e. it is a subsidized operation (Zuschussgeschaft). Since Norway is scarcely in a position to furnish labor forces to Germany, owing to her own manpower shortage, it is one of the few countries which owe us certain amounts under the clearing arrangement.

Status of German Clearing Balance
(in Mil. RM)

31/8/1940	minus	5.6
31/8/1941	plus	111.3
31/8/1942	plus	43.2
31/8/1943	plus	105.3
31/3/1944	plus	132.3

Increases and decreases in the German demands made on Norway were as follows:

		Mil. Kronen		Mil. RM Purchasing Power	
from 9/4/1940 - 31/8/1940	minus	10	minus	6.4
from 1/9/1940 - 31/8/1941	plus	205	plus	131.0
from 1/9/1941 - 31/8/1942	minus	120	minus	63.4
from 1/9/1942 - 31/8/1943	plus	109	plus	57.3
from 1/9/1943 - 31/3/1944	plus	47	plus	24.7
			plus	143.2

If this sum of about 140 mil. is subtracted from the occupation charges and credits granted, as presented above, there still remains the very considerable sum of ca. 4,900 mil. RM representing the contribution made by Norway.

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8. Serbia. . . . . .

9. Greece. . . . . .

10. Occupied Eastern Areas.

In determining the value of the contributions of the eastern occupied areas it is expedient to appraise separately the items involved. For occupation payments were made only by the Ostland and the Ukraine, but not by the zone of operations, and only a part of the foreign trade is carried on under clearing arrangments. The goods claimed by the Wehrmacht and the Reich are provided at German wholesale prices. Since the extent of much of the services rendered (quartering and transport) is unknown and the value of only the most important food and raw material deliveries has been determined, the sum arrived at by the addition of the individual items is necessarily too low.

a) Agricultural deliveries totalled just about 4 bil. RM as against German counter contributions of 500 Mil. RM, so that the total value received was in the neighborhood of 3.5 bil. RM

b) In the field of industrial contributions very little was achieved. Russian deliveries of raw materials valued at ca. 725 mil. RM are offset by German importations of machinery, tools, and equipment valued at 500 mil. RM and coal deliveries (not counting those to the Wehrmacht and the railways) amounting to ca. 35 mil. RM. There remains a net profit, therefore, of only 190 Mil. RM. There should be added the contributions made by the processing industries to the Army of the East (Ostheer), here estimated at 500 Mil. RM. The total contributions in the industrial field can therefore be placed at 690 Bil. RM.

c) Finally, the net profit from the employment of the eastern workers, obtained from laborers, remittances and deductions from wages (Ostarbeiterabgabe), must be taken into account.

Workers' remittances	26.5 Mil. RM
Deductions	209. Mil. RM
Total	335.5 Mil. RM

d) The final balance - admittedly incomplete - appears something like this:

	Mil. RM
Agricultural contributions	3,500
Industrial contributions	690
Manpower labor value	335
Total	4,525

The Russian contributions total, then, 4.5 Bil. RM. This is less than the contributions of most of the countries. France furnished about 7 times as much, Belgium more than twice as much, and the other countries, with few exceptions, also provided more. The figure given appears unbelievably low, in fact, not only in comparison with other countries, but also from an absolute standpoint. The value of all food and raw material deliveries to the Wehrmacht and of the man power employed

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in the Reich is doubtless not fully represented in this sum of 4.5 Bil. RM, even if one subtracts the very considerable German investments in the then Russian economy. The contributions which can not be assessed doubtless run into the billions. They will be taken into consideration in the concluding statement, where all the contributions which can not be statistically evaluated will be summarized.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. EC-86

6 December 1945

I, JAN CHARMATZ, Civilian, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated document No. EC-86. Where the document is translated in part only, the part omitted is indicated in the text of the translation.

Jan Charmatz
JAN CHARMATZ
Civilian

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT EC.174

OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

VOL. 23-1

Summary

"War Economy" trip to Godesberg undertaken by General Staff between 25 May and 2 June.

Welcome to General Staff's "War Economy Trip" to Godesberg in 1937. Contrary to the first trip last year which was limited to very few men, the following individuals will participate this year; members of war economy organizations, representatives of the three branches of the Armed Forces, a considerable number of men representing the Plenipotentiary General and several men who join us in these measures for rearmament. Particularly welcome is President Schacht who promised to be present during the final conference on Saturday.

Previous trips of this nature were concerned mainly with visiting industrial organizations and making the acquaintance of their leading men. Last year's trip already went one step further as mobilization of organizations was discussed, as well as, in one instance, the solution of the difficult worker problem.

During fall of the past year a first experiment was made in starting on a small scale a war game in war economy. We gained considerable experience which was applied this year. This year's trip has two main aims; first, examination of cooperation within war economy organizations, coordination of the war economy staff with the branches of the Armed Forces, and the cooperation between the war economy staff and the O.B. under presumed conditions of war; second, inner organizational mobilization.

I talked with many soldiers and industrialists regarding the nature and execution of these trips, but most of them did not understand them.

We, too, do not know much about this kind of war game in war economy. We also consider it a dangerous experiment, but hope to be able to utilize, on a large scale, what we learn from it.

The circle participating in this war game is considerably larger and therefore prevented us from basing it on a situation exposing the actual German plan of operations. We had to construct a situation which provided a reasonable and practical foundation for one game or one hand but which, on the other hand, is constructed in a manner that the purpose of the game is completely fulfilled in regard to business. Please do not examine the game too critically regarding tactical and strategic moves, but remember that the main purpose of this trip is a possible solution of war economic problems.

I want to point out, however, that all material and all information received has to be kept in strict secrecy.

A second point. The first round of a war game cannot solve all problems, it can only bring it closer to their solution. Therefore, I shall not discuss basic problems and situations, but I shall take note of originating differences in order to have them clarified in Berlin later on. We based the situation - especially regarding Red - regarding organization on several assumptions which do correspond with the real German situation and which need further examination

before they can be suggested for acceptance by the Armed Forces. I, therefore, ask you not to discuss these questions as, I repeat, we all want to gain experience from this kind of war game and want to become acquainted with the advantages and disadvantages of one or the other organization. It is possible to get acquainted only if one plays with them with the help of a practical example. The main purpose of the war game consists in pointing out to those present here how the actions of the soldiers in total war is influenced by economy and how on the other hand, economy is completely dependent on military operations. During war time there is no polarity: Armed Forces here, Economy there! It is important that they cooperate and we are attempting to find a successful method to effect this.

As the time provided for this war game is very limited we can only indicate arising questions and discuss in detail only very few subjects. Therefore, please limit your discussions. I shall only direct parts of the game; Lt. Col. Huenerman and Major Beutler will take over the lead of the remaining part of the game. I am doing this in order to keep at a certain distance from these things. I have to do this in order to gain and retain the full perspective and method of the game and to make future conclusions from gained experience.

Hopes to become better acquainted with everybody.

Translation of Part I of Speech welcoming Dr. Schacht.

Before I start with the discussion of the war game in war economy, I have to express how grateful we all are that you, President Dr. Schacht, have gone to the trouble to personally participate in our final discussion today despite all your other activities. This proves to us your deep interest in war economy tasks shown at all times and your presence here is renewed proof that you are willing to facilitate for us soldiers the difficult war-economic preparations and to strengthen the harmonious co-operation with your offices.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT EC-174.

I, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpt from Document No. EC-174.

Translation of EC-174 (contd.)

H1237-0021

H1237-0022

TRANSLATION OF DOC. NO. ECR-195
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

eichskreditkasse

Amsterdam, 21, April 1942

ubject: Dutch East Help

Central Administration
of the Reichskreditkasse
23 April 1942, 1.Mail
File No 7778/42

At the instigation of Reichskommissar Dr. Seyss-Inquart, the Netherlands ill make a voluntary contribution to the war against Bolshevism, of a monthly mount of 50 Mill Guilders of which 10 Mill Guilders will always be paid in gold. hese payments will be retroactive to 1st July 1941. 400 Mill of the 500 Mill uilders already due for the past 10 months have been paid through debiting the RM ccount of the Dutch Bank with the Reichsbank in Berlin, while transfer of 100 ill gold in bars and coins from Rotterdam to Berlin is being prepared at present.

This deals with an additional payment which does not disturb the current ccupation costs.

Reichsbankdirektor Treue is in charge of the matter in Berlin.

On this occasion we report furthermore that the Dutch Banking Law has been hanged in so far as gold coverage at 40 o/o has been discontinued. Assets at oreign banks particularly the very high RM assets, checks bills of exchange and reasury bills payable in foreign countries now serve as coverage. Thus the ote circulation can be increased further.

Reichskreditkasse
/S/ Koze /S/ illegible

o the Central Administration of
he Reichskreditkasse
n Berlin C III

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOC. NO. ECR-195

1 December 1945

I, JAN CHARMATZ, Civilian, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant ith the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct ranslation.

Jan Charmatz
JAN CHARMATZ
Civilian

H1237-0023

COPY OF DOCUMENT NO. L-151
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

No. 1267 Paris, November 23, 1937.

Subject: Visit of Ambassador Bullitt to Warsaw.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY AND THE UNDER SECRETARY.

The Honorable,
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that, in accordance with my telegram No. 1557 of November 4, 2 P.M., to the Department and the Department's telegram No. 563 of November 4, 3 P.M., to me, I left Paris, to visit Ambassador Biddle, on Saturday evening, November 13th at 6:15 P.M., arriving in Warsaw at 4:32 P.M., on November 14th. I left Warsaw at 10:20 P.M., November 17th, arriving in Berlin at 8:00 A.M., November 18th. I departed from Berlin on November 19th at 9:30 P.M., arriving in Paris at 9:55 A.M., on Saturday, November 20th.

In the course of this trip I talked with a number of statesmen and diplomats, and it has occurred to me that the Department of State might be interested in having more than a formal report of the dates of my journey. I append, therefore, memoranda recording portions of conversations with the following: 1. The 1/ Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Colonel Joseph Beck, Marshal 2/ Smigly-Rydz, and other members of the Polish Government; 2. The 3/ Japanese Ambassador in Warsaw, Shuichi Sakoh; 3. The Italian 4/ Ambassador in Berlin, Bernardo Attolico; 4. Baron Konstantin 5/ von Neurath; 5. Doctor Hjalmar Schacht; 6. General Hermann 6/ Goering.

Respectfully yours,

William C. Bullitt.

List of Enclosures:

1. Memorandum of conversation between Ambassador Bullitt and Colonel Beck, Marshal Smigly-Rydz, and other members of the Polish Government.
2. Memorandum of conversation between Ambassador Bullitt and the Japanese Ambassador in Warsaw.
3. Memorandum of conversation between Ambassador Bullitt and the Italian Ambassador in Berlin.
4. Memorandum of conversation between Ambassador Bullitt and Baron Konstantin von Neurath.
5. Memorandum of conversation between Ambassador Bullitt and Doctor Hjalmar Schacht.
6. Memorandum of conversation between Ambassador Bullitt and General Hermann Goering.

WCB:CO/lhh

H1237-0024

COPY OF DOCUMENT NO. L-151

Enclosure No. 5 to Despatch No. 1267 of
November 23, 1937, from the Embassy at Paris.

MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN AMBASSADOR BULLITT AND DOCTOR HJALMAR SCHACHT.

I had a conversation with Doctor Hjalmar Schacht which was not altogether without interest. Schacht began by saying that he regretted greatly that nothing had come of his two visits to Paris in the course of which he had attempted to establish the basis for a Franco-German rapprochement. He said that he had found Blum extremely reasonable with regard to the colonial question. He then went on to speak of the absolute necessity for doing something to produce peace in Europe before the outbreak of war toward which the Continent was drifting. He prefaced his remarks by saying that he himself today was "completely without influence on that man," meaning Hitler. He seemed to regard himself as politically dead and to have small respect for "that man." He said that the one way he could see to peace was through direct negotiations between France and Germany. He did not believe that the conversations which Halifax was about to have with Hitler would lead to any considerable results. Hitler was furious with the British because he had made his one great gesture of political generosity toward the British and the British had not responded by any similar gesture. He had offered to limit the German fleet and the British had quietly pocketed this concession and had then made none of the corresponding gestures toward Germany that Hitler had anticipated.

Schacht said that in his opinion the best way to begin to deal with Hitler was not through political discussions but through economic discussions. Hitler was not in the least interested in economic matters. He regarded money as "filth." It was, therefore, possible to enter into negotiations with him in the economic domain without arousing his emotional antipathies and begun to lead him into arrangements in the political and military fields in which he was intensely interested.

Hitler was determined to have Austria eventually attached to Germany and to obtain at least autonomy for the Germans of Bohemia. At the present moment, he was not vitally concerned about the Polish corridor and in his (Schacht's) opinion, it might be possible to maintain the Corridor provided Danzig were permitted to join East Prussia and provided some sort of a bridge could be built across the Corridor uniting Danzig and East Prussia with Germany.

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COPY OF DOCUMENT NO. L-151

Enclosure No. 6 to Despatch No. 1267 of
November 23, 1937, from the Embassy at Paris.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN AMBASSADOR BULLITT
AND GENERAL HERMANN GOERING

I said to General Goering as soon as I met him that I should be extremely glad to have his ideas on the prospects of peace and war in Europe and that I wished he would begin by telling me what he thought of Germany's relations with France.

Goering said that there was no direct conflict whatsoever today between Germany and France. Germany had given up entirely and forever the idea of regaining Alsace-Lorraine. Germany had learned through long experience that the people of Alsace and Lorraine would inevitably be against whichever of the two countries happened to have the sovereignty over Alsace-Lorraine at the moment and would be permanently a source of discord within the country to which they were attached. Germany did not desire to have any half-loyal citizens and, therefore, had not the slightest desire for a return of Alsace-Lorraine to the German Reich.

In addition, the economic systems of France and Germany were completely complementary. It should be possible to develop to a much greater extent the exchange of all sorts of products between France and Germany.

Furthermore, the French had contributed so much to the culture of Germany and the Germans had contributed so much to the culture of France that as two civilized peoples who lived side by side they had a deep underlying esteem for each other. Furthermore, the French and the Germans respected each other as brave soldiers and courageous peoples who were ready to die for their respective countries. In addition, the French Government had indicated that it was prepared insofar as it was concerned, to return the German colonies which had been transferred to France by the Treaty of Versailles. There was, unfortunately, the proviso that France would only take this action if Great Britain were prepared to make a similar concession.

There was, therefore, no cause of discord whatsoever in the direct relations between France and Germany to prevent the closest sort of friendship between the two countries. So far as Germany was concerned, he could say with authority that Germany today was prepared to conclude at once an offensive and defensive alliance with France.

The sole source of friction between Germany and France was the refusal of France to permit Germany to achieve certain vital national necessities. If France, instead of accepting a collaboration with Germany, should continue to follow a policy of building up alliances in Eastern Europe to prevent Germany from the achievement of her legitimate aims it was obvious that there would be conflict between France and Germany.

I asked Goering what aims especially he had in mind. He replied, "We are determined to join to the German Reich all Germans who are contiguous to the Reich and are divided from the great body of the German race merely by the artificial barriers imposed by the Treaty of Versailles."

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I asked Goering if he meant that Germany was absolutely determined to annex Austria to the Reich. He replied that this was an absolute determination of the German Government. The German Government at the present time was not pressing this matter because of certain momentary political considerations, especially in their relations with Italy; but Germany would tolerate no solution of the Austrian question other than the consolidation of Austria in the German Reich. He then added a statement which went further than any I have heard on this subject. He said, "There are schemes being pushed now for a union of Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia either with or without a Hapsburg at the head of the unit. Such a solution is absolutely inacceptable to us, and for us the conclusion of such an agreement would be an immediate casus belli." (Goering used the Latin expression casus belli. It is not a translation from the German, in which our conversation was carried on.)

I asked Goering if the German Government was as decided in its views with regard to the Germans in Bohemia as it was with regard to Austria. He replied that there could be only one final solution of this question. The Sudeten Germans must enter the German Reich as all other Germans who lived contiguous to the Reich.

I asked if the German Government might not be content if the Czech Government should accord to the Germans of Bohemia a large measure of local autonomy while keeping them under Czech sovereignty. Goering replied that such a concession on the part of the Czechoslovak Government would lead to a temporary appeasement of the situation; but the autonomy would have to be real autonomy and such a solution would not be a final solution. There could be no final solution but the inclusion of these Germans within the Reich.

I asked Goering how he viewed the case of the Germans in other portions of Europe; notably the Germans of Transylvania. He replied that these racial groups were cut off from the main body of the German people and could not, therefore, be joined to it. All that Germany would insist upon would be that they should be treated as equals with equal rights and be permitted to retain their cultural life. The situation of the Germans in Transylvania was extremely unsatisfactory. On the other hand, the Yugoslavs had treated the Germans within their borders with such conspicuous intelligence and fairness that the leaders of the Germans of Yugoslavia had informed him recently that they had no real grievances and that they would resist to the utmost any arrangements in Europe which might envisage their return to Hungary.

Goering then added that the only other two considerable German racial groups which would lie outside the borders of the German Reich, after the Germans of Austria and Bohemia had been included, would be the Germans of the South Tyrol who were now in the hands of Italy and the Germans in Poland. He did not feel that there was a sufficient number of Germans in Italy to warrant a major war for their attachment to the Reich. Similarly the Germans of Poland would have to stay where they were because there were a considerable number of Poles in Germany and all that either Poland or Germany could expect would be that these minorities should be treated on each side of the border with the greatest human consideration.

Goering went on to say that the idea that Germany had any ambitions to annex the Ukraine was pure nonsense. I suggested that one of the reasons it was nonsense was that it would involve first the conquest of Poland and then the conquest of the whole of Central Europe before it could become realizable.

Goering replied that this was so and that in addition Germany had no desire to have territory in Europe except territory inhabited by Germans.

I thanked Goering for giving me such a clear expression of Germany's intentions with regard to the Continent and asked him if he would pass on to the colonial field.

Goering said that Germany's demands in the colonial field were well known. They were for a return of the German colonies which had been taken away from Germany by the Treaty of Versailles. Germany had no right to demand anything but these colonies. On the other hand, Germany had no desire to be stiff-necked about this matter. If England should not wish to return German East Africa or German Southwest Africa, for military and other reasons, Germany would make no objection if England could make an arrangement, financial or otherwise, with Portugal and Belgium for the giving to Germany of Portuguese and Belgian colonies in West Africa which would compensate Germany for the loss of her East African possessions. It was idle to say that Germany could not get raw materials of great value from African colonies; for example, the Cameroons. It was entirely true that today the Cameroons had been very little developed and were producing very little, but with German intelligence and energy applied to them, they could be made to produce materials of the greatest value to Germany. The same was true of many other areas in Africa which today were undeveloped or under-developed. The essential problem for Germany was to feed and maintain her people at a decent standard of living. It was entirely clear that with the increase of population in Germany the soil now in the hands of Germany would be insufficient to maintain this increasing German population. Before the war, when barriers to international trade had been low, it had been possible for Germany to maintain herself by her great international trade. Today barriers were so high that this would soon become impossible. He hoped that there might be a reduction of such barriers and that Germany could find increasing markets for her products but she could not feel safe unless she had a colonial domain which would give her access to her own raw materials.

Goering then went on to say that he deplored greatly the present state of trade relations between Germany and the United States. The trade between the two countries was ceasing to be of any importance which was contrary to all reason. Indeed, Germany was almost isolated from the United States. There were certain countries with which Germany had good relations; and certain countries with which Germany had bad relations; but with the United States, Germany had no relations at all. He then asked me why I believed there was such hostility to Germany in the United States.

I replied that there were many sources of this hostility. All Americans were devoted to the ideal of democracy. There had been a democratic government in Germany, or at least the semblance of a democratic government, which had been destroyed and replaced by Nazi dictatorship. Any governing group which destroyed democracy to replace it by dictatorship would always be unpopular in the United States. Furthermore, the German Government had at the same time attacked with the utmost violence the Jews, the Catholic

H1237-0027

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Church and the Protestant Church. The reaction in America among Protestants, Catholics and Jews had, therefore, been natural, immediate, and intense.

Goering then protested, saying that he was informed that people in the United States believed that the National Socialist Government was attempting to set up a heathen church in Germany. I replied that this was so. He said that it was true that within the Nazi Government there was a small group of people who desired to see a return to the Norse gods, but he could assure me that this movement was completely without importance and did not include more than one percent of the Nazi Party. So far as he, himself, was concerned, he was a Protestant and still attended church services. He had been to church recently on the occasion of the confirmation of his nephew. He thought that the violence of the reaction in the United States probably was due to the Jews. I replied that in some measure it was due to the Jews as was only natural, but that it was not only the Jews but all Americans who were shocked and horrified by the treatment of the Jews in Germany and that the attacks on the Catholic Church and the Protestant Church and on democracy and human freedom were factors of equal importance.

I then added that there was an additional element which was playing a certain role at the moment. It appeared that the Nazi Government was engaged in forming Nazi organizations in the United States. Neither the Government nor the people of the United States could tolerate the formation on their soil of any national group or other group directed by any foreign country. We could not permit Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini or any other dictator to organize groups of agents in the United States. If we should do so, we would soon cease to be a nation and become a mere battleground for the conflicting ambitions of foreign dictators.

Goering said that he considered this entirely reasonable and understandable and if he were an American would certainly not tolerate the slightest interference by any foreign agency in the life of the United States. The German Government had forbidden any German citizen to participate in any way in the formation of such groups. He believed that I would find that such groups were formed by American citizens of German origin. I replied that I felt quite certain that such groups would not be formed without the approval and desire of the German Government. Goering then said: "It is true that certain persons in our Government here believe that we should attempt to organize the Germans, especially of the Middle West, because they feel that if if Germany should again become involved in war with France and England, there would come a moment when the United States might again consider entering such a war against Germany and they believe that such groups of organized Germans in the United States might throw their influence decisively against a declaration of war and might prevent the United States entering such a conflict.

I then said that I could merely remind him of two things: The first, that the organization of German groups in the United States during the late war had aroused hostility throughout the entire country against Germany. The second, a conversation which had taken place during the World War between our Ambassador to Germany, Mr. James Gerard and Zimmerman, who was Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Reich at that time. Zimmerman had stated to Gerard that the United States could not enter the war because there were five million Germans in the United States who would prevent by force, if necessary, any such action. Mr. Gerard had replied that if there were five million

H1237-0029

Germans in the United States who would prevent by force, if necessary, any such action, there were five million and one lamp posts. Goering did not seem to get the point with absolute clarity. I, therefore, added, "and you will understand that, if, as you have said, there are six million Germans in the United States today, who could be organized to influence the action of the United States Government, there are a great many more than six million tree limbs on which to hang them."

Goering seemed to find this remark entirely reasonable and in a more friendly and intimate tone asked, "What then can we do to improve our relations with the United States?" I replied that he had an excellent ambassador in Washington at the moment who could doubtless inform him better than I could on this subject.

I then asked Goering for his views with regard to the Far East. He said that he believed the Japanese would win the war and succeed in imposing on China precisely what they should desire to impose. I asked Goering if he knew precisely what that was. He said that he believed that the Japanese aim was to organize the Northern Provinces of China thoroughly as a base from which to attack the Soviet Union, since it was obvious that Japan would be compelled to attack the Soviet Union owing to the geographic position of Vladivostok. The Japanese desired to have Central and South China in relative chaos and impotence until they had finished with the Soviet Union.

At this point, Goering asked me why the United States had begun to build battleships for the Soviet Union. I replied that I had no information to the effect that the American Government was building battleships for the Soviet Union and I considered such a report highly improbable. Goering said that his information indeed was rather vague on this point.

I asked him what his views were with regard to the Soviet Union at the present time. He said that in his opinion the Red Army on the European frontier had ceased to be a serious fighting force if indeed it had ever been one. He said that the reports of the prowess of Soviet aviation in Spain were extraordinarily misleading. German officers in Spain had analyzed in detail the debris of all Soviet planes that had been shot down behind Franco's lines. They had discovered that every Soviet plane which had flown with conspicuous success in Spain had been of American manufacture. I asked him if he meant manufactured in Russia on American models. He replied in the negative, and said that the Russians had actually sent to Spain not planes manufactured in Russia on American models but planesevery part of which had been manufactured in America. That explained the excellent performance of those particular planes. All his information was to the effect that planes actually manufactured in Russia copying American models were of such inferior workmanship that they could not compare with planes actually built in America. Furthermore, this wastrue with regard to all Soviet industrial products. They might turn out five thousand tractors in a year but it was extremely improbable that a single one of those tractors would be running two years after it had been put in use. Furthermore, the service of supply of the Russian Army today was in as lamentablecondition as it had been in the time of the Czar. In the time of the Czarthe Russian Armies at the front were frequently without food or munitions. The service of supply then had been controlled largely by Jews. It was still controll largely by Jews and, if the Soviet Union should attempt to make war on the European frontier, he would expect a complete

H1237-0030

collapse of the Soviet Armies because of bad organization. He did not think that today there was the faintest change of the Soviet Union attempting any offensive operations on the European frontier.

Goering said that he believed the Soviet Army in the Far East was better organized than the Soviet Army on the European frontier; but he felt confident that in spite of the increasing weakness of Japan, the Soviet Union would not dare to intervene in the Sino-Japanese conflict. He then said that the Japanese Army had shown itself to be considerably weaker than expected and that the Chinese, with totally inadequate weapons, had made a very fine defense due in part, he felt, to the presence of German staff officers with the Chinese armies.

Goering then said that he was surprised to learn that the United States was building battleships which could not possibly pass through the Panama Canal. I replied that I believed his statement was entirely erroneous. He said that he could not admit this; that his information was positive. The newest American battleships could not possibly go through the Panama Canal. I told him that we would have to disagree on this point. He then said that no matter whether we could put our new battleships through the Canal or not, we could do nothing in the Far East to interfere in any way with Japan.

I was indiscreet enough to remark that the combined American and British fleets might be powerful enough to do something although neither Great Britain nor the United States had any desire for conflict with Japan. Goering replied, "You know that the British Fleet can not operate anywhere at the present time. It is completely pinned down by ourselves in the North Sea and by the Italians in the Mediterranean."

Goering then said that he hoped I realized there was an intense desire on the part of the German Government to develop better relations with the United States and on this note, pleasantly, our conversation ended.

H1237-0031

COPY OF DOCUMENT NO. L-151

Enclosure No. 6 to Despatch No. 1267 of
November 23, 1937, from the Embassy at Paris.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN AMBASSADOR BULLITT AND GENERAL HERMANN GOERING

I said to General Goering as soon as I met him that I should be extremely glad to have his ideas on the prospects of peace and war in Europe and that I wished he would begin by telling me what he thought of Germany's relations with France.

Goering said that there was no direct conflict whatsoever today between Germany and France. Germany had given up entirely and forever the idea of regaining Alsace-Lorraine. Germany had learned through long experience that the people of Alsace and Lorraine would inevitably be against whichever of the two countries happened to have the sovereignty over Alsace-Lorraine at the moment and would be permanently a source of discord within the country to which they were attached. Germany did not desire to have any half-loyal citizens and, therefore, had not the slightest desire for a return of Alsace-Lorraine to the German Reich.

In addition, the economic systems of France and Germany were completely complementary. It should be possible to develop to a much greater extent the exchange of all sorts of products between France and Germany.

Furthermore, the French had contributed so much to the culture of Germany and the Germans had contributed so much to the culture of France that as two civilized peoples who lived side by side they had a deep underlying esteem for each other. Furthermore, the French and the Germans respected each other as brave soldiers and courageous peoples who were ready to die for their respective countries. In addition, the French Government had indicated that it was prepared insofar as it was concerned, to return the German colonies which had been transferred to France by the Treaty of Versailles. There was, unfortunately, the proviso that France would only take this action if Great Britain were prepared to make a similar concession.

There was, therefore, no cause of discord whatsoever in the direct relations between France and Germany to prevent the closest sort of friendship between the two countries. So far as Germany was concerned, he could say with authority that Germany today was prepared to conclude at once an offensive and defensive alliance with France.

The sole source of friction between Germany and France was the refusal of France to permit Germany to achieve certain vital national necessities. If France, instead of accepting a collaboration with Germany, should continue to follow a policy of building up alliances in Eastern Europe to prevent Germany from the achievement of her legitimate aims it was obvious that there would be conflict between France and Germany.

I asked Goering what aims especially he had in mind. He replied, "We are determined to join to the German Reich all Germans who are contiguous to the Reich and are divided from the great body of the German race merely by the artificial barriers imposed by the Treaty of Versailles."

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I asked Goering if he meant that Germany was absolutely determined to annex Austria to the Reich. He replied that this was an absolute determination of the German Government. The German Government at the present time was not pressing this matter because of certain momentary political considerations, especially in their relations with Italy; but Germany would tolerate no solution of the Austrian question other than the consolidation of Austria in the German Reich. He then added a statement which went further than any I have heard on this subject. He said, "There are schemes being pushed now for a union of Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia either with or without a Hapsburg at the head of the unit. Such a solution is absolutely inacceptable to us, and for us the conclusion of such an agreement would be an immediate casus belli." (Goering used the Latin expression casus belli. It is not a translation from the German, in which our conversation was carried on.)

I asked Goering if the German Government was as decided in its views with regard to the Germans in Bohemia as it was with regard to Austria. He replied that there could be only one final solution of this question. The Sudeten Germans must enter the German Reich as all other Germans who lived contiguous to the Reich.

I asked if the German Government might not be content if the Czech Government should accord to the Germans of Bohemia a large measure of local autonomy while keeping them under Czech sovereignty. Goering replied that such a concession on the part of the Czechoslovak Government would lead to a temporary appeasement of the situation; but the autonomy would have to be real autonomy and such a solution would not be a final solution. There could be no final solution but the inclusion of these Germans within the Reich.

I asked Goering how he viewed the case of the Germans in other portions of Europe; notably the Germans of Transylvania. He replied that these racial groups were cut off from the main body of the German people and could not, therefore, be joined to it. All that Germany would insist upon would be that they should be treated as equals with equal rights and be permitted to retain their cultural life. The situation of the Germans in Transylvania was extremely unsatisfactory. On the other hand, the Yugoslavs had treated the Germans within their borders with such conspicuous intelligence and fairness that the leaders of the Germans of Yugoslavia had informed him recently that they had no real grievances and that they would resist to the utmost any arrangements in Europe which might envisage their return to Hungary.

Goering then added that the only other two considerable German racial groups which would lie outside the borders of the German Reich, after the Germans of Austria and Bohemia had been included, would be the Germans of the South Tyrol who were now in the hands of Italy and the Germans in Poland. He did not feel that there was a sufficient number of Germans in Italy to warrant a major war for their attachment to the Reich. Similarly the Germans of Poland would have to stay where they were because there were a considerable number of Poles in Germany and all that either Poland or Germany could expect would be that these minorities should be treated on each side of the border with the greatest human consideration.

Goering went on to say that the idea that Germany had any ambitions to annex the Ukraine was pure nonsense. I suggested that one of the reasons it was nonsense was that it would involve first the conquest of Poland and then the conquest of the whole of Central Europe before it could become realizable.

Goering replied that this was so and that in addition Germany had no desire to have territory in Europe except territory inhabited by Germans.

I thanked Goering for giving me such a clear expression of Germany's intentions with regard to the Continent and asked him if he would pass on to the colonial field.

Goering said that Germany's demands in the colonial field were well known. They were for a return of the German colonies which had been taken away from Germany by the Treaty of Versailles. Germany had no right to demand anything but these colonies. On the other hand, Germany had no desire to be stiff-necked about this matter. If England should not wish to return German East Africa or German Southwest Africa, for military and other reasons, Germany would make no objection if England could make an arrangement, financial or otherwise, with Portugal and Belgium for the giving to Germany of Portuguese and Belgian colonies in West Africa which would compensate Germany for the loss of her East African possessions. It was idle to say that Germany could not get raw materials of great value from African colonies; for example, the Cameroons. It was entirely true that today the Cameroons had been very little developed and were producing very little, but with German intelligence and energy applied to them, they could be made to produce materials of the greatest value to Germany. The same was true of many other areas in Africa which today were undeveloped or under-developed. The essential problem for Germany was to feed and maintain her people at a decent standard of living. It was entirely clear that with the increase of population in Germany the soil now in the hands of Germany would be insufficient to maintain this increasing German population. Before the war, when barriers to international trade had been low, it had been possible for Germany to maintain herself by her great international trade. Today barriers were so high that this would soon become impossible. He hoped that there might be a reduction of such barriers and that Germany could find increasing markets for her products but she could not feel safe unless she had a colonial domain which would give her access to her own raw materials.

Goering then went on to say that he deplored greatly the present state of trade relations between Germany and the United States. The trade between the two countries was ceasing to be of any importance which was contrary to all reason. Indeed, Germany was almost isolated from the United States. There were certain countries with which Germany had good relations; and certain countries with which Germany had bad relations; but with the United States, Germany had no relations at all. He then asked me why I believed there was such hostility to Germany in the United States.

I replied that there were many sources of this hostility. All Americans were devoted to the ideal of democracy. There had been a democratic government in Germany, or at least the semblance of a democratic government, which had been destroyed and replaced by Nazi dictatorship. Any governing group which destroyed democracy to replace it by dictatorship would always be unpopular in the United States. Furthermore, the German Government had at the same time attacked with the utmost violence the Jews, the Catholic

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Church and the Protestant Church. The reaction in America among Protestants, Catholics and Jews had, therefore, been natural, immediate, and intense.

Goering then protested, saying that he was informed that people in the United States believed that the National Socialist Government was attempting to set up a heathen church in Germany. I replied that this was so. He said that it was true that within the Nazi Government there was a small group of people who desired to see a return to the Norse gods, but he could assure me that this movement was completely without importance and did not include more than one percent of the Nazi Party. So far as he, himself, was concerned, he was a Protestant and still attended church services. He had been to church recently on the occasion of the confirmation of his nephew. He thought that the violence of the reaction in the United States probably was due to the Jews. I replied that in some measure it was due to the Jews as was only natural, but that it was not only the Jews but all Americans who were shocked and horrified by the treatment of the Jews in Germany and that the attacks on the Catholic Church and the Protestant Church and on democracy and human freedom were factors of equal importance.

I then added that there was an additional element which was playing a certain role at the moment. It appeared that the Nazi Government was engaged in forming Nazi organizations in the United States. Neither the Government nor the people of the United States could tolerate the formation on their soil of any national group or other group directed by any foreign country. We could not permit Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini or any other dictator to organize groups of agents in the United States. If we should do so, we would soon cease to be a nation and become a mere battleground for the conflicting ambitions of foreign dictators.

Goering said that he considered this entirely reasonable and understandable and if he were an American would certainly not tolerate the slightest interference by any foreign agency in the life of the United States. The German Government had forbidden any German citizen to participate in any way in the formation of such groups. He believed that I would find that such groups were formed by American citizens of German origin. I replied that I felt quite certain that such groups would not be formed without the approval and desire of the German Government. Goering then said: "It is true that certain persons in our Government here believe that we should attempt to organize the Germans, especially of the Middle West, because they feel that if if Germany should again become involved in war with France and England, there would come a moment when the United States might again consider entering such a war against Germany and they believe that such groups of organized Germans in the United States might throw their influence decisively against a declaration of war and might prevent the United States entering such a conflict.

I then said that I could merely remind him of two things: The first, that the organization of German groups in the United States during the late war had aroused hostility throughout the entire country against Germany. The second, a conversation which had taken place during the World War between our Ambassador to Germany, Mr. James Gerard and Zimmerman, who was Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Reich at that time. Zimmerman had stated to Gerard that the United States could not enter the war because there were five million Germans in the United States who would prevent by force, if necessary, any such action. Mr. Gerard had replied that if there were five million

H1237-0035

Germans in the United States who would prevent by force, if necessary, any such action, there were five million and one lamp posts. Goering did not seem to get the point with absolute clarity. I, therefore, added, "and you will understand that, if, as you have said, there are six million Germans in the United States today, who could be organized to influence the action of the United States Government, there are a great many more than six million tree limbs on which to hang them."

Goering seemed to find this remark entirely reasonable and in a more friendly and intimate tone asked, "What then can we do to improve our relations with the United States?" I replied that he had an excellent ambassador in Washington at the moment who could doubtless inform him better than I could on this subject.

I then asked Goering for his views with regard to the Far East. He said that he believed the Japanese would win the war and succeed in imposing on China precisely what they should desire to impose. I asked Goering if he knew precisely what that was. He said that he believed that the Japanese aim was to organize the Northern Provinces of China thoroughly as a base from which to attack the Soviet Union, since it was obvious that Japan would be compelled to attack the Soviet Union owing to the geographic position of Vladivostok. The Japanese desired to have Central and South China in relative chaos and impotence until they had finished with the Soviet Union.

At this point, Goering asked me why the United States had begun to build battleships for the Soviet Union. I replied that I had no information to the effect that the American Government was building battleships for the Soviet Union and I considered such a report highly improbable. Goering said that his information indeed was rather vague on this point.

I asked him what his views were with regard to the Soviet Union at the present time. He said that in his opinion the Red Army on the European frontier had ceased to be a serious fighting force if indeed it had ever been one. He said that the reports of the prowess of Soviet aviation in Spain were extraordinarily misleading. German officers in Spain had analyzed in detail the debris of all Soviet planes that had been shot down behind Franco's lines. They had discovered that every Soviet plane which had flown with conspicuous success in Spain had been of American manufacture. I asked him if he meant manufactured in Russia on American models. He replied in the negative, and said that the Russians had actually sent to Spain not planes manufactured in Russia on American models but planesevery part of which had been manufactured in America. That explained the excellent performance of those particular planes. All his information was to the effect that planes actually manufactured in Russia copying American models were of such inferior workmanship that they could not compare with planes actually built in America. Furthermore, this wastrue with regard to all Soviet industrial products. They might turn out five thousand tractors in a year but it was extremely improbable that a single one of those tractors would be running two years after it had been put in use. Furthermore, the service of supply of the Russian Army today was in as lamentablecondition as it had been in the time of the Czar. In the time of the Czarthe Russian Armies at the front were frequently without food or munitions. The service of supply then had been controlled largely by Jews. It was still controll largely by Jews and, if the Soviet Union should attempt to make war on the European frontier, he would expect a complete

collapse of the Soviet Armies because of bad organization. He did not think that today there was the faintest change of the Soviet Union attempting any offensive operations on the European frontier.

Goering said that he believed the Soviet Army in the Far East was better organized than the Soviet Army on the European frontier; but he felt confident that in spite of the increasing weakness of Japan, the Soviet Union would not dare to intervene in the Sino-Japanese conflict. He then said that the Japanese Army had shown itself to be considerably weaker than expected and that the Chinese, with totally inadequate weapons, had made a very fine defense due in part, he felt, to the presence of German staff officers with the Chinese armies.

Goering then said that he was surprised to learn that the United States was building battleships which could not possibly pass through the Panama Canal. I replied that I believed his statement was entirely erroneous. He said that he could not admit this; that his information was positive. The newest American battleships could not possibly go through the Panama Canal. I told him that we would have to disagree on this point. He then said that no matter whether we could put our new battleships through the Canal or not, we could do nothing in the Far East to interfere in any way with Japan.

I was indiscreet enough to remark that the combined American and British fleets might be powerful enough to do something although neither Great Britain nor the United States had any desire for conflict with Japan. Goering replied, "You know that the British Fleet can not operate anywhere at the present time. It is completely pinned down by ourselves in the North Sea and by the Italians in the Mediterranean."

Goering then said that he hoped I realized there was an intense desire on the part of the German Government to develop better relations with the United States and on this note, pleasantly, our conversation ended.

Copy of Document No. L-231

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM: GRA

Vienna

Dated March 13, 1938

Rec'd 11:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

75, March 13, 1 p.m.

Seyss-Inquart welcoming Hitler last night at Linz declared Article 88 St. Germane Treaty inoperative. Hitler highly emotional, expressed joy at having fulfilled his mission to "give back his dear homeland to the German Reich". He did not know on what date Austrians would be called but he hopes it was not a distant one. This event would prove to the world that any further attempt to dismember this people would be futile.

Associated Press and United Press telegraphed full text of Hitler's speech, summary Seyss-Inquart's.

WILEY

RR

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C91-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

11 Sept 1944
R/U/K 2500/44

To the
Reich's commissar for the Netherlands
Reich's minister Dr. SEYSS-INQUART

Subject: Removal of the library of the social institute of Amsterdam

Dear esteemed Party member Dr. Seyss-Inquart!

The development of the military situation in the West has caused me to instruct my special purpose staff in Amsterdam, to remove the library of the social institute there, to the Reich by the quickest way. However, great difficulties have arisen to that effect due to the proximity of the front lines. I have therefore put at the disposal of the Chief of my main work division Netherlands, SS Major Schmidt-Staehler, the special purpose chief Gummert with full powers for the execution of this task. Since this library is mainly composed of a unique collection of the writings of the European Marxism, it is therefore irreplaceable for our ideological-political struggle.

I request therefore sincerely from you to be of assistance to my deputies Schmidt-Staehler and Gummert, with your authority as Reich's commissar for the Netherlands, in case the difficulties arising by the removal of the library cannot be surmounted by them.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT [illegible]
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Exhibit USA 707
Filed Jan. 16, 1946

REPORT

On the activities of the Einsatzstab of the Bureau of the Reichsleiter Rosenberg in the occupied Western Territories and The Netherlands.

Working Group Netherland

The Working Group Netherland of the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg began its work in agreement with the competent representative of the Reichskommissar during the first days of September, 1940. The execution of the past, conforming with the Fuhrer's orders, coordinated itself with the liquidation, that is confiscation, according to civil law, of the various subversive institutions--as set forth in the circulars of the OKW(A2 Nr.2850/40g Adj. Chef OKW), dated 5 July 1940, and of the Chief of the OKW to the Commander in Chief of the Wehrmacht in France(2 f 28.14WZ Nr. 3812/40g) dated 17 September 1940, as well as to the Commander in Chief of the OKW in the Netherlands.(Az 2 f 28 J(IA) Nr. 1338/40g) dated 30 October 1940. The screening of the material of the various Masonic lodges was taken care of primarily, and the library and the archives of the following lodges were sifted and all useful material was packed.

Droit Humain	(Lodge "v. Volmaking")	Amsterdam
" "	(Lodge "George Martin II")	"
" "	(Lodge "Nr. 4")	"
" "	(Lodge "Washington Nr.53")	"
" "	(Lodge "Hiram Abif")	"
" "	(Lodge "Eenheid")	"
" "	(Lodge "De drie zuilen")	"
" "	(Lodge "George Martin I")	Den Haag
" "	(Lodge "St. Germain")	" "
" "	(Lodge "v. Volmaking")	" "

Groot Oosten der Nederlande	(Lodge"Jacob vanCampen")	Amersfoort
" " " "	(Lodge"La Bien Aimee")	Amsterdam
" " " "	(Lodge"La Charite")	Amsterdam
" " " "	(Lodge"La Paix")	Amsterdam
" " " "	(Lodge"Concordia V.A.")	Amsterdam
" " " "	(Lodge"Willem Frederik")	Amsterdam
" " " "	(Lodge"Post Nobila Lux")	Amsterdam
" " " "	(Lodge"Nos Vincit Libertas")	Amsterdam
" " " "	(Lodge"Eendracht")	Amsterdam
" " " "	(Lodge"De Gelderscne Broederschap")	Arnhem
" " " "	(Lodge"In Vrijheid Een")	Bussum
" " " "	(Lodge"Silentium")	Delft
" " " "	(Lodge"L'Union Royale")	Den Haag.
" " " "	(Lodge"Hiram Abiff")	" "
" " " "	(Lodge"L'Union Frederic)	" "
" " " "	(Lodge"Groot Nederland")	" "
" " " "	(Lodge"De Oude Plichten)	" "
" " " "	(Lodge"L'Union Provinciale")	Groningen
" " " "	(Lodge"Vincit Vim Virtus)	Haarlem
" " " "	(Lodge"Kennermerland")	"
" " " "	(Lodge"Ad Lucem et Pacem)	"
" " " "	(Lodge"Willem Frederic Karel")	Den Helder
" " " "	(Lodge"De Gooische Broederschap")	Hilversum
" " " "	(Lodge"La Vertu")	Leiden
" " " "	(Lodge"Sint Lodewijk")	Nijmegen
" " " "	(Lodge"De drie Kolommen)	Rotterdam
" " " "	(Lodge"Frederic Royal")	Rotterdam
" " " "	(Lodge"Acacia")	Rotterdam
" " " "	(Lodge"Concordia")	Rotterdam
" " " "	(Lodge"Ultrajectina")	Utrecht
" " " "	(Lodge"Anna Paulowna")	Zaandam

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I.O.O.F.	(Victorie-Lodge No.50)Alkmaar
" " " "	(Paradijs-Lodge No.1)Amsterdam
" " " "	(Mount-Sinai-LodgeNO.2)Amsterdam
" " " "	(Ware Bataven-LogeNo.4)Amsterdam
" " " "	(Concordia-Lodge No.5)Amsterdam
" " " "	(Amstel-Lodge No.12)Amsterdam
" " " "	(Spinoza-Lodge No.13)Amsterdam
" " " "	(Eensgezindheids-Lodge No.17)Amsterdam
" " " "	(Patria-Lodge No.26)Amsterdam
" " " "	(Excelsior-Lodge No.32)Amsterdam
" " " "	(Broederschaps-Lodge No.47)Amsterdam
" " " "	(Wilson-Lodge No.51)Amsterdam
" " " "	(Mozart-Lodge No.55)Amsterdam
" " " "	(Rebekkah-Lodge "Hollandia"No.1)Amsterdam
" " " "	(Gooische Lodge No.28)Bussum
" " " "	(Humanitas-LodgeNO.23)Den Haag.
" " " "	(Charitas-Lodge No.24)Den Haag
" " " "	(Fidelitas-LodgeNo.53)Den Haag
" " " "	(Rebekkah-Lodge"Acacia" No.3)Den Haag
" " " "	(Rebekkah-Lodge"Vrede" No.4)Den Haag
" " " "	(Drie Schakels Lodge No.7)Groningen
" " " "	(St. Maarten-Lodge No.15)Groningen
" " " "	(St. Maarten-Lodge No. 15)Groningen
" " " "	(Kennemer-Lodge No.27)Haarlem
" " " "	(Eem-Lodge No.36)Hilversum
" " " "	(Sleutel-Lodge No.57)Leiden
" " " "	(Maas-Lodge No. 16)Rotterdam
" " " "	(Luctor et Emergo Lodge no. 48)Rotterdam
" " " "	(Rebekkah-Lodge "Omhoog" Nor.2)Rotterdam
" " " "	(Sic Semper-Lodge No. 43)Utrecht
" " " "	(Amicitia-Lodge No.54)Utrecht
" " " "	(Rebekkah-Lodge "Tolerantia")Utrecht
" " " "	(Zaan-Lodge No.20)Zaandam
" " " "	(Harmonie-Lodge No.38)Zaandam
" " " "	(Czaar-Peter-Club)Zaandam
" " " "	(Rebekkah-Lodge "Humanite"No.5)Zaandam
Rotary Club	(Rotary Club No. 3521)Alkmaar
" "	(Rotary Club No. 3533)Amersfoort
" "	(Rotary Club No. 1336)Amsterdam
" "	(Rotary Club No. 3233)Arnhem
" "	(Rotary Club No. 5180)Bussum
" "	(Rotary Club No. 4079)Delft
" "	(Rotary Club No. 1919)Den Haag.
" "	(Rotary Club No. 3013)Groningen
" "	(Rotary Club No. 2299)Haarlem
" "	(Rotary Club No. 2943)Hilversum
" "	(Rotary Club No. 2386)Leiden
" "	(Rotary Club No. 3467)Nijmegen
" "	(Rotary Club No. 1879)Rotterdam
" "	(Rotary Club No. 1481)Utrecht
" "	(Rotary Club No. 4721)Zaandam.

All together 470 cases combining material from the a ore mentioned lodges and from organizations of a similar status were packed and transported to Germany. Furthermore, everything the temple of the lodge in Nijmegen and the temple of the I.O.O.F. in Haarlem contained, was sent to Germany. Also, Steel-shelves for about 30,000 books were taken from the building belonging to the Grooten Oosten in Den Haag where they has so far been used for the Bibliotheka Klossiana, containing parts of one library of the Grooten Oosten, and the library of the Vrijmetselar-Stichting, Amsterdam, are of great value. And so are the archives of the Grooten Oosten

in Den Haag, containing all the historical documents of the lodges affiliated with the Grooten Oosten.

To estimate the value of the Bibliotheka Klossiana, containing many rare pieces, it is to be remembered that in 1930 the Grooten Oosten der Nederlande was offered $5,000,000 for the Bibliotheka Klossiana by Freemasous in the U.S.

A particularly valuable discovery was made by the working group searching the altars in the building of the Grooten Oosten in Den Haag. The Master-Hammer of the Grooten Oosten, Made of pure gold, with which some of its members had presented to the Grooten Oosten on its 60th Anniversary, fell into our hands. It is a piece of high quality whose money-value alone is estimated to be 3,000 Reichsmark.

The Working Group took over the International Institute for Social History in Amsterdam with its library and archives, boxes of extraordinary value. It seems that this institute was founded in 1934 with the intention of creating a center of intellectual resistance against National Socialism. Its employees were mainly Jewish refugees from Germany. The contents of its library and its archives with many very valuable items were brought together from all over the world. In the library, there are about 160,000 volumes, though most of them will have to be catalogued. Of particular interest is the German, French and Russian Department. According to the decision made by Reichsleiter Rosenberg, the Institute was taken over in its entity. A member of the Dienstelle was nominated as director of the Institute--he, together with his collaborators will arrange the books, catalogue the scientific material and get the Institute ready for the work of the Party. What may be said already is that the scientific value of the library and the archives is that they contain a complete collection of material on the social and socialist movements in certain countries.

The libraries of the Societas Spinozana in Den Haag and of the Spinoza-House in Rijnsburg also were packed. Packed in 18 cases, they, too, contain extremely valuable early works of great importance for the exploration of the Spinoza problem. Not without reason did the Director of the Societas Spinozana try, under false pretenses which we uncovered, to withhold the library from us.

Then the library of the Alliance Francaise, Den Haag, was packed(6 cases) as well as the German publication of the refugee-publishers Aller de Lange, Querido, Fischer-Beerman, Forum-Zeek, of the Kultura Bookshop and the publications of the Pegasus-Verlag, all in Amsterdam, a total of 17 cases. After that,the Working Group concentrated on packing the newspaper and magazine stocks of the International Institute for Social History. The very exclusive racks which had been brought together from all over the world were kept at the Institute in complete disorder and left to self-destruction; they were properly packed into 776 cases and stored, for the time being, in the Working Group's storehouses. It is very strongly suggested that these newspaper and magazines be bound and the volumes be put up in proper librairies as fast as possible;otherwise, an irreparabe loss will be the result since these newspapers and magazines are from all over the world.

A large unknown amount of material classified as "Enemy Goods" and coming from the so called "Overseas-Gifts", that is; household goods of Jewish refugees, is falling into our hands daily. These gifts are being kept at the so-called "House in Holland", and so far 43 cases were packed there, including the private library of the former Minister of the Eisner-Government, Neurath.

In agreement with the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht in the Netherlands, all libraries in houses of Jewish refugees and confiscated by the Wehrmacht, are being turned over to the Working Group. So far, the library of the Jew De Cat in Haarlem was packed into 4 cases.

An extremely valuable library, containing inestimable works on Sanskrit, was confiscated when the Theosophischen Society in Amsterdam was dissolved, and packed into 96 cases.

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A number of smaller librairies belonging tothe Spiritists, he Esperanto Movement, the Bellamy Movement, the International tlical Research and various other minor international organizatio re packed into 7 cases;texts belonging to various minor Jewish rganizations were packed into 4 cases, and a library of the Anthrop saphic Society in Amsterdam into three.

It is safe to say that the racks of books confiscated, packed nd so far sent to Germany by the Working Group are of extraordinary scientific value and shall contribute an integral part of the library of the"Hohe Schule". The money-value of these libraries, as shown in the case of the "Klossiana", can only be estimated, but surely mount to 30-40,000,000Reichsmark.

For the coming months, action is planned on the following, enumerated here in chronological order:

1.)The libraries of the Theosophic Society and similar organizations in Den Haag, Rotterdam and several other places.

2.)Continuous sifting of objects confiscated in the "House in Holland" and other buildings.

3.)Screening of several archives with Press-photos, consisting altogether of 2.6 million pictures which shall be turned over to us by the Reichskommissariat.

4.)The Jewish private libraries in Amsterdam, particularly:

A.)The Israelite Library Beth-Hamidrasch Etz Chaim, Amsterdam, Rapenburgerstraat 109. This library, founded in 1740, contains about 4,000 volumes, particularly Jewish theology.

B.)Library of the Netherland Isrealite Seminar, Amsterdam, Rapenburgerstraat 177. It contains 4,300 volumes of Hebraica and 3,000 volumes Judaica. At the time, it took over the library of the Jewish Society for Literature, Thoelet(1830-1837) and valuable Jewish private collections. Amongst other things, it contains precious old prints from the years 1480 to 1560 and some manuscripts.

C.)The Portuguese-Israelite Seminar, Amsterdam, Jonas Daniel Meyerplein 5. There are 25,000 volumes, 450 manuscripts, 600 Prints(Inkunablen) and numerous Exlibris, coins and the like nad the famous material on Talmud Literature.

D.)The so-called Rosentaliana, primarily a foundation by the Jew Rosenthal from Hannover. From there, it was at the time transferred and affiliated with the local university liibrary.In the meantime, it has on account of donations, grown considerably. Technically, it belongs to the Municipality of Amsterdam, but in the Catalogue of Libraries in the Netherlands of 1931, it is designated as "Private". According to the catalogue, it contains 25,000 volumes and 300 manuscripts. However, the amount of volumes reached 100,000 indeed.

The libraries mentioned under 4.) ought to be of particular interest for the history of Western Europe. It is very likely that hitherto unknown facts may be brought into the open, on the era of Cromwell and that of the glorious Revolution of 1688 and the resulting personal anion between England and the Netherlands. In particular, light may be thrown on Cromwell's attitude towards the Jews, possibly even on the Jewish influence on the developemnt of the Secret Service.

The temple and the museum of the Grooten Oosten der Nederlande. At present, both are needed for exhibitions on behalf of the Dienststelle of the Reichskommissar. With the end of the exhibition temple furnishings and museum shall be turned over to us.

A very conservative estimate of the value of the objects enumerated in 1.) to 5.) may be about three times as much as that of the libraries already packed. Therefore, it is safeto say that the Library of the Hohe Schule shall, with very little effort, receive an extraordinary amount of treasures which shall give it a unique position in the realm of questions regarding Judaism and Free-Masonism.

H1237-0043

The Working Group, in executing the afore-mentioned tasks, is bound strictly to the pace set by the Reichskommissar for the handling of the Jewish questions and that of the international or ganizations. This pace again is determined by the political evolution which is tqking shape according to decisions made on a higher level, and which must not be hampered by individual acts. Work that has been authorized to be done by the Working Group, ut has not yet been accomplished should now, with twice as much personnel as before, be finished within 2 to 3 months. It may be mentioned that the Working Group has been working over-time for weeks now, and also is working, as is done on the battlefield, on Sundays.

The leader of the Working Group
Netherland.

Schimmer

Oberbereichsleiter.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 176-PS

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt. Inf. 0-133 55 67 hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the attached is a true and correct translation of Document 176-PS

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt. Inf.
0-133 55 67

H1237-0044

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 437-PS(Extract)
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Extract from report of Hans Frank to Hitler re situation in Poland, dated 19 June 1943 - Pages 10 and 11.

. . . . . .

In the course of time, a series of measures or of consequences of the German rule have led to a substantial deterioration of the attitude of the entire Polish people in the General Gouvernement. These measures have affected either individual professions or the entire population and frequently also - often with crushing severity - the fate of individuals.

Among these are in particular:

1 - The entirely insufficient nourishment of the population, mainly of the working classes in the cities, whose majority is working for German interests.

Until the war in 1939, its food supplies, though not varied, were sufficient and generally secure, due to the agrarian surplus of the former Polish state and in spite of the negligence on the part of their former political leadership.

2 - The confiscation of a great part of the Polish estates and the expropriation without compensation and resettlement of Polish peasants from manoeuvre areas and from German settlements.

3 - Encroachments and confiscations in the industries, in commerce and trade and in the field of private property.

4 - Mass arrests and mass shootings by the German police who applied the system of collective responsibility.

5 - The rigorous methods of recruiting workers.

6 - The extensive paralyzation of cultural life.

7 - The closing of high schools, junior colleges and universities.

8 - The limitation, indeed the complete elimination of Polish influence from all spheres of State administration.

9 - Curtailment of the influence of the Catholic Church, limiting its extensive influence - an undoubtedly necessary move - and, in addition, until quite recently, the closing and confiscation of monasteries, schools and charitable institutions.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 437-PS

13 October 1945.

I, Max P. SCHOTTENHAMEL, Civilian, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpt from Document 437-PS.

MAX P. SCHOTTENHAMEL
Civilian.

812-PS

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 812-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(Cont.)

Copy.

Salzburg, 6 July 1939

To the
Reich Commissar Gauleiter Josef BUERCKEL

Vienna I
Parliament

Dear Party Member BUERCKEL!

Soon after taking over in Austria, Klausner, Globocnik, and I flew to Berlin to report to Hitler's deputy, Hess, about the events which led to our taking over the government. We did this because we had the impression that the general opinion, perhaps also Hitler's own, was that the liberation depended more on Austrian matters of state rather than the party. To be more exact, Hitler especially mentioned Dr. Seyss-Inquart alone; and public opinion gave him alone credit for the change and thus believed him to have played the sole leading role.

This conception does not, however, correspond to the true proportions of powers and to the conditions of leadership which were completely clear until 12 March 1938. At that time I gave a short report in Klausner's behalf to the deputy of Hitler and also submitted a short summary of the developments since 1934. I made no single copy of this. I did not take part in further actions of this kind since they seemed to me to be too much connected with personal feelings. I think the main reason for the fact that the person of Dr. Seyss-Inquart seemed to Hitler and to public opinion to have stepped in the limelight in those March days, was that no position existed in the party from which one might have presented oneself to the public; and that there was no man who had the guts to let himself be presented. The actual reason was that the party leadership had to remain secret during the whole illegal fight, secret even from the Reich German public. He who wanted to direct correctly the political battle of the Austrian nazism had to forego public fame. Leopold did not want to forego that and made such decisive political mistakes that his recall became necessary. The person of Klausner never longed for fame and was therefore not suitable to appear gloriously after the taking over of power. The two powers behind Klausner - I consider the dynamic part of Globocnik and the political part of myself - were bound from the beginning, as collaborators of Klausner's, to put him to the fore.

We saw in March and April how a false picture about the actual leadership conditions developed from this fact which could not be corrected inspite of our attemots to that effect. This was an important factor for the varying moods of Globocnik who hoped especially from you that you would emphasize for Hitler and also for the public the role of the party during the events preceding 12 March 1938. I limited myself to address this verbal and written declaration to party member Hess, and furthermore to secure the documents from the March days. In addition, I spoke at every available opportunity about the fight of the party. I did not undertake steps to give just credit to other persons for the glory which was excessively ascribed to one person, Dr. Seyss-Inquart; and I would not do that, primarily because I appear as a beneficiary, and furthermore because I believe that I would not gladden Hitler by doing so. I am also convinced that Dr. Seyss-Inquart did not act crookedly, and furthermore that Hitler does not want to commit an act of historical justice by special preference of his person, but that he is attracted to him personally. It really is of no great account to Hitler if this or that person was more or less meritorious, in this sector of the great fight of the movement. Because, in the last analysis, by far

H1237-0045

the greatest part is to be ascribed only to him; he alone will be considered by history as the liberator of Austria. I, therefore, considered it best to accept existing conditions and look for new fertile fields of endeavor in the party.

If I should be asked to describe - without personal interest - the role of the party according to my best conviction, I am ready to do so at any time. For this reason I promised yesterday to submit to you again a short summary, and to make it available for your confidential use. Of this letter and of this abbreviated description I retain the sole copy.

Heil Hitler!

Rainer e.h.

1 Enclosure

C O P Y.

(Report given on the 6th July 1939 by Rainer to Buerkel on the events in the N.S.D.A.P. of Austria from ..... to 11th of March 1938 (Anschluss)).

Report on the events in the N.S.D.A.P. of Austria since the beginning of the last stage of battle until the seizure of power on the 11th March 1938.

- -

In 1933 the Party fought a parliamentary battle. By the seizure of power in the Reich it gained considerably in numbers. It started to try to enforce new elections in order to gain admission into the government. By these means it should have taken over the government. The enemies recognized this fact, and the Government Dollfuss proceeded, while tolerating the reds, to force the N.S.D.A.P. from its legal plane in order to render it innocuous. In this the government used legal tricks, thereby practically doing away progressively with the democratic constitution. The first attempts of the government were answered by the Party with an increase of pressure; and the government's breaches of constitution were answered by arbitrary acts with the assumption that it might thus be able to overthrow the government. This assumption was wrong; at that time the government had the backing of all anti-German foreign countries, and it felt sufficiently strong to prohibit the N.S.D.A.P., and confession of adherance to the N.S.D.A.P., and subsequently to treat as high treason the confession in favor of the "Anschluss".

Thus the first stage of battle commenced which ended with the July rising of 1934. The decision for the July rising was right, the execution of it was faulty. The result was a complete destruction of the organization; the loss of entire groups of fighters through imprisonment or flight into the "Alt-Reich"; and with regard to the political relationship of Germany to Austria, a formal acknowledgement of the existence of the Austrian State by the German Government. With the telegram to PAPEN, instructing him to reinstitute normal relationships between the two states, the Fuehrer had liquidated the first stage of the battle; and a new method of political penetration was to begin. By order of the Fuehrer the Landesleitung Munich was dissolved, and the party in Austria was left to its own resources.

There was no acknowledged leader for the entire party in Austria. New leaderships were forming in the nine Gaus. The process was again and again interrupted by the interference of the police; there was no liaison between the formations, and frequently there were two, three or more rival leaderships. The first evident, acknowledged speaker of almost all the Gaus in Autumn 1934 was engineer REINTHALLER (already appointed Landes-

H1237-0046

bauernfuehrer (leader of the country's farmers) by HESS)). He endeavoured to bring about a political appeasement by negotiations with the government, with the purpose of giving the N.S.D.A.P. legal status again, thus permitting its political activities,. Simultaneously Reinthaller started the reconstruction of the illegal political organization, at the head of which he had placed engineer NEUBACHER.

The first attempt to create a legal political organization which was to negotiate with the Government while a secret illegal organization existed, did not succeed; it brought about quarells in almost all Gaus and ended with pressure of the illegal branch against the policy of appeasement of REINTHALLER, and with the latters retirement as Landesleiter (country leader). The successor, NEUBACHER, head of the illegal organization, was not recognized by all the Gaus, because meanwhile the former Gauleader of Lower Austria, Captain LEOPOLD, was released from; and he claimed the country leadership because of his seniority in the party. In Carinthia at about that time, KLAUSNER with his collaborators GLOBOCNIK, RAINER, LONCHIN and PAWLOWSKI had reconstructed and readied the Gau Carinthia. The Gau Carinthia kept away from the quarells of the leaders, and arbitrated the differences between LEOPOLD and NEUBACHER, and finally effected a solution in such a way that NEUBACHER and his adherents recognized LEOPOLD as the country leader; and LEOPOLD appointed NEUBACHER to be his deputy. The points of friction between those two groups were not yet eliminated. Those differences did not remain concealed from the police; and the police got hold of a polemic by the group of Leopold against the group of Neubacher, on the strength of this material they arrested Leopold and Neubacher.

At that time the success of the calm attitude of the Gau Carinthia was crowned by the fact that after these arrests the representatives of all the Gaus came to Carinthia to offer KLAUSNER the country leadership. By order of Klausner Dr. Rainer reported at these conferences the political referendum and developed the political conception as adopted by the Gau Carinthia on the basis of which, as a matter of fact, an agreement was reached. In July 1935 KLAUSNER became the head of the movement without, however adopting the title of country leader because he considered it wrong as long as the country leader LEOPOLD was imprisoned, but he looked upon himself as the speaker of the college of Gauleaders. With the consent of the representatives of all the Gaus, KLAUSNER at that time appointed GLOBOCNIK as co-worker for the organizational part, and RAINER as co-worker for the political part of his task.

In August some further arrests took place, the victims of which were, apart from the Gauleaders, also Globocnik and Rainer. SCHATTENFROH then claimed, because of an instruction received from the imprisoned LEOPOLD, to have been made deputy country leader. A group led by engineer RAFFELSBERGER had at this time also established connections with departments of the Alt-Reich (Ministry of Propaganda, German Racial Agency, etc.) and made an attempt to formulate a political motto in the form of a program for the fighting movement of Austria. In Spring of 1936 SCHATTENFROH was arrested; he had named party member HINTERLEITNER of Linz as his successor as managerial country leader. In March KLAUSNER was arrested in connection with the arrest of about 60 leading Nazis, whereas Dr. RAINER was released. HINTERLEITNER again followed those directives which were set down at the conferences at Carinthia in the Spring of 1935; and in May 1936 he appointed RAINER, GLOBOCNIK and engineer HIEDLER to the country leadership in the following spheres of influence:-

Rainer to be chief of the political staff; HIEDLER as chief of the organization; and GLOBOCNIK as liaison officer with the Reich and as organizer of all the auxiliary bases outside of Austria.

H1237-0047

(Seal)
The Gauleiter

Salzburg, 22 Aug 1939
Chiemsee

Personal!

Only direct delivery!

To the

Reich Minister Dr. Arthur SEYSS-INQUART,

VIENNA I
Ballhausplatz 2

Dear Dr. Seyss:

I have received your letter of 19 August 1939 in which you asked me to inform you what I know of those matters, which, among others, are the subject of your correspondence with BUERCKEL.

I do not wish to discuss sundry talks and all that, what has been brought to my notice in the course of time by different people. I wish to clarify essentially my own attitude.

On the 5th of July 1939 I was asked by telephone by the Reich Commissioner Gauleader BUERCKEL if I was in possession of the memorandum of GLOBUS regarding the events of March. I told him that I do not have this memorandum and that I never possessed a single part of it, that I furthermore did not then participate in the matter and do not know its content. Because of official requests by BUERCKEL I have entrusted him with a report accompanied by a letter written on the 6th July.

If BUERCKEL now writes to you that certain statements were confirmed by me, I feel obliged to entrust you with a copy each of my copies of those two documents, which were only written in single originals. I shall specially inform Buerckel of this. I connect this with declaration, that I have given apart from those written explanations- confirmations, declarations, or criticisms whatsoever regarding you and your attitude, and that I have authorized nobody to refer to any statements of mine.

Since the beginning of our collaboration, I have always expressed and represented forcefully my ideas regarding yourself and my opinion of your personality. This conception of mine was the very basis of our collaboration. The events of February and March have not changed this, especially since I considered the political success of the 11th March merely as a confirmation of the intentions and convictions which have equally induced both of us to collaborate.

As far as GLOBUS is concerned you are fully aware of his species which I judged always and in every situation only by its good side. I believe that you already talked to Globus about the occurrences between the 11th of March 1938 and today; and I am convinced that he will tell you everything that is bothering him, if you will speak to him about this matter, as is your intention.

With the best regards and

H E I L H I T L E R !

Yours

signed: Friedl Rainer

2 enclosures.

H1237-0048

- -

CERTIFICATE OF PARTIAL TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 812-PS

21 November 1945.

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct partial translation of Document No. 812-PS.

ERNST M. COHN
Pfc, 33925738.

H1237-0049

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOC. 812/PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

COPY

EXTRACTS OF REPORT ON EVENTS IN THE NSDAP OF AUSTRIA FROM 1933 TO 11 MARCH 1938 (ANSCHLUSS). GIVEN BY RAINER TO REICHSKOMMISSAR GAULEITER BURCKEL ON 6 JULY 1939.

(pp. 5-6)

The principles of the construction of the organization were: The organization is the bearer of the illegal fight and the trustee of the idea to create a secret organization, in a simple manner and without compromise, according to the principle of organizing an elite to be available to the illegal land-party council upon any emergency. Besides this, all political opportunities should be taken and all legal people and legal chances should be used without revealing any ties with the illegal organization. Therefore, cooperation between the illegal party organization and the legal political aides was anchored at the top of the party leadership. All connections with the party in Germany were kept secret in accordance with the orders of the Führer. These said that the German state should officially be omitted from the creation of an Austrian NSDAP; and that auxiliary centers for propaganda, press, refugees, welfare, etc. should be established in the foreign countries bordering Austria.

Hinterleitner already contacted the lawyer Seyss-Inquart, who had connections with Dr. Wächter which originated from Seyss-Inquart's support of the July uprising. On the other side Seyss-Inquart had a good position in the legal field and especially well-established relations with Christian-Social politicians. Dr. Seyss-Inquart came from the ranks of the "Styrian Heimatschutz" and became a party member when the entire "Styrian Heimatschutz" was incorporated into the NSDAP. Another personality who had a good position in the legal field was Col. Glaise-Horstenau who had contacts with both sides. The agreement of 11 July 1936 was strongly influenced by the activities of these two persons. Papen mentioned Glaise-Horstenau to the Führer as being a trusted person.

At that time the Führer wished to see the leaders of the party in Austria in order to tell them his opinion on what Austrian National-Socialists should do. Meanwhile Hinterleitner was arrested, and Dr. Rainer became his successor and leader of the Austrian party. On 16 July 1936, Dr. Rainer and Globocnik visited the Führer at the "Obersalzburg" where they received a clear explanation of the situation and the wishes of the Führer. On 17 July 1936, all illegal Gauleiters met in Anif near Salzburg, where they received a complete report from Rainer on the statement of the Führer and his political instructions for carrying out the fight. At the same conference the Gauleiters received organizational instructions from Globocnik and Hiedler.

(pp. 7-10)

Upon the proposal of Globocnik, the Führer named Lt. Gen. (Gruppenführer) Keppler as chief of the mixed commission which was appointed, in accordance with the state treaty of 11 July 1936, to supervise the correct execution of the agreement. At the same time Keppler was given full authority by the Führer for the party in Austria. After Keppler was unsuccessful in his efforts to cooperate with Leopold, he worked together with Dr. Rainer, Globocnik, Reinthaller as leader of the peasants, Kaltenbrunner as leader of the SS, and Dr. Jury as deputy-leader of the Austrian party, as well as with Glaise-Horstenau and Seyss-Inquart.

Regarding internal conditions, it was clear that full recognition of the party leadership was given by Seyss-Inquart. He was also in permanent contact with Capt. Leopold, and there were never any serious conflicts between them . But he also acknowledged the correctness of Dr. Rainer's political interpretations, and the actual leadership of Dr. Rainer in all political actions. The situation was much the same with Glaise-Horstenau who was wholeheartedly for Rainer and Globocnik but always carefully guarded the legal party position of Leopold.

H1237-0050

Due to the cooperation of the above-mentioned people with group leader Keppler and other officials of the Reich and due to the activities of other covered contact-men in Austria, it was possible to obtain the appointment of Seyss-Inquart as "Staatsrat" (councillor of state) in July 1937. Due to the same facts, the Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg was forced to take a new so-called "satisfactory action." Through all this a new and stronger political position was won in the Austrian system. The National-Socialist Party became acceptable again in the political field and became a partner with whom one had to negotiate, even when it was not officially incorporated into internal Austrian political developments. This complicated political maneuver, accompanied by the steadily increasing pressure from the Reich, led to the talks between the Führer and Schuschnigg at the Obersalzberg. Here Gruppenführer Keppler presented the concrete political demands of the fighting underground movement, which he estimated according to his personal experiences and the information he received. The results of these talks were the right of a free acknowledgment of the National Socialist movement on the one hand, and the recognition of an independent Austrian state on the other hand, as well as the appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Minister of Interior and Public Safety, as a person who will guarantee to both sides the proper carrying out of the agreements. In this way Seyss-Inquart occupied the key position and was in the center of all obvious political actions. A legal base in the government was won for the party. This resulted in a paralysis of the "system apparates" (Schuschnigg government) at a time when a revolution needed to be carried out. Through this, the basis for a new attack on the Schuschnigg government was won.

Another result of the agreement was the appointment by the Führer of Leopold as a member of the staff of Hess. After a long, personal talk with Klausner, the Führer appointed him as leader of the Austrian National Socialists, upon recommendation of Keppler. * * * The relationship between Seyss-Inquart and Klausner was as follows: Seyss-Inquart acknowledged unconditionally the party leadership and actions taken by it; and he also acknowledged Klausner as the leader of the party. As a party member he was under the command of Klausner and received orders from him. But as a result of the agreement at Berchtesgaden and the statement the Führer made to him during his state visit in Berlin, Seyss-Inquart was the personal trustee of the Führer and directly responsible to him for the illegal NSDAP in Austria within the confines of his political sphere. Seyss-Inquart also acknowledged the free political initiative of the party leader of Austria.

(pp. 11-16)

The "Landesleitung" received word about the planned plebiscite through illegal information services, on 9 March 1938 at 10 a.m. At the session which was called immediately afterwards, Seyss-Inquart explained that he had known about this for only a few hours, but that he could not talk about it because he had given his word of honor to keep silent on this subject. But during the talks he made us understand that the illegal information we received was based on truth, and that in view of the new situation, he had been cooperating with the "Landesleitung" from the very first moment. Klausner, Jury, Rainer, Globocnik and Seyss-Inquart were present at the first talks which were held at 10 a.m. There it was decided that first , the Führer had to be informed immediately; secondly, the opportunity for the Führer to intervene must be given to him by way of an official declaration made by Minister Seyss-Inquart to Schuschnigg; and thirdly, Seyss-Inquart must negotiate with the government until clear instructions and orders were received from the Führer. Seyss-Inquart and Rainer together composed a letter to Schuschnigg, and only one copy of it was brought to the Führer by Globocnik, who flew to him on the afternoon of 9 March 1938.

* * * Negotiations with the government were not very successful. Therefore they were stopped by Seyss-Inquart in accordance with the instructions he received from the Führer. On the 10th of March all preparations for future revolutionary actions had already been made, and the necessary orders given to all unit leaders. During the night of the 10th to the 11th, Globocnik returned from the Führer with the announcement that the Führer gave the party freedom of action and that he would back it in everything it did.

H1237-0051

Rainer then gave the final instructions for Friday, the 11th of March, and explained that three situations might develop within the following days:

1st Case: The plebiscite will not be held. In this case, a great demonstration must be held.

2nd Case: Schuschnigg will resign. In this case, a demonstration was ordered in taking over the government power.

3rd Case: Schuschnigg will take up the fight. In this case, all party leaders were ordered to act upon their own initiative, using all means to capture the position of power.

Dr. Seyss-Inquart took part in these talks with the Gauleiters.

On Friday, 11 March, the minister Glaise-Horstenau arrived in Vienna after a visit with the Führer. After talks with Seyss-Inquart he went to see the Chancellor. At 11:30 a.m. the "Landesleitung" had a meeting at which Klausner, Rainer, Globocnik, Jury, Seyss-Inquardt, Glaise-Horstenau, Fischböck and Mühlmann participated. Dr. Seyss-Inquardt reported on his talks with Dr. Schuschnigg which had ended in a rejection of the proposal of the two ministers. * * * On the basis of written evidence which Glaise-Horstenau had brought with him, a leaflet, to be printed in millions of copies, and a telegram to the Führer calling for help, were prepared.

Klausner placed the leadership of the final political actions in the hands of Rainer and Globocnik. Schuschnigg called a session of all ministers for 2:00 p.m. Rainer agreed with Seyss-Inquardt that Rainer would send the telegram to the Führer and the statement to the population at 3:00 p.m. and at the same time he would start all necessary actions to take over power unless he received news from the session of the ministers' council before that time. During this time all measures had been prepared. At 2:30, Seyss-Inquardt 'phoned Rainer and informed him Schuschnigg had been unable to take the pressure and had recalled the plebiscite but that he had refused to call a new plebiscite and had ordered the strongest police measures for maintaining order. Rainer asked whether the two ministers had resigned, and Seyss-Inquardt answered "No". Rainer informed the "Reichskanzlei" through the German Embassy, and received an answer from Göring through the same channels that the Führer will not consent to partial solutions and that Schuschnigg must resign. Seyss-Inquardt was informed of this by Globocnik and Mühlmann; talks were had between Seyss-Inquardt and Schuschnigg; Schuschnigg resigned. Seyss-Inquardt asked Rainer what measures the party wished to be taken. Rainer's answer: Reestablishment of the government by Seyss-Inquardt, legalization of the party, and calling up of the SS and SA as auxiliaries to the police force. Seyss-Inquardt promised to have these measures carried out, but very soon the announcement followed that everything might be threatened by the resistance of Miklas. Meanwhile word arrived from the German Embassy that the Führer expected the establishment of a government under Seyss-Inquardt with a national majority, the legalization of the party, and permission for the legion to return, all within the specified time of 7:30 p.m.; otherwise, German troops would cross the border at 8:00 p.m. At 5:00 p.m., Rainer and Globocnik, accompanied by Mühlmann, went to the Chancellor's office to carry out this errand. Situation: Miklas negotiated with Ender for the creation of a government which included, blacks, reds and National Socialists, and proposed the post of Vice-Chancellor to Seyss-Inquardt. The latter rejected it and told Rainer that he was not able to negotiate by himself because he was personally involved, and therefore a weak and unpleasant political situation might result. Rainer negotiated with Zernatto. Director of the cabinet Huber, Guido Schmidt, Glaise-Horstenau, Legation Councillor Stein, Military Attache General Muff, and the "Gruppenführer" Keppler, who had arrived in the meantime, were also negotiating. At 7:00 p.m. Seyss-Inquardt entered the negotiations again. Situation at 7:30 p.m.: Stubborn refusal of Miklas to appoint Seyss-Inquardt as Chancellor; appeal to the world in case of a German invasion.

H1237-0052

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOC.812-PS
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel.

Situation: Miklas negotiated with Ender for the creation of a government which included, blacks, reds and National Socialists, and proposed the post of Vice-Chancellor to Seyss-Inquardt. The latter rejected it and told Rainer that he was not able to negotiate by himslef because he was personally involved, and therefore a weak and unpleasant political situation might result. Rainer negotiated with Zernette. Director of the cabinet Huber, Guide Schmidt, Glaise-Horstenau, Legation Councillor Stein, Military Attache General Muffe, and the "Gruppenführer" Keppler, who had arrived in the meantime, were also negotiating. At 7.00 p.m. Seyss-Inquardt entered the negotiations again. Situation at 7.30 p.m. : Stubborn refusal of Miklas to appoint Seyss-Inquardt as Chancellor; appeal to the world in case of a German invasion.

Gruppenführer Keppler explained that the Führer did not yet have an urgent reason for the invasion. This reason must first be created. The situation in Vienna and in the country is most dangerous. It is feared that street fights will break out any moment because Rainer ordered the entire party to demonstrate at 3 o'clock. Rainer proposed storming and seizing the government palace in order to force the reconstruction of the government. The prosposal was rejected by Keppler but was carried out by Rainer after he discussed it with Globocnik. After 8.00 p.m. the SA and SS marched in and occupied the government buildings and all important positions in the city of Vienna. At 8.30 p.m. Rainer, with the approval of Klausner, ordered all Gauleiters of Austria to take over power in all eight "gaus" of Austria, with the help of the SS and SA and with instructions that all government representatives who try to resist should be told that this action was taken on order of Chancellor Seyss-Inquardt.

With this, the revolution broke out, and this resulted in the complete occupation of Austria within three hours and the taking over of all important posts by the party. ****

The seizure of power was the work of the party supported by the Führer's threat of invasion and the legal standing of Seyss*Inquardt in the government. The national result in the form of the taking over of the government by Seyss-Inquardt was due to the actual seizure of power by the part on one hand, and th political efficiency of Dr Seyss-Inquardt in his territory on the other; but both factors may be considered only in the relation to the Führer's decision on 9 March 1938 to solve the Austrian problem under any circumstances and the orders consequently issued by the Führer.

Rainer e.h.

6.7.1939

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF EXCERPTS OF DOC. 812-PS

9 November 1945.

I, WOLFGANG E. THORMANN, M/Sgt., 33779426, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpts from Document No. 812-PS.

WOLFGANG E. THORMANN
M/Sgt., 33779426

H1237-0053

997-PS

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 997-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

The Reich Minister
and Chief of the
Reich Chancellery
RK 5043 top secret

Berlin W 8
Voss-Strasse 6
2 August 1940

(stamp) at present
Headquarters of the Fuehrer
all mail is to be sent to
the Berlin address
(stamp)
Rosenberg office
Rec. No. 2133, 5 Aug 40

Top Secret!

To

Reichsleiter Rosenberg
Foreign political office
of the N.S.D.A.P.
Berlin W 35
Margarethenstrasse 17

Re: Report about Holland

Dear Party Member Rosenberg:

I have presented the report of July 19 of this year, given to me by Stabsleiter SCHICKEDANZ on July 23 of this year, to the Fuehrer, together with the report delivered by Reich Commissioner Dr. Seyss-Inquart about the period from May 29 to July 19, 1940.

I am enclosing a copy of this last-mentioned report for your confidential information and submit an opinion on it.

Heil Hitler!

Yours very respectfully
(signed) Dr. Lammers

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 997 PS
Continued

1. Report

about the situation and developments in the occupied territories of the Netherlands.

Period covered by this report: 29 May to 19 July, 1940.

Top Secret!

Commission and task.

With the nomination as Reich Commissioner the commission is given

in serving the interests of the Reich to secure public order and public life.

and the task is connected

to bind the Netherlands, which have to remain independent for the purpose of the preservation of Dutch Indies territory, as much as possible to the Reich economically, apart from military security measures.

This task is to be solved if we succeed in bringing about a political attitude which would make it possible for the economic ties of the Netherlands to the Reich to appear to be the emanation of the will of the Dutch people.

It will not be possible in every individual case to combine fulfillment of the given commission with the solution of the assigned task, for the interest of the occupation power demands the extensive suppression of all possible public activities, while in order to create and lead a formation of a political will it would be necessary to grant such freedoms as would for the Dutch, make the final result their own decision.

(Page 2)

Situation.

The situation at the time the decree of the Fuehrer went into effect (29 May 1940) is characterized by the position of the Commander in Chief of the Dutch Army and Navy (General WINKELMANN). He exercised all power in the administration of the country, under the powers he had received in consideration of the state of siege and beyond that from the government and the queen who had fled, and he was considered by the people as a sort of viceroy. He issued orders, the Dutch Secretaries General (offices corresponding to our State Secretaries) executed their orders in the name of Winkelmann within administrative machinery unchanged in personnel and functioning perfectly.

Wherever Winkelmann appeared in public he received ovations.

The Dutch Army was in only slightly reduced mobilization strength under the command of their own officers (Winkelmann's Staff) in the barracks and camps. The occupation force was not seen often.

The behavior of the Dutch population - glad that the war is over, pleasantly surprised by the conduct of the German troops, though at first the circles hostile to the Germans kept themselves reserved - concealed the real attitude of the Dutch toward the Germans. The Dutch population for many years, especially since 1933, were stirred up by the emigrants, who were tolerated here as in no other country against the Reich and National Socialism. The ability of forming their own political opinion is limited for the majority. Politics and administration are in the hands of a (Page 3) small group (ruling families), whose ideas and attitude are liberal and influenced materially and ideologically by the west.

The real wages of the employed population are generally higher than in the Reich. About 500,000 unemployed from about 2,000,000 people capable of working in non-independent industry, trade, or business are being carried along with unemployment compensation up to 70% of simple wages, thanks to the riches of the Dutch Indies possessions, just as agriculture, struggling with sales and price difficulties, is supported almost entirely by state subsidies.

The Dutch people are caught in political stagnation as well as in economic immobility. In spite of a good external impression (racial appearance, cleanliness of the buildings and gardens, etc) one can observed extensive biological and even moral damage, such as unexpected uncleanliness among the unemployed and the country population in the Calvinistic districts, poor physical constitution, exclusive interest in material matters, and so on. The people are widely split confessionally and within the confessional groups bound and influenced by all kinds of activities (from political organizations to chess clubs).

The Royal House of Orange lives on the prestige won in the battles for freedom and is considered by the group oriented materially as in the west. (Page 4) (big businessmen, financiers, industrialists, higher officials, and court nobility) as a guarantee for their political predominance and economic positions. Additional motives, based on national conviction, for bourgeois the devotion of the Dutch people to the royal family which is more a matter of habit, cannot be found, unless they think by clinging to the royal family to banish the fear of being overwhelmed by the Reich.

There was no real opposition against the system among the representative bodies of the parliament. In the second chamber there were 4 NSB men among 100 Deputies; Faselst and National Socialist ideas especially the latter- are tabooed, are considered evidence of being uneducated, and are now branded as the sentiments of traitors. There are concrete indications that N.S.B. were in the uniform of Dutch soldiers intervened in support of the invading troops of the Reich.

In Dutch political life there are almost no personalities of any importance. Somewhat outstanding from the average is the 71 year old COLIJN - although his basic character is domineering and energetic, he is completely bound up with western-liberal views, and as a decided Calvinist he cannot be won for any National Socialist ideas. Noteworthy is his desire for importance, which might induce him to make a political deal with the occupation power, in which he might be conceited enough to think that he could outwit us and keep a distance from the Reich with the help of the House of Orange.

(Page 5)

The system parties - that is, the Catholic State Party, the Christian People's Party (reformed) the Anti-Revolutionists (Calvinists, descendants of the revolutionary CUNUL) the Social Democrats, the Democrats, etc., were entirely undisturbed as far as their party organizations, trade unions, press, etc., were concerned, and their activities were only partly restricted by the state of siege. Apart from a strong horror propaganda against the N.S.B. people, the political factors and the greater part of the population were just biding their time.

The Rightist Parties, especially the NSB, were numerically as unimportant minority, against whom as a matter of course an arrogant rejection prevailed among the intellectuals, the capitalists, and also among the greater part of the officers' corps. This attitude, strengthened by the charge of treason, was carried over to the rest of the population. Of leading men among the Rightists the following are to be mentioned within the framework of the NSB: MUSSERT: a liberal nationalist attempting to use Fascist methods, who is in the end afraid of the greater German Reich. His political

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qualities are not as great as those of an average Gauleiter in the Reich. In the Netherlands he plays a not inconsiderable role with them.

ROST VAN TONNINGEN: Ideologically perfectly adequate, adjusted to the Germanic idea and National Socialism, a temperamental and effective speaker yearning (Page 6) for activity, does not find his strength in himself but tries to get support and steadiness from third persons.

COUNT ANSEMBOURG: No outspoken personality, positively valuable in spite of his obligations of creed (Catholic), he is more a tactician and diplomatic mediator.

GEIKERKEN: The representative of Mussert, with strong Walloon mixture, he is certainly a determined opponent of the system with reservations toward the Greater German Reich.

WOUDENBERG: Representing labor in the N.S.B., he is the type of a union man without special initiative but with common sense and confidence-inspiring simplicity.

Some younger men, such as FELDMEYER, ZONDERVAN, and others, are - even according to the standards of the party within the Reich - types of absolutely good leaders of the rank and file. Special attention is due ARNOLD MEIJER, the leader of the Black Front, a Catholic Fascist group, who has his followers in the southern parts, Brabant and Limburg, is without doubt bound to Catholism but strictly opposed to the liberal democratic course and is above all opposed to the political influence of the representatives of the Protestant North (Colijn, etc.)

The economic situation was nowhere threatening; supplies of all kinds available in abundance, only the traffic has been largely interrupted by the blowing up of bridges and the consequent shifting of the canals, which handle 70% of the total traffic; sea traffic has been stopped entirely. The (Page 7) agricultural improvement economy, dependent on the import of disproportionately large quantities of fodder, possesses supplies sufficient until the gathering of the next harvest.

It is the almost unanimous opinion of the Dutch that they were unjustly attacked by the Germans. The charges of violation of neutrality as reported by bye communique of the High Command of the Armed Forces are not known to the population or if known are rejected as justification. A certain impression is made by pointing out that on the soil of the Netherlands, with the cooperation of high Dutch officials, are attack on the life of the Fuehrer was prepared. It is also admitted that it was at least unwise and probably unjust, too, that the emigrants from the Reich in the Netherlands and the Dutch press were allowed to give news to their fury against the Reich and the National Socialists in such an unqualifiable form.

Measures

In view of this state of affairs it was necessary first to remove Winkelmann's influence. This was done by expressly advising the Secretaries General that they now have to accept orders only from the Reich commissioner, which they accepted explicitly. The institution of the Secretaries General as well as the persons themselves were retained, since it had to be considered improbable in case of their resignation to find Dutchmen - among the Rightists there are almost no suitable persons at all - who would have taken over the administration. It seemed politically necessary, however, that some measures, especially economic ones (Page 8) but indirectly also police ones, had to be taken, carrying the signatures of the Netherlands Secretaries General, for the Dutch people. The attempt of one of the Secretaries General to call on Winkelmann as authority - in the question of the continuation of the work in armament plants for the German Armed Forces - was answered with the immediate dismissal of that secretary General. Winkelmann had to admit in a public declaration that he had only to execute the demobilization under the command of the Commander of the Armed Forces, but that otherwise he had nothing to say. ------- This acknowledgment as well as the fact that he publicly dropped a Secretary General reduced Winkelmann's influence considerably. Finally he could be quietly made a prisoner of war in connection with the known events of June 29.

In order to execute the given commission and administrative body as small as possible was set up, divided into four working fields of the commissioners-general. The individual specialists of these commissioners-general, as for instance the ones for finance, justice, etc., are sitting as liaison men in the respective Dutch ministries. Importance was attached to an immediate and clear distribution of competences and determination of the performance of the work because the Dutch people, being very formal and casuistic by nature, need such a determination. This distribution has proved its worth so far, as there has been no friction either within the administrative machinery or with the Dutch authorities for reasons fo organization.

(Page 9) Commissioners (BEAUFTRAGTE) are provided for the provinces, which have extensive autonomy. We hesitated to create this office, as it was necessary first to investigate conditions. Now it is seen that for this office politically experienced men were needed rather than administration officials. Therefore, through Reich Office Director (REICHSAMTSLEITER) SCHMIDT we requested from REICHSLEITER BORMANN (HESS staff) some men who, almost entirely members of the party, are on their way here and can be put into office in the provinces in a few days.

It was clear that with the occupation of the Netherlands a large number of economic but also police measures had to be taken, the first ones of which had the purpose of reducing the consumption of the population in order to get supplies for the Reich, on the one hand, and to secure a just distribution of the remaining supplies, on the other hand. In consideration of the assigned task, we had to endeavor to see to it that all these measures carried the signature of Dutchmen. The Reich Commissioner therefore authorized the Secretaries-General to take allthe necessary measures by means of ordinances.

As a matter of fact, up to today almost all orders concerning the seizure of supplies and their distribution to the population and decrees about restrictions in the formation of public opinion have been issued but also agreements concerning the transport of extraordinarily large supplies to the Reich have (Page 10) been made, all of which bear the signatures of the Dutch Secretaries General or the competent economic leaders, so that all of these measures have the character of being voluntary. It should be mentioned in this connection that the Secretaries General were told in the first conversation that loyal cooperation was expected of them, but it would be their privilege to resign if something should be ordered which they felt they could not endorse. Up to date none of the Secretaries General has made use of this privilege, so that one may reasonably conclude that they have complied with all requests of their own free will.

Almost the entire seizure and distribution of food supplies and textiles have been executed at least all the respective orders have been issued and are being executed.

A Series of instructions concerning the reorientation of agriculture have been issued and are being executed; essentially it is a question of seeing to it that the available fodder is used in such a way that as large a stock as possible of horned cattled is carried over into the next farming period, about 80% at the expense of the over-dimensional stock of chickens and hogs. Rules and restrictions have been introduced in the organization of traffic and the principles for the regulation of gasoline as in the Reich were carried out here.

Restricting the right to quit jobs as well as to cancel leases have been issued in order to check the liberal-capitalistic customs of the Dutch employers (Page 11) and to avoid unrest. In the same way the periods for repayment of debts have been extended under certain conditions.

Ordinances concerning news service, radio, etc., prohibit listening to foreign radio stations and introduce all other restrictions necessary in this field for defense reasons. The ordinance about registration and control of enemy property as well as about confiscation of the property of persons who act hostile to the Reich and to Germans were in this case issued in the name of the Reich commissioner. On the basis of this ordinance an administrator for the property of the royal family has already been appointed.

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The supplies of raw materials have been seized and, with the consent of the General Field Marshal, distributed according to this system: the Dutch keep enough raw materials to maintain their economy for half a year, whereby they receive the same distribution quotas as in the Reich. The same principle of equal treatment is being used in the supply of food etc. This enabled us to secure considerable supplies of raw materials for the Reich, as for instance 70,000 tons of industrial fats, which is about half of the amount which the Reich lacks.

The bank moratorium could be cancelled, bank deposits are increasing, the stock exchange has been reopened to a limited extent. Bills concerning the control of foreign currencies have been introduced according to the standards in the Reich.

Finally it was achieved that the Dutch state makes available in sufficient quantities all means needed by the Reich, including the German administration so that these expenses do not burden the Reich budget in any way.

(Page 12) A sum of guilders has been liquidated to redeem the fiduciary monetary tender to the amount of about 36 million, further 100 million for the purposes of the occupation army, especially the extension of the airports; further 50 million for raising the raw materials to be shipped to the Reich, insofar as they are not booty; further for unrestricted transfer to guarantee the remittance of the savings of the Dutch workers brought into the Reich to their families, etc. Finally the rate of exchange of the fiduciary monetary tender, set at first by the army high command in the proportion of 1 guilder to 1.50 Reichsmark, has been reduced to the correct proportion of 1 guilder to 1.33 RM.

Above all, however, it was possible to get the consent of the president of the bank of the Netherlands, Trip, to a measure suggested by Commissioner General FISCHBOECK and approved by the General Field Marshal, namely the unrestricted mutual obligation of accepting each other's currencies, that means that the Bank of the Netherlands is bound to take over any amount of Marks offered to it by the Reich Bank and in return to make available Dutch guilders at the rate of 1.33, that is, 1 RM is 75 cents. Only the Reich bank has control over this, not the Bank of the Netherlands, which will be notified only about the individual transactions. This ruling goes far beyond all pertinent rulings made hitherto with the political economies of neighboring countries, including the Protectorate, and actually represents the first step toward a currency union.

In consideration of this significance of the agreements, which already touches the independence of the Dutch State, it is of special weight that the (Page 13) president of the Bank, Trip, who is unusually well-known in western banking and financial circles, signed this agreement of his own free will in the above sense.

Furthermore, military jurisdiction was introduced, and at present German criminal jurisdiction is being set up; for special cases not only the Special Court but also SS and Police jurisdiction have been provided for as substitutes for court-martial jurisdiction, which was not introduced. Subject to German criminal jurisdiction are: all citizens of the Reich or the Protectorate without restriction and all Dutch citizens and aliens in cases of crimes against the honor and security of the Reich, the Armed Forces, etc.,

The experiences with the Dutch officials show that these people like all Dutchmen, are basically difficult. One has to negotiate with them very much; if they say no, it does not mean definitely no, if they say yes they still think the matter over for a long time, but in the end they will do as one wants them to. Besides, they want someone else to carry the responsibility; since the Dutch still do not really believe that England, which for centuries was the overwhelming power in Europe, is finally eliminated from the continent, in many cases they want a direct order which they then obey, so that one day they will be able to refer to this pressure. In general, however, one cannot complain about the behavior of the officials in the execution of the administration. One cannot say that the officials are delaying any vital work. For instance, in restoring traffic routes, especially in clearing canals, the respective ministry worked extremely to the purpose and fast. In the fields, however, entirely

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liberal methods and principles prevail.

The Police itself is much split and is subordinated in the most important parts to the ministry of justice and not to the ministry of the Interior. The special troops, the motorized and mounted units, are relatively good, the MARECHAUSSEE, a sort of troop gendamerie, is very good. Among the latter we have already won some agents in the higher ranks which makes probable a further extension in a sense favorable to us.

The Marechaussee will therefore be brought to a correspondingly high standard by selected non-commissioned officers of the army and will be the backbone of the executive.

The dismissal of two mayors (in the Hague and in the provincial capital of ZWOLLE) had an extraordinary effect. The moment will come when it will be possible to exchange some of the Secretaries General and possibly also other officials, but in any case mayors.

Concerning the right of assembly and association, we introduced the obligation of giving notice. The interdiction comes from the public prosecutors of the court of appeals (GENERALSTAATSANWAELTE) (Subordination of the Police to the Justice) who are working almost without complaint under the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer. The states-general were eliminated from public representative bodies; the provincial states (PROVINZIALSTAATEN) and the town councils were kept for the time being, but they are under the supervision of the provincial commissioner. Politics in these is not tolerated for the present. The reconstruction of the country - except in Rotterdam, MIDDELBURG, and RHENEN the devastation is not very extensive - was placed in the foreground of a visit to MIDDELBURG the importance of the preservation of historic monuments as an expression of the will for formation of a people has been emphasized, and the social side of such action stressed by raising a fund for reconstruction. In the handling of this reconstruction fund the reactionary spirit of the Dutch administration is especially evident.

It is necessary to give special attention to the reconstruction of Rotterdam. Rotterdam, thanks to its position at the mouth of the Rhine, the possibility for sea-going vessels to sail far inland, and the harbor conditions, which are in every respect favorable, is doubtless a place which disposes of the best natural port facilities in Central Europe, which can even be increased by the completion of the Rhine - Main-Danube Canal, as its sphere of action will reach from Rotterdam to CONSTANTA. With regard to developments in the more distant future one must consider whether one should not exercise influence on the reconstruction of Rotterdam in such a way that the city with this unique opportunity for construction should receive the imprint of a big seaport of the Germanic area. The demobilziation of the Dutch Army, which has now finally been accomplished, was carried out without complaints. The officers and men not taken over into other occupations were transferred, with the exception of the higher ranks, to construction service. This is to be the basis for a future Labor Service. It is led by the Dutch Major BRUNESS, who has long been in contact with the men of the Reich Labor Service in the Reich (MUELLER- Brandenburg and has always taken the part of the Reich. The impression this man makes is an excellent one, at present decidedly non-political, as is usual among officers, (Page 16) ideologically all right. It is assumed that within three to six months the present construction service can be liquidated, that is, the men will be inducted into economic operations and there will be a basis for a real Labor Service. The organization is already being built up with the cooperation of the head of the Reich Labor Service , HIERL.

The extremely ramified and numerous Dutch press has not been submitted to a preliminary censorship, as that would have destroyed all press life immediately. By holding press conferences under the supervision of SCHMIDT the big press is managed well and successfully. The danger of some slips, becoming more and more rare, was accepted in view of the necessity of keeping the press alive. Circulation is falling off, however - a not unusual phenomenon, which has the advantage, though, that the newspapers get into difficulties and can therefore be folded up or taken out of the hands of the present owners. The NSB press is already completely available, there is a personal influence at the Telegraph and within the next few days the entire S.D.P. Press is going to be taken over in connection with a corresponding political action whichis already underway.

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The German newspaper has reached a circulation of 30,000. About half of the subscribers are Dutch. A quite extensive press front is therefore available.

From the point of view of the occupation power the present development can be considered satisfactory. The supplies for the occupation army are being delivered, the work, etc., is being done in order, and there are almost no cases of sabotage. There is (Page 17) no need at all to fear active resistance by the population. There are, however, signs of rather extensive espionage, at any rate there is contact with England, probably by short-wave radio. In this respect there is close cooperation between the Counter-Intelligence posts of the Armed Forces and the Security Police posts, since it seems necessary to ascertain such cases as soon as possible and to punish them exemplarily (death sentences).

Concerning the political developments in regard to the assigned task, I have the following to say: The Dutch have stepped out of their political reserve. Disregarding the continued or rather increased animosity among the circles which heretofore formed political interest for the Reich is increasing. It is noteworthy in this connection that the former opponents, insofar as they are beginning to change their opinion, want to establish contact not with the N.S.B. but rather directly with the N.S.D.A.P. and the Reich. A conversation with COLIJN, who thereupon wrote a pamphlet, did much to help overcome the reserve. The main points of this pamphlet are summarized in the statement that in Continental Europe England has doubtless been eliminated by the Reich and that the Reich will lead this continental Europe. The Netherlands must adjust itself to that fact if they hope, in closest economic cooperation with the Reich, to retain their independence in clinging to the House of Orange. This attitude of COLIJN has had a very great effect, as it was the cue for Protestant and especially Calvinist circles to discuss the new situation, whereby Colijn's statement on the importance of the Reich was considered as an authoritative declaration, but his (Page 18) conclusions were subjected to lively criticism. COLIJN later in his newspaper (Standard) questioned the correctness of a document of the last White Book. The Standard was thereupon banned for 8 weeks and Colijn got a warning. At the moment he is designated not only by the N.S.B. but also by the group of ARNOLD MEIJERS as a worn-out politician who himself has to take the blame for developments, and he is holding back. His importance is not actual but potential.

At the moment many efforts toward concentration are to be noted, which make it their task to appear as partners in a contract with the Reich. The attempt of the system parties to regain influence through COLIJN has been, at least for the moment, rejected by the public. His place was taken by a group of the commissioners of the province of GRONINGEN LINDHORST-HOMANN and of the Catholic politician DE QUAI. They presented a proclamation to REICHSAMTSLEITER SCHMIDT. He refused to authorize it and pointed out that a profession of loyality to the House of Orange could not be tolerated by the occupation power. This group was confused thereby and lost much of its prestige among the people, which had not been too great, anyway.

Right now a political action against the K.P. (Communist party) and the S.D.P. (Social Democrat Party) is in progress. The K.P. does not exercise any activity, the S.D.P. has its main support in the free trade unions. The heads of these free unions have now been dismissed and the above-mentioned KOUDENBERG has been appointed provisional head. This reorganization took place - as far as we can see (Page 19) without complaint and the former functionaries offer their cooperation willingly. In direct connection with this action the political organizations of the Communist and Social Democrat parties are being subordinated to ROST VAN TONNINGEN as liquidation commissioner (STILLEGUNGSKOMMISSAR), who has orders to liquidate the K.P. entirely and to transfer its funds to the assets of the S.D.P., which are administered by him. By taking over the leadership of the free unions and the SDP organizations, especially its press, we gained a broad basis political influence on the Dutch people, for this party represented 20 to 22% of the Dutch population.

Arrangements have been made with the N.S.B., according to which the organizations corresponding to the SA and the SS, as well as the youth organization will be built up. It will be of special importance that through the disciplined marching of these organizations an appropriate impression is made, especially on the working classes but also on the rest of the Dutch population.

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Aside from these arrangements in the political field we have now begun gathering together pro-German and obliging circles in the field of economy especially agriculture, culture, art, and science, first in a loose social form in order to create a circle of friends of the new Germany or the new Europe, who will gradually become the carriers of opinion and will in the corresponding fields. The first step has been taken successfully in the field of the press. Under the leadership of Prof. DE GUDENAGEN a sort of presscommittee has been formed, to which the right-thinking press people belong. After initial reluctance, today all the journalists of the Netherlands are aspiring to this association, in which the press people hostile in the past (Page 20) toward the Reich are not accepted even if they are considered especially leading.

The attempt is made to establish contact with the Dutch Indies. There are daily radio broadcasts on the regular wavelength, bringing reports from the homeland, even news about individual persons and families, so that we can assume that in time the Dutch people in the Dutch Indies will tune their radios to this wavelength.

It can already be said today with some confidence that it is only a question of time when the Dutch people can be won also in their political formation of will for a program of a close connection of the independent Netherlands and the Dutch Indies with the Reich (Union of currency and economy). The decision boils down to the question of the monarchy. In that question it has gone so far that some leading people already realize that Queen Wilhelmina is opposed to this development and that Crown Princess Juliana is also rather out of the question on account of her marriage with BIESTERFELD. The royalists therefore now speak only of holding to the house of Orange, and individual voices are already heard advocating the appointment of a regent to take care of affairs until the question of the monarchy is ripe for a final decision.

Any manifestations for the Queen or for the House of Orange, which is represented only by Crown Princess Juliana, who is married to Biesterfeld, will no longer by tolerated, with the explanation that the queen persistently remains in the ranks of the enemy and does not oppose the British air-raids on the Netherlands. From the view point of the occupation power a manifestation for the Queen must be considered in the same light as a manifestation for Churchill, for example.(Page 21) This point of view will be enforced with increasing severity. Since the Queen apparently hopes to be supported by Dutch Indies circles, there is danger that this legitimistic attitude could lead to a break between the Netherlands and the Dutch Indies. The Dutch people show increasing understanding for these arguments, and there is really no longer any doubt that the Dutch, at least in Europe, are ready to renounce the Queen and probably also the crown princess, if the Reich could offer them a guarantee that the Dutch Indies will be kept by the Dutch even against possible endeavors of the United States or Japan.

In this connection the possibility should be discussed of transferring the province of ZEELAND to a new territorial formation around Antwerp and the province of LIMBURG to a new Gau-division. In this regard it must be mentioned that such a transfer at this moment would probably destroy all prospects of a political solution. That is certainly true of Zeeland. The people living here are really of Frisian origin and have nothing in common with the population around Antwerp. In the post-war period of 1918-20 they were strongly opposed to an incorporation into Belgium. It could even be used as a pressure on the Netherlands to reach a currency and economy union if we demand the cession of Zeeland as the economicpassage area for the port of Antwerp. The Dutch people will certainly be ready to agree to a far-reaching economic union if in return they can retain politically the province of Zeeland.

(Page 22)
Statements.

In conclusion it is stated that

1. Order and security are perfectly secured.
2. The administration is at present sufficiently and for the future increasingly under the direction and control of the German authorities.
3. Economy and traffice have been set going and converted to war conditions, plans for a large-scale transformation to continental economy have been started, the preparation for it is almost universal, the supplies of the

country have been conducted into the war economy of the Reich, the financial sources for it have been widely opened up and joined with the management of the Reich, all on the basis of extensive cooperation of the Dutch.

4. The necessity of deviating from the democratic party system is becoming more and more the general opinion. The endeavor to get into a close friendly relationship with the Reich is increasing. That the question of the House of Orange arises in this connection is becoming more and more evident. The fate of the Dutch Indies is more significant, however.

If we succeed in retaining the people belonging to the free trade unions and to the SDP organizations, and if the NSB makes further progress, one-fouth to one-third of the Dutch people will in well-organized form be going the same road as the Reich, whereas the other groups will be split and undecided. Moreover, the workers and farmers - the latter, if the worst comes to the worst (Page 23) by the suggestion of the idea of agrarian reform, for almost half of the farmland is divided into small tenant farms - will only gain from a union with the Reich. The labor service is being used for ideological training, and the intellectual circles are being used in social form as needed. The question, in what way the political opinion which is being formed can be used, remains open. The answer depends party on the conditions of the moment.

signed: SEYSS-INQUART

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 997 PS

6 December 1945

I, VIRGINIA VON SCHON X-046318, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 997 PS.

VIRGINIA VON SCHON
X-046318

H1237-0063

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1162 - PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

H1237-0064

ORDER.

BY ORDER of the GERMAN WEHRMACHT all men from 17 up to and including 40 years old must register for the Labour Service.

Immediately on receipt of this order ALL men within this age-group must appear in the street with the required equipment.

All other inhabitants, women and children included, must stay in their houses until the operation is completed. Men of the age mentioned above, who are found in their houses when they are searched, will be punished , and their private possessions will be confiscated.

Identification cards from civilian or military authorities must be brought along for inspection.

Those, who are in possession of such identification cards must also appear in the street.

Warm clothing, strong shoes, blankets, protection against rain, eating-utensils, knife, fork and drinking cup and bread for one day, must be taken along. Persons who bring along their bicycles, which they take with them, will be allowed to keep them.

THE DAILY COMPENSATION CONSISTS OF GOOD FOOD, TOBACCO AND FIVE GUILDERS.

THE RELATIVES LEFT BEHIND WILL BE LOOKED AFTER.

ALL INHABITANTS OF THE MUNICIPALITY ARE FORBIDDEN TO LEAVE THEIR RESIDENCE.

THOSE WHO TRY TO ESCAPE OR TO RESIST WILL BE SHOT.

ANNOUNCEMENT.

All male persons between the ages of 17 and 50, resident in the township of APELDOORN, must report on the 2nd October, 1944 at 9 a.m. in the market place at Apeldoorn, in order to work for several days in the Province of Gelderland.

They must bring with them a shovel or spade, also eating utensils, spoon, fork, and a blanket.

ZUTPHEN, 1st October, 1944.

The Plenipotentiary of the Reichs-Commissioner for the Province of Gelderland.

Dr. SCHNEIDER.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1162 - PS.

31 December 1945.

I, ERNEST P.UIBERALL, hereby certify that the above is a true and correct translation of the original Dutch portions of Document 1162 -PS.

ERNEST P. UIBERALL
0133781
2nd Lt.Inf.

H1237-0065

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1162-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

OFFICIAL NOTICE.

By order of the German Wehrmacht all men of the town of AMERSFO between the ages of 17 and 50 years must report to-day at 9 o'clock at the Infantry Barracks for digging operations.

Release certificates from civil or military places of employment are to be brought for scrutiny. They are not a release from the duty to report.

Return after the period of employment can be definitely guaranteed.

Men must bring: warm clothing, strong footwear, blankets, cove ing against rain, eating utensils with spoon, knife and fork as wel as spades or shovels. Bicycles brought remain in the possession of the owners.

Good food, smokes and 5 Gulden daily will be given.
Leaving the town is forbidden on principle.

The Delegate of the Reich Commissioner
for the Province of Utrecht:

MUELLER-REINERT.

NOTICE.

By virtue of Section 1 of Order No. 42/1941 regarding conscription and regarding the limitation of change in places of work within the scope of Order No. 48/1942, and by virtue of special authorisation, it is decreed:

All male Dutch nationals and those without nationality born within the years 1915 to 1928 inclusive, who have their domicile or permanent residence in the Provinces of North Holland, South Holland and Utrecht, are under labour obligation. The calling-up for labour duties will be effected by special proclamation.

Until the calling-up for labour duties the above-mentioned persons are obliged, without prejudice to the existing regulations regarding change of place of work, to remain at their present place of work and in their dwelling place or their present permanent domici All labour necessary for the maintenance of public administration, as well as for the continuance of installations and agricultural a industrial undertakings, in which vital tasks are to be accomplish or commissions of military importance are to be carried out, will be reserved and not called-up for conscripted labour elsewhere. Al persons thus reserved will receive a generally valid reservation certificate. It will render invalid all other reservation certificates hitherto issued as such. When called-up for work, the maintenance of those called-up as well as of their dependents will be pro vided for in sufficient measure.

Whoever acts contrary to the stipulations of this Notice or of the regulations issued for its execution, or tries to circumvent them, will be punished by imprisonment as per Section 4 of Order No. 42/ in as much as a heavier punishment is not incurred in accordance with other stipulations. Accessories before the fact, collaborator and assistants incur the same punishment as the perpetrators themselves. Security Police measures are held in reserve. Houses and places in which a called-up man hides, will be sequestrated, toget with their contents.

The regulations of this Notice come into force immediately.

The Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Dut Territories.
The Plenipotentiary for total war effort.
LIESE.

The Hague, 14th. December, 1944.

H1237-0066

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1162-PS

31 December 1945

I, EVELYN WITT, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1162-PS.

EVELYN WITT.

H1237-0067

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1163-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

N O T I C E !

I consider all inhabitants responsible for destruction or damage to railroad installations, waterways with their installations, telephone cables and Post Offices; occurring within their districts.

The population of such communities may therefore expect reprisals in the form of seizure of property and destruction of houses or groups of houses.

I advise the communities to arrange for adequate protectio of the means of transportation and of communication in their districts, by patrols or other effective means.

The Hague, 24 September 1944.

(Sd.) SEYSS-INQUART

The Reich Commissioner
for the Occupied Netherlands Territories.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 1163-PS

29 December 1945

I, EVELYN WITT, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1163-PS.

EVELYN WITT.

H1237-0068

H1237-0069

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1163-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

N O T I C E .

"The Superior SS and Police Chief gives notice that on 20 Nov 1944 Schutzgruppenmann JANSSEN and on 13 Dec 1944 the Senior Officer Candidate GUSE were shot in the back by criminal Netherlands elements.
Both were robbed of their pistols."

"Independent of further investigation of the perpetrators, two houses were blasted and 12 Netherlanders were executed at the place of one of the crimes as reprisals.

The Hague, 16 Dec 1944"

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1376-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

1376-PS

1940 REICHSGESETZBLATT
PART I, PAGE 778

REICHSGESETZBLATT
TEIL I P. 778

20 May 1940 Nr 87

Decree of the Fuehrer of 18 May 1940 on the Execution of Power by the Government in the Lowlands

Erlass des Führers über Ausübund der Regierungsbefugnisse in den Niederlanden.

In order to secure public order and public life in the Dutch territories taken under the protection of German troops, I decree:

Paragraph 1

The occupied Dutch territories will be subordinated to the "Reichs Commissioner for the Occupied Dutch territories." His seat will be The Hague. The Reichs Commissioner is protector of the interests of the Reich and will represent the supreme power of the government within the civil sphere. He will be directly subordinated to me and will receive directives and orders from me.

Paragraph 2

The German military commander in the Netherlands will exercise military sovereign rights, his demands within the civilian sphere will be carried out by the Reichs Commissioner. He has the right to order the measures which are necessary for the execution of his military mission and for military security. The same right belongs to the supreme commanders of the branches of the armed forces.

Paragraph 3

The Reich Commissioner may use German Police forces to carry out his orders. The German Police forces are at the disposal of the German military commander insofar as the military necessities require this and if the missions of the Reichs Commissioner permit it.

Paragraph 4

For the execution of his orders and the functioning of the administration the Reichs Commissioner may make use of the Dutch authorities.

Paragraph 5

1) The law which was formerly valid remains in force, in as much as it is compatible with the occupation.

2) The Reichs Commissioner may enforce law by decree. The ordinances will be proclaimed in the "Ordinance for the occupied Dutch territories."

Paragraph 6

I appoint Reich Minister Dr. Arthur SEYSS-INQUART to be Reich Commissioner for the occupied Dutch territories.

H1237-0070

Paragraph 7

Regulations for the execution and completion of this decree will be issued according to my directives for the civilian sphere by the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory and for the military sphere by the Chief of the supreme command of the armed forces.

Paragraph 8

This decree will be inforced as soon as and insofar as I shall cancel the order given to the Supreme Commander of the Army for the exercise of the complete power.

Fuehrer's Hqs. 18 May 1940

The Fuehrer
Adolf Hitler

The President of the Cabinet Counsel for the defense of the Reich
Goering, Field Marshal
The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory
Dr. Lammers
The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Keitel
The Minister for Foreign Affairs
von Ribbentrop
The Reich Minister of the Interior
Frick

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 1376-PS

7 January 1946

I, WILLIARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt. (jg) USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1376-PS.

WILLIARD EVANS SKIDMORE
Lt. (jg) USNR
391590

H1237-0071

H1237-0072

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NR. 1621-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

The Reichsfuehrer SS
Personal Staff
File Nr. 19 /9/43a/
Pers/V

Command Post, 12 November 1942

(Rubber Stamp:)

Personal Staff, Reichsfuehrer SS
(illegible) Administration
Secret/

SECRET!

SECRET!

To
1.) SS Major General (SS-Gruppenfuehrer) R a u t e r

T h e H a g u e

Dear Major General (Gruppenfuehrer),

SS Captain (SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer) Dr. R a s c h e r is in need of medico-physiological appliances. He points out that there are sufficient appliances at the University of L e y d e n and at the University of U t r e c h t, which could be put to use.

The Reichsfuehrer SS asks you to attempt to obtain these appliances, which would still have to be listed in detail by SS Captain (SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer) Dr. Rascher resp. by SS Colonel (SS-Standartenfuehrer) Sievers, through the Reich Commisar. SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Dr. Rascher resp. SS-Standartenfuehrer Sievers will submit the list directly to you.

H e i l H i t l e r !

(signed) B r a n d t

Transmitted to
2.) SS Colonel (SS-Standartenfuehrer) Sievers
3.) SS Captain (SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer) Dr. Rascher,
with the request that the above be noted and the necessary steps taken.

(Signed illegible)

SS-Lieutenant Colonel

(SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer)

H1237-0073

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NR. 1621-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL (CONT'

(Rubber Stamp:)

Personal Staff Reichsfuehrer SS

(illegible)
SECRET/

SECRET !

Dr. S. Rascher
SS Captain (SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer)

SECRET!

File Memorandum.

Procurement of medico-physiological appliances is so difficult in Germany that the continued conduct of experiments is seriously endangered. If the necessary appliances cannot be procured, it will be very much more difficult to build up the Institute for Functional Research in Military Science within the frame ork of the Ancestral Heritage Organization (Ahnenerbe).

The Institutes of the Universities of L e y d e n and U t r e c h t, however, are very plentifully equipped with the very best scientific appliances at both these universities is not feasible, however, since the University of L e y d e n is, and will remain, closed, notwithstanding all rumors, and since the University of U t r e c h t works with only half its usual enrollment.

SS Lieutenant Colonel (SS-Standartenfuehrer) Sievers therefore suggests that the Reichsfuehrer SS write a letter to Reich Governor (Reichsstatthalter) Dr. Seyss-Inquart saying that it is request that the Reich Governor (Reichsstatthalter) put the appliances of the University Institutes concerned at the disposal of the Ancestral Heritage Organization (Ahnenerbe), initially on a loan basis.

(signed)Dr. Rascher

Munich, 12 November 1942

(Handwritten notation:

Dr. Brandt to Reuter)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1660-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART 1, PAGE 631

Decree for the Registration for the Active Service in Austria in the year 1938 of 16 June 1938

Anordnung über die Auschebung zum aktiven Wehrdienst im Jahre 1938 im Lando Österrei vom 16. Juni 1938

I. The registration for the active service in the army for the year 1938 in the country of Austria will be conducted during the time from 16 August until 10 September 1938.

II. To be called for registration:

1. All those subject to duty, born in the year 1917, without regard to their physical fitness and regardless whether they were exempt from induction in spring of the year 1938;

2. All those volunteers of other years of birth who were considered "general service";

3. All those subject to duty considered "general service" or "limited service" at the time of induction of the class of 1915 and 1916 who have registered with reserve commands and who have as yet not been trained;

4. The volunteers who have reported, or want to report, in June 1938, for induction into active service for the fall of 1938 (for the Luftwaffe also for the spring of 1939), without regard whether or not they have been physically examined.

III. Charged with this task are

in the higher administrative echelons:
The Landeshauptmänner (governors of provinces)
in Vienna the mayor;
in the district police echelons:
in the cities, the mayor, and the State police officer, as far as they are on hand.
in Vienna the Chief of Police
in the rural districts the district governors

IV. This decree is based upon Article 37, Section 2 of the draft law dated 21 May 1935 (Reichsgesetzbl. I, page 609) and the decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor regarding the transfer (carrying over) of the institutional law according to the draft law dated 22 May 1935 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, page 615) and the decree on the introduction of the general draft in the country of Austria dated 15 June 1938 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, page 631).

Berlin, 16 June 1938

The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces
Keitel
The Reich Minister of the Interior
Frick

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 1660-PS

28 September 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf. O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1660-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
O-1335567

H1237-0074

1726-PS

EXCERPT FROM DOCUMENT NO. 1726-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT COMMISSIONER FOR REPATRIATION

SECTION EASTERN EUROPE

PART I: DEPORTATION OF JEWISH NETHERLANDERS TO POLAND.

A) MEASURES PRECEDING DEPORTATION.

I) GERMAN MEASURES IN THE NETHERLANDS

For a better understanding of the measures preceeding the deportation of the Dutch Jews, the following survey is given, arranged in chronological order, of the measures, issued partly as "Verordnungen" and partly as "Anordnengen"etc., taken by the enemy against the group of Netherlands subjects.

July '40 Jews removed from Civil Defence services.

October '40 Marketing prohibition for Jews.

October '40 Registration at the "Wirtschafts-Prufstelle" of Jewish firms and of Limited Companies with one or more Jewish managers and/or directors; these firms etc. were put under the management of a "Verwalter", to be "aryanised" or liquidated; Official definition of the term "Jew" (Vererdn. 189/'40);

Nov. '40/ Jan '41 Dismissal of Jewish Officials;

Jan-March '41 Compulsory registration of Jews at the registers of population (Verordn. 6/'41);

Febr. '41 Dismissal of other Jewish officials in Government service.

Febr. '41 Antisemitic riots in Amsterdam;

Febr. '41 Formation -on German orders- of the "Joodsche Raad" (Jewish Council as liaison between the German authorities and the Dutch Jews - Jews no longer allowed to have contact with Netherlands officials.

Febr. '41 Formation of the "Zentralstelle fuer Juedische Auswandering"-leader S.S. Obersturmfuehrer Aus der Fuente;

Febr. '41 First razzia; about 1,000 Jews gradually arrested and within a few months sent to Buchenwalde and/or Mauthausen; the ashes of these young men were offered to their relatives shortly afterwards against the payment of f.75.-

Spring '41 Jews forbidden to visit cinemas;

March '41 Jews removed from trade and industry (Vererdn. 48/'41);

April '41 Burning of Synagogues in a number of towns in the provinces of Gelderland and Overijssel;

May '41 Registration and compulsory sale of arable land (Verdn.102/'41)

May '41 Application of the Nuremberg laws on marriages and sexual contact between non-Jews and Jews; Jews who were betrothed to non Jews were arrested and sent to concentration camps;

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May '41	Jewish lawyers, doctors and chemists were no longer allowed to have any but Jewish clients, patients respectively;
Summer '41	Jews no longer allowed to enter Parks and public gardens, or to visit theatres, concert-halls, museums, libraries, etc.
June '41	Jews no longer allowed to visit seaside resorts and swimming pools; liquidation of the "Co-ordination Commission", established in August '40;
July '41	Compulsory stamping of the identity-cards, belonging to Jews, with a "J"
Aug. '41	Compulsory registration and depositing on blocked accounts of capital and revenues of Jews with the firm Lippmann, Rosenthal & Co, which had in the meanwhile been transferred to German hands; maximum payment per family f.250 a month (Verordn. 148/'41)
Aug '41	Registration and compulsory sale of real estate by the "Grundstuecks-verwaltung" in the "Hague" (Verordn. 154/'41).
Sept. '41	Jewish children banned from the schools;
Sept. '41	Razzias in Twente and Achterhook;
Sept. '41/ Oct. '41	General travel ban for Jews;
Sept '41/ Oct '41	Jews prohibited to move to another domicile;
Sept '41/ Oct '41	Jews no longer allowed to visit hotels, cafes and restaurants;
Oct '41	Non-Jewish firms urged to dismiss their Jewish staff; in case of dismissal it was made possible to pay one lump sum in lieu of a pension (Verordn. 198/'41);
Sept/ Oct '41	Liquidation of Jewish institutions etc. by the "Commissaris voor Vereenigingen en stichtingen zonder Economisch doel" (Commissioner for Associations and Foundations without an economic object). H.W. Muller-Lehning); depositing of their capital with H.Albert de Bary & Co., Ltd.
Oct '41	Jews no longer allowed to be members of general "Associations and Foundations without an economic object" (Verordn. 199/'41);
Oct '41	Jews no longer allowed to have non-Jewish domestic staff;
Nov '41	Jews removed from theatre companies, orchestras, etc.(Verordn.211/ '41);
Jan/Apr'42	Thousands of Jews sent to Netherlands Labour Camps, of which especially the camp at Ellecom was notorious for the ill-treatment of its inmates. Age originally between 18 and 35, afterwards 18 and 5[illegible]
March '42	"Purging" of the province of Noord-Holland and of parts of Zuid-Holland and Zealand of Jews; concentration of Jews in three districts of Amsterdam
May '42	Tightening up of the regulations concerning the depositing of capital and revenues with Lippmann, Rosenthal & Co; compulsory handing in of gold, silver, jewels, objects of art, etc, (Verordn. 58/'42);

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H1237-0077

May '42	Compulsory wearing of the Yellow Badge;
May '42	Jews no longer allowed to be in the street between 8 p.m. and 6 a.m.;
May '42	Jews no longer allowed to visit non-Jewish shops except between 3 p.m. and 5 p.m.;
May '42	Jews no longer allowed to buy fruit and fish; compelled to buy food in Jewish shops only (concerns Amsterdam)
May '42	Jews forbidden to be in para-medical and a number of other professions;
May '42	Jews no longer allowed to use public conveyances; Jews with "travel permits" must travel in third class smoking compartments in trains;
May '42	Jews no longer allowed to use bicycles, - all bicycles must be handed in;
May '42	Jews no longer allowed to use the telephone;
May '42	Jews no longer allowed to enter the houses of non-Jews;
July '42	Completion of the "aryanisation" or liquidation of Jewish firms; decision to intern the Jews gradually in Westerbork to be deported from there to Poland;
July/ Sept '42	Razzias - Jews taken from their houses, assembled at the Zentralstelle fuer Juedische Auswanderung, transported to Westerbork; their household belongings seized;
Oct '42	New large scale razzias - all Jews from labour camps transferred to Westerbork;
Since Nov'42	Jews taken from their houses, from now on assembled in the so-called "Jewish Theatre" in Amsterdam, from where they were sent to Westerbork; after a few days;
April '43	Jews living outside Amsterdam sent to the camp at Vught - a labour camp for the German Army,- and eventually transported to Westerbork;
Sept '43	Last Jews from Amsterdam including the leaders of the Jewish Council, sent to Westerbork;

The transfer to Westerbork took place gradually from the Summer of 1942 till the Autumn of 1943.

Postponement, and sometimes waiving of internment could be obtained through a so-called "Sperr" stamp on the identity-card. These were given principally to persons of "mixed" marriage, whose children had been born before October '42; to baptized Jews, to persons employed by the Jewish Council, to Jews working in Factories etc, for the German Army, including diamond workers, and moreover to those figuring on the Carlmeyer, Frederiks-or van Dam list.

The Carlmeyer list, compiled by a German official, contained the names of Portuguese Jews and of others who thought that they were wrongly considered as Jews.

H1237-0078

The lists Frederiks and Van Dam, compiled by the Secretary General of the Netherlands Home Office respectively, the Ministry of Education and "Protection of Culture", contained the names of those who had deserved well of the Netherlands, including the members of their family, totalling about 500 persons. Originally they were housed near Barneveld and received the assurance that they would not be deported. Afterwards they were nevertheless transferred to Westerbork, and it seems that they were deported to Theresienstadt, presumably.

2. Westerbork.

In Westerbork - of which we need not give a description here - 12,000 to 15,000 persons used to live at the same time; they were housed in huts, which were adjusted for the purpose, and each of which contained about 800 persons.

All Jewish Netherlanders, whom the Germans could lay their hands on - with the exception of a small group of exempted persons - were brought together here; hospitals, old age homes, institutions for the blind and other disabled persons were emptied in order to concentrate the inmates in Westbork for deportation. Even the inmates of lunatic asylums did not escape deportation.

Gradually all those interned in Westerbork were deported to Poland - old people and babies included! "Zum Aebeitseinsatz unter polizeiliche Bewachung".

Once or twice a week a train "Westerbork-Auschwitz" left with 1200 to 2,000 persons. Originally these trains were composed of passenger cars, afterwards only goods vans, (first with and afterwards without straw) in each of which about 60 deportees used to be transported. Even sick people were loaded into goods vans. Every deportee was allowed to take maximum 15 kilograms of luggage with him. The choice of those to be deported was more or less arbitrary; some were able to get their deportation temporarily postponed by means of so-called "Sperr" stamps. In the Autumn of 1943, all those who had been interned at Vught - a number of about 1,200 - were deported to Poland - with the exception of diamond workers and those employed at Philips (Het Parool, 15/12/43).

The above enumeration shows clearly the gradual character of the measures of the enemy, some of which may seem of little importance. The Dutch Jews were deprived of their livelihood, their property and possessions were confiscated, every freedom of movement was taken from them, they were isolated from their fellow-citizens, and finally, as a group without any rights, humiliated and extruded, they were deported, condemned to slave labour and as it is to be feared partly killed.

After Deportation.

It is almost impossible to get details about the individual fate of Dutch Jews deported to Poland.

After their leaving Holland all trace of them was lost. Absorbed in an agglomeration of deportees from almost all occupied countries, they can no longer be identified as a separate group.

DEPORTATION OF JEWISH NETHERLANDERS
Statistical and other details.

1. THE NETHERLANDS.

a) Number of Jewish deportees.

Registered as Jews in January 1941; Netherlands subjects;			138,000
Non-Netherlands subjects:			22,000
Total number of those registered :			160,000
of whom "half" and "quarter" Jews			20,000
"Full" Jews, being liable to deportation			140,000
to be deducted:			
those who fled or emigrated		4500	
those who were killed or committed suicide		2000	
still in the Netherlands			
Jews of "mixed" Marriage:	7500		
exchange list)			
Portuguese Jews)	4000		
working in the "Wehrmacht industry,			
"Special" cases,			
in hiding.)	7000		
		18500	
			25,000
Deported from the Netherlands 1)			115,000
Deported from France and Belgium 2)			2,000
Total number of deportees			117,000

Distribution

To Poland : Netherlands subjects: 100,000, non-Netherlands subjects 15,000=115,00
To Terezin " " " 1,000, " " " 1,000= 2,00

With reference to further deportations still to be expected, and estimated a about 3,000 persons, a sum total may be reached of about 120,000 Jewish deportees

The above numbers are only approximative.

1) Netherlands and non-Netherlands subjects
2) Netherlands subjects only.

b) Names of the Deportees.

Details were registered - and may be found - with
1) the "Registratie" department in Westerbork,
2) the Zentralstelle fuer Juedische Auswandering (Aus der Fuente) in Amsterdam.

c) Moreover (in a clandestine way) with the Jewish Council in Amsterdam.

Moreover the local registers of the population as well as the Central Register of Population in The Haque are in the possession of the names of the persons whose identity cards were stamped with a "J" - the majority of whom were deported.

H1237-0079

APPENDIX 2

a) Organisations in the Netherlands which were connected with the various anti-Jewish measures;

1) the Jewish Council, Compelled to be an instrument of the Germans for the carrying out of their antisemitic measures.

2) the firm Lippmann Rosenthal & Co., seemingly a Jewish banking concern, in reality a German instrument for the confiscation of Jewish capital and revenues.

3) the "Generalkommissar fuer das Sicherheitswesen" (Hoehere S.S. und Polizeifuehrer H. Rauter, General der Polizei,), who issued many of the above-mentioned "Anordnungen."

4) the "Zentralstelle fuer Juedische Auswanderung"("Leeder Aus der Funte") under the "Generalkommissar" mentioned sub 3), seemingly an organisation for Jewish emigration - in reality a body to deprive the Jews of their rights, segregate them and deport them.

5) the "Wirtschaftspruefstelle" (working in cooperation with the "Deutsche Treuhand" A.G.) a body for the aryanisation or liquidation of Jewish firms.

6) the "Grundstueckverwaltung", a body for the confiscation of Jewish real estates.

7) the "Commissaris voor Vereenigingen en Stichtingen zonder Economisch Doel" (H.W. Muller-Lehning), who carried out the liquidation of Jewish associations and institutions.

8) the firm H.Albert de Bary Co., the bank where the capital of the above mentioned associations were deposited.

d) Economical data.

The following may be mentioned with a certain reserve:

The "Frankfurter Zeitung" of 9th June 1942 estimates that the total number of Jewish firms etc. in the Netherlands was 21,000; 11,000 of these had to be aryanised and 10,000 liquidated.

The same paper estimates the value of the firms which were "aryanised" at fl. 150,000,000, that of confiscated Jewish real estate at fl. 200,000,000, and the total of all Jewish property seized in the Netherlands at fl, 500,000,000.

London 30 th March 1944.

w.s.H.Dentz.

H1237-0080

Translation of Excerpts from Jodl Diary.

1937

4 February:

Decisive conference about the scarcity of raw materials by the Commissioner of four-year plan.

Only 50% of steel and iron available, therefore rationing necessary. Full allotment only for export. Armed forces and constructions for four-year plan must be cut down by about 40%. Therefore, requests for money have to be converted into requirements for raw materials. Three branches of the Armed Forces and L. for R.V. special resources must make up a priority sequence. Until further notice no more orders to be placed with industry so they will have a chance to fill the many orders previously placed with them.

The sentence "Money is an unimportant factor" has come true, even in another sense. The main part is the raw materials.

Bad harvest and (illegible), especially bread grain (Brotgetreide), demand considerable use of foreign currency for the feeding of the people.

31 March:

Report to the Minister about the maneuvers of the Armed Forces. The Field Marshal emphasized the necessity to bring some influence to bear (on the maneuvers) in so far as a special Armed Forces problem has to be dealt with daily. These exercises are to be designated as "Armed Forces Maneuvers" (army, etc.). After two years, a two front war i.e., two maneuvers, should be presented.

5 November:

Hitler develops his ideas of future development, intentions, and conduct of policy to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force.

There is a divergence in the recording of his ideas as made by the Chief of the Armed Forces Office (War Department) (des Chef WA (R Kr.Min)) and by the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force (Directive to the Chief of the General Staff of Air Force). (No minutes were kept).

Intention of L to put ideas on paper and transmit them to the Services (C-in-C, Air Force); furthermore, to incorporate them into mobilization instructions.

1938

11 February:

In the evening and on 12 February General K. with General V. Reichenau and Sperrle at the Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg together with G. Schmidt are again being put under heaviest political and military pressure. At 2300 hours Schuschnigg signs protocol.

13 February:

In the afternoon General K. asks Admiral C. and myself to come to his apartment. He tells us that the Fuehrer's order is to the effect that military pressure by shamming military action should be kept up until the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive maneuvers are drafted and submitted to the Fuehrer by telephone for approval.

H1237-0081

14 February:

At 2:40 o'clock the agreement of the Fuehrer arrives. Canaris went to Munich to the Counter-Intelligence office VII and initiates the different measures.

The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is created that Germany is undertaking serious military preparations.

15 February:

In the evening an official communique about the positive results of the conference at the Obersalzberg is issued.

16 February:

Changes in the Austrian government and general political amnesty.

22 February:

At 1300 hours General K. sees the Fuehrer in order to inform him about the planned advances (vorstösse).

3 March:

The Austrian question is becoming critical. 100 officers shall be dispatched there. The Fuehrer wants to see them personally. They should not see to it that the Austrian Armed Forces will fight better against us, but rather that they do not fight at all.

10 March:

By surprise and without consulting his ministers, Schuschnigg ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13 March, which should bring strong majority for the Legitimists in the absence of plan or preparation.

Fuehrer is determined not to tolerate it. The same night, March 9 to 10, he calls for Goering. General v. Reichenau is called back from Cairo Olympic Committee. General V. Schebert is ordered to come, as well as Minister Glaise Horstenau, who is with the District leader (Gauleiter) Burckel in the Palatinate. General Keitel communicates the facts at 1:45. He drives to the Reichskanzlei at 10 o'clock. I follow at 10:15, according to the wish of General v. Viebahn, to give him the old draft.
"Prepare case Otto."

1300 hours: General K informs Chief of Operational Staff (and) Admiral Canaris. Ribbentrop is being detained in London. Neurath takes over the Foreign Office.

Fuehrer wants to transmit ultimatum to the Austrian Cabinet. A personal letter is dispatched to Mussolini and the reasons are developed which force the Fuehrer to take action.

1830 hours: Mobilization order is given to the Command of the 8th Army (Corps Area 3), 7th and 13th Army Corps; without reserve Army.

Air puts 300 JU-52 in readiness for dropping of propaganda pamphlets. In addition, one Pursuit Squadron (Jagdgruppe), 3 bomber groups (Kampfgeschwader) and two companies as airborne troops with transport planes are held ready at civilian airports (Friedensflugplatze) in Bavaria.

Subordinated to the Army are: one commander of the Air Force, 2F, 3H Squadrons, courier squadron, 1 heavy A.A. Bn., Regt General Goering.

H1237-0082

H1237-0083

11 March:

Instruction No. 1 of the Fuehrer is given on 11 March at 2:00 without signature; at 1300 hours with his signature.

The Army is joined by the SS Military Units (V.T.) by regiments, 40,000 men of the police and the Totenkopf Unit Upper-Bavaria as second wave.

1700 hours: The Navy has ordered all ships back home.

1800 hours: Schuschnigg has resigned; Seyss-Inquart is chancellor. SA and SS perform duty in uniform. Own movements have commenced Frontier will not be crossed at the moment. Air Force plans large scale propaganda flights for tomorrow. The police force will be needed in any case and will be mixed with the troops.

1835 hours: Department L. has been informed. Colonel Winkler and Oberfuehrer Petri have also been informed. The Air Force has its doubts if it should initiate the movements that have not yet started.

Decision: yes.

2030 hours: Briefing received from Major General Viebahn that the situation has changed once more. The occupation will take place.

Later undated entry.

After annexation of Austria, the Fuehrer mentions that there is no hurry to solve the Czech question because Austria has to be digested first. Nevertheless preparations for Case Green will have to be carried out energetically; they will have to be newly prepared on the basis of the changed strategic position because of the annexation of Austria. State of preparations (see memorandum L I a of 19 April) reported to the Fuehrer on 21 April.

The intention of the Fuehrer not to touch the Czech problem as yet is changed because of the Czech strategic troop concentration of 21 May, which occurs without any German threat and without the slightest cause for it.

Because of Germany's self-restraint, its consequences lead to a loss of prestige of the Fuehrer, which he is not willing to take once more. Therefore, the new order is issued for "green" on 30 May.

22 May:

Fundamental conference between the Fuehrer and K. Henlein (see enclosure).

23 May:

Major Schmundt reports ideas of the Fuehrer. Further conferences, which gradually reveal the exact intentions of the Fuehrer take place with the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command (OKW) on 28 May, 3 and 9 June, see enclosures. (War Diary L)

30 May:

The Fuehrer signs directive Green, where he states his final decision to destroy Czechoslovakia soon and thereby initiates military preparation all along the line. The previous intentions

of the Army must be changed considerably in the direction of an immediate break-through into Czechoslovakia right on D-Day (X-Tag), combined with aerial penetration by by the Air Force. Further detail are derived from directive for strategic concentration of the army. The whole contrast becomes acute once more between the Fuehrer's intuition that we must do it this year and the opinion of the Army that we cannot do it as yet, as most certainly the Western Powers will interfere and we are not as yet equal to them.

10 August:

The Army chiefs and the chiefs of the Air Force groups, Lt.Col. Jeschonnek and myself are ordered to the Berghof. After dinner the Fuehrer makes a speech lasting for almost three hours, in which he develops his political thoughts. The subsequent attempts to draw the Fuehrer's attention to the defects of our preparation, which are undertaken by a few generals of the Army, are rather unfortunate. This applies especially to the remark of General Wietersheim, in which to top it off he claims to quote from General Adams (die er noch dazu den General Adams in den Mund legt) that the western fortifications can only be held for three weeks. The Fuehrer becomes very indignant and flares up, bursting into the remark that in such a case the whole Army would not be good for anything. "I assure you, General, the position will not only be held for three weeks, but for three years." The cause of this despondent opinion, which unfortunately enough is held very widely within the Army General Staff, is based on various reasons. First of all, it (the General Staff) is restrained by old memories; political considerations play a part as well, instead of obeying and executing its military mission. That is certainly done with traditional devotion, but the vigor of the soul is lacking because in the end they do not believe in the genius of the Fuehrer. And on does perhaps compare him with Charles XII. And since water flows downhill, this defeatism may not only possibly cause immense political damage, for the opposition between the Generals' opinion and that of the Fuehrer is common talk, but may also constitute a danger for the morale of the troops. But I have no doubt that (?) the Fuehrer will be able to boost the morale of the people in an unexpected way when the right moment comes.

21-26 August:

Visit to Germany of the Hungarian Regent (Reichsverweser). Accompanied by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Honved Minister v. Rattz (?).

They arrive with the idea, that in the course of a great war, after a few years, and with the help of German troops, the old state of Hungary can be reestablished. They leave with the understanding that we have neither demands from, nor claims against them, but that Germany will not stand for a second provocation by Czechoslovakia, even if it should be tomorrow. If they want to participate at that moment, it is up to them.

Germany, however, will never play the role of arbitrator between them and Poland. The Hungarians agree; but they believe that, when the issue arises, a period of 48 hours would be indispensable to them to find out Yugoslavia's attitude.

6 September:

Chief of General Staff, General of Artillery Halder, has a conference with the Hungarian Chief of General Staff Fischer.

H1237-0084

H1237-0085

Before that he is briefed by me on the political attitude of the Fuehrer - especially his order not to give any hint on the exact moment. The same with OQI, General v. Stuelpnagel.

8 September:

General Stulpnagel OQI asks for written assurance that the Army High Command will be informed five days in advance if the plan is to take place. I agree and add that the overall meteorological situation can be estimated to some extent only for two days in advance, and that therefore, the plans may be changed up to this moment. (D-day-2) (X-2 TAGE).

General Stulpnagel mentions that for the first time he wonders whether the previous basis of the plan is not being abandoned. It presupposed that the Western Powers would not interfere decisively. It gradually seems as if the Fuehrer would stick to his decision even though he may no longer be of this opinion. It must be added that Hungary is at least moody and Italy reserved.

I must admit that I am worrying too, when comparing the change of opinion about political and military potentialities, according to directives of 24 June, 5 Nov 37, 7 Dec 37, 30 May 38, with the last statements.

In spite of that one must be aware of the fact that the other nations will do everything they can to apply pressure to us. We must pass this test of nerves, but because only very few people know the art of withstanding this pressure successfully, the only possible solution is to inform only a very small circle of officers of news that causes us anxiety, and not to have it circulated through anterooms as heretofore.

1800 hours to 2100 hours: Conference with Chief of Army High Command and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force (present were Jeschonnek, Kammhuber, Stumpff and myself).

We agree about the promulgation of the D-day order (X-Befehl) (x-1, 4 o'clock) and preannouncement to the Air Force (D-Day-1, x-1 day, 7 o'clock). The "Y time" has yet to be examined; some formations have an approach flight of one hour.

10 September:

General Halder back from Nurnberg. He reports that the Fuehrer signed decree subordinating the Reich Labor Service to the Army High Command, as of 15 September. Furthermore it was decided that the 13th and 2nd motorized divisions would join the Reichenau Army and their place would be taken by two other divisions (3 words illegible).

11 September:

In the afternoon conference with Secretary of State Jahnke from the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda on imminent common tasks.

The joint preparations for refutation (Wiederlegung) of our own violations of international law, and the exploitation of its violations by the enemy, were considered particularly important.

15 September:

In the morning conference with Chief of Army High Command and Chief of General Staffs of Army and Air Forces; the question was discussed what could be done if the Fuehrer insists on advancement of the date, due to the rapid development of the situation.

H1237-0086

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT
NO. 1780-PS. Continued.

16 September:

General Keitel returns from the Berghof at 1700 hours. He graphically describes the results of the conference between Chamberlain and the Fuehrer. The next conference will take place on the 21st or the 22nd in Godesberg.

With consent of the Fuehrer, the order is given in the evening by the Armed Forces High Command to the Army High Command and to the Ministry of Finance, to line up the V.G.A.D. along the Czech border.

In the same way, an order is issued to the railways to have the empty rolling stock kept in readiness clandestinely for the strategic concentrations of the Army, so that it can be transported starting 28 September.

17 September:

Contrary to the previous intention to transfer all Sudeten Germans with previous military training to the Replacement Army, the Fuehrer issues order to unite them into a Sudeten German Free Corps. The Armed Forces High Command puts Lt. Col. Koechling (reporter on youth questions) at the disposal of Konrad Henlein as advisor to Henlein.

19 September:

Order is given to the Army High Command to take care of the Sudeten German Free Corps.

20 September:

England and France have handed over their demands in Prague, the contents of which are still unknown. The activities of the Free Corps start assuming such an extent that they may bring about, and already have brought about, consequences harmful to the plans of the Army. (Transferring rather strong units of the Czech Army to the proximity of the border). By checking with Lt. Col. Koechling, I attempt to lead these activities into normal channels.

Toward the evening the Fuehrer also takes a hand and gives permission to act only with groups up to 12 men each, after the approval of the Corps HQ.

21 September:

The motorized reinforcements by the L. take effect.

1130 hours: Telephone call from the Adjutant of the Fuehrer, Captain Engel, (it is submitted during the conference with the Chiefs by Captain Eberhardt). "The Fuehrer has received news five minutes ago that Prague is said to have accepted unconditionally."

1245 hours: Department heads are informed and directive is given to continue preparation for "Green", but nevertheless to get ready with everything necessary for a peaceful penetration. Orders to the Ic and Ib of Navy High Command and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force; General Stumpf to be informed.

22 September:

1920 hours: Ia reports about a telephone call from Godesberg by General von Stulpnagel on behalf of Keitel. Subject: a) Date cannot yet be ascertained (D-Day) (x- Tag); continue preparations according to plan. In case "Green" occurs, it will not be before 30 September. If it occurs sooner, it will probably be improvised.

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20 Sept.:

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Toward the evening the Fuhrer also takes a hand and gives me permission to act with groups up to 12 men each, after the approval of the Corps Gen. Staff HQ.
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The motorized reinforcements by the L. take effect. 11:30 hours.: Telephone call from the Adjutant of the Führer, Capt. Engel, (it is submitted during the conference with the Chiefs by Capt. Eberhardt).
"The Führer has received news five minutes ago that Prague is said to have accepted unconditionally.
12:45 hrs.: Department heads are informed and directive is given to continue preparation for "green" but nevertheless to get ready with everything necessary for a peaceful penetration. Orders to the Ic and Ib of Navy High Command and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force, General Stumpf to be informed.

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25 Sept.:

By order of the Führer, two Death Head SS battalions have moved into the Panhandle territory near Asch (Ascher Zipfel) to the rear of the Free Corps.

26 Sept.:

Chief of the Armed Forces High Command has stopped through the Army High Command, the intended approach march of the advance units to the Czech border, because it is not yet necessary and because the Führer does not intend to march in before the 30th in any case. Order to approach towards the Czech frontier need be given on the 27th only.
In the evening of the 26th, fixed radio stations of Breslau, Dresden and Vienna are put at the disposal of the Reich Ministry for popular enlightenment and propaganda for interference with possible Czech propaganda transmissions.

Foreign (?) question whether Czechs are to be allowed to leave and cross Germany. Decision from Chief of the Armed Forces High Command: Yes.
15:15 hrs.; The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command informs General Stumpf about the result of the Godesberg conversations and about the Führer's opinion. In no case will x day be before the 30th.

It is important that we do not permit ourselves to be drawn into military engagements because of false reports, before Prague replied.

A question of Stumpf about Y hour results in the reply that on account of the weather situation, a simultaneous intervention of the Air Force and Army cannot be expected. The Army could be drawn, the Air Force can only start later on account of frequent fogs.

The Führer has to make a decision for the O.B. (commander in chief(?)) who is to have priority.
The opinion of Stumpf is also that the attack of the Army has to precede. The Führer has not made any decision as yet about commitment against Prague.
20:00 hrs.: The Führer addresses the people and the world in an important speech at the sportpalast.

27 Sept.:
13:20 hrs.:The Führer consents to the first wave of attack being advanced to a line from where they can arrive in the assembly area by 30 Sept.

28 Sept.;
Hapf(?) reports about a conference with Goering where the latter states that a Great War can hardly be avoided any longer. It may last 7 years, and we will win it.
17:00 hrs.: Tension relaxes. The Führer has decided on a conference with Chamberlain, the Duce and Daladier in Munich.

29 Sept.:
The pact of Munich is signed. Czechoslovakia as a power is out. four zones as set forth will be occupied between the 2nd and 7th of October. The remaining part with mainly German features will be occupied by the 10th of October. The genius of the Führer and his determination not to shun even a World War have again won the victory without the use of force. The hope remains that the incredulous, the weak and the doubtful people have been converted and will remain that way.

1939
23 Aug.:
Received order from Armed Forces High Command to proceed to Berlin and take over position of Chief of Armed Forces Executive officer.(WFA).
11hrs--13:30 hrs.: Discussions with Chief of Armed Forces High Command. Y day has been announced for 26 Aug.
X time has been announced for 4:30 hours.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 1780-PS

19 November 1945.

I, PAUL W. FREEDMAN, S/Sgt. AUS, 33,799,122, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document 1780-PS.

-/-

PAUL W. FREEDMAN,
S/Sgt. AUS,
33,799,122

H1237-0088

1816-PS

STENOGRAPHIC REPORT

OF THE MEETING ON "THE JEWISH QUESTION"

UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF FIELD MARSHALL

GOERING

IN THE REICHS AIR FORCE

(12 November 1938--11 O'clock.)

- -

H1237-0089

H1237-0090

Stenographic Report on a part of the Conference on the Jewish Question under the presidency of Fieldmarshall Goering at the Reich Ministry for Air on 12 November 1938--11 O'clock.

Goering: Gentlemen! Today's meeting is of a decisive nature. I have received a letter written on the Fuehrer's orders by the Stabsleiter of the Fuehrer's deputy Borman, requesting that the Jewish question be now, once and for all, coordinated and solved one way or another. And yesterday once again did the Fuehrer request by phone for me to take coordinated action in the matter.

Since the problem is mainly an economic one, it is from the economic angle that it shall have to be tackled. Naturally a number of legal measures shall have to be taken which fall into the sphere of the Minister for Justice and into that of the Minister of the Interior; and certain propaganda measures shall be taken care of by the office of the Minister for Propaganda. The Minister for Finance and the Minister for Economic Affairs shall take care of problems falling into their respective resorts.

In the meeting, in which we first talked about this question and came to the decision to aryanize German economy, to take the Jew out of it, and put him into our debit ledger, was one in which, to our shame, we only made pretty plans, which were executed very slowly. We then had a demonstration, eight here in Berlin, we told the people that something decisive would be done, but again nothing happened. We have had this affair in Paris now, more demonstrations followed and this time something decisive must be done!

Because, Gentlemen, I have enough of these demonstrations! They don't harm the Jew but me, who is the last authority for coordinating the German Economy.

If today, a Jewish shop is destroyed, if goods are thrown into the street, the insurance company will pay for the damages, which the Jew does not even have-; and furthermore goods of the consumer goods belonging to the people, are destroyed. If in the future, demonstrations which are necessary, occur, then, I pray, that they be directed, so as not to hurt us.

Because it's insane, to clean out and burn a Jewish warehouse then have a German insurance company make good the loss. And the goods which I need desperately, whole boles of clothing and what not, are being burned; and I miss them everywhere.

I may as well burn the raw materiels before they arrive. The people of course, do not understand that; therefore we must make laws which will show the people once and for all, that something is being done.

I should appreciate it very much if for once, our propaganda would make it clear that it is unfortunately not the Jew who has to suffer in all this but the German Insurance Companies.

I am not going to tolerate a situation in which the Insurance Companies are the ones who suffer. Under the authority invested in me, I shall issue a decree, and I am, of course, requesting the support of the competent Government Agencies, so that everything shall be processed through the right channels, and the Insurance Companies will not be the ones who suffer.

It may be, though, that these Insurance Companies may have insurance in Foreign countries- If that is the case, foreign bills of exchange would be available which I would not want to lose. That shall have to be checked. For that reason, I have asked Mr. HILGARD of the Insurance company, to attend, since he is best qualified to tell us to what extent the insurance companies are protected against damage, by having taken out insurance with other companies. I would not want to miss this, under any circumstances.

I should not want to leave any doubt, Gentlemen, as to the aim of today's meeting. We have not come together merely to talk again but to make decisions, and I implore the competent agencies to take all measures for the elimination of the Jew from German economy and to submit them to me, as far as it is necessary.

The fundamental idea in this program of elimination of the Jew from German Economy is first, the Jew being ejected from the Economy transfers his property to the State. He will be compensated

H1237-0091

The compensation is to be listed in the debit ledger and shall bring a certain percentage of interest. The Jew shall have to live out of this interest. It is a foregone conclusion, that this aryanizing, if it is to be done quickly, cannot be made in the Ministry for Economy in Berlin. That way, we would never finish.

On the other hand, it is very necessary to have safety precautions so that the lower echelons, Stassholser, and Gauleitern will not do things unreasonably. One must issue correction directives, immediately.

The Aryanizing of all the larger establishments, naturally, is to be my lot,-the ministry for economy will designate, which and how many there are-; it must not be done by a Statthalter or his lower echelons, since these things reach into the export trade, and cause great problems, which the Statthalter can neither observe, nor solve from his place.

It is my lot, so that the damage will not be greater than the profit, which we are striving for.

It is obvious, Gentlemen, that the Jewish stores are for the people, and not the stores. Therefore, we must begin here, according to the rules previously layed down.

The Minister for Economic Affairs shall announce which stores he'll want to close altogether. These stores are excluded from aryanizing at once. Their stocks are to be made available for sale in other stores; what cannot be sold, shall be processed through the "Winterhilfe" or taken care of otherwise. However, the sales values of these articles shall always be considered, since the State is not to suffer but should profit through this transformation. For the Chain and Department Stores- I speak now only of that, what can be seen, certain categories have to be established, according to the importance of the various branches.

The trustee of the State will estimate the value of the property and decide what amount the Jew shall receive. Naturally, this amount is to be set as low as possible. The representative of the State shall then turn the establishment over to the "ARian" proprietor, that is, the property shall be sold according to its real value.

There begins the difficulties. It is easily understood that strong attempt will be made to get all these stores to Party-members and to let them have some kind of compensations. I have witnessed terrible things in the past; little chauffeurs of Gauleiters have profited so much by these transactions that they have now about half a million. You, Gentlemen, know it. Is that correct?

(Assent)

Of course, things like that are impossible. I shall not hesitate to act ruthlessly in any case where such a trick is played. If the individual involved is prominent, I shall see the Fuehrer within two hours and report to him.

We shall have to insist upon it, that the Arian taking over the establishment is of the branch and knows his job. Generally speaking he is the one who must pay for the store with his own money. In other words, an ordinary business-transaction is to be sought-one merchant selling, the other one buying a business. If there are party members among the contenders, they are to be preferred, that is if they have the same qualifications: first shall come the one who had the most damage, and secondly, selection should be according to length of Party membership.

Of course, there may be exceptions. There are party-members who, as may be proven, lost their business concessions by action of the Schuschnigg or Prague Government, and so went bankrupt. Such a man has naturally first option on a store for sale, and he shall receive help if he does not have the means to help himself. The trustee of the State can justify this help, if he is more business like in the transfer. This party-member should have the chance to buy the store for as cheap a price as possible. In such a case the state will not receive the full price, but only the amount the Jew received. Such a buyer may even receive a loan, besides, so that he will get off to a good start.

H1237-0092

I wish to make it clear that such a proceeding shall only be legal if the Party-member has once owned such a store. For example, a Party-member was the owner of a Stationary store, and Schuschnigg took away the concession to operate it so that the man lost the store and went bankrupt. Now, if a Jewish Stationary store is being aryanized, this party-member should get the store on conditions which he'll be able to fulfil. Such a case shall be the only exception though, in all other cases the procedure shall be of a strictly business-like nature whereby the Party-member, like I said before, shall have the preference, if he has the same qualifications as any other candidate, who is not a member of the party.

When selling for the actual value we shall find only about 60 Arians ready to take over 100 Jewish stores. I don't think that we have a German for every Jewish store. You must not forget that the Jew sees his main activity in the field of trade, and that he owns 90% of it. I doubt that we'd have a demand big enough. I even doubt that we'd have enough people, particularly now since everybody has found his field of work.

Therefore, I ask the Minister for Economy to go beyond what we think ought to be done for the sake of the principle, in liquidating the establishments-I ask him to go further, even though there won't be any candidates. That'll be perfectly alright.

The transfer of stores and establishments shall have to be executed by the lower echelons, not through Berlin but through the Gaue and through the Reichstatthalterschaft. Therein shall be the seat of the members of the Board of Trustees, even if it consists of a few people only. The Statthalter and his people cannot do this job; the trustees will have to tackle it. But the Statthalter shall be the authority which supervises, according to the regulations given him, the Trustees, particularly in dealings such as the transfer to Party-members.

Naturally, these establishments cannot disappear all at once but we'll have to start by Monday, in a manner that shall make it obvious that a change has begun to materialize. Besides that, certain stores could be closed which will make things here easier.

Another point! I have noticed that Arians took over a Jewish store and were then so clever to keep the name of the Jewish store as "formerly", or kept it altogether. That must not be; I can no permit it. Because it may happen-what has just happened-stores were looted because their sign-boards bore Jewish names-because they had once been Jewish, but had been "aryanized" a long time ago. Names of former Jewish firms shall have to disappear completely, and the German shall have to come forward with this or his firm's name. I ask you to carry this out quite definitely. That much then regarding aryanizing of stores and wholesale establishments, particularly in regards to sign-boards and of all that is obvious!

Of the consequences resulting from this for the Jew, I shall speak later, because this is connected with other things.

Now for the factories. As for the smaller and medium ones, two things shall have to be made clear.

1) Which factories do I not need at all, which are the ones where productions could be suspended? Could they not be putto another use? If not, the factories will be razed immediately.
2) In case the factory should be needed, it will be turned over to Arians in the same manner as the Stores. All these measures have to be taken quickly, since Arian employees are concerned everywhere. I'd like to say right now that Arian employees shall have to be given employment immediately after the Jewish factory is closed. Considering the amount of labor we need these days, it should be a trifle to keep these people, even in their own branches.
As I have just said; if the factory is necessary, it will be aryanized. If there is no need for it, it being abandoned shall be part of the procedure of transforming establishments not essential, for our national

welfare into one that is essential for it,-a procedure that shall take place within the next few weeks. For it, I shall still need very much space and very many factories.

If such a factory is to be transformed or razed, the first thing to be done is check the equipment. The questions arising will be: Where can this equipment be used? Could it be used after the place is transformed? Where else might it be needed badly? Where could the machinery be set up again? It follows that aryanizing factories will be an even more difficult task than the aryanizing of stores.

Take now the larger factories which are run solely by a Jewish owner, without control by a Board of Directors; or take corporations where the Jew might be in the Supervisory Council or Board of Directors. There the solution is very simple: the factory can be compensated in the same manner as in the sale of stores and factories; that is, at a rate which we shall determine, and the trustee shall take over the Jew's interest as well as his shares, which he in turn may sell or transfer to the State, which will then dispose of them. So, if I have a big factory, which belonged to a Jew or a Jewish corporation, and the Jew leaves, perhaps with his sons who were employed there, the factory will still continue to operate. Maybe a director will have to be appointed because the Jew has run the factory himself. But otherwise, particularly if the maintenance of the establishment is very essential everything will run smoothly.

Everything is very simple. I now have his shares. I may give them to some Arian or to another group or I may keep them. The State takes them over and offers them at the stock market, if they are acceptable there and if it so desires, or it makes use of them in some other way.

Now, I shall talk of the very big establishments, those in which the Jew is in the Board of Directors, in which he holds shares etc, and so is either the owner or one of the co-owners; in any case in which he is greatly interested. There too, things are comparatively simple; he delivers all of his shares which shall be bought at a price fixed by the trustee. So the Jew gets into the account book. The shares shall be handled like I've just explained. These cases can not be taken care of by the Gaue and Reichsstatthalter, but only by us here on top; because we are the only ones to decide where these factories are to be transferred to, how they may be affiliated with other establishments or to what an extent the State shall keep them or hand them over to another establishment belonging to the State. All this can only be decided here. Of course, will the Gauleiter and Statthalter be to glad to get hold of the shares, and they'll make great promises to beautify our capital cities etc. I know it all! It won't go! We must agree on a clear action that shall be profitable to the Reich.

The same procedure shall be applied where the Jew has a share in, or owns property of German Economy. I am not competent enough to tell off hand in what forms that might be the case, and to what an extent he'll have to lose it. Anyway, the Jew must be evicted pretty fast from German Economy.

Now, the foreign Jews. There we'll have to make distinctions between the Jews who have always been foreigners,-and who shall have to be treated according to the laws we arranged with their respective countries. But regarding those Jews who were Germans, have always lived in Germany and have acquired foreign citizenship during the last year, only because they wanted to play safe, I ask you not to give them any consideration. We'll finish with these. Or have you any misgivings? We shall try to induce them through slight and then through stronger pressure and through clever manoevering,-to let themselves be pushed out voluntarily.

Woermann: I'd like the Foreign Office to be included, since a generally valid decision could hardly be made

Goering: We cannot consult you in every case,-but on the whole we will.

H1237-0093

Woermann: Anyway, I'd like to make known the claim of the Foreign Office to participate. One never knows what steps may become necessary.

Goering: Only for important cases! I do not like to take this category under special consideration. I have learned only now to what extent that has been done, particularly in Austria and Checkoslovakia. If somebody was a Check in Sudetenland, we do not have to consider him at all, and the Foreign Office doesn't have to be consulted because that person now belongs to us. And in Austria and also in Sudetenland, too many become all of a sudden Englishmen or Americans or what not -and generally speaking we cannot consider that a great deal.

(PART II IS MISSING)

(Part III)

Funk: That is quite a decisive question for us: should the Jewish stores be re-opened?

Goebbels: If they will be re-opened is another question. The question is will they be restored? I have set the dead line for Monday,

Goering: You don't have to ask whether they'll be re-opened. That is up to us to decide.

Goebbels : Number 2. In almost all German cities synagogues are burned. Now, various possibilities exist to utilize the space where the synagogues stood. Some cities want to build parks in their place, others want to put up new buildings.

Goering : How many synagogues were actually burned?

Heydrich: Altogether there are 101 synagogues destroyed by fire, 76 synagogues demolished, and 7,500 stores ruined in the Reich.

Goering : What do you mean "destroyed by fire"

Heydrich: Partly, they are razed, and partly gutted.

Goebbels: I am of the opinion that this is our chance to dissolve the synagogues. All those not completely intact, shall be razed by the Jews. The Jews shall pay for it. There in Berlin, the Jews are ready to do that. The synagogues which burned in Berlin are being levelled by the Jews themselves. We shall build parking lots in their places or new buildings. That ought to be the critireon for the whole country, the Jews shall have to remove the damaged or burned synagogues, and shall have to provede us with ready free space.

Number 3:-I deem it necessary to issue a decree forbidding the Jews to enter German Theaters, movie houses and circuses. I have already issued such a decree under the authority of the law of the chamber for culture. Considering the present situation of the theaters, I believe we can afford that. Our theaters are over crowded, we have hardly any room. I am of the opinion that it is not possible to have Jews sitting next to Germans in Varietees, Movies and Theaters. One might consider, later on, to let the Jews have one or two movie-houses here in Berlin, where they may see Jewish movies. But in German theaters they have no business anymore.

Furthermore, I advocate that the Jews be eliminated from all positions in public life in which they may prove to be provocative. It is still possible today that a Jew shares a compartment in a

sleeping car with a German. Therefore, we need a decree by the Reich Ministry for Communications stating that separate compartments for Jews shall be available; in case where compartments are filled up, Jews cannot claim a seat; They shall be given a separate compartment only after all Germans have secured seats. They shall not mix with Germans, and if there is no more room, they shall have to stand in the corridor.

Goering: In that case, I think it would make more sense to give them separate compartments.

Goebbels: Not if the train is overcrowded!

Goering: Just a moment. There'll be only one Jewish coach. If that is filled up, the other Jews will have to stay at home.

Goebbels: Suppose, though, there won't be many Jews going on the express train to Munich, suppose there would be two Jews in the train and the other compartments would be overcrowded. These two Jews would then have a compartment all themselves. Therefore, Jews may claim a seat only after all Germans have secured a seat.

Goering: I'd give the Jews one coach or one compartment. And should a case like you mention arise and the train be overcrowded, believe me, we won't need a law. We'll kick him out and he'll have to sit all alone in the toilet all the way!?

Goebbels: I don't agree. I don't believe in this. There ought to be a law. Furthermore, there ought to be a decree barring Jews from German beaches and resorts. Last summer----

Goering: Particularly here in the Admiralspalast very disgusting things have happened lately.

Goebbels: Also at the Wannsee-beach. A law which definitely forbids the Jews to visit German resorts!

Goering: We could give them their own.

Goebbels: It would have to be considered whether we'd give them their own or whether we should turn a few German resorts over to them, but not the finest and best, so we cannot say the Jews go there for recreation.

It'll also have to be considered if it might not become necessary to forbid the Jews to enter the German forest. In the Grunewald, whole herds of them are running around. It is a constant provocation and we are having incidents all the time. The behavior of the Jews is so inciting and provocative that brawls are a daily routine.

Goering: We shall give the Jews a certain part of the forest, and the Alpers shall take care of it that various animals that look damned much like Jews,- the Elk has such a crooked nose,-get their also and become acclimated.

Goebbels: I think this behavior is provocative. Furthermore, Jews should not be allowed to sit around in German parks. I am thinking of the whispering campaign on the part of Jewish women in the public gardens at Fehrbelliner Platz. They go and sit with German mothers and their children and begin to gossip and incite.

Goebbels: I see in this a particularly grave danger. I think it is imperative to give the Jews certain public parks, not the best ones- and tell them: "You may sit on these benches:" these benches shall be marked "For Jews only". Besides that they have no business in German parks. Furthermore, Jewish children are still allowed

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in German schools. That's impossible. It is out of the question that any boy should sit beside a Jewish boy in a German Gynnasium and receive lessons in German history. Jews ought to be eliminated completely from German schools; they may take care of their own education in their own communities.

Goering: I suggest that Mr. Hilgard from the Insurance Co. be called in; he is waiting outside. As soon as He'll be finished with his report, he may go, and we can continue to talk. At the time Gustloff died, a compensation for the damage Germany had suffered, was prepared. But I believe that at present we should not work it through rained taxes but with a contribution paid only once. That serves my purpose, better.

(Hilgard appears)

Mr. Hilgard: The following is our case. Because of the justified anger of the people against the Jew, the Reich has suffered a certain amount of damage. Windows were broken, goods were damaged and people hurt, synagogues burned etc. I suppose that the Jews, many of them are also insured against damage committed by public disorder etc.

(Hilgard:- "Yes"

If that is so, the following situation arises; the people, in their justified anger, meant to harm the Jew; but it is the German insurance companies that will compensate the Jew for damage. This situation is simple enough; I'd only have to issue a decree to that effect that damage, resulting from these risks, shall not have to be paid by the insurance companies. But the question that interests me primarily, and because of which I have asked you to come here, is this one; in case of reinsurance policies in foreign countries, I should not like to lose these, and that is why I'd like to discuss with you ways and means by which profit from reinsurance, possibly in foreign currency will go to the German economy, instead of the Jew. I'd like to hear from you, and that is the first question I want to ask: In your opeinion, are the Jews insured against such damage to a large extent?

Hilgard: Permit me to answer right away. We are concerned with three kinds of insurances. Not with the insurance against damage resulting from revolt or from risks. But with the ordinary fire-insurance, the ordinary glass-insurance, and the ordinary insurance against theft. The people, because of their contracts, who have a right to claim compensation are partly Jews, partly Arians. As for the fire-insurance they are practically all Jewish, I suppose. As for the department-stores, the victim is identical with the Jew, the owner. That applies more to the synagogues, except for neighbors to whose places the fire may have spread. Although the damage is done to the latter's property seems to be rather slight, according to the inquiries I made late last night.

As for the glass-insurance which plays a very important part in this, the situation is completely different. The majority of the victims mostly the owners of the buildings are Arians., the Jew has usually rented the store, a procedure which you may observe all over, for example on Kairfuerstendamin.

Goering: That is what we've said.

Goebbels: In these cases, the Jew will have to pay.

Goering: It doesn't make sense, we have no raw-materials. It is all glass imported from foreign countries and has to be paid for in foreign currency! One could go nuts.

Hilgard: May I draw your attention to the following facts; the glass for the shop-windows is not being manufactured by the Bohemian, but by the Belgian glass industry. In my estimation, the approximate money-value of which these damages amount is 6,000,000- that includes the broken glass, glass which we shall have to replace, mainly to Arians because they have the insurance policies.

Of course I have to reserve final judgement in all this, Your Excellency, because I have had only one day to make my inquiries. Even counting on about half of the 6,000,000 being spent in transacting the business-specialists from the Industry itself are more confident in this matter than I am, we might well have to import glass for approximately 3,000,000. Incidentally, the amount of the damage equals about half of a whole year's production of the Belgian glass industry. We believe that half a year will be necessary for the manufacturers to deliver the glass.

Goering: The people will have to be enlightened on this.

Goebbels: We cannot do this right now.

Goering: This cannot continue! We won't be able to last with all this. Impossible! Go on then! You suggest that the Arian is the one who suffers the damage; is that right?

Hilgard: Yes, to a large extent, as far as the glass-insurance goes.

Goering: Which would have to replace the glass.

Hilgard: Yes. Of course there are cases in which the Arian, the owner of the store is identical with the owner of the building. That is so with all department stores. In the case of the department store Israel, the owner is the Jew.

Goering: And now the third category.

Hilgard: Under this fall the victims of thievery.

Goering: I have to ask you a question. When all kinds of goods were taken from the stores and burned in the streets, would that also be thievery?

Hilgard: I don't think so.

Goering: Could that be termed as "Riot"?

Hilgard: That is just the question which we are unable to decide at this moment. Is it ordinary theft if entry into a dwelling or a container of any kind is forced and something is taken away?

Goering: That is a case of "Riot".

Hilgard: Riot does not mean much since we have very little insurance against damage caused by riots, these were discarded by us long ago.

Goering: But this here is "Rioting ". That is the legal term. There was no theft, and no individual broke into any place. But a mob rushes in and knocks everything to pieces., or "Public Disturbances"

Hilgard: Public disturbance. It is no riot.

Goering: Are they insured against damages caused by public disturbances?

Hilgard: No, no more. May I show this by an example. The most remarkable of these cases is the case MARGRAF Under Den Linden. The Jewelry store of MARGRAF, is insured with us through a so-called combined policy. That covers practically any damage that may occur. This damage was reported to us as amounting to 1,700,000 because the store was completely stripped.

Goering: Daluegue and Heydrich, you'll have to get me this jewelry through raids, staged on a tremendous scale!

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Saligue: The order has already been given. The people are being controlled all the time. According to reports, 159 were arrested by yesterday afternoon.

Goering: These things will otherwise be hidden. If somebody comes to a store with jewels and claims that he has bought them, they'll be confiscated at once. He has stolen them or traded them in alright.

Heydrich: Besides that, looting was going on in the Reich in more than 800 cases, contrary to what we supposed. ; but we have already several hundred people who were plundering, and we are trying to get the loot back.

Goering: And the jewels?

Heydrich: That is very difficult to say. They were partly thrown into the street and picked up there. Similar things happened with furiers, for example in Friedrichstrasse, district C, There the crowd was naturally rushing to pick up minks, skunks etc. It'll be very difficult to recover that. Even children have filled their pockets, just for fun. It is suggested that the Hitler-Youth is not to be employed and to participate in such actions without the Party's consent. Such things are very easily destroyed.

Saluegue: The Party should issue an order to the effect that the police will immediately recieve a report in case the neighbor's wif everybody knows his neighbor, has a fur coat altered or in case somebody appears wearing new rings or bracelets. We'd like the Party to support us here.

Hilgard: These damages are not covered by the policy, I believe. May I say a word in general about our liabilities and a "Petidum" of the Versicherungswirkschaft report. We'd like to make it our point, Mr. General Field Marshall, that we shall not be hindered in fulfilling the obligations for which our contracts call.

Goering: But I have to. That is important for me.

Hilgard: If I may give reasons for this request, I'd like to say that it simply has to do with the fact that we carry out, to a large extent, quite a number of international transactions. We have a very good international basis for our business-transactions, and in the interest of the equilibrium of the Foreign exchange in Germany, we have to make sure that the confidence in the German Insurance shall not be ruined. If we now refuse to honor clear-cut obligations, imposed upon us through lawful contract, it would be a black spot on the shield of honor of the German Insurance.

Goering: It wouldn't the minute I issue a decree, a law sanctioned by the State.

Hilgard: I was leading up to that.

Heydrich: The insurance may be granted, but as soon as it is to be paid, it'll be confiscated. That way we'll have saved face.

Hilgard: I am inclined to agree with what General Heydrich has just said. First of all, use the mechanism of the insurance company to check on the damage, to regulate it and even pay, but give the insurance company the change to:

Goering: One moment! You'll have to pay in any case because it is th Germans who suffered the damage. But there'll be a lawful order forbidding you to make any direct payments to the Jews. You shall

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also have to make payment for the damage the Jews have suffered, but not to the Jews but to the Minister of Finance.
(Hilgard: Aha!)
What he does with the money is his business.

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Schmer: Your Excellency, I should like to make a proposal. A Cert in rate should be fixed, say 15% or maybe a little higher, of all the registered wealth, I understand one billion is to be confiscated so that all Jews shall pay equally, and from the money raised this way, the insurance companies shall be refunded.

Goering: No. I don't even dream of refunding the insurance companie the money. The companies are liable. No, the money belongs to the State. That's quite clear. That would indeed be a present for the insurance companies. You make a wonderful Petidum there. You'll fulfill your obligations, you may count on that.

Kerl: It seems that in one respect, we'll have to arrange this somewhat differently. As far as the glass-insurance goes, the fact of the matter is that the owners of the buildings will definitely have to be paid for the damage, as stipulated. The majority of these companies, with the exception of one Joint Stock Company in Cologne, are all very smallReciprocity-companies(Gegenseitsvereine). They won't be able to make up for the damage. We'll have to find out how far they are covered by re-insurance which I cannot tell at the moment.

Hilgard: In this connection, the re-insurance plays a relatively small role, except for the large fire-insurance policies taken out by department stores. There is no re-insurence in the glass insurances, for the simple reason that, under normal conditions glass insurance is one of our best branches in the insurance business; and therefore does not need re-insurance. I have to add, though, that the amount of this damage is approximately twice as high as the amount of damage for an average year. It makes all our calculations wrong and completely wipes out our chance for profit.(Interrupted by Kerl)

No, Sir, that is the way it is. The whole premium of the German glass insurance amounts to 14,000,000. if I am not wrong. Under normal conditions it amounted to 4 or 5 million. The glass insurance is our greatest asset. So far, the greates profits were made in it. But now, the amount of this damage is alone twice as high as the amount for one ordinary year. With the various special glass-insurances, it altogether different.

Goering: One moment! 4 to 5 millions normally. Twice as much would be about 10 million. You suggested 14 million. There are still 4 million left.

Hilgard: We'll also have to pay for the expenses. No, it is a very great catastrophe for us. Let me point out that the damage in the whole of Germany, in my estimation, shall amount to approximately 25 million mark. I wanted to be careful.

Heydrich: We estimate that the damage to property, to furniture and to consumer-goods amounts to several hundred million; although that includes the damage the Reich shall suffer from loss of taxes. sales taxes, taxes on property and on income. I assume that the Minister for Finance too , has been informed on all this.

V. Krosigk: I have no idea about the extent.

Heydrich: 7,500 destroyed stores in the Reich.

Daluege: One more question ought to be cleared up. Most of the goods in the stores were not the property of the owner but were kept on the books of other firms, which had delivered them. Then there are the unpaid for deliveries by other firms, which definitely are not all Jewish but Arian, those goods that were delitered on the basis of commission.

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Contd.

Hilgard: We'll have to pay for them, too.

Goering: I wished you had killed 200 Jews, and not destroyed such values.

Heydrich: There were 35 killed.

Kerl: I think we could do the following: Jews we don't pay anyhow. As for Arians, payment shall have to be made; the insurance company may contact us through the "Reichsgruppe" and we shall investigate each case. I am thinking of the small Reciprocity-Companies; it should be easy to find out whether they are capable of paying or not. In their cases, the amounts involved are not too large. We may find an arrangement for this later on; I am thinking of one in which the insurance companies arrange for recompensation exclusively to Arian, and once they know the results of their inquiries, contact us. We shall then find a way out for these small companies. Of course only in cases where it is absolutely necessary.

Funk: That is not necessary. I'd like to refer to what I've said before about the decree. That seems to be the easiest solution.

Goering: We cannot do that. These people make a point of their ability to pay.

Funk: If the Jews pay for it, the insurance companies don't have to pay.

Goering: Right, well, Gentlemen, this is all very clear. We'll stick to it. At this moment every insurance company, except Mr. Hilgard who is here, counts on having to pay for the damage. They want to pay too, and I understand this very well. They'll have to want that, so they cannot be reproached for not being secure enough to pay. The glass insurance, and a point was made of that, has brought the highest profits so far. That means they'd have enough surplus money, and if they haven't divided it all up in dividends, they'll have savings enough for the compensation. Such an insurance company will have to be in a position to pay for a damage of 10, 12, 15 million, that is three times the amount paid in the normal year. If they are unable to do that, then we'll have to wonder whether we should let small companies live at all. It would be insane to keep insurnace companies which would be unable to pay for such a damage. To permit an insurance company like that to exist would simply mean to cheat the people. I suggest now the following. The damage shall be determined in each case. And for the time being, the insurance companies shall have to honor their contracts in every respect and shall have to pay.

(No. 4 is missing)

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PART V

Goering: Now for the damage the Jew has had. At Margrafs', the jewels disappeared, etc. Well, they are gone, and he won't get them refunded. He is the one who has to suffer the damage. As far as the jewels may be returned again by the police, they belong to the State. Now for the consumer foods which were thrown into the street, stolen or burned. There too, the Jew will be the one who has the damage.

As for the goods that were kept on the basis of commissions, the Jew shall have to make good for the damage.

Goebbels: That doesn't have to be put in the decree, though. This decree is quite sufficient the way it is.

Hilgard: I wonder to what an extent insurance companies in foreign countries might be involved in this.

Goering: Well, they'll have to pay. And we'll confiscate that.

Hilgard: As for this merchandise sold on the basis of commissions, I can imagine that the American supplier of fur coats, shipping them from England or from America would in many cases insure it with English or American insurance companies!

Goering: Then they'll pay him for the damage. The question merely is the following: do you think there are re-insurances for all this damage in foreign countries?

Hilgard: Very few, amounting to very little.

Goering: Of course, the Aryan cannot report any damage because he hasn't had any. The Jew will make good.

The Jew shall have to report the damage. He'll get the refund from the insurance company but the refund will be confiscated. If it's all said and done, there will remain some profit for the insurance companies since they can't have to make good for all the damage. Mr. Hilgard, you may enjoy yourself.

Hilgard: I have no reason for that - The fact that we won't have to pay for all the damage is called profit!

Goering: Just a moment! If you are compelled under the law to pay 5 million and all of a sudden there appears an angel in my somewhat corpulent form before you, and tells you: you may keep 1 million - why, cannot that be called making a profit? I should actually split with you, or whatever you'd call it. I can see it, looking at you. Your whole body grins. You made a big profit.

(Remark: Let's initiate a tax for damages, resulting from public disturbance, to be paid by the insurance companies)

Hilgard: For me it goes without saying that the honorable German merchant cannot be the one who suffers. I have discussed this matter with the enterprises and I have spoken for it that the Aryan must not be the one who has the damage. But it is decidedly he who has it, because all the insurance companies, not one insurance company, are the ones that shall have to pay higher rates and at the same time shall receive lower dividends. Therefore, all the insurance companies are the losers. That is so, and that'll remain so, and nobody can tell me differently.

Goering: Then why don't you take care of it that a few windows less are being smashed! You belong to the people too! Send your representatives out. Let them instruct the people. If there should be any more questions speak to Mr. Lange.

(Reichsgruppenleiter Hilgard leaves the meeting)

Gentlemen, let us continue.

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Woermann: I think that the foreign Jews are left out completely in Article 1. They are covered only by Article 2. But they should also be taken care of in Article 1. Otherwise they can be dealt with only if they are insured, and not if they are not insured.

Goering: Well, they'll have to insure themselves - or what else do you mean?

Woermann: As for insurances, the foreign Jews are, to my understanding, mentioned only in Articles 2 and 3, and not in Article 1. If I remember correctly, you were going to say in Article 1: "Jews inside the country". Well, we'll have plenty of complaints then.

Goering: Pardon me. According to Article 2, they'll receive their compensation.

(Woermann: If they are insured!)

The number of those who are not insured is negligible.

Heydrich: I'd like to say one more thing of primary importance. In the decree we should not mention the confiscation. We can do that easily.

Goering: No, you cannot do that tacitly. A clear legal procedure will have to be employed there. But that is not what Mr Woermann means, he is talking about these foreign Jews who are not insures. As far as they are insured, they are covered. This here concerns those who are not insured. That may be the case here and there.

Woermann: We shall then have plenty of complaints.

Goering: I'd like to avoid paying too much attention to the foreign Jews.

Woermann: But if Article 2 contains that provision, Article 1 may as well have it. The first draft by the Minister for Justice covered it all very nicely.

Guertner: Now, if I don't misunderstand, Mr Woermann, he is primarily concerned with the obligation for restoration which shall be valid generally while only Jews who have German citizenship are mentioned regarding the insurances.

I'd like to know whether there are any objections against compelling also the foreign Jews to restore the damage, and to inform him that he shall not be paid the money from the insurance.

Goering: He is quite able to do that.

Woermann: Even if he is not insured?

Guertner: Oh-!

Goering: There should hardly be such instances. Let's take a chance on it.

Stuckart: If he is not insured, he'll have to have the damage restored anyway. How can he then make claims against anybody?

Goering: He cannot.

Woermann: He can file claims against the State.

Stuckart: According to which law? Damage caused by riots? We won't recognize riots.

Goering: Perfectly right.

Woermann: Generally speaking, may I say: regarding foreign Jews, the reservation that the contract is to be taken into consideration was made only for the organization. That is valid for all branches which we have discussed today, and also for the expropriation.

Goering: Like the Fuehrer says, we'll have to find a way to talk this over with the countries which also do something against their Jews. That every dirty Polish Jew has a legal position here and we have to stand him, - that ought to cease. The Fuehrer was not very happy about the agreement that was made with the Poles. He thinks we should take a few chances and just tell the Poles; all right, we are not going to do that; let's talk over what we may be able to accomplish together; you are doing something against your own Jews in Poland; but the minute the Itzig has left Poland, he should suddenly be treated like a Pole! I'd like to disregard these stories from foreign countries a little.

Woermann: It ought to be considered whether or not, the U S might take measures against German property. This question cannot be handled equally for all countries. I have to make a formal and general reservation.

Goering: I have always said and I'd like to repeat it that our steamship companies and German companies in general should finally catch on and liquidate their investments in the U S, sell them, etc. That country of scoundrels does not do business with us according to any legal rules. Once before they stole everything from us, that is why I don't understand how we could do it again, just for some temporary profit. It is dangerous. You can do it with a regular country but not with one that cares for the Right as little as the U S. The other day I had the American ambassador with me, we talked about the zeppelin and I told him: "We don't need any helium, I fly without helium but the prerequisite will have to be that this ship will be flying to civilized countries where the Right prevails. It goes without saying that one cannot fly to such gangster-states" He had a rather silly look on his face. One ought to tell these Americans. But you are right, Mr Woermann, it ought to be considered.

Woermann: In other words, the foreign office is granted the right to be consulted.

Goering: Granted, but I'd like to avoid mentioning the foreign Jews as long as we can help it. We'd rather have the foreign office take part in those cases where that question becomes acute, so that some compromise can be reached.

Woermann: Generally, and in particular cases.

Funk: The decisive question is: Are the Jewish stores to be reopened or not?

Goering: That depends on how big a turnover these Jewish stores have. If it is big, it is an indication that the German people are compelled to buy there, in spite of its being a Jewish store, because a need exists. If we'd close all Jewish stores which are not open right now, altogether before Christmass, we'd be in a nice mess.

Fisdiboeck: Your Excellency, in this matter we have already a very complete plan for Austria. There are 12,000 Jewish artisan and 5,000 Jewish retail shops in Vienna. Before the National Revolution, we had already a definite plan for tradesmen, regarding this total of 17,000 stores. Of the shops of the 12,000 artisans, about 10,000 were to be closed definitely and 2,000 were to be kept open. 4,000 of the 5,000 retail stores should be closed and 1,000 should be kept open, that is, were to be aryanized. According to this plan, between 3,000 and 3,500 of the total of 17,000 stores would be kept open, all others closed. This was decided following investigations in every single branch and according to local needs, in agreement with all competent authorities, and is ready for publication as soon as we shall receive the law which we requested in September; this law shall empower us to withdraw licenses from artisans, quite independently from the Jewish question.

Goering: I shall have this decree issued today.

Fisdiboack: It was granted us in connection with the economic plan for Austria. I believe the only reason why it was not yet published was that negotiations between the Reich Ministry for Economic Affairs and the National Food Corporation were going on. A basic agreement had already been reached. We'll be able to close these 10,000 stores as a matter of mere routine as soon as the decree will be issued. As for the actual execution

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of the matter, somebody will have to take care of the merchandise in these stores. Until last week we had intended to more or less leave it up to the Jews themselves to liquidate the warehouses. We cannot do that anymore. We intend to create a central agency which shall take care of the merchandise to be used. Generally, the best procedure might be to turn the merchandise over to the particular branch which in turn shall divide it up among the Aryan stores. These, in turn, shall re-sell it on the basis of commissions or for a fixed price.

If this is carried out as planned, it'll concern only the approximately 3,000 remaining stores which shall be aryanized, according to the investigations made in the various branches. Actual buyers for about half of those stores are waiting: their contracts have been checked and are ready to be approved. If many of these cases were not approved sooner, it is only because the decision on the planning had not yet been made. As for the remaining 15,000 stores, negotiations have also gone rather far in many cases. We think that a dead line should be set, say until the end of the year. If, by the end of the year, definite buyers for the stores designated for aryans, cannot be found, it'll have to be examined once more whether the stores should not be liquidated. In most cases that will be possible; an artisan's shop is of a rather individual character. As for retail stores, it would never be urgent enough, so as to say that the economic worth was too big. The very few stores which would still remain and found to be necessary but for which no buyer was available, could be taken over by trustees. This way, I believe that fewer than 100 stores would be left, and by the end of the year we would have liquidated all the Jewish owned businesses which so far has been obvious as such in the eyes of the public.

Goering: That would be excellent.

Fisdibeeck: Out of 17,000 stores 12,000 or 14,000 would be shut down and the remainder aryanized or handed over to the bureau of trustees which is operated by the State.

Goering: I have to say that this proposal is grand. This way, the whole affair would be wound up in Vienna, one of the Jewish capitals, so to speak, by Christmas or by the end of the year.

Funk: We can do the same thing over here. I have prepared a law elaborating that, effective 1 January 1939, Jews shall be prohibited to operate retail stores and wholesale establishments as well as independent artisan shops. They shall be further prohibited from keeping employees or offer any ready products on the market. Wherever a Jewish shop is operated, the police shall shut it down. From 1 January 1939, a Jew can no longer be employed as an enterpriser as stipulated in the law for the Organization of National Labor from 20 January 1934. If a Jew holds a leading position in an establishment without being the enterpriser, his contract may be declared void within 6 weeks by the enterpriser. With the expiration of the contract all claims of the employee, including all claims to maintenance, become obliterated. That is always very disagreeable and a great danger. A Jew cannot be a member of a copporation; Jewish members of corporations shall have to be retired by 31 December 1938. A special authorization is unnecessary. The competent Ministers of the Reich are being authorized to issue the provision necessary for the execution of this law.

Goering: I believe that we can agree with this law.

(Remark: Yes)

Of course there remain a few things to be straightened out even after 1 January. We shall be able to handle them with these general methods which we shall have to employ for handling all other Jewish property. As for the Jewish stores, we may proceed vigorously; we believe that by Christmas enough buyers shall be found to take over the stores which from now on shall be entirely under pressure. Also the merchandise may be taken the way you have proposed it. To me, all this seems to be prepared in an excellent manner.

Funk: In every single store everything is there.

Schmer: Everything is there, except that we have no control, anymore, over this business with the trustees. I personally am of the opinion that we don't need it at all; so far we have managed quite well with the aryanization. For those few stores that are to be kept open, we shall easily find buyers. All other rooms shall be rented without much ado. There is a great need for this right here in Berlin.

Goering: But my dear friend, that way the Jew will receive the full amount.

Schmer: He will receive the amount that is far below the value, and the aryanizing shall have to be authorized, as before.

Goering: The Jew will receive the amount and won't be put into the account-book.

Schmer: No. We can arrange that later. He cannot swallow the money. The amount is fixed, and under the law the Jew is compelled to report every change in his wealth, so that it can easily be controlled. He won't run away; we'll keep it in the Reich. The only thing you'd have to do is to issue a decree, or to transfer the provisions of Article 7 on to the Ministry for Economic Affairs in order to confiscate the Jewish property. He cannot run away from us.

Goering: Mr Schmer, could not the following be done: Somebody will become aryanized and get 300,000 marks into his hands. He runs into the next best jewelry-store around the corner and buys one piece of jewelry after another, and on the same day disappears across the border.

Schmer: In that case, we'll have to report this change in his property.

Goering: But if he wants to scram'.

Fisdiboeck: The O K on the aryanizing is not being given the minute the price for the purchase is being paid. We do that the following way. The aryanizing is being authorized only under the condition that the price for the purchase is to be paid in instalments lasting over a long period of time, in case the buyer is unable to pay; or, in case payment is being made, that the amount is to be put in the bank of a frozen account.

Goering: We could do the same thing here.

Schmer: In the provisions for the execution of the law we may stipulate that from a certain level on, payment shall have to be made in bonds of the Reich or something similar. That would have to be a decree made to the authorities which O K the aryanizing.

Daluege: The number of Jewish stores is unknown. Until yesterday, 7500 were reported to us and the number does not increase.

Fisdiboeck: Because of what has happened the day before yesterday in Vienna, 5000 were shut down there. There were 40,000 altogether.

Schmer: Shall the arrangement made in Austria remain?

Goering: Nothing will be changed there.

Fisdiboeck: Everything can be shut down at any time.

Heydrich: I know that a very high limit has been set for registering, 3000 I believe.

Fisdiboeck: More than 5000.

Goering: Is that the same in the Reich?

Fisdiboeck: Yes,, in the Reich too. In this connection, I'd like to make a few more remarks. What we are very much concerned with, is the situation regarding the Jewish apartment houses which contribute a large percentage of Jewish wealth. Surprisingly enough, the Jewish national wealth in Austria is reported to amount of 320 million marks only; the value of the

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apartment houses alone amounts to 500 million. We should appreciate it very much if the regulation which makes it possible to requisition Jewish property would be made to be valid also for the apartment buildings; thus we would be enabled to have these houses administered by a board of trustees and to give the Jews the right to have a claim on the debit ledger of the Reich. That could also be an occasion to cash the contribution which might be deducted this way in advance. The administration of these blocks of apartment buildings wouldn't be a problem at all. The only thing we'd need for it would be managers, and there'd be plenty of them. We'd like to requisition the apartment buildings and also any bonds that way. This question of the bonds has been left open so far. In Austria, a very large part of Jewish wealth, 266 billion Reichsmarks, is invested in bonds of all kinds in shares or simply in bonds bringing a fixed rate of interest. In my opinion, a danger for the market does not exist because the Ministry for Economic Affairs would have control over these bonds. We'll pay by handling out claims, on the debit-ledger of the Reich. Therefore, the finances of the Reich won't be affected; the Minister for Finance shall only pay 3% for the claims on the debit-ledger of the Reich. He in turn receives internal loans, that means saves money. And if the bonds are not being sold, one might keep them 30 years until those claims on the debit-ledger of the Reich shall be expired.

Funk: Why should Jews not be allowed to keep bonds?

Goering: Because that way he would actually be given a share.

Funk: That is entirely new.

Goering: No. I said very clearly before; bonds and shares.

Funk: Shares yes, but not internal loans.

Fisdiboeck: It is certainly better to pay the Jew 3% instead of 4%. We'd have no possibility to control Jewish wealth the minute we'd let him have shares.

Goering: Gentlemen, no arguments. It is out of the question that he'd keep the shares. He'll have to turn them in.

Fisdiboeck: In that case I'd like you to arrange this by calling the shares in so that the stock market won't be ruined. That can very easily be done. They'll be turned in. Administering the shares is also much simpler. The trustee turns the shares over to the depot and receives claims on the debit-ledger of the Reich in their place. With this, the whole affair is settled. The only question is whether you want to recall the shares or not.

Funk: This way, the Reich will become processor of half a billion shares.

Goering: Yes, Yes.

Goebbels: He'll be able to get rid of them according to its needs.

Fisdiboeck: But it is a business based on profits.

v. Krosigk: I am wondering, first whether it will bring us profits. I grant you that, though. But secondly, an entirely new point of view has to be entered here. I can very well see the point in what the Minister, Mr. Fisdiboeck, says. As for the values that otherwise bring fixed rates of interest, it is an entirely new idea to expropriate the Jew also in this, though the intention had been to refrain his status as the owner of the shares.

Fisdiboeck: The reason why this is so very important is that our whole action shall remain without success as long as the Jews shall be in the possession of values, which they may realize quickly and employ for any other undertaking.

Goering: That's it. We want to prevent the Jews from again secretly manipulating against us.

Fisdiboeck: For example, if we don't want the Jews to possess jewelry we can prevent them from having it by allowing them to possess only Internal Loan bonds, that means that they could acquire the jewelry only by paying with bonds.

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Goering: Nobody would pay them their claims on the debit-ledger.

Fisdiboeck: They are not transferable.

Goering: Only if authorized.

Heydrich: Is it not possible to issue an order forbidding the Jew to invest his money in certain values, such as art treasures?

Goering: The arrangement with the registration in the debit-ledger is much simpler. Claims on the debit-ledger are not transferable. He cannot do anything with them, and he cannot do much with those 3½%.

Heydrich: But we'll also have to find an arrangement for confiscation of valuable objects in Jewish possession.

Goering: What he has now in his possession, that'll come.

Schmer: Article 7 of the decree states that the use of Jewish wealth in German economy shall be regulated through the Four Year Plan.

Goering: I think Fisdaboeck's proposal is very good. We should give it the form of a draft now, find the apartment buildings, the shares, etc.

Fisdaboeck: I should also like to have a decision made on the following question. In Austria, individuals, not institutions, owe the Jews 184 billion Reichsmarks. This way the Jews certainly have invested money in a way we don't like. That is money which they have loaned out to other Jews, oftener enought to an Aryan. This way, a dependency of the Aryan artisan from the Jewish creditor is created which we do not want. Now the question arises, and I would answer yes. Should trustees not be created to administer these debts and then pay with claims on the debit-ledger, according to demand coming in. The goal of this procedure would be to make the debtor independent from the Jewish creditor, to insert Aryan trusteeship and pay the Jew, as far as his demands could actually be met. Therefore it does not have to be paid. So we should have to insert trusteeship in this case also, but the difference to that in the case of the bonds would be that we won't simply pay but leave the decision for payment up to the trusteeship.

Funk: If word of this debate should reach the public, we'd have a run on the capital market tomorrow.

Fisdiboeck: That's why we have postponed these ideas all the time. We have examples for it that the Jews have sold, head over heel, bonds of internal loans, shares and everything they had.

Goering: I could stop that with a single decree, ordering the immediate stoppage of traffic of Jewish capital. He is punishable who buys from Jews, and his purchase shall be confiscated. I would not do it any other way.

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Part VII

Frick: The Ministry of the Interior shall have to take part in it.

Goering: I have said so before.

(Shout by Goebbels)

---that is a misunderstanding. That is now the committee which is elaborating on nothing but on this problem which is being tackled. How are the shares, how are the claims on the debit-ledger to be handled? Therefore, I shouldn't like to have anybody else in the Committee, in order to keep it as small as possible.

Buerkel: Is the plan for the arianizing to be discussed also?

Goering: Mr. Fischboeck shall bring that up. This place is the crux of the matter. I hope you have listened properly so that you know exactly what is to be valid for the Sudetengau!
Of course, I too am of the opinion that these economic measures ought to be strengthened by a number of Police-action-Propaganda-measures and cultural displays so that everything shall be fixed now and the Jewry will be slapped this week right and left.

Heydrich: In spite of the elimination of the Jew from the economic life, the main problem, namely to kick the Jew out of Germany, remains. May I make a few proposals to that effect?
Following a suggestion by the Commissioner of the Reich, we have set up a center for the Emigration of Jews in Vienna, and that way we have eliminated 50,000 Jews from Austria while from the Reich only 19,000 Jews were eliminated during the same period of time; we were so successful because of the cooperation on the part of the competent Ministry for Economic Affairs and of the foreign Charitable organizations.

Goering: The main thing is, you cooperated with the local leaders of the "Green Frontier".

Heydrich: That amounted to a very small number, your excellency. Illegall---

Goering: This story has gone through the whole world-press. During the first night the Jews were expulsed into Checkoslovakia. The next morning, the Checks grabbed them and pushed them into Hungary. From Hungary, they were returned to Germany and from there into Checkoslovakia. They travelled around and around that way. They landed finally on an old Barge in the Danube. There they lived, and wherever they tried to go ashore, they were barred.

Heydrich: That was the report. There weren't even 100 Jews.

Goering: For practically two weeks, a number of Jews left every midnight. That was in the Burgenland.

Heydrich: At least 45,000 Jews were made to leave the country by legal measures.

Goering: How was that possible?

Heydrich: Through the Jewish Kulturgemeinde, we extracted a certain amount of money from the rich Jews who wanted to emigrate. By paying this amount, and an additional sum in foreign currency, they made it possible for a number of poor Jews to leave. The problem was not to make the rich Jew leave but to get rid of the Jewish mob.

Goering: But children, did you ever think this through? It doesn't help us to extract hundreds of thousands from the Jewish mob. Have you ever thought of it that this procedure may cost us so much foreign currency that in the end we won't be able to hold out.

Heydrich: Only what the Jew has had in foreign currency.

(Goering---agreed)

This way. May I propose that we set up a similar procedure for the

Reich, with the cooperation of the competent government agencies, and that we then find a solution for the Reich, based on our experiences, after having corrected the mistakes, the General Field Marshall has so rightly pointed out to us.

(Goering:--agreed)

As another means of getting the Jews out, measures for Emigration ought to be taken in the rest of the Reich for the next 8 to 10 years. The highest number of Jews we can possibly get out during one year is 8-10,000. Therefore, a great number of Jews will remain. Because of the Arianizing and other restrictions Jewry will become unemployed. The remaining Jews gradually become proletarians. Therefore, I shall have to take steps;to isolate the Jew so he won't enter into the German normal routine of life. On the other hand, I shall have to restrict the Jew to a small circle of consumers, but I shall have to permit certain activities within professions; lawyers, doctors, barbers etc. This question shall also have to be examined.

As for the isolation, I'd like to make a few proposals regarding police measures which are important also because of their psychological effect on public opinion. For example, who is Jewish according to the Nurnberg laws, shall have to wear a certain insignia. That is a possibility which shall facilitate many other things. I don't see any danger of excuses, and it shall make our relationship with the foreign Jew easier.

Goering: A uniform!

Heydrich: An insignia. This way we could also put an end to it that the foreign Jews who don't look different from ours, are being molested.

Goering: But, my dear Heydrich, you won't be able to avoid the creation of ghettos on a very large scale, in all the cities. They shall have to be created.

Heydrich: As for the question of ghettos, I'd like to make my position clear right away. From the point of view of the police, I don't think a ghetto in the form of completely segregated districts where only Jews would live, can be put up. We could not control a ghetto where the Jews congregate amidst the whole Jewish people. It would remain the permanent hideout for criminals and also for epidemnics and the like. We don't want to let the Jew live in the same house with the German population; but today the German population, their blocks or houses, force the Jew to behave himself. The control of the Jew through the watchful eye of the whole population is better than having him by the thousands in a district where I cannot properly establish a control over his daily life through uniformed agents.

Goering: We'd only have to forbid long-distance calls.

Heydrich: Still I could not completely stop the Jews from communicating out of their districts.

Goering: And in towns all of their own?

Heydrich: If I could put them into towns entirely their own, yes. But then these towns would be such a heaven for criminals of all sorts that they would be a terrific danger. I'd take different steps. I'd restrict the movement of the Jews and would say; In Munich, the governmental district and the district----

Goering: Wait a minute! I don't care so much for it that the Jews don't appear in spots where I don't want them. My point is this one; if one Jew won't have any more work, he'll have to live modestly. He won't be able to go far on his 5½%, to restaurants, etc. He'll have to work more. That'll bring about a concentration of Jewry which may even facilitate control. You will know that in a particular house only Jews are living. We shall also have concentrated Jewish butchers, barbers, grocers etc. in certain streets. The question is of course whether we want to go on tolerating that.

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If not, the Jew shall have to buy from the Arian.

Heydrich: No, I'd say that for the necessities in daily life, the German won't serve the Jew anymore.

Goering: One moment. You cannot let him starve. But there'll be the following difficulty. If you say that the Jews will be able to have so and so many retail stores, then they'll again be in business, and they'll continually have to sell for the wholesaler.

Schmer: In a small town that wouldn't work at all.

Goering: It could only be worked out if you'd reserve inadvance whole districts or whole towns for the Jews. Otherwise, you'll have to have only Germans do business, and the Jew shall have to buy from them. You cannot set up a Jewish barbershop. The Jew will have to buy fodd and stockings.

Heydrich: We'll have to decide whether we want that or not.

Goering: I'd like to make a decision on that right now. We cannot make another sub-division here. We cannot argue: so and so many stores will remain for the Jew because then again no control will be possible since these stores in turn would have to work with wholesale stores. I'd say, all stores should be Arian stores, and the Jew may buy there. One may go one step further and say that these and these stores will probably be frequented mostly by Jews. You may set up certain barbershops operated by Jews. You may make concessions in order to channel certain professions into certain streets for certain tasks. But not stores.

Heydrich: What about the ghetto? Would the Jew have to go to an Arian district to buy.

Goering: No. I'd say that enough German storekeepers would love to dwell in the Ghetto if they could do some business there. I wouldn't alter the principle that the Jew shall have no more say in German Economy.

Heydrich: I shouldn't like to comment on that. Now a few things which are important also form a psychological angle.

Goering: Once we'd have a ghetto, we'd find out what stores ought to be in there, and we'd be able to say;you, the Jew so and so, together with so and so, shal take care of the delivery of goods. And a German wholesale-firm will be ordered to deliver the goods for this Jewish store. This store would then not be a retail-shop but a cooperative-store, a cooperative one for Jews.

Heydrich: All these measures will eventually lead to the institution of the ghetto. I'd say one shouldn't want to build a ghetto. But these measures, if carried through as outlined here, shall automatically drive the Jews into a ghetto.

Funk: The Jews will have to move quite close together. What are 3 million? Everyone will have to stand up for the next fellow. The individual alone will starve.

Goering: Now, as to what Minister Goebbels has said before, namely compulsory renting. Now, the Jewish tenants will be together.

Heydrich: As an additional measure, I'd propose to withdraw from the Jews all personal papers such as permits and drivers licenses. No Jew should be allowed to own a car, neither should he be permitted to drive because that way he'd endanger German life. By not being permitted to live in certain districts, he should be furthermore restricted to move about so freely. I'd say the Royal Square in Munich, the Reichsweihestatte, is not to be entered any more within a certain radius by Jews. The same would go for establishments of culture, border fences,military installations. Furthermore, like

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Minister Dr. Goebbels has said before, exclusion of the Jews from public theaters, movie houses etc. As for cultural activities, I'd like to say this; cultural activities in holiday resorts may be considered an additional feature, not absolutely necessary for the individual. Many German Volksgenossen are unable to improve their health through a stay at a resort town. I don't see why the Jew should go to these places at all.

Goering: To health spas, no.

Heydrich: Well, then I'd like to propose the same thing for hospitals. A Jew shall not lie in a hospital together with Arian Volkgenossen.

Goering: We'll have to manage that gradually.

Heydrich: The same applies to public conveyances.

Goering: Are there no Jewish Sanatariums and Jewish hospitals? (Remarks--Yes!) We'll have to finagle all this. These things will have to be straightened out one right after another.

Heydrich: I only meant to secure your approval in principle so that we may start out on all this.

Goering: One more question, gentleman: What would you think the situation would be if I'd announce today that Jewry shall have to contribute this 1 billion as a punishment?

Buerckel: The Viennese would agree to this whole-heartedly.

Goebbels: I wonder if the Jews would have a chance to pull out of this, and to put something on the side.

Brinkmann: They'd be subject to punishment.

V. Krosigk: Mr. Fischboeck, one question, Could this authorization be ordered without their closing out their securities?

Funk: They are all registered. They'll also have to register the money.

V. Krosigk: But for the time being they may dispose of it.

Goering: It won't help them to cash them all. They can't get rid of the money.

Funk: They'll be the ones to have the damage if they sell their stocks and bonds.

Fischiboeck: There is a certain danger, But I don't think it is very great. But only then, when all the other measures shall definitely be carried out during next week.

V. Krosigk: They have to be taken during the next week at the latest.

Goering: I would make that a condition.

Fischiboeck: Maybe it is good that we put ourselves under pressure this way.

Goering: I shall close the wording this way; that German Jewry shal as punishment fortheir abominable crimes etc. etc. have to make a contribution of 1 billion. That'll work. The pigs won't commit another murder. Incidentally, I'd like to say again that I would not like to be a Jew;in Germany.--

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V. Krosigk: Therefore, I'd like to emphasize what Mr. Heydrich has said in the beginning; that we'll have to try everything possible, by way of additional exports, to shove the Jews into foreign countries. The decisive factor is that we don't want the society-proletariat here. They'll always be a terrific liability for us.

(Frick;--"and a danger!")

I don't imagine the prospect of the ghetto is very nice. The idea of the ghetto is not a very agreeable one. Therefore, the goal must be, like Heydrich said, to move out whatever we can!

Goering: The second point is this. If, in the near future, the German reich should come into conflict with foreign powers, it goes without saying that we in Germany should first of all let it come to a showdown with the Jews. Besides that, the Fuehrer shall now make an attempt with those foreign powers who have brought the Jewish question up, in order to solve the Madagascar project. He has explained it all to me on 9 November. There is no other way. He'll tell the other countries. "What are you talking about the Jew for?-Take him!" Another proposal may be made. The Jews, gotten rid of may buy territory for their "co-religionists" in North America, Canada or elsewhere.

I wish to summarize: The Minister of Economic Affairs shall direct the committee and he shall in one form or another, take all steps necessary within the next few days.

Blerning: I fear that during the next few days, beginning Monday, the Jews will start to sell bonds on internal loans for hundreds of thousands, in order to provide themselves with means. Since we hold the course of the internal loan in order to sell more bonds, The Reich-Treasury, Loan-Committee or the Reich Minister for Finance should have to back this internal loan.

Goering: In what way could the Jew bring his bonds on the market?

(Remark;--"Sell them")

To Whom?

(Remark:--on the stock market.
He orders a bank to do it.)

Well, I'll prohibit selling internal loan bonds for three days.

Blerning: That could be done only through a decree.

Goering: I can't see any advantage for the Jew. He won't know himself how and he'll have to pay. On the contrary, I believe he won't move.

Goebbels: For the time being he is small and ugly and stays at home.

Goering: I don't think it would be logical. Otherwise we'll have to do it. The reason why I want this decree in a hurry is that for the time being we have peace but who can guarantee that there won't be new trouble by Saturday or Sunday. Once and for all I want to eliminate individual acts. The Reich has taken the Affair in its own hand. The Jew can only sell. He can't do a thing. He'll have to pay. At this moment, the individual Jew won't think of throwing anything on the market. There'll be some chatter first, and then they will begin to run to us. They'll look for those great Aryans with whom, they'll think they may have some luck., the so-called various mail-boxes of the Reich with whom they can lodge their protests. These people will run my door in. All that takes some time, and by then we'll be ready.

Daluegue: May we issue the order for confiscating the cars?

Goering: Also the Ministry of the Interior and the Police will have to think over, what measures will have to be taken. I thank you.

(Conference closed at 2.40 P.M.)

6 October 1945.

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt. Inf. O-133 55 67, Hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the attached is a true and correct translation of the Stenographic Report of the meeting on "The Jewish Question" unfer the chairmanship of Field Marshall Goering in the Reichs Air Force on 12 November 1938--11 O'clock.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt. Inf.
O-133 55 67

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1949-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

State Administration
of Reich Gau Vienna

Statistical Office
for Reich Gau Ostmark

Zl. 3305/I 39

Vienna, 15 December 1939
1. Heldenplatz, Neue Burg
Tel. R 27-5-65

To the Reich Commissar
for the Reunion of the Austrian Nation with
the German Reich

through channels via the Governor (Regierungspräsident) of Vienna

The Statistical Office for Reich Gau Ostmark has the honor to submit herewith, in the enclosure, an initial compilation of early results of this year's census relative to the number and reduction in number of Jews and part Jews in Reich Gau Ostmark, especially in the Vienna districts, together with a brief commentary.

(Signature illegible)

1 file of the Statistical Office for the Reich Districts (Gaue) of the Ostmark, together with a summary of 15 December 1939. Zl. 3305/I 39

Jews and Part Jews
in the Reich Districts (Gaue) of the Ostmark

In the census of 17 May 1939, the question was put for the first time whether one of an individual's grandparents was full Jew by race. The declarations were to be made by the people on the "Supplementary Card for Data on Descent and Education" in full and to the best of their ability; this supplementary card was to be given to the honorary census taker in a sealed, opaque envelope, which was opened only when the statistical count was made. No check has yet been made as to the correctness of the information submitted. In the compiling of the statistics, everyone who reported that three or four of his grandparents were full Jews was counted as a full Jew himself, everyone with two Jewish grandparents as a part Jew, Grade I, and correspondingly everyone with only one Jewish grandparent as a part Jew, Grade II. The resulting slight deviation from the pertinent legal definitions of full Jew and part Jew was occasioned by formulation of the question in the simplest possible way.

According to the initial results of this year's census, there were 91,480 full Jews and 22,344 part Jews of Grades I and II in Vienna as of 17 May 1939. In the remaining Reich Districts (Gaue) of the Ostmark there were 3,073 full Jews and 4,241 part Jews. According to this, there were altogether 121,138 Jews in the Ostmark, of whom 113,824, i.e. 94%, lived in Vienna, 3% in Niederdonau, 1% in the Steiermark, and less than 1% in each of the remaining Gaus.

While 80% of all the Jews in Vienna were full Jews and only 14% were part Jews, Grade I, and 6% part Jews, Grade II, in the other Reich Gaus the part Jews predominated, totaling 58%, as against 42% who were full Jews. Only in Niederdonau were the full Jews, with a total of almost 2,000, approximately as numerous as the part Jews.

These varying proportions of full Jews and part Jews are explained primarily by the emigration of Jews following the political change over.

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This emigration had reduced the number of full Jews in the Reich Gaus of the Ostmark, excluding Vienna and Niederdonau, to a small remainder of 1,103 by the time of the census.

The extent of the emigration of full Jews can be estimated approximately by comparison with the number of persons of Jewish faith reported in the census of 1934. It must be remembered, however, that in 1934 the number of those of Jewish faith did not include all full Jews and that, on the other hand, a small number of those of Jewish faith were part Jews, Grades I and II.

With this reservation, it can be stated that the number of Jews in the Ostmark (not including the annexed Sudeten-German regions) has diminished from 191,528 Jews by faith to 94,384 full Jews. At the same time the number of Jews in the Reich Districts (Gaus), excluding Vienna, decreased by 13,000 i.e. approximately 82% to 3,000. In Vienna alone, the decrease amounted to 84,000 persons, i.e. 48%.

The ratio of the sexes among full Jews has become so greatly dislocated that there are 100 male full Jews to every 136 female full Jews in Vienna, which can probably be ascribed to the earlier emigration of the Jewish males. The ratio among the part Jews, comparatively few of whom are thought to have emigrated, is 100:112, more nearly the average surplus of women in the population of Vienna.

According to data furnished by the Central Office for Jewish emigration, Vienna IV., about 100,000 Jews emigrated from the Ostmark in the period between the change over (Umbruch) and the census. This number is very close to the figure of 97,000 given above as the reduction in Jews since the census of 1934. Some 26,000 persons of Jewish faith emigrated from the Ostmark in the months succeeding the census.

While the problem of full Jews is almost completely solved, therefore, in the Reich Districts (Gaus) of the Ostmark, with the exception of Vienna, from a numerical standpoint the problem of part Jews still plays a relatively large role. For example, almost half of the approximately 1,000 Jews in Oberdonau are part Jews, Grade I, and more than one quarter are part Jews, Grade II. Similar conditions prevail in the remaining Reich Gaus, particularly in Salzburg, in Carinthia, and in the Tyrol.

Nevertheless the problem of part Jews in the Ostmark is first and foremost a problem for the Reich District (Gau) of Vienna, where there are 86% of the part Jews Grade I and 80% of the part Jews Grade II. Gau Niederdonau takes second place, with a large interval, but has only 6% of the part Jews Grade I and 8% of the part Jews Grade II.

Out of all the part Jews in the Ostmark, 68% had two Jewish grandparents and 32% had one Jewish grandparent. It is worth noting that 70% of all Jews in Vienna were half-Jews, whereas less than 60% were half-Jews in the remaining Gaus of the Ostmark.

At the present time the problem of part Jews in Vienna is still numerically overshadowed by the large number of full Jews, of whom there are estimated in round figures to be 70,000, since approximately 4,000 persons of Jewish faith have emigrated from the Ostmark every month since the census - with the exception of September.

(Signature illegible)
15.12.39.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1949-PS
CONTINUED-

-JEWS AND PART JEWS IN THE DISTRICT OF VIENNA

Preliminary Results of 1939 Census

DISTRICTS	JEWS											
	GRAND TOTAL			FULL JEWS			PART JEWS, GRADE I			PART JEWS, GRADE II		
	total	male	female	total	male	female	total	male	female	total	male	female
I. Innere Stadt	6,825	3,001	3,824	5,947	2,596	3,351	650	293	357	228	112	116
II. Leopoldstadt	33,889	14,483	19,406	31,564	13,370	18,194	1,862	885	977	463	228	235
III. Landstrasse	7,623	3,290	4,333	5,890	2,530	3,360	1,180	520	660	553	240	313
IV. Wieden	3,166	1,365	1,801	2,121	901	1,220	698	31-	388	348	154	193
V. Margareten	2,712	1,229	1,483	1,769	788	981	632	293	339	311	148	163
VI. Mariahilf	4,634	2,016	2,618	3,826	1,653	2,173	608	263	345	200	100	100
VII. Neubau	5,187	2,263	2,924	4,181	1,786	2,395	740	356	384	266	121	145
VIII Josefstadt	3,699	1,668	2,031	2,958	1,314	1,644	534	256	278	207	98	109
IX. Alsergrund	12,764	5,179	7,525	11,281	4,527	6,754	1,076	498	578	347	154	193
X. Favoriten	2,307	1,057	1,250	1,393	609	784	609	292	317	305	156	149
XI. Aimmering	447	218	229	265	134	131	127	57	70	55	27	28
XII. Meidling	1,986	900	1,086	1,045	444	601	610	298	312	331	158	173
XIII. Hietzing	2,008	851	1,157	1,310	524	786	457	210	247	241	117	124
XIV. Penzing	1,729	759	970	933	403	530	506	230	278	290	126	164
XV. Funfhaus	3,667	1,572	2,095	2,573	1,051	1,522	758	368	390	336	153	383
XVI. Ottakring	3,123	1,440	1,683	1,874	831	1,043	833	410	423	416	199	217
XVII. Hernals	1,690	760	930	934	394	540	508	249	259	248	117	131
XVIII. Wahlring	3,246	1,411	1,835	2,150	922	1,233	744	329	415	347	160	187
XIX. Dobling	2,961	1,325	1,636	2,030	845	1,185	633	315	318	298	165	133
XX. Brigittenau	7,082	3,020	4,063	6,025	2,519	3,506	754	339	415	304	162	142
XXI. Floridsdorf	1,391	671	720	524	224	300	540	279	261	327	168	159
XXII. Grossenzersdorf	171	82	89	45	21	24	69	35	34	57	26	31
XXIII. Schwechat	364	215	149	286	175	112	44	23	21	34	18	16
XXIV. Modling	365	176	189	113-	56	57	146	67	79	106	53	53
XXV Liesing	507	205	302	240	89	151	185	80	105	82	36	46
XVIKlosterauburg	340	161	179	198	93	105	88	41	47	54	27	27
Total	113,824	49,317	64,507	91,480	38,798	52,682	15,591	7,296	8,295	6,753	3,223	3,530

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H1237-0118

Decrease of Jews in the Reich Districts (Gaue) of the Ostmark*

(Based on preliminary results of 1939 census)

Reich Gau	Jews by Religion as of 22 Mar, 1934	Full Jews by Race, as of 17 May 1939	Number less than in 1934 Absolute	Number less than in 1934 in percent	Local Distrubution Jews By Religion 1934	Local Distrubution 1939 Full Jews	Local Distrubution 1939 Part Jews Grade I	Local Distrubution 1939 Part Jews Grade II
Vienna	175,099	91,480	83,619	47.8	91.4	96.9	86.8	84.5
Niederonau	11,439	1,836	9,603	83.9	6.0	2.0	5.6	7.1
Oberdonau	1,257	216	1,041	82.8	0.7	0.2	2.4	3.4
Steiermark	2,818	563	2,255	80.0	1.5	0.6	2.9	5.2
Karnten	273	60	213	78.0	0.1	0.1	0.7	1.5
Salzburg	239	67	172	72.0	0.1	0.1	0.7	1.0
Tirol	361	119	242	67.0	0.2	0.1	0.8	1.1
Vorarlbg	42	43	1	---	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.4
OSTMARK	191,528	94,384	97,144	50.7	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

* Regional status as of Oct. 15, 1938, without the annexed Sudeten-German districts.

Jews and Part Jews in the Reich Districts(Gaus) of the Ostmark
(Preliminary results of the census of 17 May 1939)

Reich Gau	these include			in Percentages		
	Jews and part Jews together	full Jews	Part Jews	full Jews	Part Jews	
			Grade I / Grade II		grade I	Grade II
Niederonau	3,737	1,970	1.117 650	52,7	29.9	17.4
Oberdonau	1,015	281	468 296	24.7	46.1	29.2
Steiermark	1,512	563	508 441	37.2	33,6	29.2
Karnten	313	60	129 124	19.2	41.2	39.6
Salzburg	273	67	123 63	24.5	45.1	30.4
Tirol	360	119	147 94	33.1	40.8	26.1
Vorarlberg	104	43	28 38	41.4	22.1	36.5
Total	7,314	3,073	2,515 1,726	42.0	34.4	23.6
Vienna	113,824	91,480	15,591 6,753	80.4	13.7	5.9
Ostmark	121,138	94,553	18.106 8,479	78.1	14.9	7.0

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1949-PS

Jan. 4,1946

I,ERWIN COOPER,certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of document no. 1949-PS .

ERWIN COOPER
W.D. CIV.
B-210751

H1237-0119

OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
TRANSLATION OF DOC. NO. 2111-PS

Order of the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories concerning the Establishment of Administrative Courts Martial.

(Verordnungsblatt, 1941, page 190)

Pursuant to Section 5 of the decree of the Fuehrer concerning the exerci of governmental authority in the Netherlands, of May 18, 1940 (RGBl. 1, p. 778 I hereby order as follows:

Section 1.

(1) The Reich Commissioner for the occupied Netherlands territories may, if h shall deem it necessary for the maintenance or restoration of public order and security, establish administrative courts martial for these territories or for certain areas within these territories.

(2) The establishment of administrative courts martial shall become effective as soon as it is announced. Such announcement shall be made by posters along public roads, streets and squares, by radio, by the press, or according to loc custom. The abolition of administrative courts martial shall be made public i the same manner.

(3) Simultaneously with the establishment of administrative courts martial, i shall be decreed that everyone shall refrain from all activities which might d turb or endanger public order and security, and that everyone must comply with special orders issued by the Reich Commissioner, in which he shall make partic lar reference to the strictness of the administrative courts martial. Any per son acting contrary hereto shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the adminis trative courts martial.

Section 2.

Unless the Reich Commissioner shall order otherwise, the provisions of Sections 3 to 8 shall be effective for the areas in which administrative court martial have been established, so long as these courts are maintained.

Section 3.

(1) The Leader of the Superior S.S. and the Police shall take all measures deemed necessary by him for the maintenance or restoration of public order and security.

(2) He may promulgate rules and regulations, having the force and effect of laws, which are necessary for the fulfillment of his functions. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7, such rules and regulations may contain penal clauses subjecting a defendant to fines of unlimited amount, imprisonment or jail. They shall be published in accordance with the provisions of Section 1, paragraph 2, sentence 2.

(3) In the fulfillment of his duties, the Leader of the Superior S.S. and the Police may deviate from existing law.

Section 4.

(1) The Reich Commissioner shall appoint a Special Agent for the entire area for which an administrative courts martial has been decreed.

(2) The Special Agent shall be the head of the entire public administration, excluding the police administration, unless the Leader of the Superior S.S. and the Police assumes administrative tasks in accordance with Section 3, paragraph 1.

(3) The Special Agent shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the fulfillment of his functions. Notwithstanding the provisions contained in Section 7, they may contain penal clauses subjecting a defendant to fines

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of unlimited amount, imprisonment, or jail. They shall be published in accordance with the provisions of Section 1, paragraph 2, sentence 2.

(4) In the fulfillment of his duties, the Special Agent may deviate from existing law.

(5) The Reich Commissioner shall have the right to appoint Special Agents, even for certain parts of the area in which administrative courts martial have been established.

Section 5.

The activities of all public representative committees which made decisions as a body, shall be suspended. Their powers and duties shall be transferred to the chief administrative authority concerned with the subject matter (for example, commissioner of the province, major, overseer of dikes, etc.)

Section 6.

The validity of regulations issued by the Secretaries General in the Netherlands Ministries in accordance with Section 3, paragraph 2, sentence 2, of Order No. 3/1940, or by virtue of Order No. 23/1940, shall be dependent upon prior consent by the Special Agent (Section 4).

Section 7.

Any person shall be subject to court martial who, after the establishment of an administrative court martial, shall intentionally participate in activities likely to disturb or to endanger public order and security, or who intentionally violates special orders of the Reich Commissioner issued in accordance with Section 1, paragraph 3. Such person shall be punishable by death or, in less serious cases, by hard labor either for life or for a period of not less than ten years.

Section 8.

(1) The German Superior Court shall operate as a court martial in accordance with the procedure established in the Old Reich for proceedings before Special Courts.

(2) The provisions regarding judicial procedure for the German Armed Forces and the jurisdiction of Special Courts in criminal cases concerning members of the S.S. and of the police forces assigned to special duty, shall not be affected by this order; Section 11 of Order No. 52/1940, regarding the possibility of referring certain criminal cases to the jurisdiction of Special Courts, shall likewise remain unaffected.

(3) The judges of the court martial shall be appointed by the Reich Commissioner. The Court Martial shall be considered lawfully constituted even if only one judge has the educational qualifications required for judicial tenure.

(4) Death sentences shall be executed by shooting

Section 9.

This order becomes effective on the day of publication.

The Hague, March 19, 1941

SEYSS-INQUART
Reich Commissioner for the Occupied
Netherlands Territories.

2 7 2

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I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt., Inf., O-133 55 67, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2111-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt., Inf.,
O-133 55 67.

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OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
TRANSLATION OF DOC. NO. 2112-PS

(1941, Verordnungsblatt, p. 655)

Order of the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories concerning Jewish Real Estate -
11 August 1941

VERORDNUNG
des Reichskommissars für die besetzten niederländischen Gebiete über den jüdischen Grundbesitz.

By virtue of article 5 of the decree of the Fuehrer concerning the exercise of Governmental authority in the Netherlands, of May 18, 1940 (RGBl. I, p. 778) I order as follows:

Part I
DEFINITION

Section 1

(1) Jewish real estate, as defined in this order is any real estate which belongs in whole or in part:

1. To a Jew, as defined in Section 4 of Order No. 189/1940, concerning the registration of enterprises;

2. To an enterprise which is required to register by virtue of Order No. 189/1940;

3. To a private corporation, an association, an institution, a foundation or any other endowment, if one of the conditions of Section 2 of Order No. 189/1940 is fulfilled, although the organization in question is not an enterprise within the meaning of that order.

(2) Jewish real estate for the purpose of this order is, further, any right in real estate, as well as any mortgage, to which a person, an enterprise, an association, an institution, a foundation or any other endowment, as defined in paragraph (1), is entitled in its entirety or in part.

(3) The owner or beneficiary, for the purpose of this order, is the holder of title to the property, the possessor of a right in the real estate, or the mortgage creditor.

Section 2

The provisions of this order shall not apply to real estate covered by the provisions of Order No. 102/1941, concerning the registration and treatment of agricultural real estate in Jewish hands (Order for the Exclusion of Jews from Agriculture).

Part II
REQUIREMENT OF REGISTRATION

Section 3

(1) Jewish real estate must be registered in writing with the Netherlands Real Estate Administration, The Hague, Juliana van Stolberglaan 45, by the use of a form which may be obtained from the Chambers of Industry and Commerce.

(2) Registration must be made before September 15, 1941. Any real estate acquired only after this order has become effective, must be registered within one month after such acquisition.

(3) The owner or beneficiary of real estate must register it. Any person who is entitled to represent the owner or beneficiary, or who is entitled to administrate such real estate, must also register it.

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Section 4

(1) A person required to register must fill out the registration form completely and truthfully.

(2) Copies of the following documents must be filed with registration form, if they are in the possession of the person registering:

1. Excerpts from the Land-Register and the Mortage-Register;

2. Contracts of sale and other documents concerning the acquisition of the real estate;

3. Contracts of lease or tenancy, or other documents showing an existing use.

(3) The Netherlands Real Estate Administration is empowered to require further information and the production of books, vouchers, and any other documents.

Section 5

(1) Every parcel of real estate, every right in real estate and every mortage which on or before May 9, 1940, belonged to a person, an enterprise, an association, an institution, a foundation or any other endowment, as defined in Section 1, paragraph 1, or to which such person, enterprise, association, institution, foundation or other endowment was entitled, and which, before this order has become effective, has been transferred to any other person, must likewise be registered.

(2) The owner or beneficiary as defined in paragraph I, and his representative, as well as his immediate successor in title and the representative of the latter, are required to perform this registration.

(3) Registration must be filed in writing before September 15, 1941, with the Netherlands Real Estate Administration. The registration must be accompanied by excerpts from the Land-Register and the Mortgage-Register, as well as by the contracts of sale and other documents concerning the legal transfer to which reference was made in paragraph 1. Section 4, paragraph 3, shall not be applicable.

Section 6.

The registration requirements shall not apply to real estate:

1. Which has been registered pursuant to Order No. 26/1940, concerning the handling of enemy property;

2. Which belongs or did belong to an association or foundation which has been registered by virtue of Order No. 145/1940, concerning the registration of non-commercial associations and endowments;

3. Which has been reported in the registration of an enterprise, pursuant to Section 6 of Order No. 189/1940.

P a r t III
ADMINISTRATION

Section 7

(1) The Netherlands Real Estate Administration shall be empowered to take over Jewish real estate for administration.

(2) It shall be empowered to appoint third persons for such administration.

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Section 8

(1) As soon as real estate has been taken over for administration, the Netherlands Real Estate Administration shall be empowered to execute all translations, by court procedure or otherwise, which are necessary in the regular course of administration; it may alienate real estate in its entirety or in part, and may also mortgage it. The Netherlands Real Estate Administration shall be empowered to transfer these powers in their entirety or in part to the persons whom it has appointed for the administration of the real estate.

(2) Dispositions by the owner or beneficiary of the real estate shall be void during the period in which such real estate is being administered by the Netherlands Real Estate Administration. During such period payments by a mortage debtor to the owner or beneficiary shall have no releasing effect.

Section 9

(1) The taking over of administration by the Netherlands Real Estate Administration shall be recorded in the public register without payment of a fee.

(2) It shall become legally effective on the date on which the request for recording was received by the agency competent to keep the register.

P a r t IV
PERMISSIONS

Section 10

(1) Persons, enterprises, associations, institutions, foundations or other endowments, as defined in Section 1, paragraph 1, may acquire real estate by legal transfer, only with the permission of the Reich Commissioner for the occupied Netherlands Territories (Commissioner General for Finance and Economic Affairs).

(2) Acquisition at an execution sale shall also be considered acquisition by legal transfer.

Section 11

(1) Jewish real estate can be alienated, mortgaged, leased, or made subject to other changes in ownership or possession, in part or in its entirety, only with the permission of the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories (Commissioner General for Finance and Economic Affairs); mortgages in particular can be paid off entirely or in part only with such permission.

(2) Paragraph 1 shall not apply, if real estate:

1. Is being administered by the Netherlands Real Estate Administration;

2. Is being administered by an administrator appointed pursuant to Order No. 26/1940;

3. Is being administered by a trustee appointed pursuant to Order No. 48/1941 (Order concerning the Exclusion of Jews from Economic Affairs);

4. Belongs to an association or foundation registered pursuant to Order No. 145/1940;

(3) The incurring of an obligation to execute any of the legal acts mentioned in paragraph 1, sentence 1, is also subject to the granting of permission. If permission is granted to incur such obligation, said permission shall also extend to legal acts in performance of the obligation.

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Section 12

The request for permission shall be made by the person who intends to conclude a contract subject to permission, or to carry out any legal act subject to such permission.

Section 13

The permission may be made dependent upon the fulfillment of certain conditions or may be connected with certain requirements.

Part V
COSTS

Section 14

(1) The procedure pursuant to this order may be subject to costs.

(2) Action on applications may be made dependent on advance payment of such costs in part or in their entirety.

Part VI
PROVISIONS

Section 15

(1) Any person who maliciously violates or circumvents the provisions of this order, or of any order, condition or requirement issued or made by virtue of this order, shall be subject to imprisonment or fine, unlimited as to the amount, or to both of these penalties.

(2) If the act has been committed negligently, the punishment shall be imprisonment not exceeding one year, or a fine not exceeding 100,000 guilders.

Section 16

(1) In addition to such penalty, the confiscation of the property to which the criminal act referred may be ordered.

(2) If no particular person can be prosecuted or convicted, confiscation may be ordered independently.

Section 17

(1) Prosecution shall be initiated only upon request of the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories (Commissioner General of Finance and Economic Affairs).

(2) The request for prosecution can be withdrawn until sentence has been pronounced in the court of last resort.

Section 18

Acts punishable pursuant to Section 15 shall be considered criminal acts as defined in Section II, paragraph 2, of Order No. 52/1940, concerning German jurisdiction in Criminal Cases, as revised in Order No. 123/1941.

Section 19

(1) Property involved in the punishable act pursuant to Section 15 may also be confiscated by administrative procedure.

(2) In this case, confiscation takes place upon order of the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories (Commissioner General for Security); it becomes effective upon general publication or upon notice to the

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person concerned. If such confiscation involves property or rights which by virtue of a legal provision have been recorded in a public register, such confiscation shall be immediately recorded free of cost in such register, upon request of the Reich Commissioner (Commissioner General for Security).

(3) The Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories (Commissioner General for Finance and Economic Affairs) shall decide as to the disposition of confiscated property.

Part VII
FINAL PROVISIONS

Section 20

(1) The Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories (Commissioner General for Finance and Economic Affairs) shall carry out all measures necessary for the enforcement of this order. He is authorized to delegate his powers.

(2) The Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories (Commissioner General for Finance and Economic Affairs) shall have general power to make legally binding final decisions, in doubtful cases arising from the application of the provisions of this order.

Section 21

This order shall become effective on the day of publication.

THE HAGUE

August 11, 1941

Reich Commissioner
for the Occupied Netherlands Territories
SEYSS-INQUART

2 5 9

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2112-PS.

24 October 1945.

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt., Inf., 0-133 55 67, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2112-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt., Inf.,
0-133 55 67.

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DOCUMENT NO. 2176-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

REPORT OF INVESTIGATING OFFICER

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of the Judge Advocate

AG 092 (3 JA - 132) GNMCJ

APO 403
17 June 1945

SUBJECT: Report of Investigation of Alleged War Crimes.

TO: Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group, APO 655, U. S. Army.

I. AUTHORITY

1. This investigation was conducted in conformity with Letter, European Theater of Operations, 24 February 1945, by EUGENE S. COHEN, ASN O-1573121, Major, 514th Quartermaster Group, APO 403, United States Army, Investigator-Examiner, during the period 6 May 1945 to 15 June 1945, and pursuant to directive of Commanding General, Third United States Army, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit 1.

II. MATTERS INVESTIGATED

2. Murder by shooting, beating, use of poison gas, drowning, starving, injections, stoning, exposure, burning, and choking of nationals of twenty-three (23) nations, including members of the United States armed forces, of the German civilian population working under the German armed forces and of other nationals under the orders of said German armed forces, in violation of Article 2 of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention (Par 73, Rules of Land Warfare, Article 2 of same, Par 25, 26, 30, and 31, Rules of Land Warfare).

III. PROCEEDINGS

3. a. The testimony of all witnesses examined in the course of this investigation and which is attached and made a part hereof was secured through the use of interpreters where requisite, after the witness had been sworn by me, through the interpreter, under the authority of Article of War 114, in the following form: "You swear (or affirm) that the evidence you shall give in this investigation now being conducted by me shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. So help you God." Where practicable, the witness was given an opportunity to sign his testimony in my presence and, in all cases, it was signed after such testimony had been read back to the witness in his own language by the interpreter. The use of a stenographic reporter was impracticable under existing conditions.

The interpreter was sworn in the following form: "You swear (or affirm) that you will truly interpret this investigation now being conducted by me. So help you God."

b. The transcribed testimony of each such witness whose name is below listed is hereto attached as an Exhibit - the number of which is indicated immediately following the witness' name. As a further aid, the name of each camp in the chain at which the said Exhibit was prepared is listed alongside the name of the witness:

* * * * *

c. Other Exhibits:

Description

(a) (Exhibit 4 is a report by an International Committee set up by this Investigation, and same is sworn to in due form by the two witnesses named.

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The report is further documented with the names of others who helped compile the facts and figures).

(b) Journal Record of victims between certain dates, including information as to name, nationality, residence, date of birth, date of death, manner of death, and the names of guards performing the actual execution. (Ex. #214)

(c) "Totenbuch," or Book of the Dead, representing names of victims, nationality, residence, date of birth, date of death, and manner of death, between certain dates. This is a sample of small journals which were later incorporated in the permanent records which number sixteen (16) volumes and which will be submitted in a supplemental report. (Ex. #215)

(d) Specimen of poisonous gas used in gas chamber at MAUTHAUSEN and GUSEN No. 1 and No. 2. (Ex. #216)

(e) Rubber hose used by SS Guards to beat prisoners in the MAUTHAUSEN Chain of Camps. (Ex. #217)

(f) Heavy whip used by SS Guards to beat prisoners in the MAUTHAUSEN Chain of Camps. (Ex. #218)

(g) Cat of Nine Tails Whip used by SS guards. (Ex. #219)

IV. SUMMARY OF FACTS

4. A certificate by the Investigator-Examiner is attached hereto in separate form, summarizing the camp and methods of working them in the present investigation.

a. Between 1,500,000 and 2,000,000 political prisoners are known to have been incarcerated and labeled for extermination at the MAUTHAUSEN system of concentration camps from available records. The Chain consisted of between 23 and 30 individual camps between the years 1941 and 1945, the number varying as the smaller of these were occasionally evacuated when certain jobs had been finished (see Exhibits 4, 81, and 213).

b. Of the camps affiliated with MAUTHAUSEN, the present investigation covered 13 of them of which the largest were MAUTHAUSEN, GUSEN, Number 1 and Number 2, EBENSEE, STEYR, and GUNSKIRCHEN. Others in the list situated in Third Army Territory were LINZ, Numbers 1, 2 and 3, WELLS, LENZING, SCHLIER, and ENNS. The victims of this Chain of camps were murdered by the SS Guards working in these camps under the command of FRANZ ZIEREIS, Commandant and GEORGE BACHMAYER, Assistant Commandant, both now deceased, whose headquarters were at the fortress in MAUTHAUSEN (see Exhibits 209, 210, and 212).

c. Evidence reveals that the orders for the systematic decimation of these prisoners originated in BERLIN under the direct orders of SS FUHRER HEINRICH HIMMLER (see Exhibit 4).

d. American Forces liberated this camp on 5 May 1945 and this Investigator-Examiner and his team commenced this investigation on 6 May 1945.

e. The victims of the MAUTHAUSEN Chain of concentration camps are in the process of compilation and will be submitted in a supplementary report.

5. It may be added that one of the functions of the International Committee formed by this investigator to assist in the investigation of these camps was to arrange for each nation to copy the names of each of its dead from the available records in order to notify the next of kin. Therefore, it is confidently concluded that each such nation already has a list of its own dead with all information regarding their manner of death and the statistics thereupon. This International Committee was selected from the inmates by the

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team and consisted of the most distinguished members selected by the prisoners themselves. The Committee numbered six men as principals and many assistants have greatly helped the investigation in securing the best witnesses and covering all phases in the preparation of this case for trial (see Exhibit 4).

6. ENEMY INDIVIDUALS

a. See Exhibit 2.

b. Wanted notices for all perpetrators are in the process of preparation.

V. CONCLUSIONS

The evidence collected in this case shows very clearly that the whole purpose of the MAUTHAUSEN Chain of concentration camps was extermination of human beings for no other reason than their opposition to the Nazi way of thinking. There is no doubt that MAUTHAUSEN was the basis for long term planning. It was constructed as a gigantic stone fortress on top of a mountain flanked by small barracks.

MAUTHAUSEN, in addition to its permanency of construction, had facilities for a large garrison of officers and men, and had large dining rooms and toilet facilities for the staff. It was conducted with the sole purpose in mind of exterminating any so-called prisoner who entered within its walls.

The so-called branches of MAUTHAUSEN were under direct command of the SS officials located there. All records, orders, and administrative facilities were handled for these branches through MAUTHAUSEN. The other camps, including GUSEN and EBENSEE, its two most notorious and largest branches, were not exclusively used for extermination but prisoners were used as tools in construction and production until they were beaten or starved into uselessness, whereupon they were customarily sent to MAUTHAUSEN for final disposal.

The responsibility for the deaths of these victims lies definitely with the Nazi Party and with the SS men who executed its commands. Men like HIMMLER, ZIERIES, BACHMAYER, SCHULZ, GIESLER, PELZER, and others names in Exhibit 2 are but the arch criminals. However, although direct evidence is not established against all the members of the SS Guards in this disreputable Chain, the inescapable presumption is that all of them are prima facie guilty of these mass murders and the burden of proof is upon them individually to prove his innocence. In this connection the SS organization was purely a voluntary one and its purposes were obviously criminal, in violation of the Hague and Geneva Conventions, and the rights of humanity.

It is the belief of the Investigator-Examiner that the theory of "Association des Malfaiteurs" should be employed most stringently in a case as virulent and as atrocious as the MAUTHAUSEN setup (see Certificate attached hereto).

/s/ Eugene S. Cohen

EUGENE S. COHEN, Major, QMC,
JA Section, Third US Army,
Investigator-Examiner.

H1237-0131

3 JA-132

C E R T I F I C A T E
of Officer Investigating Mauthausen Concentration Camp.

I hereby certify as follows:

1. The Mauthausen Chain of Concentration Camps varied in number from twenty to thirty or more, depending on the needs of any specific work assignment.

2. As shown in EXHIBITS 21, 22, and 201, the captured records indicated the names of most of these camps, which varied in size from the huge fortress of Mauthausen itself, to a small detached lager similar to STEYR or LENZING. LENZING for example, like Steyr (See EXHIBITS 86, 194 and 195) were detachments from Mauthausen sent and billeted in Barracks to run two large factories.

3. The map herein included as EXHIBIT 201 shows the locations of these named camps with most important route numbers leading to them. It is thus seen that the majority of these camps were located EAST of the RIVER ENNS (which flows into the Danube and passes through STEYR and ENNS-TOWNSHIP, AUSTRIA), and, therefore, are of Russian concern, since this river is the present International Occupation Boundry between ourselves and the Soviet Union.

4. However, the remainder of the camps (as shown in EXHIBIT 201), amounting roughly to about 13, have been accounted for in this present investigation. (See list of Exhibits). The so-called most notorious of these camps are, of course, first MAUTHAUSEN (ranked with AUSCHWITZ as by far the largest and worst of all Concentration Camps); EBENSEE (ranked by many as worse than DACHAU yet only an inferior Aussenlager (Branch) to MAUTHAUSEN); GUSEN, divided into two large branches named NUMBERS ONE and TWO and of large size in themselves; GUNSKIRCHEN and STEYR, (See EXHIBIT 84), numbering at capacity five-thousand people. (See EXHIBIT 195).

5. Many of these camps were evacuated almost immediately upon liberation, even so large a one as GUNSKIRCHEN. (See EXHIBIT 84) This camp was said to have numbered as many as 20,000 prisoners at one time, but however, GUNSKIRCHEN, like STEYR and LENZING and the LINZ GROUP (Exhibit 22), and even EBENSEE, were not equipped for Mass Murder (Extermination), like Mauthausen and the Gusens, and when deaths were "required" other than through starving, beatings, exposure, or lack of hygienic treatment, the prisoners were dispatched either to Mauthausen or the Gusens where all were labelled for eventual annihilation. (See EXHIBIT 4 as a conclusive Exhibit which in itself, makes a complete case against the perpetrators involved).

6. The total count of victims is impossible to estimate, but with HARTHEIM Castle (a building used for mysterious disposal of people), (See Exhibit 213,) almost 2,000,000 are counted from the German Records themselves. (Also see again EXHIBIT 4).

7. As to the perpetrators or murderers, a complete list of leaders and some 10,000 (approximately) other S.S. names are included in this investigation. Descriptions are included whenever possible and at all events, Name, Rank, Date of Birth, Last Residence, and Residence of Next of Kin (to whom they might return) are given. (See EXHIBIT 2, and valuable EXHIBIT 213 which lists the victims between certain dates, giving their names, nationalities, Dates of Birth, Day of Death, Method of Death, and NAMES OF GUARDS doing the killing).

8. All Camps presently investigated are as follows:

MAUTHAUSEN, GUSEN (Nos. 1 and 2) LINZ (Nos. 1, 2, and 3), and EBENSEE.

H1237-0132

MELS, GUNSKIRCHEN, LENZING, STEYR, and SCHLIER are also taken care of as part of the chain and as indicated heretofore. All others were either in Russian or British areas. All these camps have been treated as one case. However, a Supplemental Report is now being prepared to follow the present one in a short time. It should be noted that FRANZ ZIEREIS, Commandant of the MAUTHAUSEN CHAIN and GEORG BACHMAYER, Assistant Commandant, are now dead. (See EXHIBITS 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 209 and 210).

9. Besides the books made Exhibits in this present report, sixteen TOTENBUCHER (Books of the dead, as described in EXHIBIT 4) have been photographed in micro-film and although ready cannot be received in time to submit in this present report.

Additional still photographs and more than 1000 feet of motion pictures have been taken by an official Signal Corps Team and will also be submitted in the Supplemental Report.

/s/ Eugene S. Cohen
EUGENE S. COHEN,
Major, QM Corps,
Investigating Officer.

2219-PS

H1237-0133

PARTIAL
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2219-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

To the General Field Marshal
Sir:

At Present in Vienna, 14 July 1939

If I may add something about myself, it is the following: I know that I am not of an active fighting nature, unless final decisions are at stake. At this time of pronounced activism (aktivismus) this will certainly be regarded as a fault in my personality. Yet I know that I cling with unconquerable tenacity to the goal in which I believe. That is Greater Germany (Grossdeutschland) and the FUEHRER. And if some people are already tired out from the struggle and some have been killed in the fight, I am still around somewhere and ready to go into action. This, after all, was also the development until the year 1938. Until July 1934 I conducted myself as a regular member of the party. And if I had quietly, in whatever form, paid my membership dues the first one, according to a receipt, I paid in December 1931. I probably would have been an undisputed, comparatively old fighter and party member of Austria, but I would not have done any more for the union. I told myself in July 1934 that we must fight this clerical regime on its own ground in order to give the Führer a chance to use whatever method he desires. I told myself that this Austria was worth a mass. I have stuck to this attitude with an iron determination because I and my friends had to fight against the whole political church, the Freemasonry, the Jewry, in short, against everything in Austria. The slightest weakness which we might have displayed would undoubtedly have led to our political annihilation; it would have deprived the Führer of the means and tools to carry out his ingenious political solution for Austria, as became evident in the days of March 1938. I have been fully conscious of the fact that I am following a path which is not comprehensible to the masses and also not to my party comrades. I followed it calmly and would without hesitation follow it again because I am satisfied that at one point I could serve the FUEHRER as a tool in his work, even though my former attitude even now gives occasion to very worthy and honorable party comrades to doubt my trustworthiness. I have never paid attention to such things because I am satisfied with the opinion which the FUEHRER and the men close to him have of me.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

13 November 1945

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5, 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of DOCUMENT 2219-PS.

GOETZ MAYER
T/5, 33812169

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2233-PS
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Page 18
2nd Pnd 3rd Paragraph Diary, 1940
1st Vol.

Thursday, January 11th

1520 (Abteilunepleiter) Section Chief Dr. Frauendorfer reports to the Governor General on the possibilities and teh extent of the transport of workers into the Reich. TherGerman State Railway sends daily 10 transports, each carrying 1000 workers. Beginning with January 15, these transports, which were stopped temporarily - will be taken up again.

In regard to the project of re-settlement, it should be avoided, that it be carried out further in the brutal manner which has prevailed up till now, because otherwise it is to be feared that people will not volunteer any more to go into the Reich, and also because of the way in which the re-settlement is carried out, the possibility of usin g these people in the Reich will be impaired. As an extra allowance for the unemployment pay the Reich Ministry for labor has held out the prospect of an additional sum of 3 million Reichmarks a month.

Pages Ihr Mehmeas
183/184 Citadel of Cracow

March 7th, 1940

1645 Conference with SS Brigidier General Shreckenbach
1650 Attache Dr. Albers is introduced by Concillor of legation v. Grolinan to the Governor General
1700 Conference with Brigidier General Buehrmann, Stabsleiter Reichert, Reichshauptamtsleiter Dr. Frauendorfer, and 2 special advisors.

Subject of the discussion is the question of the shipment of Polish agricultural workers into the Reich.

Brigadier General Buehrmann started bb saying that Stabsleiter Reichert has been appointed by the Reich Food Ministry, to make sure, that Polish workers would be sent into the Reich under all circumstances, and - if necessary - a compulsory service should be enforced upon them. Brigidier General Buehrmann would like to recommend, that the Governor General - for the time being - not make any decision for the inrtoduction of a compulsory service or employment of force upon the Polish agricultural workers.

Stabsleiter Reichert emphasizes that Berlin insists that the one million agricultural workers be sent into the Reich

Reichshauptamsleiter Dr. Frauendorfer replies to a question of the Governor General, that so far 81477 Polish agricultural workers were sent into the Reich - wf which 56,721 were men, and 24,756 women.

Since 12 February, 154 special trains have been sent off, that was the utmost that could have been accomplished in this time. To these figures - just mentioned - are to be added 42,000 workers, who had been already in the Reich so that the amount is increased to 130,000.

The Governor General has the opinion, that the 480,000 prisoners of war should also be included in the sum of one million. On account of the railroad and the highway conditions, it is not at present possible to do anything by force, also there were not sufficient police forces at disposal, to carry out If any force were exercised, then it would affect workers who, were employed as specialized workers for the plants.

Stabsleiter Reichert asks - if the occasion arises - that superior offices should make the decision in this question.

H1237-0134

Cracow

Wednesday, March 6th 1940
10:00 Conference with Ministerial-Diredtor Dr. Buchler.
10:50 Conference with bank-director Dr. Paersel
11:00 Conference with Riechslauptamtsleiter Dr. Franenforfer
Reichshauptamtleiter Dr. Franendorfer reports, that 73,000 Polish workers have been sent now into the Reich. At present 4,000 men are transferred daily. Further, Dr Fauendorfer reports on the organization in the plants. It is as simple as possible. On Monday, he visited a few plants in Warsaw, and he could only say, that they all were running excellently, this applies also to the machinery. Kitchens were also installed everywhere now and furthermore, the necessary quantities on soap had been provided. 5,000 sets of underwear and linen, 32,000 Kg. flour, 4,000 Kg. of beef and of pork and other merchandise had been distributed. The Governor-General order that the exact figures should be published in the press. Now, as before, he thinks that the soup given out daily was one of the best solutions, for the problem of the welfare for the working men.

Reichshauptamtsleiter Dr. Franendorfer remark that this soup is being served daily now with one pound of bread.

The Governor-General will not out of basic considerations give his consent to the proposal that an introductory note should be added to the 2nd decree for the regulation of social insurance, but he thinks it better to point out in a suitable way, that the chief of the labor section has given an explination about it to the press chief.

In this conference the question of the sending of polish agricultural workers into the Reich was then discussed. Here , Dr. Franendofer points out that workmen from the Lublin area had never gone to the Reich before, from which naturally certain difficulties arise. Besides numerous letters from the agricultural workers to their fimilies had already come from the Reich, in which the Polish agricultural workers expressed themselves very gratefully concerning their treatment in Germany. The Governor-General orders that some of these letters should be published in the press.

H1237-0135

page 216
last 12 lines
15 March 1940
Conference with ambassador in Wuehlisel.
18:30: Ambassador v. Wuehlisel reports that the preparations for the transport of the Vert Stoss Tltar to Nurnberg have been completed. The church really looked better, due to the space gained by the removal of the alter. Ambassador v. Wueblisch reported further more, that the former ambassador Wysoske had asked again for an audience with the Governor-General. The Ambassador v. Ruemelin had been asked to make a request that he be taken into the service of the Government-General.

page 216
last 12 lines.
The question of the Polish relief committee the Security service wrote to mr. Arlt, and pointed out, that the Head of this organization count Radriwill, participated in Silesian revolt, that he supported Korfanty and that he also was supposed to have disloyal remarks about the Reich. The ambassador v Wuehlisel asked mr. Arlt, to proceed very carefully in this matter, before expelling Count Radriwill from the relief committee because such a procedure might have disagreeable consequences.

Under any circumstances case the consent of the Governor-General would be necessary for this.

The so-called Polish Government in anger has completed a white book which deals with the arch-diocese of Posen and Suesen.
The governor General said, that he discussed this question with the pontifical nunzio in Berlin. He gathered from this conversation that a great deal was said about the treatment of the churches and apparantly it was attempted to push many things off into the government general, for which it was not at all responsible.
Ambassador v Wueblisch thinks it worth while that thoes and similar questions be discussed in Berlin. Such negotiations would have to be handled through the foreign office.

The Governor General daid, that he had long conferences with the Ministry of Finance and with the representatives of the Reich Food Ministry. It was requested there very ungently, that the Polish agricultural workers be sent in greater quantities to the Reich. In Berlin the explained that if he were asked to do so, he could naturally exercise some compulsion in perhaps such a way, that he might have the police surround a village and bring out the men and women in question by force, and then send them to Germany. But besides these police measures one also could proceed by witholding unemployment relief for the workers in question. Ambassador v. Wuehlisch discussed then certain violations of the border which occurred at the Soviet frontier. By request of the Reich Minister of Finance and by request of the Armed Forces High Command representation had been made in Moscow evidently for the reason that the Soviet border guards always employed their firearms immeidiately. It was suggested that such incidents be straightened out right away on the spot.

The deputy foreign commissor Potemkin suggested that liaison officers should be appointed by both sides for this purpose. The liaison staff Russia should serve as central office.

The Governor General does not condiser this method practicable and he feels that here also the Government General should be unhindered, he requested that the ambassador v. Wuehlisel confer on this question with the Secretary of state Dr. v. Wuehlisel. This question did not only concern the Wehrmacht but also for example the custom administration, for this reason representatives of the Ministry of Finance must also cooperate in this matter.

Ambassador v. Wuehlisch draws attention to the fact that the customs officials are subordinated to the Wehrmacht.

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H1237-0137

The Governor General points out, that a superior office would not make any decision... In this matter the decision would be up to him. For the time being one must try to reach the goal by employing different means. For instance letters might be published, that were sent from the Reich, written by Polish workers to their families. If the occasion arises, such compulsory decree should not be announced publicly.

Reichshauptamtsleiter Dr. Frauendorfer confirms, on the basis of his experiences, that in many cases there was no possibility of employing recruiters from the Reich. On account of the snowfall, the passenger cars could not be used, and by using field sleighs, the recruiters could have travelled not more than 60 km. daily. Also, the Warsaw district was never really an emigration-area for Polish agricultural workers.

It has to be observed, that unfortunately the agricultural workers have medical certificates or statements made out by the words, which purport to say that they are not fit for service. Other workers took refuge into the woods. Often complaints were expressed, that the words did not support the action sufficiently, and cases have been observed, where official labor measures, had been intentionaly violated. Besides, the activity of the recruiter man not be without danger; just some time ago, one of these German officers was fired upon. Also the fact should be noted; that of 800 workers, which were already assigned, only 69 reported to the station.

All that could be traced back to the fact that the rural population is affected by a psychosis of anxiety, without mentioning the fact that the POLES might have organized themselves well in the meantime.

The Gobernor General is not at all disinclined to take the most extreme measures. But then, the authority of the Reich would have to be fully utilized, but as long as there is snow on the ground, any change in this situation can not be contemplated.

Page 198 lines 15-22 II

12 March 1940

Governor General Dr. Frank:

In view of the propaganda in the U.S.A. any use of force should if possible be avoided, but a light pressure could be exercised by stopping the payment of unemployement relief, for those categories which are concerned at all, at any rate agriculture should not send back young, strong workers, just because they were inskilled

Reichsbauernführer Behrendt: The Agriculture needs skilled as well as unskilled workers. One unskilled worker could be employed for each two skilled workers.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2233-PS

29 November 1945

I, Charles E. Bidwell, S/Sgt, 13146054, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2233-PS

Charles E. Bidwell
S/Sgt
13146054

H1237-0138

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT No.2233-PS
OFFICE OF U.S.CHIEF OF COUNSEL .

Diary 1940
Second Volume
April to June

.....

12[45] Discussion with State Secretary Dr.Bühler,SS lieutenant general (Obergruppenführer) Krüger and Reichshauptamtsleiter Dr.Frauendorfer in presence of Reich Minister Dr.Seyss-Inquart.

Subject of the discussion is the sending of workers,particularly agricultural workers into the Reich.

Reichshauptamtsleiter Dr.Frauendorfer reports,that so far about 160.000 agricultural workers and about 50.000 industrial workers have been sent to the Reich.However, in total there should be 500.000. It is to be hoped that there would yet be enough voluntary enlistments.

The governor-general stated that the fact that all means in form of proclamations etc did not bring success,leads to the conclusion that the Poles out of malevolence,and guided by the intention of harming Germany by not putting themselves at its disposal,refuse to enlist for working-duty.Therefore,he asks Dr.Frauendorfer,if there are any other measures,not as yet employed,to win the Poles on a voluntary basis.

Reichshauptamtsleiter Dr.Frauendorfer answered this question negatively.

The General Governor emphasized the fact that he now will be asked to take a definite attitude toward this question.Therefore the question will arise whether any form of coercive measures should now be employed.

The question put by the general governor to SS lieutenant general (Obergruppenführer) Krüger: does he see possibilities of calling Polish workers by coercive means,is answered in the affirmative by SS Lieutenant general (Obergruppenführer) Krüger.

So far as he knows another 300.000 Polish workers should be sent into the Reich,and it will be possible to fill this request once the working-duty decree has gone into effect.

Reichshauptamtsleiter Dr.Frauendorfer suggests to begin by issuing orders to report for certain age groups and to wait for the result of this measure.However,some difficulties will be encountered as it is not known where to send these orders to report.There might be the possibility of getting the co-operation of the Poids.It is important,however,that the workers of large cities be recruited and there the difficulties will naturally be particularly great.

H1237-0139

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT No.2233-PS
CONT'D.

The general governor is willing to agree to any practical measure,however,he wishes to be informed personally about the measures to be taken.One measure,which no doubt would be successful,would be the discontinuance of unemployment compenstion for unemployed workers and their transfer to public welfare.Therefore,he decrees that,beginning 1 May, claim for unemployment compensation will cease to exist and only public welfare may be granted.For the time being only men are to report and above those men living in cities.There might be a possibility of combining the moving of the 12o.ooo Poles from the Warthe district with this measure.

Reich Minister Dr.Seyss-Inquart mentions that not many of the Polish workers are left in the Warthe district who would be qualified to be send to the Reich.All those who are fit for work are already being sent to the Reich. Those capable of assimilation are going to the Reich with their families anyway.Of those not capable of assimilation only useful men are being chosen.

The general governor closes the discussion by saying that guiding directions are now given.The officials involved must work out the details by themselves.Wherever the labor section does not succeed,the police must act.

12 November 1945.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO.2233-PS

I,WOLFGANG E.THORMANN, M/SGT, 33779426,hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages;and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2233-PS.

WOLFGANG E.THORMANN
M/SGT.
33779426.

H1237-0140

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2233-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

FROM: FRANK DIARIES, 1939, from 25 October to 15 December.

pp. 6-7.

1230 hours. The governor general received Captain Benninghoff. The latter reported about the extensive reconstruction works on the bridges blown up by the Poles and pointed out that special engineer troops are occupied on rebuilding these bridges (at the present time still 25 units).

The governor general received the president of the police of LODSCH, SS-Lieut. General Beckerle.

Questions pertaining to the committment of police and civil service employees were discussed. Lieutent General Beckerle pointed out that the former fear psychology present among the people had passed and that there were more Jews in Lodsch than before. This is one of the reasons for the continued deterioration of the food situation.

The Governor General received the district chief in Warsaw (Reichshauptamtsleiter) Dr. Fischer.

He discussed with him current questions, especially on the subject of finance and monopoly. Dr. Fischer was instructed to clear up the question of mayoralty in Warsaw, and to determine what amounts of copper and scrap metal are available. Dr. Fischer promises to secure 300 fur coats for the main office. The Governor General requested information concerning the diplomatic representation, who were still in Warsaw, and concerning ~~the shooting of Jews.~~ other matters. Dr. Fischer reported also that there is a cable connection from Warsaw to Krakau and moreover there is a large cable supply at hand. Dr. Fischer was requested to set up border signs at the border of the general government.....

p. 44.
.... By spring 1,000,000 Poles and Jews from East and West Posen, Danzig, Poland and Upper Silesia must be received by the general government. The resettlement of the ethnic Germans and the taking on of Poles and Jews (10,000 daily) must be accomplished according to plan. Especially urgent is the instituting of forced labor for the Jews. The Jewish population if possible must be extracted from the Jewish cities and be put to work on roads. The critical questions of housing and feeding are still to be cleared up.....

p. 19. 11:00 o'clock.
..... The Governor General received SS Lieutenant General Krüger, General Becker, SS Brigadier General Streckenbach, and Lieutenant Colonel Gudewill.
Brigadier General Streckenbach reported:
The Reichsführer SS wishes that all Jews be evacuated from the newly gained Reich territories. Up to February approximately 1,000,000 people are to be brought in this way in to the general government. The families of good racial extraction present in the occupied Polish territory (approximately 4,000,000 people)

should be transferred into the Reich and individually housed and thereby be uprooted as a people. The deadline provided for the migration transport is the 15th of November. The Governor General points out that better and greater transport ways be made ready for both the West-East as well as the East-West movements. SS Lieutenant General Krüger explained that, starting 15 November, the entire railroad net of the general government will be at the disposal of the resettlement transports. The general governor gave SS Lieutenant General Krüger the assignments to organize these refugee transports ....

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2233-PS

I, Wolfgang E. Thormann, M/Sgt, 33779426, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpt from Document No. 2233-PS.

WOLFGANG E. THORMANN
M/Sgt, 33779426.

H1237-0141

H1237-0142

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2237-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Excerpt from:

File on actions against the Jews in November 1938.

1120

Action against the Jews on 9 and 10 November 1938
Legal Regulations

pp. 3 and 4:

Reich Commissioner for the
Re-Union of Austria with
the German Reich

Wien I, 18 November 1938
Parliament
phone R, 50-5-60

S e c r e t

To the
Minister President
Generalfieldmarshal Goering

B e r l i n

Sir!

The action in Vienna which took place during the night from 9 to 10 November was finished up completely by Tuesday.

The following is what happened substantially:
A decree of Dr. Goebbels, the Reichsminister for Propaganda, but above all his speech which he delivered in Berlin on the evening of 9 Oct 1938 as well as the contents of the speech he made in Munich were preludes for this so-called action. Though the hint was somehow indefinite, no different conclusion could be drawn since it said: "The fire-department has to be notified". This order was not given in the first place to the district leaders (Gauleiter), but the lower echelons (Gliederungen) were notified first so that the district-leader had no chance to possibly take counter-measures. Besides there existed a few orders which were farther reaching than the hint by Dr. Goebbels. Here in Vienna in many cases even the schools were closed in the morning so that the youth could participate - "according to the order" in the demonstrations, like it always happens in such cases, the disorderly elements soon were leading and 40 different places were on fire. Around noontime the Major reported that the fire-department was no more in the position to control the situation. Simultaneously, the tumult against the Jewish stores began. That, one may say was the signal for the day and the night of the long fingers. (Translatore's note: i.e. for the thieves.) How did the Party act in this situation, and especially the political leaders?
Fieldmarshal, I assure you, that after thorough investigation am able to state today that the political leaders, and that is the district leader and their Kreis-leaders, are the ones who have prevented chaos in Vienna. Enormous quantities of stolen merchandise, above all jewelry and valuables were safeguarded immediately by the Kreis-leaders, and at this moment

H1237-0143

an inventory is being made. Gold, silver and valuables will be brought to a safe in a bank today. There is no question of returning the goods which were taken away from the Jews because one does not know their original owners and also because the Jews make the most ontrageous and untruthful statements. Therefore I am forced, my Fieldmarshal, to safeguard an extremely high quantity of valuables. The rest of the goods will be checked, and shall be sold to retail-shops for the purchase-value, since we have to except a scarcety of goods on account of the protective measures for our territory we hade to take (Gebietsschutzmassnahmen).

Especially the enclosed orders will be necessary, for the restoration of normal conditions and of a legal status.

Fieldmarshal, please do examine the enclosures. In case you have no objections, I would like to enforce them immediately.

I may refer again to my request for support as for the introduction of the laws on organization and also for the execution of the Fuehrer-order.

Heil Hitler!

sign.: (illegible)

H1237-0144

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2237-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
CONT'D

page 55

Telephone-message of the Kripo D.D.

State Police Vienna, Reg. Rat Dr. Pifrader gives the following information via phone at 07,30:

Since the Kripo-agencies (Kripostellen) of the "Pol.-Aemter" are constantly making inquiries at the state police (Stapo), they will have to be informed by phone of the following:

Influential and rich male Jews of German nationality of not too high an age and who are healthy, have to be arrested.

The owners of fire-arms are to be treated especially severly and a special notation has to be made about them.

The police agencies (Po. Amtsdienststellen) have to be informed (as top secret) that the property of all native Jews has to be razed entirely. Therefore the police is not supposed to come to the aid of Jews in such cases.

Fires may be started only where there is no danger that the fire may spread. Therefore, as a rule, not in narrowly built parts of the city.

On a whole about 3.000 Jews are to be arrested.

Dr. Bayer D.D. of the Kripo

CERTIFICATE OF PARTIAL TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 2237 - PS

28 November 1945

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5, 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct partial translation of Document 2237-PS.

GOETZ MAYER
T/5
33812169

H1237-0145

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPT OF DOC. 2246-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

EXCERPT OF LETTER OF VON PAPEN TO HITLER

(3 last paragraphs)

Subject: Report on Danube situation.

The progress of normalizing relations with Germany at the present time is obstructed by the continued persistence of the Ministry of Security, occupied by the old anti-National Socialistic officials. Changes in personnel are therefore of utmost importance. But they are definitely not to be expected prior to the conference on the abolishing of the Control of Finances (Finanzkontrolle) at Geneva. The Chancellor of the League has informed Minister de Glaise-Horstenau, of his intention to offer him the porte folio of the Ministry of the Interior. As a guiding principle (Marschroute) I recommend on the tactical side, continued, patient psychological manipulations, with slowly intensifyed pressure directed at changing the regime. The proposed conference on economic relations, taking place at the end of October, will be a very useful tool for the realisation of some of our projects. In discussion with government officials as well as with leaders of the illegal party (Leopold and Schattenfroh) who conform completely with the concordat of July 11. I am trying to direct the next developments in such a manner to aim at corporative representation of the movement in the fatherland front (Vaterländischen Front) but nevertheless refraining from putting National-socialists in important positions for the time being. However such positions are to be occupied only by personalities, having the support and the confidence of the movement. I have a willing collaborator in this respect in Minister Glaise-Horstenau.

(Signature) von Papen

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF EXCERPT OF DOC. 2246-PS

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6 November 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Excerpt of Doc. 2246-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
O-1335567

2278-PS Exhibit USA 706
Filed Jan. 16, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2278-PS
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Reviewer's Note.
The first page of the M/S bears a stamp at the foot, the translation of which is:
Entered in the Catalogue of books
3 AIC under current No. A 238.

Official tour of Reich Minister Dr. Seyss-Inquart to the districts of Warsaw, Lublin and Radom from 17th November to 22nd November 1939.

Those taking part were:

1. Reich Minister Dr. Seyss-Inquart
2. Dr. Sild
3. Dr. Rahn, department of food and agriculture in the office of the General Governor.
4. Legation Councillor (LGR) Dr. Goetze, economic department.

17.11. Departure at 7.0 a.m. from Burg Cracow in a car. To Warsaw via Mislowitz, Sosnowitz, Czestochau, Radomsko, Petrikau, Lodz, Tomaszow and Rawa. Arrival 1.0 p.m. Received by the governor, Dr. Fischer and the gentlemen of his staff, followed by a small luncheon party.

At 3.0 p.m., Reich Minister Dr. Seyss-Inquart addressed the department heads of the District Chief and stated, among other things, that the chief guiding rule for carrying out the German administration in the General Government must be solely the interests of the German Reich. A stern and inflexible administration must make the area of use to German economy and so that excessive clemency may be guarded against, the results of the intrustion of the Polish race into German territory must be brought to mind.

Following that the Reich Minister held conferences with the governor, Dr. Fischer and Section Head, Dr. Barth on administrative and economic questions; later on, experts and heads of departments were called into the conferences to make reports.

Among other specifications, Dr. Fischer submitted to the Reich Minister the specification attached to the plan for the preliminary arrangement of the departments in the office of the District Chief and of the authorities in Warsaw.

Dr. Fischer reported that, in particular, the number of personnel was still considerably too small. Three out of 14 Sub-Prefects (Landraete) were also missing. Of the departments in the District Office, only a few had their full complement; that was also the case with the department of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda and the Labour department. Of important experts, there were still none for taxes and monopolies. In the Health Service, one medical advisor was, at the same time, head of the Health Department and district physician. The accommodation of the authorities also left much still to be desired.

Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart then stated that a large sum for the productive support of unemployed would be made available. This sum could be used for erecting or repairing any buildings required by the administration.

The governor, Dr. F. reported that further German administrative and municipal officials were also required for the administration of the city of Warsaw. Then a discussion took place on the organization

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of the district authorities, the occupation of the rural districts (Landkreise) and on the question of transferring the remaining 5 communities of the Grojec district (Kreis) from the district of Radom, and a further 5 communities of the Garwolin district from the district of Lublin, to the district of Warsaw. Reich Minister S.I. promised to look into this affair. After that, general questions on the division and personnel to occupy the districts were discussed. Reich Minister S.I. agreed that should the District captain (Kreishauptmann) not be a lawyer the best arrangement for a district captaincy (Kreishauptmannschaft) was to assign to him a representative who was trained in legal matters. Dr. Fischer reported that, up to now, the German administration had been set up as essentially a supervising authority over the Polish administration. Questions arose from this as to what range of subjects should be included in the functions of the District captain. It was superfluous to draw up any building regulations, for should accommodation be had, it concerned only the Poles themselves. Then the question of using Polish employees at the German administrative courts was touched upon. There were some 300 Polish employees working at the office of the District Captain of Warsaw. The administration by the German authorities would have especially to serve for the utilisation of the Government's sphere for German economy, so the administration of agriculture, Labour and Roads especially would have to be well-ordered, on the other hand, trade, settlements or even the accountancy of the Polish communities are of less importance.

Dr.FISCHER then raised the question of prices. Price commissars were to be sent from the Reich and they would equalise the standard of prices with that in the Reich. Wages would then however have to be adapted to his standard and this might have unforeseen consequences. Reich Minister S.I., on the other hand, stated that Generaloberst v.BRAUCHITSCH wished to place army orders for textiles cheaply in Lodz and suitable industrial centres. Dr. F. thought that higher prices had their good points as at Warsaw, for instance which had only been fed because of higher prices which gave the farmers an incentive to bring their goods into the city. Thereupon, Reich Minister S.I. put the question of how a definite influence could be obtained on the price system and on the system of distributing goods by setting up monopolies for essential goods such as salt, sugar, coal, petrol and tobacco. If these goods are in one's hands and if it be possible to make them available to the farmer for a definite price, he would also be prepared to sell his products for a corresponding price in order to obtain the goods he requires.

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Moreover for the time being it could not be a question of furnishing better living conditions for the Poles, but merely of securing the minimum of existence for them. However, it could not be regarded in that light when a forced laborer was paid nine Zloty per week.

Hereupon Reichsminister Dr. S.I. received the report of the City President (Stadtpraesidenten) of Warsaw, Dr. Dengel. He declared the problem of the unemployed to be the most urgent one. Until now taxes to the amount of 150,000 RM had been received, but this would not be nearly sufficient, not even for the reconstruction of the most urgently needed public buildings. The city budget was now in preparation, but already it became apparent, that a loan to the amount of 50,000,000 Zloty from the Reich Credit Bank (Reichskreditkasse), was needed. Sufficient city property would be available as security, of which an inventory was being prepared. Later on the tax revenue would probably be sufficient for regular interest on the loan. Regarding the tax system, the City President reported that the cities received shares and additional payments over and above the remittances (Ueberweisungen) of State taxes, about the same as in the old Austria. The administration of property taxes would be particularly difficult, since during this mix-up no status of persons or assets could be established.

On the question being put by Reichsminister Dr. S.I. the City President reported that in Warsaw about 40% of the buildings would be again habitable, after part of them had been repaired. Dr. F. thought, one would leave one quarter of the destroyed city for inspection, but otherwise lay out grass plots in place of the debris. The City President then mentioned the question of the Polish City officials. For their necessities they have been receiving so far up to 250 Zloty a month and those with higher salaries half of the surplus up to 1200 Zloty. Dr. F. pointed to the decree of the Governor General, whereby 100 % of the basic salaries and not over 1000 Zloty could be paid. The activity of the banks was then mentioned. Stocks in gold, precious metals and foreign currencies had been delivered by them to the Reichsbank. The inhabitants were obliged to deposit all their money at the bank, withdrawals depending on the approval of the City President. Dr. F explained that the banking system was now attached to the Department of Economic Affairs at the office of the District Chief.

The City President now reported on welfare questions. Specific difficulties had arisen from the sudden departure, on higher authority, of the relief train Bavaria. Workers who could buy no food for themselves, were frequently unable to continue working. The welfare service of the NSV confined itself to the racial Germans, whereby certain difficulties were caused by the question of determining who were racial Germans, of which about nine to ten thousand were now living in Warsaw. Jews were not aided, even out of municipal funds.

For the care of the Poles, the Polish social Self-Help was to be called into activity again, and was to be continued by the men who had formerly directed it. The supervisor was to be supplied, against payment, with motor cars and trucks with fuel, and permission was to be granted to the organization to accept voluntary contributions in the country. The confiscated bank accounts of about 9,000,000 Zloty are to be at the disposal of the organization.

The City President then pointed to the absolute necessity of the speediest establishment of criminal justice officials as well as a civil court. An orderly continuation of economic life depended on the latter. He then also reported on the Court of Corporal Punishment (Pruegelstrafengericht), which had been established for the punishment of crimes amongst the Poles.

Dr. F pointed out that possibly greater treasures might be hidden in the Jewish quarter.

Reichsminister S.I. commented then that the building up of the administration to be effected in Poland, was a good school for those participating in it.

The ideal arrangement would be that a Party man with strong initiative should stand at the head of the administration, at whose side would be experts and an experienced administrator, in order to include the work in the general system.

The head of the department, Labour Oberregierungsrat Dr. Epse then spoke. He expressed the hope that it would later on be possible to exchange forced labor by normal labor. There was a definite lack of tools; he had therefore a small factory for the manufacture of tools, and now construction of the

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most primitive sort was going on at the airport and on the highways. The question of transport was the most important and would have to be tackled ahead of the clearing-up work. At present a survey was being made of all undertakings which were at all capable of production, and, after the Reich had decided what was to be manufactured, they were to begin operations. Possibly three shifts were to work in these factories to equalize the destruction.

A difficult problem was the multitude of the now unemployed Polish intellectuals. The students could still be trained in handicraft, but for the 80,000 to 90,000 Polish officials, one must, if occasion arises, revert to reconstruction of the Polish Administration Departments.

Reichsminister S.I. then stated clearly that a second Polish sub-administration would be considered by the German authorities solely in the form of a welfare organization.

Oberregierungsrat Dr. ESPE remarked that the activity of the sick fund and of social welfare would largely be dependent on the functionaries of the railroad and postal systems. Both welfare branches were controlled by a head institution for social security which, was already again showing a certain profit. The administrative office could also be rebuilt with available materials. The property of the head institution is said to have been largely transferred to Russia in the form of securities. Fortunately, it was largely a question of mortgages, which could be declared invalid.

As an added difficulty, Oberregierungsrat Dr. ESPE then also mentioned that wages had been brought down below the former level, due to surplus labour.

Reichsminister Dr. S.I. asked if the proclaimed tariffs were really to be enforced. In any case no official Polish State should be set up. Oberregierungsrat Dr. ESPE thought that, on the basis of tax collection, this decree was advantageous, and one could naturally not suffer the obvious ignoring of regulations which we had promulgated. Reichsminister Dr. S.I. thought that this was no further problem east of the Reich border. One could, at an opportune moment, seize upon a case of border violation for corresponding exemplary and also otherwise useful action.

Then the representative of the Reich Railways (Reichsbahn) at the office of the District Chief, OBERREICHS BAHNRAT PRASCH, appeared to give a report. He said not that military transport had come to an end, traffic from the west was going on well. Also trains to Cracow went through Kattowitz. The number of locomotives taken over, was fairly satisfactory, the major part, however, had gone to Russia where they possibly would not even be needed because of the change in the railway guage, which had already been started to great extent. Trains were already going to Lublin, also. Today, two railroad bridges were in operation. Reichsminister S. I. pointed out that, above all, the tracks to Cracow which do not go through Kattowitz, had to be restored in order that the necessary gasoline and petroleum could be brought from the oil field region to Warsaw. Admittedly, an increased amount of suitable freight cars was still necessary, but that could be accomplished by repairing.the existing damaged tank cars.

The director of the "Trade Economy" Department, Regierungsrat Dr. von COELLN now came forward to give a report. He stated that, in the district of Warsaw, almost all branches of industry were represented. French and Dutch capital was invested in the oil field enterprises. Dr. von COELLN then said that in the district of Warsaw still considerable supplies of raw materials were stored in soap factories. These soap factories should again be put into operation. The produced soap was made of a higher solution of fat acid than was at present stipulated in the Reich. Reichminister Dr. S. I. said the Order of the Governor General according to which the factories were permitted to produce one third of their pre-war production, must be amended and the soap should be confiscated. Furthermore, it was agreed that war economic works, car factories, the chemical and optical industries etc., should be put quickly into operation. Dr. von COELLN then also raised the question of how the import and export between the Reich and the "Government" should be arranged, if the coal region with SOSNOWIC, DABROWA, and TRZEBINIA also becomes German territory and. after the 20th the control of foreign currencies and customs will be carried out. He then reported that the electrical plants in Warsaw were in working order. In spite of an order to the contrary, there were about 30 night clubs in Warsaw.

Of primary importance was the question of safeguarding the still existing supplies of soap, tea, etc. The control of such goods as petroleum, light, salt fertilizers, etc., by some method of monopoly, could best be accomplished through consumer co-operatives.

Now appeared Landesbauernfuhrer (State Farmer Leader) KOERNER. He reported that the supplying of Warsaw with food from Lublin and Radom must be made to operate better. Up to now, Warsaw had been supplied in that respect by Posen. Five thousand tons of grain were now going to be supplied to Warsaw, 15,000 of which were already on the way. (Translator's note: these figures are exactly the same as in the original) 20% of the grain in the "Government" was destroyed through military action. There was also a shortage of meat and similar commodities. In this case, however, as a matter of principle, nothing should be sent in from the Reich. Until the next harvest, the Polish population should be principally provided with sufficient amounts of grain and potatoes only. It would take about from 3 to 4 years to build up the stock of cattle again. The prices of grain should be kept on a level of from 25 to 30% above those of 1 September 1939. Such prices were sufficient for the farmers.

At 8.00 P. M. supper with the commanding officer of the city garrison presents

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18. 11, 8 o'clock departure from Hotel Europejski in Warsaw for a drive of inspection within the Warsaw district accompanied by the Governor Dr. Fischer. Survey of the destroyed bridges ov r the Bug at Wyszkow, and then on via Lochow to Ostrow.

At Ostrow visit to the Sub-Prefect (Landrat) von Bochnau , who reports on his work to Reichsminister Dr. Seyss-Inquart. Bochnau sees a special difficulty in the fact that the administrative services of the Wehrmacht will be recalled in the very near future. The Sub-Prefects (Landraete) have relied mainly on these units. After they have gone away they will be very short of labor.

In the Ostrow district there are also special food difficulties to be noted, since the district on whose agricultural authorities Ostrow's supplies depended was said to have come under the Russians. There was some talk that the Russians here would withdraw 5 kilometres.

A particular nuisance also was the badly guarded frontier, due to the shortage of police, which made possible a continuous uncontrolled running backwards and forwards, and a considerable removal of property, particularly by the Jews.

After Ostrow the refugee camp at Malkinia was visited in which there were no refugees at the time. It was reported that up to now about 10,000 German nationals had crossed over the frontier there. Frequently displaced Germans from Posen and West Prussia were concerned. Near the frontier we saw the countless Jews and similar rabble that were on the 200 metres or so of no man's land between the German and the Russian frontier posts waiting to cross over into Russian Territory in the darkness. Frequently it is said the Russians themselves bring such refugees back again after a few days. Recently 150 Tax collectors have arrived who will be installed in this section. Above all it is essential that when the administrative services of the Wehrmacht leave, replacements should be put in in good time.

The police officer reported that when settling the frontier zone of interests the Russian officers made an excellent impression and were distinctly better informed than the Germans were,

After lunch at the Landrat von Bochnau's in Ostrow we set out at 1400 hours on the drive via Siedlce, Sokolow to Biala-Podlaska, where we spent the night at the operations command of the Security Service there.

On 19. 11. at 7.30 a.m. departure in the direction of Brest-Litovsk to the Bug frontier. We drove past the airdrome of Terespol where we could see numbers of airplanes destroyed by German bombers. The land there is partly marshy, the villages produce a distinctly Russian impression. In the afternoon we drove on from Biala via Radzyn, Lubartow to Lublin. On the way, lunch at Major General von Courbiere's, the commander of the 213th Division.

1900 hours, arrival in Lublin, received by the Governor, SS.Brigadefuehrer Schmidt, at the town council building where the Sub-Prefects(Landraete), the divisional leaders and the police leaders attached to the District chief were gathered together.

SS.Brigadefuehrer Schmidt welcomed the Reich Minister "in the easternmost corner of the territory of German interests." Dr. Seyss-Inquart, after having had the collaborators of the Governor's introduced, conveyed the good wishes of the Governor General whose forthcoming visit to Lublin he announced.

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He then expounded the Principles in accordance with which the administration in the "Government" must be conducted. This administration would require above all the ability to pull through on its own Strength without being a burden to the Reich. This could be attained especially by the firm comradship of the men stationed there. The resources and inhabitants of this country would have to be made of service to the Reich, and only within these Limits could they prosper. Independent political thought should no longer be allowed to develop. The Vistula area might perhaps be still more important to German destiny then the Rhine. The Minister then gave as a guiding theme to the District Leaders: We will further everything which is of service to the Reich and will put an end to everything which may harm the Reich. Dr. SEYSS-INQUART then added, that the Genaeral Governor wished that those men who were fulfilling a task for the Reich here should receive a material post in keeping with their responsibility and achievements.

Reichsminister SEYSS-INQUART then touched on the question of Ukrainians, who could be allowed a cartain cultural life of teir own, which must never, however, be allowed to lead to a national movement. In conclusion Dr. SEYSS-INQUART invited the District Leaders to bring their troubles and questions at any time to the Governor, so that he can find the best solution in co-aperation with them.

District Chef (Distrikt chef) SCHMIDT replied that these political directives should also be worked out in the course of the present conference. Personality was more necessary for the tasks before them than the knowledge required for a usual administration. The area ambracing the district of Lublin required special consideration, for on account of the re-settlement it was a collecting point for Germans, who were no longer allowed to live in Germany, and for other destructive elements. Here iron firmness must be brought to bear. It would be a good idea if the Gemeral Governor were personally to gain an insight into the particular conditions existing in this region. Here also, a guard of collaborators was being trained, who would carry out the most valuable work in German Eastern Politics.

We had dinner with SS Sturmbannfuehrer HASSELBERGER where we also spent the night (until the arrival of Brigadefuehrer GLOBOCYNIK, police Assistant to the District Chief).

HASSELBERGER is of the opinion, in answer to question by Minister Dr. SEYSS-INQUART, that the (racial German) individual protection is an encumbrance. He did not dream it possible to organise the Ukraineans as an ausiliary Police Force.

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Nov 20, 1939

0830 Sight-seeing tour of Lublin, University, Cracow Gate and the part of the city, built by the Germans, - Old Lublin, - as well as the prison. Then a conference with the District Chief. At first questions were discussed concerning the division into districts and the supplying with personnel of the offices of the District Leaders. Here also the lack of staff again stood first. Especially after the withdrawal of the construction battalion the Sub-Prefects will be left without police and without any office help. Here also Dr Seyss-Inquart raised the question, as to what tasks should belong to the sphere of the German administration. On the question of the setting up of the councils of the District leaders, many District Leaders thought it necessary, to have a legal representative (Assessor). Furthermore clerical staff and interpreters would be required . In the administrative services of the Wehrmacht were some people, who, in case of need, were willing to remain on there as employees. Also the Wehrmacht might be willing to transfer certain people, for instance as trustees for agricultural estates, and so on. Also individual teachers badly needed for schools could be obtained in this way. After the departure of the administrative troops, there might also be a lack of motor vehicles, as they had very often brought their own vehicles with them.

Governor Schmidt had learned that the petrol of the Government was to be included in the Reich Syndicate. Petrol here costs 8 Pfg. more than in the Reich. Therefore 8 Pfg. more will have to be paid to the German Petrol accounts for which the Government will be charged. Then questions were discussed concerning the general construction of the office of the District Chief in Lublin. As to taxes, it was to be confirmed, that the revenue offices had re-employed 80 % of the Polish revenue officials, many of whom were to be in sole charge of the tax administration out in the country. Now inspectors are to be appointed for the supervision of these posts. The District Captain should handle the supervision of the revenue offices.

The office work of the District Chief is much delayed by the lack of expert workers- Partly also there was no control over the work of the people who had already arrived, Thus Mrs Ziere the veterinary surgeon - had gone to Cracow, and said he had to look after the wollynisch cattle there..

Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart suggested that Junkers from Ordensburg should be asked for as assistants for the administration of the General Government. This would be excellent training for them. Besides higher officials, the District Chief is still in need of a magistrate, four inspectors, and a larger [illegible] of clerical staff and typewriters.

Of petrol the office of the District Chief would need 10,000 litres per month, and each Sub-Prefects Office would need 2,000 litres. But one of the greatest nuisances was the poor communications. One hardly could get any connection with Cracow by telephone, also the mail service was very poor. Till now no replies have been received to letters or orders sent to Cracow. The installations of a teleprinter was urgently needed. But above all the telephone or police communications from Lublin to the frontier districts should function.

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With regard to the necessary force of the police, that should be at the disposal of the Sub-Prefects. Governor Schmidt said, that 25 for each District Captain did not seem sufficient.

In the afternoon, a sight-seeing tour was made to Wlodawa, Cycow. Cycow is a German village. About 300,000 German nationals, who made a very poor impression were gathered in the streets, and they song national songs conducted by the German Travelling Teacher (Wanderlehrer) Lindner who is leader of the German nationals there. Reich Minister Dr. Seyss-Inquart made a speech, on which he pointed out that the fidelity of these Germans to their nationality now found its justification and reward through strength of Adolf Hitler. This district with its very marshy character could, according to District Governor Schmidt's deliberations, serve as a reservation for the Jews, a measure which might possibly lead to heavy mortality among the Jews.

35,000 German nationals are said to be living in the Lublin government district. As to the problem, which concerns schools the Landrat Kalmus in Cycow said he held the view that no salaries should be paid to the Polish teachers at all, as the Poles in his district represented a minority in comparison with the Jews.

In the evening dinner with the Commissar of the city, Mr. Hagerer, in Chelm where we spent the night.

21.11.1939

8 A.M. sight-seeing tour of the city and visit to the camp for German refugees. For this purpose a big, newly-built house belonging to the Polish railways was reserved, which however is not ready yet to be occupied, as the heating especially cannot be brought into working order on account of the lack of parts, which cannot be procured in Lublin.

Then followed a drive to the famous cathedral of Chelm that used to have a golden dome. After that, we drove off to Hrubieszow, where we found Ukrainian settlements, which are fine compared to the poor Polish huts. The soil also is better. Here also we visited the frontier of the Bug at Uszilug. The Jews are said to have removed much property here, also owing to the poor guarding of the frontier. In this vicinity too is the best soil for wheat in Poland. From this section, some time ago 4,000 refugees were taken over from the Russian side. But still thousands are beyond on the border, and many of them are dying, as they cannot be housed or fed. Dr. Seyss-Inquart pointed out, the refugees could be allowed to enter, if they themselves, took measures to guarantee that only German nationals entered the district of the Government.

According to the report of the District Captain the Ukrainians attempted to form a self-administration against or without the German administration. Further the District Captain criticized the Reich-Credit-Bank for not granting a credit, which is necessary for the starting of a sugar refinery, to make use of the harvested sugar beets. Then we continued our journey via Zamost, Tomaszow to the border near Belzek. Then there is a refugee camp with Jews. The staff-Surgeon there fears that an epidemic may break out in the camp, which then would endanger the whole neighborhood.
These Jewish refugees who have crossed the frontier secretly, are often sent back again by the Russians days after.
Also there is much concern in this district at the mustering of horses by the Wehrmacht. This mustering would affect the cultivation of the fields.

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Governor SCHMIDT also reported that, in his district, collaboration with the Wehrmacht was poor. Lieutenant General BULCHS, LUBLIN, was giving the "Government" - administration and police all possible trouble.

In the evening, supper, and night spent at STURMBANNFUEHRER HASSELBERGER'S house.

22.11.1939.

Departure for RADOM.

In Radom, reception by District Chief Dr.LASCH. The latter reported, that on his arrival in Radom, he had found a very unpleasant situation there. His predecessor, Regierungspraesident RUEDIGER, had put himself into strongly opposed the Wehrmacht, and Dr.LASCH had first to bring about a better understanding. Dr.LASCH introduced SS-Oberfuehrer KATZMANN to the Reichsminister as Senior SS- and Police Chief attached to the District Chief of Radom. Brigadefuehrer LOBOCZNIK who had been nominated to that position in Lublin and was just travelling through, also reported to Dr.SEYSS-INQUART.

Dr.SEYSS-INQUART and Dr.LASCH now discussed the plan to establish a messenger center in Radom in order to remedy the bad communication system between Cracow and Lublin and between Cracow and Warsaw. According to this plan, mail for all the three northern districts of Cracow should be taken in 5 hours to Radom by train and from there, according to the weather, to the respective places of destination either by NSKK (Nationalsozialistisches Kraftfahrer-(Motorists)Korps-messenger or otherwise. The same procedure should be used for the return journey. The agency should be called, perhaps: "Messenger agency of the Governor General in Radom".

Next, Dr.LASCH gave a report on the work which had already been done and on that which would still have to be done in the work of reconstruction and improvement. Here also, lack of personnel and difficulties in transportation were particularly prominent. Furthermore, in the district of Radom, the Polish Squadron was said to be still roving about. The people in question were said to be men who, during the day, attend to their occupations in civilian clothes and, at night, commit excesses in uniform. An encounter with the Wehrmacht was said to have had no success. With the help of a map given the Reichsminister, Dr.LASCH then explained the consolidation of the existing 16 districts into 10. Dr.LASCH will not comply with Governor Dr.FISCHER's expressed wishes to hand over a few communities on the border of the northern district, as those were the most fertile ones of the district which, as a whole, was a shortage area.

Regarding the economic question, it was reported that the gun and iron works in Stachachowitsche had already been taken over by the "HERMANN-GOERING-WERKE". Provision should also be made for the restarting of the whole economy, not only the war economy.
In order to do that, it was particularly necessary that unemployment pay should no longer be at the rate of 7 Zloty per day and wages at the rate of 3 Zloty. Such a margin offered insufficient incentive to earn one's livelihood through work.

The Governor urgently needed experts and other personnel. A medical officer was especially urgently needed. There was no German physician in the entire district. Individual cases of epidemics such as typhus and dysentery, had occurred.

Furthermore, a man for the press and propaganda was necessary. There were eight Polish newspapers in the district who were being attended to by the District Leaders (KREISHAUPTLEUTE), but with such a procedure a thorough check was not possible. The District Chief then stated his intention to submit to Cracow in the near future a detailed list of the personnel required. ./.

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After that, the Governor reported on the set-up of his office which had seven Departments:

1.) the Department of Internal Affairs:
Supervision over the District Leaders, Supreme Supervision over the Polish Administration, Justice, School Affairs, Veterinary Affairs, Medical Affairs, and General Matters.

2.) Department of Forestry and Game Preservation:
Preservation of Forests and Game, Control of the Entire Timber Industry which was here of particular importance.

3.) Department of Economic Affairs:
Industry, Commerce, Handicrafts, Price Control, industrial Market Regulations, Collaboration with the Agencies of the Four-Year-Plan and the War Economy Inspection (WEHRWIRTSCHAFTSINSPEKTION)

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4. Traffic Department:

Highway System, Railroad System, Postal System, Waterways (shall the river Vistula be controlled), Control of the Biliecza, the boundary between the districts of Radom and Warsaw, which could have a favorable result upon agricultural productiveness.

5. Department of Food and Agriculture:

The district is an agricultural shortage area. Cultivation must therefore be intensified. For this purpose a good agricultural organization is necessary. The avoidance of difficulties in the food supply this winter is mainly a question of transport. In some areas there is still corn but it must be threshed. There is no coal for the working of the threshing machines. The salt mine at Wiliczka delivers salt only in compensation against natural products.

6. Finance Department:

Revenue and expenditure.

Concerning "justice" the governor remarked that too many are being condemned to gaol and penal servitude, which hereby burdens the district with costs. The criminals found in the convict prisons were shot. The shootings, however, were no longer carried out in public but in isolated wooded regions.
The majority of the intelligentsia have been imprisoned, one must be careful, however, because the cooperation of these people cannot be dispensed with, especially the doctors, as they are needed for the health of the people and as they also must treat the Germans in many instances. He asks that the governor general issue an order that caution and reserve be exercised when arresting doctors. Concerning the Polish jurisdiction the District Chief suggested an "organisation" in three legal administrative branches:

1. Baronial court (Burggericht)
2. District court (Bezirksgericht)
3. Court of appeals (Kassationsgericht)

The question was then discussed as to in whose name sentences were to be pronounced and if the Polish authorities were to have some kind of official seal.
In regard to the communal administration the appointment of Polish governors (Starosk) to administer parts of the district as deputies of the District Chief with headquarters at his office was discussed. There are Polish majors in Radom and Czenstochau, and they would also be appointed to the towns subordinate to the districts. Reichsminister Dr. Seyss-Inquart pointed out that delegates of the District Chief must be associated with them. Dr. Lasch added, furthermore that he intended to make the communities pay something towards the repair of roads and other work, executed by means of compulsory labour service or of forced labour, as expense was caused to districts by such work. The wages also for free work must be established uniformly for the whole General Government, as otherwise undesirable movement of workers seeking the highest salaries would result.
At this point the question of the monopoly of important exchange goods for the acquiring of agricultural products was discussed.
Dr. Lasch then declared that it was not possible to transport all scrap metal to the Reich. In the Government there was also a need of scrap metal for the existing foundries.
Dr. Lasch stated furthermore that he had received a petition to send

H1237-0158

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2278-PS
(cont'd)

5,000 specialists to the Reich.
Regarding the Polish police the opinion was expressed that arming in a modest way could be carried out and was necessary. The foresters needed at least a fowling piece to defend themselves against wood thieves and peasants.
In the case of the founding of an "individual protection" (Selbstschutz) unit of racial Germans a careful selection and military training of those selected must take place. According to information given by Dr. Lasch the Ukrainians are said to be specially qualified to be policemen.
Dr. Lasch brought up the question as to what should be done with the destroyed villages.
The tax system could consist mainly of indirect taxes and contributions, which were to be borne by the communities. A contribution of 6 Million Zloty must be borne by the Jews in the district of Radom. In the district of Radom a co-perative buying and selling society will be founded in order to eliminate the entire Jewish Commission business.
Reichsminister Dr. Seyss-Inquart then spoke of the regulation provided, according to which the government should not receive any more motor fuel from the Reich, but must be dependent on the production of Jaslo and Krosno the utilisation of which, however, was to be determined in accordance with the principles of the Reich. In this connection the formation of a trading organisation was also discussed.
Dr. Lasch and Brigade-Leader Schmidt then spoke of the intention of the Wehrmacht to confiscate 54,000 horses. Two studs in the district he declared district studs. Dr. Seyss-Inquart pointed out that the possessions of the Polish government were confiscated by decree and therefore are out of the reach of the Wehrmacht. Finally Dr. Seyss-Inquart spoke of the plan to publish a general administration decree for the General Government after a period of development and elucidation.

Cracow, 22nd November 1939.

I, Catherine W. Bedford, Civ. 110561, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 2278-PS.

CATHERINE W. BEDFORD
Mil. Permit: 110561

2307-RS

H1237-0159

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2307-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 237

Law concerning the Reunion of Austria with the German Reich, March 13, 1938

Gesetz über die Wiedervereinigung Oesterreichs mit dem Deutschen Reich.

The Reich Government has ordained the following law, which is hereby proclaimed:

ARTICLE I. The Federal Constitutional Law of March 13, 1938, ordained by the Austrian Federal Government, concerning the reunion of Austria with the German Reich, hereby becomes a law of the German Reich. It has the following text:

By virtue of Article 3, Section 2, of the Federal Constitutional Law concerning extraordinary measures in the constitutional field (B.G.Blatt, I, No. 255, 1934), the Federal Government has ordained:

Article 1. Austria is a province of the German Reich.

Article 2. On Sunday, April 10, 1938, a free and secret plebiscite shall be held for German men and women of Austria over twenty years of age on the question of reunion with the German Reich.

Article 3. In the plebiscite the majority of the votes cast shall decide the issue.

Article 4. The necessary regulations for the implementation and supplementing of this Federal Constitutional Law shall be provided by decree.

Article 5. This Federal Constitutional Law shall enter into force on the day of its proclamation.

The Federal Government is entrusted with the execution of this Federal Constitutional Law.

Vienna, March 13, 1938.

ARTICLE II. The laws at present in force in Austria shall remain in ofrce until further notice. The introduction of Reich law into Austria will be effected by the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor or by the Reich Minister to whom he may delegate this power.

ARTICLE III. The Reich Minister of the Interior, in consultation with the other Reich Ministers concerned, is empowered to issue the legal and administrative regulations necessary for the implementation and supplementing of this law.

ARTICLE IV. This law shall enter into force on the day of its proclamation.

Linz, March 13, 1938.

ADOLF HITLER, Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor; GOERING, General Field Marshal, Reich Minister of Aviation; FRICK, Reich Minister of the Interior; VON RIBBENTROP, Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs; R. HESS, Deputy Fuehrer.

H1237-0160

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 2307-PS

17 November 1945

I, FELIX EDWARD SHARTON, 046312, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2307-PS.

FELIX EDWARD SHARTON,
046312

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2311-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 245

Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor concerning the Administration of Oath to the Officials of the Province of Austria, March 15, 1938.

Erlass des Fuehrers und Reichskanzlers ueber die Vereidigung der Beamten des Landes Oesterreich.

By virtue of Article II of the law of March 13, 1938, concerning the reunion of Austria with the German Reich, (RGBl I, p. 237), I issue the following order:

SECTION 1. Public officials of the province of Austria shall take an oath of office upon entrance into service.

SECTION 2. The oath of office of public officials reads: "I swear that I shall be loyal and obedient to Adolf Hitler, the Fuehrer of the German Reich and People, and that I shall observe the laws and conscientiously fulfill the duties of my office, so help me God."

SECTION 3. The officials at present in office shall be sworn in forthwith in accordance with Section 2.

Jewish officials shall not be sworn in.

Section 4. A person is Jewish if he is descended from at least three racially full-blooded Jewish grandparents. A grandparent is automatically considered a full-blooded Jew if he belonged to the Jewish congregation.

A Jewish half-breed descended from two full-blooded Jewish grandparents is considered a Jew:

a) If he belonged to the Jewish congregation on September 16, 1935, or became a member of it thereafter.
b) If he was married to a Jew on September 16, 1935, or entered into marriage with one thereafter.

SECTION 5. Anyone who refuses to take this oath shall be removed from office.

SECTION 6. The legal and administrative regulations necessary to the implementation of this law shall be issued by the Reich Governor (Austrian Provincial Government).

SECTION 7. This decree shall enter into force on the day of its proclamation.

Vienna, March 15, 1938.

ADOLF HITLER, Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2311-PS

19 November 1945

I, FELIX EDWARD SHARTON, 046312, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2311-PS.

FELIX EDWARD SHARTON,
046312

H1237-0161

Exhibit USA 703
Filed Jan. 16, 1946

H1237-0162

(PARTIAL)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2463-PS
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel.

DOKUMENTE DER DEUTSCHEN POLITIK GROSSDEUTSCHLAND 1938
Vol. 6, part 1, 1939.
(edited by Paul Meier-Bennekenstein)

Page 134, no. 23b.

Telegram from DR. SEYSS-INQUART, Austrian Minister of the Interior, to the Führer and Reich chancellor on the eve of 11 March 1938.

The provisional Austrian government which after the dismissal of the SCHUSCHNIGG government, considers it its task to establish peace and order in Austria, sends to the German government the urgent request, to support it in its task and to help it to prevent bloodshed. For this purpose it asks the German government to send German troops as soon as possible. 2)

signed SEYSS-INQUART.

1)VB of 12 Mar 38, Melzer, Weltgeschichte miterlebt p. 39; Berber, Das Diktat von Versailles, p.597. After the resignation of the Schuschnigg cabinet on 11 March at 2000 hours, minister of the interior Dr. SEYSS-INQUART had complete government power in Austria as the last minister of the Confederation in office.

2) On the morning of 12 March from 0600 hours on, German troops under the high command of Infantry General FEDOR VON BOCK, crossed the Austrian border.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2463-PS.

14 Nov. 1945.

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc. 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2463-PS.

ERNST M. COHN, Pfc.
33925738.

H1237-0163

(Partial)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2464-PS
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel.

DOKUMENTE DER DEUTSCHEN POLITIK, GROSSDEUTSCHLAND 1938
Vol. 6, part 1, 1939.
(edited by Paul Meier-Benneckenstein.)

Page 125, no. 21b.
Official Austrian Announcement
of the change in the Austrian cabinet
and the general political amnesty, dated
16 February 1938.

At 0200 hours, the following announcement was made by the official news agency:

Bund chancellor Von Schuschnigg proposed to the Bund president a change in the cabinet. The Bund president has executed the following removals and appointments.

The cabinet now consists of the following:
Bund chancellor: Dr. KURT VON SCHUSCHNIGG;
Vice chancellor: Field marshal-Lieutenant LUDWIG HÜLGERTH;
Foreign minister: DR. GUIDO SCHMIDT;
Finances; DR. RUDOLF NEUMAYER;
Commerce: ING JULIUS RAAB;
Social administration; DR. JOSEF RESCH;
Interior and Safety; DR ARTUR SEYSS-INQUART;
Agriculture: Economy counsel PETER MANDORFER;
Education: DR. HANS PERNTER;
Justice: University professor DR. LUDWIG VON ADAMOVICH;
Minister without portfolio: GUIDO ZERNATTO;
Dr. n.c. EDMUND GLAISE-HORSTENAU; HANS ROTT;

(pages 127,128)

The ministerial counsel, upon request of the Bund chancellor, decided in executing the measures of yesterday's official announcement, to submit to the Bund president a resolution for the proclaiming of an amnesty for lawfully punishable political debits. It comprises all political crimes which were committed before the 15th of February of this year, if the criminal remained in the country. It pertains to the non-institution of penal procedure for actions before this date as well as the discontinuance of pending trials and amnesty of sentences not yet completed.

The amnesty is subject to the conditions of probation until 31 December 1941. The competent department ministers should quickly work out the required measures, in order to annul sentences passed on account of political delicts as well as measures referring to pensions, revenues, and supports and matters of education. Reinstatements into the active civil service are out of the question.

The Bund government has taken steps in this spirit of reconciliation, to make it possible for all citizens heretofore standing on the sidelines to participate in the construction of the fatherland and thereby to safeguard the internal and external peace of the country.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2464-PS

14 Nov. 1945.

I, Ernst M. Cohn, Pfc.33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document no. 2464-PS.

Ernst M. Cohn, Pfc.
33925738

H1237-0164

Doc. 2465-PS

PARTIAL
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2465-PS
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel.

DOKUMENTE DER DEUTSCHEN POLITIK GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
1938
Vol. 6, Part 1, Page 137, No. 25a
(edited by Paul Meier-Benneckenstein)

Official announcement
of the nomination of Dr. Seyss-Inquart as
Austrian Bund Chancellor in the eve of 11 March 1938.*

The Bund president has, under the pressure of the internal political situation, entrusted the Confederation Minister, Dr. Seyss-Inquart, with the leadership of the office of the Bund chancellery to maintain quiet and order.

* Announced on 11 March at 23:14 over the Austrian radio.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2465-PS

14 Nov. 1945

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc. 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct translation of Document No. 2465-PS

ERNST M. COHN, Pfc.
33925738

H1237-0165

(PARTIAL)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2466-PS
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel.

DOKUMENTE DER DEUTSCHEN POLITIK GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
1938
Vol. 6, part 1, 1939.
(edited by Paul Meier-Benneckenstein)

Page 147, no. 30b

Official Announcement dated 13 March 1938 of the resignation of the Austrian Bund President MIKLAS.

The Bund president, upon request of the Bund chancellor by letter dated 13 March has resigned from his office. According to article 77, item 1 of the constitution of 1934, his affairs are transferred to the Bund chancellor Dr. JEYSS-INQUART.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2466-PS

14 Nov. 1945.

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc. 33925738 , hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document no. 2466-PS.

ERNST M. COHN, Pfc.
33925738

H1237-0166

(PARTIAL)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2469-PS
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel.

DOKUMENTE DER DEUTSCHEN POLITIK, GROSSDEUTSCHLAND 1938
Vol. 6, part 1., 1939.
(edited by Paul Meier-Benneckenstein)

Page 128, no. 21d.
Official German and Austrian Statement on the equality of right of the Austrian National Socialists in Austria dated 18 February 1938.

On the basis of the agreement made between the Führer and Reich chancellor and the Bund chancellor Dr. SCHUSCHNIGG at Berchtesgaden on 12 February, the Austrian national socialist will now be in the position to be legally active within the VATERLÄNDISCHE FRONT and all other Austrian organizations. However, these activities can only be pursued on the basis of the constitution which as heretofore includes political parties, in equalization with all other groups. Steps will be taken by the Reich in executing the existing prohibitional laws which will exclude an interference by party organs in internal Austrian conditions in order to contribute thus also toward the peaceful development.

- -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2469-PS.

14 Nov. 1945.

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc. 33925738, HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I AM THOROUGHLY CONVERSANT WITH THE ENGLISH AND GERMAN LANGUAGES; AND THAT THE ABOVE IS A TRUE AND CORRECT TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2469-PS.

ERNST M. COHN
PFC.
33925738.

H1237-0167

(EXCERPT)
(PARTIAL) TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2484-PS
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel.

DOKUMENTE DER DEUTSCHEN POLITIK, GROSSDEUTSCHLAND 1938
Vol. 6, part 1.,1939.
(edited by Paul Meier-Benneckenstein)

Page 128, no. 21c

Official German announcement dated 17 February 1938 about the visit of the Austrian minister of the interior Dr. SEYSS-INQUART to the Führer and Reich chancellor in Berlin.

The Führer and Reich chancellor received today the Austrian Bund minister of the interior and security Dr. Artur Seyss-Inquart.

Dr. Seyss-Inquart arrived this morning for a short visit in Berlin.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2484-PS

14 Nov. 1945.

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2484-PS.

Ernst M. Cohn, Pfc.
33925738.

H1237-0168

(PARTIAL)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2485-PS
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel.

DOKUMENTE DER DEUTSCHEN POLITIK GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
1938
Vol 6. part 1, Page 144-145; no. 28a
(edited by Paul Meier-Bonneckenstein)

Address of Bund Chancellor Dr. SEYSS-INQUART from the balcony of the city hall at Linz on 12 March 1938.

My Führer! In a moment important for the German nation and in its far-reaching effects for the shaping of the European history, I welcome you and with me the whole country, my Führer and Reich Chancellor, for the first time again in Austria.

The time has come when inspite of the peace dictation, force envy and want of judgement of a whole world finally German met German.

Today the German nation stands unaminous and united to endure every fight and every suffering as one nation.

The road was difficult, hard and full of sacrifice. It led over the most shocking defeat of the German people, but yet out of it grew the great and brilliant idea of the indivisible common fate, the knowledge of one living nation, the idea of the national socialism!

You, my Führer, have experienced the nation's want and sorrow as a son of this frontier country. Out of this knowledge you conceived the great idea to use everything to deliver the German people from this, their worst defeat. You have done that!

You have delivered it! You are the Führer of the German nation in the fight for honor, freedom and right!

Now we Austrians have recognized this leadership freely and openly, proudly and independently, for all times while we, at the same time, solemnly declare article 88 of the peace treaty as invalid!

The Reich's mighty forces move into our country amidst the jubilation of Austria. Austria's districts welcomes German soldiers, not to spite us, but as a clear and final confirmation that the entire German nation has gathered to secure German right from all the world, and for all times!

The racial Reich of order, peace, and the freedom of the nations is our aim, and we are standing at the threshold of its beginning, and ADOLF HITLER is its leader!

My Führer! We Austrians thank you. I can say only plainly and as a simple man, but from the hearts of millions of Austrians: We thank you. We have always fought with you with the determination and attitude which befits us in this frontier country, everlasting with the greatest patience. I believe we fought a good fight till the end. But now we salute you with the jubilation of all German hearts; Heil, my Führer!

- -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2485-PS

14 Nov. 1945.

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct translatinn of Document No. 2485-PS.

ERNST M. COHN, Pfc.
33925738

H1237-0169

COPIES OF PARTS OF ORIGINAL DOCUMENT
NO. 2613 - PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

The Black Book of Poland.

Page 236.

The Lublin Reservation.

In a speech on October 6, 1939, Hitler hinted at a general solution of the Jewish problem as one of his war aims, but he did not go into details. Soon afterword, the establishment of a so-called "Jewish reservation" in the Lublin area was begun. It is significant that the Nazis themselves have written almost nothing about this "reservation". Only through neutral sources did it leak out that large numbers of Jews were being transferred from Western Poland, Bohemia and Austria to the Lublin area.

"The haste with which the reservation has been established out of nothing is leading to desperate situations. Sometimes trains drive on for forty kilometres beyond Lublin and halt in the open country, where the Jews alight with their luggage and have to find themselves primitive accommodation in the surrounding villages. Up to November 6 about 45.000 Jewish men, women and children from Cieszyn, Bogumin, Moravska Ostrava, Prague, Pilzno, other towns of the Protectorate, and from Vienne and the new Reich provinces, Danzig-Westpreussen and Posen-Warthegau, have been sent to the reservation. Under the supervision of men of the SS-Death's-head Corps, the Jews are compelled to work at road-building, draining marshes and rebuilding the damaged villages. There is compulsory labour service for men up to seventy years and for women up to fifty-five." (Luxemburger Wort, November 21, 1939.)

" Up to now some 8.000 persons, one-third of them women and children, have been transported to the resettlement camps in the Jewish reservation. These camps are about 15-20 km.from Nisko, a Polish town on the San which suffered severely in the war. These camps are completely isolated behind high barbedwire fences and the Gestapo maintains a strict control over them." (National-Zeitung, Basle, November 7, 1939.)

The methods adopted when Jews are transported to this reservation can be gathered from a letter sent by the Israelitische Kultusgemeinde Wien to those of the Viennese Jews who were chosen by the authorities to be transported to Lublin. It runs:

"By order of the authorities a large transport of Jews, fit to work, up to fifty years of age, will go to Poland on October 18, 1939, to start colonizing work. You have been chosen by the authorities to go with this transport and you have to appear on October 17, 1939, at 6 a.m.in..... Every person in this transport is permitted to take with him clothes and equipment up to 50 kg in weight. Every person is allowed to take money up to 300 marks. It is of the greatest importance that all concerned should take builders'tools with them, such as mallets, saws, planes, hammers and nails, and when reporting, an exact statement must be made as to which of these tools you can provide. Should you disobey this summons, which has been issued by the State authorities, you will have to face the consequences." (See photograph No.54.)

Page 241

The Ghetto in Warsaw.

When the ghetto idea was adopted finally, it was carried out with German thoroughnes. At first, a few weeks after the occupation, the German authorities had tried to drive all the Jews in Warsaw into a ghetto.

H1237-0170

COPIES OF PARTS OF ORIGINAL
DOCUMENT NO. 2613 - PS
CONT'D.

The Warsaw Jews, by payment of a heavy fine, were able to avoid the overhasty establishment of the ghetto, which would have created very difficult problems. This fine, however, did not achieve anything more than postponement.
Already in April, 1940, the area destined for the ghetto was called "the closed, contaminated area" and was surrounded by walls. In October last the Governor of Warsaw , Fischer, and his delegate, Leist, issued a series of orders defining the limits of the ghetto, ordering the concentration of Jews from all over Warsaw within these limits, and the expulsion from the newly-formed ghetto of all Aryans. These migrations had to take place before October 31, 1940. Thus 113,000 Jews and 80,000 Poles were given 12 days in which to move. Both Poles and Jews hurried to migrate, although the removals were very difficult and expensive in view of the many houses destroyed and of the lack of means of transport. The time limit had to be postponed until November 15, 1940. Meanwhile the limits of the ghetto were twice changed, on one occasion being reduced, on the other enlarged. For various reasons the most fantastic enclaves were made. For instance, the market halls, the Law Courts in Leszno Street and many works under German direction were not included in the ghetto, although they are in the heart of the old Jewish district. As a result, both Poles and Jews had to move several times. The Jews who were removed to the ghetto were forbidden to take anything with them with the exception of hand luggage.

On November 16, the ghetto was closed without any warning. An 8-foot high concrete wall was built to enclose the district. The supplies of food to the ghetto were stopped. The German police confiscated the food carried to the ghetto by Poles, and also the food, transported by Poles in tramcars, passing through the ghetto. Food prices in the ghetto soared. When the ghetto was closed the German police started practicing endless chicanery towards the Jews. The Jews have to take off their hats to German policemen. They were ordered to exercise with bricks or concrete slabs in their hands, to climb telephone poles, to wash in the gutters, ect. The police shot at sight Poles or Jews who tried to get food into the ghetto (about twenty Jews and Poles were killed). Germans in uniform rob the homes of the richer Jews (in the Leszno and Ogrodowa Street), taking away furniture, money and even food.

Page 243

The Ghetto in Lódz.

Warsaw is by no means the only place where the Jews have been herded into a ghetto. The same process took place in many other towns with large Jewish populations, although it was not tackled everywhere with the same thoroughness as in Warsaw.
A very similar position to that in Warsaw has developed at Lodz. This big industrial town of Central Poland was formally annexed by Germany and even given a new name, Litzmannstadt. [illegible]
Page 244, if not all.

On April 30, the Jewish quarter i the northern part of Lodz was finally barred off. Here all the Jews of the town were compelled to live. Again, of course, hygienic reasons were given for this step. But it is admitted that economic reasons too had influenced the Germans to introduce this measure. Jews had played an important part in the economic life of Lodz and had contributed to the importance of this town as an industrial center.

H1237-0171

COPIES OF PARTS OF ORIGINAL DOCUMENT
NO. 2613 - PS , CONT'D.

In order to get hold of businesses founded by Jews and to rob them of the raw material in their possession, the ghetto plan proved very convenient. This is openly admitted in the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of October 13, 1940, where it is said that:

Page 246

The Ghetto of Cracow

At the beginning of 1941 the German authorities decided to organize a ghetto in Cracow. Originally, as already said, the Germans intended to expel the Jews from Cracow altogether, and in fact a large number were so expelled. Later a decision was taken to leave some 20.000 Jews in the city. Part of a suburb of Cracow, Podgorze, situated on the right bank of the river Vistula, has been assigned as the ghetto area. The Poles living in this area have been ordered to shift to other parts of the city. The general order issued by Dr. Frank was applied to Cracow in a decree issued by the Chief of the Cracow district on March 3 and published in the Krakauer Zeitung of March 6, 1941. This decree provides for the creation of a special closed ghetto district in Cracow.

Page 247

Health in the Ghetto.

No official figures have been published relating to the hygienic conditions in occupied Poland, but occasionally notes and articles in the German press reveal that health conditions, particularly in the Jewish quarters, are anything but good. Considering that the Jews are all but starving, this is hardly surprising. According to the Hamburger Fremdenblatt of October 29, 1940, 98 per cent of the cases of typhoid and spotted fever in Warsaw were in the ghetto. The delegation of the American Joint Distribution Committee reported that all but 8 per cent of the typhoid cases in Warsaw were among the Jewish population. Diseases due to malnutrition and overcrowding are used by the Nazis as a pretext for slandering the Jews and for further restrictions. The head of the Health Department in the"Government General," for instance, issued an order in March, 1940, to the effect that in future Jews could only be attended by Jewish doctors.
The catastrophic condition of food supplies and terrible housing and sanitary conditions in the ghetto are causing a very high mortality, which is increasing with every month. In May, 1941, the figure was 5,000, which is equal to 120 per thousand per annum. This is a twelvefold increase over the pre-war rate. As the birthrate has fallen to a minimum, there is not only no annual increase, but even a decline in the population. But this is more than offset by the continual influx of Jews compulsorily deported from the provincial towns, where the Germans do not propose to set up seperate Jewish quarters.

Page 571

Decree Concerning the Introduction of Compulsory
Labour for the Polish Population of the "Government General".

Dated October 26, 1939

Section 1

(1) All Polish inhabitants of the "Government General" between the ages of 18 and 60 years are subject to compulsory public labour with immediate effect.

H1237-0172

COPIES OF PARTS OF ORIGINAL DOCUMENT NO. 2613 - PS. CONT'D.

Section 3

(2) Compulsory public labour comprises, in particular, work in agricultural concerns, the building and maintenance of public buildings, the construction of roads, waterways and railways, the regulation of rivers and land works.

Page 572

Section 4

(1) The payment of persons subject to compulsory labour shall be effected at rates that may to be fair.
(2) The welfare of persons subject to compulsory labour and their families shall be secured as far as possible.

Section 5

The regulations required for the execution of the present Decree shall be issued by the Director of the Department of Labour in the office of the "Government General."

Warsaw, October 28, 1939.

Page 573

Decree Concerning the Introduction of Compulsary Labour for the Jewish Population of the "Government General."

Dated October 26, 1939.

Section 1

Compulsory labour for the Jews domiciled in the "Government General" shall be introduced with immediate effect. The Jews shall for this purpose be formed into forced labour groups.

Section 2

The prescriptions required for the execution of the present Decree shall be issued by the higher SS and police leader. He may define territories east of the Vistula in which the execution of the present Decree shall be waived.

Warsaw, October 26, 1939.

The Governor-General
for the Occupied Polish Territories

Frank.

H1237-0173

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2705-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Official Gazette (Verordnungsblatt) for the Occupied Netherland Territories

Article 16
published on August 3, 1940

80.

Decree

of the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherland Territories

for the Avoidance of Cruelty to Animals in Slaughtering.

On the basis of Article 5 of the Fuehrer's decree in re executory powers of the government in the Netherlands of May 18, 1940 (RGBl. I S.778) I decree:

Article I.

(1) In slaughtering, warm-blooded animals are to be stunned before beginning the drawing of blood.

(2) During forced slaughterings (Article 3 of the law re Inspection of shambles(Fleischschaugesetz) Official Gazette (Staatsblatt) 1919 Nr.524) in which the situation does not permit the stunning of the animal, the rule of paragraph 1 is not applied.

Article 2

(1) The stipulations necessary for the execution of this decree will be issued jointly by the Secretary General in the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Secretary General in the Ministry of Agriculture and fisheries.

(2) They will be published in the "Nederlandsche Staatsconrant."

Article 3

(1) Whoever violates premeditatedly the rules of this decree or the stipulations necessary to its execution, will be punished with imprisonment up to the maximum of 6 months or with a fine up to 10,000 guilder.

(2) These violations are crimes.

Article 4

This decree will be effective as of August 5,1940.

The Hague, 31 July, 1940

The Reich Commissioner for the
Occupied Netherland Territories:
Seyss-Inquart

I, Everett V. CUNNINGHAM, B 210795, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of document 2705-PS.

EVERETT V. CUNNINGHAM
B 210795.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2909-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

H1237-0174

OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
FOR THE PROSECUTION OF AXIS CRIMINALITY
APO 403 - U.S.ARMY.

SECTION FIVE

A F F I D A V I T.

August Eigruber, being first duly sworn, on oath deposes and says that he was a member of the Nazi Party in Austria before the Anschluss with Germany on 15 March 1938, having joined this organization in 1928; that the Nazi Party was an illegal organization in Austria until 12 March 1938; and that he remained a member of the Nazi Party from 1928 until its dissolution after the surrender of Germany, 8 May 1945.

Affiant further states that prior to 12 March 1938 there were two groups of Nazis in Austria, one of which was led by Dr. Arthur Seyss-Inquart and the other by a Captain Leopold, a more radical National Socialist in Austria; that on the evening of the 11 March 1938, at between 8:00 and 9:00 o'clock p.m., he received two telegrams, one of which came from Dr. Seyss-Inquart as Bundes Chancellor of Austria, and the other from one Dr. Rainer; that the telegram from Dr.Seyss-Inquart appointed the affiant as temporary Landeshauptmann in Upper Austria; and that the telegrm from Dr. Rainer appointed the affiant temporary leader of the National Socialist Party in Upper Austria.

Affiant further states that on 12 March 1938, about 5:00 o'clock a.m., he received a telephone call from a member of his organization stating that the German Army had crossed the frontier of Austria immediately before and was then marching toward Linz. He was informed by the same man over the telephone that Hitler had crossed the Austrian border at about 2:00 or 3:00 o'clock p.m. of the same day. About the same time Heinrich Himmler, Dr. Seyss-Inquart, Glaise-Horstenau and Dr. Huebner arrived in Linz in order to receive Hitler there.

On the 12 of March 1938, a conference took place between Seyss-Inquart and Hitler in the Hotel Linzerhof. Hitler did not speak at this conference about Anschluss, rather addressed Seyss-Inquart as Bundes Chancellor. It was only on the 13 of March in connection with Mussolini's telegram that Seyss-Inquart had to return to Linz. There he was given a document by Hitler containing these two points: One, Austria is a port of the German Reich. Two, legislation will be under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior. The draft was made by State Secretary Stuckart. There on the 13th the Anschluss was effected and Austria incorporated in the German Reich.

Affiant further states that later in the year 1938 he was made Landeshauptmann under Dr. Seyss-Inquart, and then made temporary Gauleiter for Upper Austria under Reichskommissar Buerckel.

Affiant further states that the confiscation of Jewish property, the removal of Jews in accordance with the Nuernberg laws emanated from Dr. Frick, Minister of Interior; and were executed in Austria by Dr. Seyss-Inquart as Reichsstatthalter of Austria. Reichskommissar Buerckel exercised an important influence upon the execution of these laws.

Affiant further states that he visited the concentration camp at Mauthausen on several occasions, but on most of these occasions went only to the headquarters of the Camp Commandant. That on two occasions he visited the concentration camp at Mauthausen with Heinrich Himmler, and certainly on one occasion with Himmler and Kaltenbrunner.

Further affiant saith not.

AUGUST EIGRUBER

Subscribed and sworn to before me
this 9th day of November 1945 at
Nuernberg, Germany.

2910-PS

H1237-0175

DOCUMENT NO. 2910-PS
OFFICE US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

POSITIONS HELD BY SEYSS-INQUART

1. Member of the NSDAP (Nazi Party) 13 March 1938 - 8 May 1945.
2. General in the SS, 15 March 1938 - 8 May 1945.
3. State Councillor of Austria, May 1937 - 12 February 1938.
4. Minister of the Interior and Security of Austria, 16 February - 11 March 1938.
5. Chancellor of Austria, 11 March - 15 March 1938.
6. Reich Governor of Austria, 15 March 1938 - 1 May 1939.
7. Member of the Reichstag, April, 1938 - 8 May 1945.
8. Member of the Reich Cabinet, 1 May 1939 - 1945.
9. Reich Minister Without Portfolio, 1 May 1939 - September 1939.
10. Chief of the Civil Administration of South Poland, Early September 1939.
11. Deputy Governor-General of the Polish Occupied Territory, 12 October 1939 - 18 May 1940.
12. Reich Commissar for Occupied Netherlands, 18 May 1940 - 8 May 1945. (Started on 29 May 1940)

I certify that the above and foregoing correctly lists positions held by me from 1934 to 1945.

Done at Nurnberg, Germany, 10 November 1945.

/s/ Arthur Seyss-Inquart
/t/ ARTHUR SEYSS-INQUART

Witness to Signature:

/s/ W. Frank, Capt.

/s/ Gladys Picklesimer

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2936-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

DOKUMENTE DER DEUTSCHEN POLITIK, VI, I, PAGE 150

Instruction of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor, concerning the Austrian Federal Army, March 13, 1938

Verfuegung des Fuehrers und Reichskanzlers ueber das Oesterreichische Bundesheer vom 13 Maerz, 1938

---

1. The Austrian Federal Government has just resolved by law upon the reunion of Austria with the German Reich. The Governmnent of the German Reich has by a law of this date recognized this resolution.

2. By virtue thereof I give this instruction: The Austrian Federal Army, as a component part of the German armed forces, shall be placed under my command as of this date.

3. I commission Infantry General von Bock, Commander in Chief of the Eighth Army, to assume command of what are now the German Armed Forces within the borders of the Austrian Province.

4. All members of the former Austrian Federal Army shall without delay take an oath of allegiance to me as their supreme commander. Infantry General von Bock shall immediately issue the necessary orders.

ADOLF HITLER.

---

21 November, 1945

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2936-PS

I, Felix Edward Sharton, 046312, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and thatthe above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2936-PS

Felix Edward Sharton
046312

H1237-0176

2949-PS

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2949 PS
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

TOP SECRET

Reichs Ministry
for Aviation

14 March 1938

Institute for Research

B Nr. F..V. 1106/38g R

To the General Fieldmarshal

Fieldmarshal

Enclosed I submit, as ordered,-the copies of your telephone conversations.

/s/ HIHN

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2949-PS, Cover Page

21 November 1945

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2949-PS, cover page.

GOETZ MAYER,
T/5 33812169

H1237-0177

Notes Concerning the Telephone Conversations between the Fieldmarshall (f) and the Minister Seyss-Inquart (s).

14:45 Phone call from F.

F: How do you do, doctor? My brother-in-law, is he with you?

S: No.

Thereupon the conversation took approximately the following turn:

F: How are things with you? Have you resigned, or do you have any news?

S: The Chancellor has concelled the elections for Sunday, and therefore he has put S and the other gentlemen in a difficult situation. Besides having called off the elections, extensive precautionary measures are being ordered, among others curfew at 8 PM.

F: Replied that in his opinion the measures taken by Chancellor Schuschnig were not satisfactory in any respect. At this moment he could not commit himself.officially. F. will take a clear stand very shortly. In calling off the elections, he could see a postponement only, not a change of the present situation which had been brought about by the behavior of the Chancellor Schuschnigg in breaking the Berchtesgadener agreement.
Thereupon a conversation took place between F. and the Fuehrer.
Afterwards F. phoned again S. This conversation was held at 15:05.

F: Told S that Berlin did not agree whatsoever with the decision, made by Chancellor Schuschnigg since he did not enjoy any more the confidence of our government because he had broken the Buchtesgadener agreement, and therefore further confidence in his future actions did not exist. Consequently, the National Minister, S. and the others, are being requested to immediately hand in their resignation to the Chancellor, and also to ask the Chancellor to resign. F. added that if after a period of one hour no report had come through the assumption would be made that S. would no more be in the position to phone. That would mean that the gentlemen had handed in their resignations. S. was then told to send the telegram to the Fuehrer as agreed upon.
As a matter of course, an immediate commission by the Federal President for S. to form a new cabinet would follow Schuschnig's resignation.
Telephone message by S. at 15:55.

S. informed the Fieldmarshal that the Chancellor Schuschnig was on his way to Federal President Miklas in order to hand in his resignation, as well as that of the whole cabinet.
Asked by F. if with this the commission to form a new cabinet intended for S. was secure.
S. said that he would let F. know not later than 17:30.

F: Replied emphatically that this, besides the resignation of the Chancellor Schuschnig, was an absolutely firm demand

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2949-PS, Part A

21 November 1945

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversan with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2949-PS, Part A.

GOETZ MAYER,
T/5 33812169

H1237-0178

Telephone Conversation Between Field Marshal Goering, Reichchancellery, with the German Embassy, Vienna, 1700 hours, March 11, 1938.

Dombrowski: I have to report the following. Seyss-Inquart has talked to the Austrian Chancellor until 1630 hours but he is not in a position to dissolve the Cabinet by 1730 hours because it is technically impossible.

Goering: By 1930 hours the Cabinet must be formed and several measures must have been taken. Is Seyss-Inquart there?

Dombrowski: He is not here just now. He is in conference. That is why he sent me here to telephone you.

Goering: What is the message? Repeat exactly.

Dombrowski: His message is that he is not in a position .... (Goering interrupts, What does he have to say?) He says that he has no hesitation to allow the party formations to come in now.

Goering: All that is not to the point. I want to know what is going on? Did he tell you that he is now the Chancellor?

Dombrowski: Yes.

Goering: As just transmitted to you?

Dombrowski: Yes.

Goering: Good, go on. What time can he form the Cabinet?

Dombrowski: Possibly by 9:18.

Goering: The Cabinet must be formed by 7:30.

Dombrowski: By 7:30.

Goering: For that purpose Keppler is now going to arrive.

Dombrowski: To continue, the SA and SS have already been organized as auxiliary police.

Goering: (Goering repeats the last sentence.) The demand of legalizing the Party must also be made.

Dombrowski: All right.

Goering: All right, with all of its formations, SA, SS, HJ.

Dombrowski: Yes, Field Marshal, only one thing, that the formations which are now outside the country will not come at this time.

Goering: They will only come during the next few days.

Dombrowski: Yes. He thinks after the plebiscite has been accomplished.

Goering: No, no, what plebiscite.

Dombrowski: Yes. He believes that the program then established will be carried out by Hitler.

Goering: One moment, As to the plebiscite, there are certain special things, aren't there. Anyway, this plebiscite tomorrow is to be cancelled.

H1237-0179

H1237-0180

Dombrowski: That's already been taken care of. That's now out of the question.

Goering: Good, the Cabinet must been entirely National Socialist.

Dombrowski: Good, that also has been settled, by 7:30 that must be ....

Goering: (Interrupting) That must be reported by 7:30, and Keppler will bring you several names to be incorporated.

Dombrowski: Very well. One thing Seyss-Inquart requests regarding the organizations now in emigration are to come in later and not now.

Goering: All right, we can talk about that .... That will take a few days anyway.

Dombrowski: That is his request.

Goering: Good.

Dombrowski: That is all right then.

Goering: Yes, they will not come immediately. About that we will have a special talk.

Dombrowski: Very well, General Field Marshal.

Goering: Now to go on. The Party has definitely been legalized?

Dombrowski: But that is .... it isn't necessary to even discuss that.

Goering: With all of its organizations.

Dombrowski: With all of its organizations within this country.

Goering: In uniform?

Dombrowski: In uniform.

Goering: Good.

Dombrowski: calls attention to the fact that the SA and SS have already been on duty for one-half hour which means everything is all right.

Goering: Regarding the plebiscite, the Special Envoy will be coming down and will confer with you about the kind of plebiscite that is to be.

Dombrowski: Well then, we have time in that matter.

Goering: Yes, there is time. Seyss-Inquart is of the opinion that the relationship Germany-Austria must be put on a new basis.

Dombrowski: What did he mean by that? Well he means that the independence of Austria should be maintained but that everything else should be ruled on a National Socialist basis.

Goering: That will be a natural result. Tell him the units must come down in the next few days. That's in the interest of Seyss-Inquart, namely that he receives first-class units which are absolutely at his disposal.

Dombrowski: About that he will talk with you himself.

Goering: All right, he can do that.

H1237-0181

Dombrowski: So that he knows who is coming down but we have a few days for that.

Goering: Yes, and by 7:30 the report about the formed Cabinet.

Dombrowski: He'll have that by then.

Goering: And by 7:30 he also must talk with the Fuehrer and as to the Cabinet, Keppler will bring you the names. One thing I have forgotten, Fishbeck must have the Department of Economy and Commerce.

Dombrowski: That's understood.

Goering: Kaltenbrunner is to have the Department of Security and Bahr is to have the armed forces. The Austrian Army is to be taken by Seyss-Inquart himself and you know all about the Justice Department.

Dombrowski: Yes, yes.

Goering: Give me the name.

Dombrowski: Well, your brother-in-law. Isn't that right?

Goering: Yes?

Dombrowski: Yes.

Goering: That's right and then also Fishbeck.

Dombrowski: Yes, that is taken care of.

Goering: Be careful, the daily press must leave immediately and our our people.

Dombrowski: Well, as to the man whom you mentioned with regard to the Security Department.

Goering: Kaltenbrunner. Yes, he is to get the Security Department and then mark this, immediately the press representatives. (They both talk at the same time, Dombrowski says several times, "Yes".) All right, at 1730 hours, no at 7:30--goodby.

M. (Much?): (Much comes to the telephone and calls Goering's attention to the fact that Keppler will not arrive until 5:40. Goering tells Much that he has just given the names to Dombrowski over the telephone.)

M: [illegible] Requests to be allowed to support the suggestion that the Party formations now abroad would not be let loose until this was called for from "here".

Goering: Yes, no, the Fuehrer wants to ... that he will tell to Seyss-Inquart in person ... those are the most disciplined and best units, they will come immediately under the command of Seyss-Inquart so that he has the best possible support.

M: [illegible] Yes, but as to the foreign political situation.....

Goering: (interrupting) That will be handled. The foreign political aspect will be handled exclusively by Germany in this direction. Furthermore, Seyss-Inquart and the Fuehrer will talk about this matter, that will take quite some time anyway, until they can be dispatched. Anyway they won't come today or tomorrow or the day after tomorrow.

H1237-0182

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 2949-PS, PART C

23 November 1945

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, 2nd Lt., Inf., 01332102, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document 2949-PS, Part C.

GERARD SCHAEFER
2nd Lieutenant, Inf.
01332102

Transcript of Telephone Conversation between Goering and Dr. Ullrich Vienna. Berlin-Vienna

17:20-17:25 on 11 March 1938

U: I was just looking for the gentleman, in order to tell him myself the same thing.

G: Look, Franz, you take over the Ministry of Justice, and corresponding to the wish of the Fuehrer, you also take over for the time being the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, later on someone else will replace you in this.

U: Please, there is something else. Fischbach (?) intends, before accepting his appointment, to the Fuehrer --

G: He should not do that at this moment, it won't be necessary tat all.

U: Then he will phone you, I also am against it.

G: Yes, let him call me. There is no time for it. Also he cannot afford to get for himself special favors, and be responsible now before he has to act history. With the Federal Chancellory, he should still reserve for himself the department of trade, Kaltenbrunner (ph) Security, you the department of Justice, and for the time being, the Foreign Office.

U: Does he know about it already?

G: The latter he does not yet know, I shall tell him that myself. He has to form the cabinet immediately, he shall not fly over here, because the Cabinet has to be formed till 7:30, otherwise it's all for nothing. Otherwise, things will take their own course, and very different decisions will be made then.

U: That is understood, I shall take care of it immediately.

G: And then another important factor which I forget to mention before, but that is rather a matter of course. The Reds, who were given arms yesterday, have to be disarmed in the quickest way and just as well in a ruthless manner, that is rather a matter of course. Also make sure that he gives me a ring immediately, he shall not fly, there is no sense in doing so. Just a moment. He should call me under the following number, 125224. (Here the conversation is interrupted) The conversation was interrupted twice, in the beginning, and at the end. It seemed that Vienna was to blame for the interruption

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2949-PS, Part D

21 November 1945

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversan with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2949-PS, Part D.

GOETZ MAYER,
T/5 33812169

H1237-0183

Transcript of Telephone conversation between Goering and Seyss-Inquart
11 March 1938

Wien-Berlin, 17:26-17:31

S: The situation is like that: The Federal President (Bundespraesident) has accepted the resignation, but his point of view is, that no one but the Chancellor is to be blamed for Berchtesgaden and its consequences, and therefore he'd like ... but he would like to entrust a man like Ender (?) with the Chancellorship. At this moment our own gentlemen (?) are in conference with him, Klawotschnik (??) and so on, and report on the situation.

G: Yes, now look here: This will change the whole situation. The Federal President or some one else has to be told that this is entirely different from what we were told. Gowotschnik (?) said upon your order that you had been given the chancellorship.

S: I myself? When did he say that?

G: Just an hour ago. He said that you had the chancellorship and that also the Party had been restored, SA, SS had already taken over police duties etc.

S: No, that is not so. I suggested to the Federal President to entrust the chancellorship to me, usually it takes 3 to 4 hours. As for the Party we still do not have the possibility to restore it but we have ordered the SA and SS to take over police duties (Ordnungsdienst)

G: Well, that won't do! Under no circumstances! the matter is in progress now therefore, please, the Federal President has to be informed immediately that he has to turn the powers of the Federal Chancellor over to you and to accept the Cabinet like it was arranged; you as Federal Chancellor and the Army --

S: (Interrupted him) Fieldmarshal, just now Muehlmann who was there has arrived. May he report to you?

G: Yes.

Dr. Muehlmann (?) takes over the conversation with G. -

M: The situation that the Federal President still refuses persistently to give his consent and asks for official diplomatic action by the Reich. Now we three National Socialists - Rodenstock (?), Dreila (?) and I went to speak to him personally in order to make him understand that in this hopeless situation only one thing can be done by him: namely to say yes. He would not even let us see him. So far it looks as if he were not willing to give in.

G: (short conversation) (give me S.)
S.I. continues the conversation.

G: Now remember the following: You go immediately together with Lt. General Muff and tell the Federal President that if the conditions which are known to you are not accepted immediately, the troops who are already stationed at and advancing to the frontier will march in tonight along the whole line, and Austria will cease to exist. Lt. General Muff should go with you and demand to be admitted for conference immediately. Please, do inform us immediately about Miklas' position. Tell him, there is no time now for any joke. Just thru the false report we received before action was delayed, but now the situation is that tonight the invasion will begin from all the corners of Austria. The invasion will be stopped and the troops will be held at the border only if we are informed by 7:30 that Miklas has entrusted you with the Federal Chancellorship. (it follows a sentence which is broken up) ------
M. does not matter whatever it might be, the immediate restoration of the Party with all its organizations --- (again interruption) and then call

out all the National Socialists all over the country. They should now be in the streets. So remember, report must be given till 7:30. Lt. General Muff is supposed to come along with you. I shall inform him immediately. If Niklas could not understand it in 4 hours, we shall make him understand it now in 4 minutes.

S: All right.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2949-PS, Part E

21 November 1945

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversan with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2949-PS, Part E.

GOETZ MAYER,
T/5 33812169

H1237-0185

H1237-0186

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO 2949-PS, Part H
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

H, Transcript of Telephone- Conversation between Goering and Keppler and Lt.General Muff, instead of Muff, Keppler answered the phone.
11 March 1938 Wien-Berlin, 12.28 -18-34

k, I just spoke to Muff. The Muff action was going on at the same time as mine was, so I did not know about it. Muff just saw the President. but he also refused. I shall call once more to find out whether or not the President wants to speak to me at this last minute.

G, Where is Muff now?.

K, Muff just came down, his action was unsuccessful.

G. But, what does he have to say?

K, Well, he would not agree with it.

G. Well, then Seyss-Inquart has to dismiss him; just go upstairs again and just tell him plainly that S.I. shall call on the National-Socialists guards and in 5 minutes the troops will march in by my order.

K. (Muff is called to the phone) Muff (?) does not answer by name.

M. It is a fact that Schushnigg tried to prove to the world, that the National Socialists do not have any majority, and only by the threat of German arms .....

the conversation is interupted for about 3 minutes, interuptions comes from Vienna G, remains at the phone

Unknown voice (male)

U. Hallo

G. Is that Secretary of the State Keppler?

U. No, he is just in conference with the Federal Chancellor.

G. With the Federal President;

U. No, with the Federal Chancellor, they are all together, Federal President and Federal Chancellor.

G. Who is speaking?

U. Fehsemeier (?) Adjutant of .....

G. Has he gone upstairs ?

U. Yes, just now.

G. Who is with him, upstairs ?

U. The Federal President, the Federal Chancellor, and Mayor Schmidt.

G. Yes, I hold on,- Fehsemeier, you have to hurry, we have just 3 minutes left;

U. Yes, I know:

Goering waits a while at the phone.

Cont:

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2949-PS, Part H

K: Comes first to the phone, "Well, I just saw the President again, but he has not given his consent

G: He refused : Well, then Seyss shall call immediately

K: He come to the phone immediatley.

Seyss Inquart come to the telephone.

G: Well, how do we stand?

S. Please, Fieldmarshal, yes.

G: Well, what is going on?

S: Yes, ah, the Federal President sticks to his old view-point. Now the Federal Chancellor(double name, not to be understood clearly -------- Weserick (?) went to see Schuschnigg in order to change his mind. He himself uses all his influence, but there is no decision made yet:.

G. But do you think it possible that we shall come to a decision in the next few minutes.

S. Well, the conversation cannot take longer than 5 to 10 minutes, it will not take any longer, I guess.

G. Listen, so I shall wait a few more minutes, till he comes back then you inform me via Blitz conversation in the Reich Chancery- as usually, but it has to be done fast. I hardly can justify it as a matter of fact. I am not entitled typ do so; if it cannot be done, then you have to take over the power alright ?

S. But if he threatens?

G. Yes.

S. Well, I see, then we shall be ready (antreten)

G. Call me via Blitz.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2949-PS, Part H

21 November 1945

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2949-PS, Part H.

GOETZ MAYER,
T/5 33812169

H1237-0188

Transcipt of telephone conversation between Seyss-Inquart and Goering 11, March 38. Wien-Berlin 19-57 20-03

S. Dr. Schuschnigg will give the news over the radio that the Reich Goverment has given an ultimatum.

G. I heard about it.

S. And the Goverment itself has abdicated, General Schiwaski is in command of the Military forces and he will draw the troops back. The gentlemen pointed out that they are waiting for the troops to march in.

G. Well, they were appointed by you?

S. No.

G. Did you dismiss them from their office, ?

S. No, nobody was dismissed from his office, but the Goverment itself has pulled back and let matters take their course.

G. And you were not commissioned, it was refused?.

S. Now like before it was refused. they expect that they are taking a chance with the invasion and expect that, if the invasion will actually take place the executive power will be transferred to other people

G. O K. I shall give the order to march in and then you make sure, that you get the power, Notify the leading people about the following which I shall tell you now: Everyone who offers resistance or organizes resistance, will immediately, be subjected to our court -martial, the court-martial of our invading troops. Is that clear?.

S. Yes

G. Including leading personalities, it doesnot make any difference.

S. Yes, they have given the order, not to offer any resistance.

G. Yes, it does not matter: the Federal President did not authorize you, and that also can be considered as resistance.

S. Yes,

G. Well, now you are officially authorized.

S. Yes.

G. Well, good luck, Heil Hitler.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2949-PS, Part I

21 November 1945

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2949-PS, Part I.

GOETZ MAYER,
T/5 33812169

H1237-0189

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2949-PS, Part J

Transcript of Telephone-Conversation between Goering and Lt.General Muff
Goering himself adresses Muff who till an hour ago Lt.General as General
German Embassy, Vienna.

G. Tell Seyss-Inquart the following: As we understand it the Goverment has abdicated but he himself remained. So he should continue to stay in office, and carry out necessary measures in the name of the Goverment. The invasion is going to happen now, and we shall state that every one who put up any resistance has to face the consequences. But the Austrian organizations may join us any time, rather they may seek protection from the German Wehrmacht. I should try to avoid chaos.

M. Seyss, will do so, he is already making a speech:

G. But he should take over now the Goverment, and should carry through things quietly. The best will be if Miklas resigns,

M. Yes, but he won't! It was very dramatic, I spoke to him almost 15 minutes He declared that he will under no circumstances yield to force

G. So- he will not give into to force,

M. He does not yield to force.

G. What does this mean? so he justs wants to be kicked out?

M. Yes, he does not want to move.

G. Well, with 14 children one cannot move as one likes. Well, tell Seyss that he'll take over.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2949-PS, Part J

21 November 1945

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2949-PS, Part J.

GOETZ MAYER
T/5 33812169

Transcript of Telephone Conversation between Goering and Keppler
Berlin-Vienna, 11 March 1938

20:48-20:54

K: I want to inform you shortly: Federal President Miklas has refused to do anything. But nevertheless, the government has ceased to function. I spoke to Schuschnig and he said they had laid down their functions and we had to act accordingly. (Was the last sentence repeated) They have laid down their functions, and Schuschnig himself said that we had to act and (consequently?) Buhler (Buhler or Buhle - very unclear) has spoken to Seyss-Inquart over the phone, he (?)who is still in Office as Secretary of the Interior, spoke over the radio.

G: (interrupts) I have read that. Continue.

K: The old Government has ordered the Army not to put up any resistance. Therefore, shooting is not allowed.

G: OK, I do not give a darn.

K: Pretty soon Landesleiter Kloose (?) will deliver a speech over the radio, and now (?) I want to ask you if not a prominent personality in Berlin wants to add a few words for the Austrian people?

G: Well, I do not know yet. Listen: The main thing is, that Inquart takes over all powers of the Government, that he keeps the radio stations occupied ...

K: Well, we represent the Government now.

G: Yes, that's it. You are the Government. Listen carefully: The following telegram should be sent here by Seyss-Inquart: Take the notes

"The provisional Austrian Government which after the dismissal of the Schuschnig Government, considers it its task to establish peace and order in Austria, sends to the German Government the urgent request, to support it in its task and to help it to prevent bloodshed. For this purpose if asks the German Government to send German troops as soon as possible."

K: Well, SA and SS are marching through the streets, but everything is quick. Everything has collapsed with the professional groups (?).

G: Now listen: He has to guard the borders, so that they cannot disappear with their fortunes.

K: Yes, indeed.

G: And then, - above all, he also is responsible for the Foreign policy.

K: Yes, We still do need some one for this post.

G: Well, that does not matter. Now, Seyss-Inquart has to take it over and he has to appoint a few people. He should call upon the people we recommended to him. He should form now a provisional government. It is absolutely unimportant what the Federal President may have to say.

K: Yes, they are not doing anything!

G: No, no, he has to form the Government right now like he intended to do, and he should inform the people abroad about it.

K: Yes.

G: He is the only one who still has Power in Austria.

K: Yes.

G: Then our troops will cross the border today.

K: Yes.

G: Well. And he should send the telegram as soon as possible.

K: Will send the telegram to S.I. in the office of the Federal Chancery.

G: Please, show him the text of the telegram and do tell him that we are asking him - well, he does not even have to send the telegram - all he needs to do, is to say: agreed.

K: Yes.

G: Either call me at the Fuehrer's or at my place. Well, good luck Heil Hitler!

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2949-PS, Part L

21 November 1945

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GOETZ MAYER,
T/5 33812169

H1237-0191

Transcript of Telephone Conversation between Wilhelm Keppler and Mr. Dietrich, Berlin-Vienna, 2154, 11 March 1939.

General Bodenschatz wants to speak to Keppler. Dr. Dietrich Berlin
Keppler Wien

Dietrich: I need the telegram urgently.

Keppler: Tell the General Field Marshal that Seyss-Inquart agrees.

Dietrich: This is marvelous. Thank you.

Keppler: Listen to the radio. News will be given.

Dietrich: Where?

Keppler: From Vienna.

Dietrich: So Seyss-Inquart agrees?

Keppler: Jawohl!

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2949-PS, Part M

21 November 1945

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GOETZ MAYER
T/5 33812169

H1237-0192

Transcript of Telephone Conversation between Adolf Hitler and Prince Philipp von Hessen, 11 March 1938

FL ZUERICH 22:25-22:29

H; I have just come back from Palazzo Venezia. The Duce accepted the whole thing in a very friendly manner. He sends you his regards. He had been informed from Austria, Schuschnig gave him the news. He had then said it would be a complete impossibility, it would be a bluff, such a thing could not be done. So he was told that it was unfortunately arranged thus and it could not be changed any more. Then Mussolini said that Austria would be immaterial to him.

F: Then, please, tell Mussolini, I will never forget him for this.

H: Yes.

F: Never, never, never, whatever happens. I am still ready to make a quite different agreement with him.

H: Yes, I told him that, too.

F: As soon as the Austrian affair has been settled, I shall be ready to go with him through thick and thin, nothing matters.

H: Yes, my Fuehrer.

F: Listen, I shall make any agreement - I am no longer in fear of the terrible position which would have existed militarily in case we had gotten into a conflict. You may tell him that I do thank him ever so much, never, never shall I forget that.

H: Yes, my Fuehrer.

F: I will never forget it, whatever will happen. If he should ever need any help or be in any danger, he can be convinced that I shall stick to him whatever might happen, even if the whole world were against him.

H: Yes, my Fuehrer.

F: Well

H: Then, I would like to say that this afternoon the French envoy asked for a conference with Count Ciano, by order of his Government on account of the Austria affair. But Count Ciano refused to see him and thereupon the envoy stated that they have to desregard any further oral negotiations with Italy.

F: Yes, I thank you.

H: My Fuehrer, also I wanted to ask you do you want me to stay here, or shall I come back at once tomorrow?

F: You may still stay there.

H: Shall I send the machine back ?

F: No, you may still keep it there.

H: Yes, I shall report again tomorrow.

F: Yes, I thank you.

H1237-0193

H1237-0194

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2949-PS, Part N

21 November 1945

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GOETZ MAYER,
T/5 33812169

H1237-0195

Telephone Conversation between
Goering and Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, von Ribbentrop
13 March 1938, London
9:15 - 9:55

G: As you know the Fuehrer has entrusted me with the administration of the current government procedures (Führung der Regierungsgeschäfte). And therefore I wanted to inform you. There is overwhelming joy in Austria, that you can hear over the radio.

R: Yes, it is fantastic, isn't it?

G: Yes, the last march into the Rhineland is completely overshadowed The Fuehrer was deeply moved, when he talked to me last night. You must remember it was the first time that he saw his homeland again. Now, I mainly want to talk about political things. Well, this story we had given an ultimatum, that is just foolish gossip. From the very beginning the National Socialist ministers and the representatives of the people (Volksreferenkn) have presented theultimatum. Later on, more and more prominent people of the Movement Party participated, and as a natural result, the Austrian National Socialist ministers asked us to back them up, so they would not be completely beaten up again and be subjected to terror and civil war. Then we told them we would not allow Schuschnigg to provoke a civil war, under no circumstances. Whether by Schuschnigg's direct order, or without consent the Communists and the Reds had been armed, and were already making demonstrations, which were photographed with "Heil Moscu" and so on, naturally, all these facts caused some danger for order-Neustadt. Then you have to consider that Schuschnigg made his speeches, telling them the Fatherlandish Front (Vaterlandische Front) would fight to its last man, one could not know that they would capitulate like that and therefore Seyss-Inquart who already had taken over the government asked us to march in immediately. Before we had already marched up to the frontier since we could not know whether there would be a civil war or not. These are the actual facts which can be proved by documents. This way the people may..... The following is interesting: The absolute complete enthusiasm for the National Socialism which is surprising even to us. And the reason for that is: About 80% among the members of the Fatherlandish Front were National Socialists, but these people had to join the Fatherlandish Front, otherwise they were subjected to terror, mainly economically, in that everybody who did not belong to the Fatherlandish Front lost his job so the Fatherlandish Front really seemed to be something. But actually, these were all our people which is just being discovered now, and that explains the whole situation, which did even surpass all our expectations. At least we thought..... but with the one exception of the Jews and a part of those deep black ones, there is no one against us.

R: So it seems that all Austria is on our side.

G: Well, let me tell you, if there were an election tomorrow, - I already told S-I he should invite the representatives of the democratic powers - they could convince themselves that this was really an election carried through on a democratic basis - and we shall have 90% votes in our favour. Absolutely! Only now one gets the reports how these people have been mistreated; I believe it is absolutely necessary that serious people from England and France should be asked to come over here and to watch what is actually going on. The biggest trick which ever had been played was done here.

R: I believe that this conviction will grow here. During these last days I had a few conversations not to forget the one I had the day before yesterday. Things are like that: at the moment they had their big surprise were.....later on I shall tell you more but generally

H1237-0196

people act very sensibly. The day before yesterday I told Halifax - who was with me quite a long time - that the whole English public opinion knows exactly what is going on in Austria.

G: There is something else I started to say: We cannot afford to have any elections as long as our troops are stationed there, they should be back first. Besides, during the next few days our troops will return. No one could stop that, any military man knows that, when such a thing is running, when the order is given to start the matter takes its course, till the troops have reached their destination, and till they are ready to be shipped away and returned. As I was informed yesterday, one figures with 5 - 6 days. This is now nothing but a friendship march. Nothing has happened, not one shot was fired. Still we have to take over Vienna and Wiener-Neustadt. But I am convinced that will be an easy job - as it was all over. But no one could have expected that. Just remember the speeches of these people. They always shouted these were fanatics, determined... to fight for Austria, for her independence, and soon, that there was nothing behind it, no one could suspect. Officials, for instance, reported and the higher ups just as well as the smaller ones and the ones in the ranks in between, they all told the same story: "You cannot imagine if we only once had mentioned that we were sympathizing with you we would have been put ruthlessly into the streets with our families." It was such a brutal system! They only could fool the world by covering all their deeds with the word "christianity", they were so slimy. But they were the most brutal days that ever did exist. I have to say I take my hat off to those

H1237-0197

in Russia, at least they are honest. On top of it, these people here were infamous. There they did not behead people - well, some of them they did behead - but here they killed them economically, they ruined them. One thing I want to say: it is claimed that we overpowered the Austrian people, and took away their independence, then one should admit at least that just one little part of it was put under pressure - not by us - and that was the government which existed on such a small basis. The Austrian people have only been freed by now. I would just suggest to Halifax or to some real serious people whom he trusts to just send them over, so they may have a picture of what is going on here. They shall travel through the country, then they will see everything. Besides I also want to point out, yesterday, you know, if there..... they were saying the most serious things, war, and so on, it made me laugh because where would one find such an unscrupulous statesman who would send again millions of people to death only because 2 German brother-nations - - - -

R. Yes, this is absolutely ridiculous; one realizes that over here; I do think one knows pretty well over here what is going on.

G. Mr. Ribbentrop, I would call attention to one fact particularly: What state in the whole world will get hurt by our union? Do we take away anything from any other state? If the states say: well, that is against our interests! What kind of interest did these states have? They only could have one interest, to create hostile feelings against Germany. The percentage of minorities does not exceed more than 0.1% over all Austria. All the people are German, all the people speak German. Well, not one single state is involved in it. And the states which as the only ones might have an interest. You may say that, Italy and Yugoslavia and Hungary because a few hundred thousand Germans are living there - these who could say that they might feel etc. ... they actually do not feel that they are threatened. Therefore, it is ridiculous, if France.... Besides I do want to point out that the Czechoslovakian Minister came to see me yesterday and he explained, that the rumor Czechoslovakia had mobilized was taken out of the thin air and they would be satisfied with one word from me that I would not undertake the slightest thing against Czechoslovakia.

R. Of this the embassy was already informed the day before yesterday. He himself called here yesterday and told Woermann so.

G. There upon I said the following: The German troops are supposed to stay away 15-20 Km from the border, on their march through Austria, and north of the Danube in the whole sector only one dissolved battalion was to march merely so that these villages can share in the joy and pleasure. Today the advance does no more take place according to military principles but all over the roads smaller columns are marching because every village wants to see a German soldier.

R. Now let me tell you this: Later on I want to take a plane. I paid my farewell visit to everyone already the day before yesterday. The embassy takes care of all business. I do not have any more authority.

G. But the Fuehrer thought because you are just there that you could inform the people what is really going on. Above all, that it is absolutely wrong to think Germany had given an ultimatum.

R. I have already spoken very openly with Halifax and Chamberlain. There is no doubt about it. Only the fact that the newspapers --- people start to ask questions and it does not seem to be right if I still remain here, it would look strange, somehow.

G. No, no, I think so, too. Only, I did not know if you spoke already to these people. I want that you once more, - but no, - not at all once more, - but generally speaking - tell the following to Halifax and Chamberlain: It is not correct that Germany has given any ultimatum. This is a lie by Schuschnigg, because the ultimatum was presented to him by S-I, -

H1237-0198

Gleise-Horstenau and Jury. Furthermore, it is not true that we have presented an ultimatum to the Federal President, but it also was given by the others and as far as I know just a military-attache came along, asked by S-I, because of a technical question; he was supposed to ask whether in case S-I would ask for the support of German troops, Germany would grant this request. Furthermore I want to state that S-I asked us expressively - by phone as by telegram to send troops because he did not know about the situation in Wiener- Neustadt, Vienna, and so on; because arms had been distributed there. And then he could not know how the Fatherlandish front might react since they always had had such a big mouth.

R. Mr. Goering, tell me, how is the situation in Vienna, is everything settled yet?

G. Yes. Yesterday I landed hundreds of airplanes with some companies, in order to secure the airfield and they were received with joy. Today the advance unit of the 17. division marches in, together with the Austrian troops. Also I want to point out that the Austrian troops did not withdraw but that they got together and fraternized immediately with the German troops, wherever they were stationed.

R. That had to be expected.

G. The marching-in took place, then, according to this wish. Now we also recognize that further invasion is no more necessary. The whole affair is rolling as it is supposed to roll and it has crystallized into a march of joy; if you want to call it like that, as soon as it will stop, - which will be either tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, - the transport back shall start. The Austrian Government

H1237-0199

has informed us that it will then hold a free and secret election, on the basis of democratic principles, so that every Austrian will be able to give his real free vote in a free and secret election. And therefore they want to ask people from abroad so that afterwards no reproach of falsification can be made - like Schuschnigg did - so that they will see that this is a real and secret election. It is also in our interest because we are absolutely convinced that we shall get an overwhelming majority. Therefore it is also in our interest that this election will be handled absolutely correctly. After the election then we shall see the decision the people made and we shall see what is going to happen. But above one thing you must not leave any doubt: We will respect the decision, Austria will make in any respect. And, in case she decides for union - of which we have no doubt - then no power on earth will be able to separate us. It may be that a world-league of all states may overpower Germany, but it won't be possible that we will tolerate to be separated again if Austria decides to go together with Germany. And this is no threat for any state whatsoever, I want to make that clear. In no respect are we threatening the CSR but the CSR has now the possibility to come to a friendly and reasonable agreement with us. They say (the CSR) : " We did not mobilize any soldiers in the West. Nothing has been changed in the present situation." Everything under the condition that France remains sensible and does not take any steps. Naturally, if France organizes now a big mobilization close to the boarder, then it'll not be funny.

R: I believe that they will behave all right.

G: We have a clear conscience and that is the decisive factor. Before world history we have a free conscience. Never has it happened in the world that anyone did interfere if two brother-nations united. That would be against the sovereign rights of people. That would be absolutely ridiculous.

R: I had a long intensive conversation with Halifax, and I told him our basic conception also in respect to the German-English understanding.....

G: That I wanted to say, you know yourself, Ribbentrop, that I always was in favour of a German-English understanding. Noone else would be more glad than I, if the English really wanted it seriously, and if they also recognized that we are also a proud and free nation. After all, we also do represent 2 brother-nations.

R: I can tell you one thing, Mr. Goering. The other day I spoke to Chamberlain after that breakfast, and I got a very good impression of him, and he gave me a message, some news for the Fuehrer, which I shall deliver personally to the Fuehrer. Will you be in Berlin this afternoon?

G; Yes, I will. We celebrate the "Memorial Day" (Heldengedenktag) but let me tell you this, you'll have to stay in Berlin. The Fuehrer himself gave me the order that every minister..... You know, otherwise we would have a great migration ..... Yesterday not one single minister and official was at home. I would have needed 1000 planes. Naturally, they all want to enjoy this ecstasy of joy. Therefore I had to keep the gentlemen back by using draconic measures.

R: I cannot tell you that over the phone. But it is better for me to take off today.

G: Yes, I leave it entirely to you.

R: Otherwise, it will not make sense. My conversations are concluded, and if I sit around it might give a funny impression. But I had an excellent impression of Chamberlain.

G: I am glad to hear that.

R: The other day I spoke quite a while with him. I do not want to speak about it over the phone, but I have the impression that Chamberlain also is very serious about an understanding. I told him in this conversation that after the Austrian problem had been settled, the understanding between Germany and England will be so much less complicated than before. I believe, he realized that.

H1237-0200

G: - Look, since the whole problem has been settled down there and no more danger of excitement and disturbance exists - and this was a source of real danger - the people should be thankful for our having eliminated this source of crisis.

R: I told them that, too and also pointed out that we got rid of a situation, which caused always many troubles. Even if there was some excitement at this moment, the great line for the German-English understanding could only be strengthened by it. I also said to Halifax at the end of our conversation that we honestly do want to come to an understanding and he replied that his only worry was the CSR.

G: No,no, that is out of the question.

R: I told him then that we were not interested and we did not intend to do anything there. On the contrary , if our Fellow-Germans were

H1237-0201

treated in a sensible way, then we should come to an agreement there, too.

G: Yes, I am also convinced that Halifax is an absolutly reasonable man.

R: I got the best impression of Halifax as well as of Chamberlain. He thought it would a little difficult with our (engl) public opinion, because here it looks like force etc. I have the feeling that the normal Englishman, the man in the street will say, why should England bother with Austria. And therefore I believe that if the English Government will tell Chamberlain today him as the leader - after all he is the leader; he himself said so during the last few weeks if he really does interfere in this case and if he gives an explanation in the sense in which we worked it out together (3 words unintelligible) that at home, our Fuehrer, as far as he could see that it is proved by the public English opinion which after a few days or weeks on a great problem of world history in the sense of a German-English understanding like we all desire it (extremely unintelligible).

G: This is absolutly clear. (The following unintelligible). There are matters which do concern people, and there are matters which do not concern them at all.

R: I have to say thru my last conversation with Halifax I have the impression that he did not react to the arguments I gave him, but at last he said I could be convinced that he also did favour a German-English understanding.

G: More or less everything is in wonderful peace. Two peoples embrace each other and are overjoyed and express their happiness.

R: All the people over here think .....

G: Another people which other ..... the other state bears the whole responsibility if such misery overcomes the people. Besides I must say, Mussolini behaved wonderfully.

R: Yes, I heard already about it.

G: Wonderful.

R: Very good, indeed. We always thought so !

G: Marvellous ! He (M) said Schuschnigg asked him about the the election. So he answered Schuschnigg: you cannot do that, you cannot do it, such a kind of an election has never happened before; now we have the material which shows how Schuschnigg wanted to carry out these elections. (Some words unintelligible). Everysingle vote we found was a yes-vote. Only votes which did indicate neither yes nor no were considered as no-votes and on these slips was written: "I say no Hermann Goering, Innsbruck ?Strasse 2".

H1237-0202

R: Unbelievable. Anyone of the small people would never have dared to do that.

G: Listen; if someone took a yes-vote and crossed it out with a pencil and then wrote over it "no", then this was considered as "yes". If you took a yes-vote and you tore it in 2 pieces and you threw both parts in, then is was not considered as one vote, but it counted for 2 yes-votes since it was torn into pieces.

R: Really ?

G: As true as I am here ! These are the secret matters which we shall still publish.

R: By God, you should publish it immediately, this is unbelievable.

G: Well, every torn vote was considered as yes-vote; so if several were torn, one did not put them together, but every single torn piece was a yes-vote.

R: This is quite unbelievable

G: Now - but how did one vote !

R: Do we have any material which gives us any clue ?

G: Yes, yes, this is how it happened: Well, you went into the voting-place and said: I am Mr. Meier ! "Yes, Mr.Meier, give me your vote". Now they said that the registry of all the inhabitants was

H1237-0203

delivered. Well, let's say, this Mr. Meier had this list and he marked it. Thenhe went into the next voting place in Innsbruck; they had the same lists, every voting had these lists (words unintelligible.) Mr. Meier said: "I want to vote" "Please, Mr. Meier". It is being marked again. Now he goes into the third voting-place, where again one has the same list, because every voting-place always had the same list.

R: It is unbelievable

G: Now, he gives his vote for the third time. The only fear these people had was the following: That one might find more yes-votes than these were people entitled to vote. But even that would not have bothered them, they would just have subtracted them.

R: They just would have subtracted them.

G: S.-I believes - and so do I, - that he may still find out thru interrogation of the employees that they already had fixed beforehand the numbers of the yes and no-votes and also the amount of people who had not given their vote at all.

R: unintelligible

G: That was the most brozen election which would ever have taken place.

R: Immediately when I was informed first I expressed myself very strongly against this election as a pure swindle a few days ago in my conversation with Halifax.

G: Listen: Another swindle was enacted. Inspite of the fact that them then is a new minister for foreign affairs, the an Hassadors - I believe* the one in London, Frankenstein, (pt.) went and they have responsibility (unintelligible) toward their old government -- they were made to come, changed opinions of the new ministers according to their convictions. This is being investigated. S-I in formed me about it yesterday. He said, he found out, that there still exist connections between the embassies and underground forces, that is unauthorized people of the old government and that these ambassadors represent requests of the old government on behalf of the new one. Do you understand?

*also

R: Yes.

G: And this is supposed to have happened in London.

R: Yes, yes. Frankenstein himself .... we have a few people, I know, they are very unfriendly.

G: How is Frankenstein?

R: Well, toward us -- I do not know how he really feels, you see, - they borrowed swastika flag for today -

G: That is fine

R: Yes, that is ok. But I believe he always showed himself loyal and decent toward me, I cannot say differently; I cannot say how he really feels though. But, as you know, we have a few people here who are most disagreable.

G: But tell Frankenstein he has to represent the present government.

R: Yes, that is understood.

G: Well, any way, S-I told me yesterday, I do not Know if it was the Austrian Minister in England or in Paris, I believe in Paris, who asked? , is it correct that the Austrian government asked for the German troops. So he was fold by the new foreign office: Yes, that is correct. Well, we said that the new ministry for foreign affair did say the government had not asked for them. This matter is being investigated.

H1237-0204

R: There are a far more fellows there who just try to mingle in; well, thank you so much, Mr. Goering.

G: Come over here, it is beautiful over here.

R: Well, I shall come this afternoon. Generally speaking, I do believe it is a wonderful thing.

G: I want to tell you, I am happy beyond any description. You do not know how much I suffered under the Austrian question. That was what always made me suffer so immensely as a German. I never could understand, that 4 foreign powers were against us, - when just Germans were yearning for Germans. Always this penetrated me to my marrow.

R: I have also, you know, in a very short time - I do not think I am wrong - one will say here - by God, it is good that finally a problem has been settled in such a peaceful way - isn't it fantastic,-

G: Now listen, I do not ask for anything but that the world will respect the election in Austria as we do. If this will happen then I believe that in the next future unintelligible

R: And then I believe, we may - -

G: Ribbentrop, then you have to mention another thing, if you have a chance to, - it is very important. The Austria people is ruined economically. There are many many unemployed people, a terrific misery. In case Austria will make her decision in favor of Germany, we will be able to help these people with our great economic program. We can continue the Autobahn immediately, we can build more highways, we may buy again timber, also some cattle, and imagine, Austria always has lived from tourists. Imagine, if now Austria will make her decision for Germany, then - I am sure - there will not exist a German who will not gotto Austria next summer.

R: Well, I believe the unemployment problem will no more exist there, within a short time. I guarantee you, I personally -

G: I believe-within the next 6 weeks - there will be no more one unemployed in Austria - but everybody will be working, and they will be put to work in Austria herself.

R: I want to tell you one more thing: I have not left any doubt what so ever, - that in case of a threat, or if any thing would happen - the Fuehrer and the whole nation will stand behind it - 100 percent.

G: Let me tell you the following, confidentially: The Fuehrer who is usually well controlled, - is too much involved in this respect with his heart since it concerns his homeland. I believe if he receives any threat in the Austrian question he will never give in, and I have to make it clear, neither will the 2 nations. That would be a fanatic matter, in Germany as well as in Austria.

R: That is clear.

G: There is no doubt. Who ever threatens, us now, will strike at both peoples, and both shall put up a fanatic resistance.

R: I believe there is no doubt about that any where.

H1237-0205

G: Yes, if anyonce insists on it, all right-. But I always say if there is any states man in the world unscrupulous enough- because 2 German people want to get united - ready to threaten with war, or who ever is ready to send millions of people to the battle-field,- let him come. I rather want my people to be eliminated than that they may give in to this.

R. I never left any doubt about that. But I may say, that I am of the opinion that one is rather reasonable, I do belive.

G. In that,- I have to say,- I'd not see anything reasonable, that would be the most absurd thing. Then the world must have become an insane - asylum. It might be differnt if there was a people over there which might resist with all its force against a German invasion and ask the whole world for help. Then I might understand that. This is just ridiculous.

R. Yes, Mr. Goering-

G. Well, do come! I shall be delighted to see you.

R. I shall see you this afternoon.

G. The weather is wonderful here. Blue sky. I am sitting here on my balcony,- all covered with blankets- in the fresh air, drinking my coffee. Lateron I have to drive in, I have to make the speech, and the birds are twittering, and here and there I can hear over the radio the enthusiasm, which must is wonderful over there.

R. That is marvellous.

G. I do envy all those, who could be there yesterday. I have to sit here and have to keep the key - position.

R. Just a whole ago we also listened in.

G. It is interesting, did you hear the Fuehrer's speech from Linz?

R. No, unfortunately not.

G. To me it was the most interesting one- it was very short,- the most interesting speech I ever heard from the Fuehrer. This man who masters the language as hardly any one- this man could hardly speak. It was not much that he said, but he was deeply moved. Then later he phoned me and said: "Goering, you cannot imagine, how beautiful my homeland is-I had forgotten it." Today, he is visiting the grave of his parents where he will deposit a wreath. Linz, imagine, for many years it has been the first time that he is in the city, at the grave of his parents,--- how crazy and grotesque circumstances have been. Imagine, shortly before the Berchtesgadener agreement,- when the house of my sister was searched, she is married to the present secretary of Justice,- the pictures of the Fuehrer and the one of myself - of her own brother- were taken away. (Next sentence annot be understood)
Nothing was written about that.

R. Was the Fuehrer very much shocked?

G. Yes, very much so. I believe, that he goes through dark days. Scenes are supposed to happen... Besides, Hard Price is with him.

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R. Yes, I already have read the article by Ward Price, this morning.

G. From Linz?

R. By Ward Price, very good.

G. Yes, I mean, concerning Linz?

R. Yes, about Linz, wonderful/

G. Well, this does interest me, because, he is supposed to ---

R. I do know: The Fuehrer asked for him and wanted his opinion, if he did consider that, what he did see here, as force?

G. What does W P write about it?

R. Well, he writes,--- it looks like it must have been overwhelming.

G. Imagine, this small town of 36.000 inhabitants, almost half a million people are supposed to have gathered here. - Well, do come!

R. Good bye, and Heil Hitler.

G. Heil Hitler.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 2949-PS, Part W

23rd November, 1945.

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5 33 812 169; hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the Document 2949-PS, Part W.

GOETZ MAYER

T/5 33 812 169.

H1237-0207

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2994 - PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Nuernberg, Deutschland
19. November 1945

Zeugenaussage des Kurt von Schuschnigg - frueherer Kanzler von Oesterreich.

Ich, Kurt von Schuschnigg, erklaere unter Eid, bezeuge und sage folgendes aus:

Ich war Bundeskanzler von Oesterreich vom 1. August 1934 bis 11. Maerz 1938

Waehrend meiner Dienstzeit als Bundeskanzler von Oesterreich, besonders am 11. Juni 1936 verhandelte ich mit der damalig bestehenden Regierung Deutschlands ueber eine Vereinbarung welche besser als Uebereinkommen vom 11. Juli 1936 bekannt ist.

Ich bezeuge weiter und sage aus, dass vor dem Abschluss der obengenannten Vereinbarung die deutsche Regierung gewisse oekonomische Schranken gegen den Handel zwischen deutschen und oesterreichischen Staatsangehoerigen, naemlich, den 1.000.- Mark Schranken, errichtete.

Diese Schranke verfuegte, dass jeder Deutsche, der die Grenze von Deutschland nach Oesterreich ueberschreitet, verpflichtet ist der deutschen Regierung die Summe von 1.000.-- Reichsmark fuer dieses Vorrecht zu bezahlen- vor diesem Edikt der deutschen Regierung war Oesterreich gewohnt ungefaehr 100.000 Besucher jaehrlich von Deutschland zu empfangen.

Ich erklaere weiter, dass die obengenannte Sperre, errichtet gegen Oesterreich, bei dessen landwirtschaftlichen und industriellen Interessen sehr schmerzhaft empfunden wurde.

Als Staatskanzler von Oesterreich versuchte ich darum eine Versicherung von der deutschen Regierung, und insbesonders von Adolf Hitler, dem Haupt der vorgenannten deutschen Regierung zu erhalten, dass er die 1.000.-- Mark Sperre, die er gegen Oesterreich errichtet hatte, aufheben und Oesterreich wieder versichern wuerde, dass er keine politischen Absichten bezueglich unseres Staates - Oesterreich - habe.

Zu der Zeit, Franz von Papen, der der rechtlich ernannte Vertreter Deutschlands in Oesterreich, naemlich der besondere Gesandte in Wien war, fuehrte alle Verhandlungen mit der oesterreichischen Regierung fuer den Abschluss der obengenannten Vereinbarung.

Ich bezeuge weiter und sage aus, dass ein Ausdruck der besagten Vereinbarung in Wien, Oesterreich, bei der oesterreichischen Regierung zusammen mit Papen vorbereitet wurde. Dieser besagte Ausdruck wurde bei von Papen nach Deutschland gebracht und mit kleinen Aenderungen dort bei Hitler ohne weitere Formalitaeten angenommen - sowohl bei Hitler als auch bei der oesterreichischen Regierung.

Diese Vereinbarung lautete folgendermassen:

1. Die Reichsregierung anerkennt die volle Unabhaengigkeit des Bundesstaates Oesterreich im Sinne der Erklaerung des Fuehrers und Reichskanzlers vom 21. Mai 1935 (Deutschland hat weder die Absicht noch das Begehren sich in die Innenangelegenheiten Oesterreichs einzumengen, noch eine Anektierung oder Anschluss Oesterreichs durchzufuehren).

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2. Innenpolitische Angelegenheiten, inbegriffen die Frage des oesterreichischen Nationalsozialismuses werden bei jedem Staat einfach als Privatangelegenheit des anderen angesehen, die es nicht direkt oder indirekt zu beeinflussen versuchen wuerden.

3. Oesterreich verspricht, dass es seine allgemeine Politik, besonders gegenueber Deutschlands, im Uebereinstimmen mit den Tatsachen fuehren wuerde, dass Oesterreich sich als deutscher Staat bekenne.

Ich bezeuge weiter und sage aus, dass es einen geheimen Teil des erwaehnten Vertrages gab, der im Allgemeinen die folgende Vereinbarung enthaelt:

1. Naziverbaende sollten auf oesterreichischem Boden fuer deutsche Staatsangehoerige ins Leben gerufen werden, vorausgesetzt, dass sie nicht versuchen, Oesterreich durch Propaganda zu beeinflussen.

2. Widerrufend, dass beide Staaten dem deutschen Kulturkreis angehoeren, beide stimmten gegenseitig ueberein, aggresives Verhalten gegen den andern in Rundfunk, Film, Nachrichten oder schauspielerischen Angelegenheiten nicht zu bewilligen. Das Verbot von Buechern sollte nach und nach aufgehoben werden.

3. Presse - jedes Land verpflichtet sich seine eigene und wenn moeglich auch auslaendische Presse zu beeinflussen, sodass sie sich nicht in Innenangelegenheiten einmischen und ihre Kritik ueber den anderen beschraenken. Oesterreich akzeptiert 5 nationale Zeitungen:
Berliner Boersen-Zeitung, Berliner Tageblatt,
Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten,
Essener National-Zeitung.

4. Oesterreich genehmigt den Gebrauch der Hakenkreuzbinde und Banner und das Singen des Horst-Wessel-Liedes bei Deutschen in Oesterreich.

5. Oesterreich wuerde die Frage der Rueckkehr der oesterreichischen Legion untersuchen.

6. Voraussichtlich der gegenseitigen Aufhebung von Beschraenkungen im Touristenverkehr - die 1.000.-- Mark Sperre wuerde aufgehoben werden.

7. Zukuenftiger Touristenverkehr zwischen den zwei Staaten.

8. Dasselbe als im Paragraph 3 der obengenannten Orginalvereinbarung.

9a Oesterreich gewaehrt eine Amnestie fuer alle Nationalsozialisten ausser denen, die schwerer Verbrechen schuldig sind, eingeschlossen Mitglieder der oesterreichischen Legion, wann immer diese gestattet ist, zurueckzukehren.

9b Eine wirkliche Befriedigung im Auge, erklaert der oesterreichische Kanzler, dass verbreitet waere in einem guenstigen Moment, den er in der baldigen Zukunft erwarte, die Fuehrer der sogenannten Nationalen Opposition in Oesterreich zusammenzurufen, um fuer politische Verantwortung zusammenzuarbeiten. Die betreffenden Personen, die er selbst auserwaehlen wuerde, sollen das Vertrauen des oesterreichischen Kanzlers geniessen. Hiermit wird uebereingestimmt, dass diese Personen die Aufgabe erhalten, die fuer die innere Befriedigung der Wuensche der nationalen Opposition und ihre Mitarbeit in der Bildung politischer Meinungen in Oesterreich sorgt und dass nach einem Plan der im vorhinein aufgezogen werden soll.

Deutschland setzte es fort, die Nationalsozialistische Partei in Oesterreich zu unterstuetzen trotz des Abkommens von und zwischen Oesterreich und Deutschland, das am 4. Juli 1936 aufgezogen wurde, unterstuetzend und ermutigend die genannte nationalsozialistische Partei, damals in Existenz in Oesterreich, um oeffentliche Taten gegen die rechtmaessig eingesetzte Regierung Oesterreichs zu instigieren, mit der Absicht, die Oesterreichische Regierung zu stuerzen.

1. Der olympische Fackellauf in den letzten Tagen des Juli 1936 als anlaesslich der olympischen Spiele, die olympische Fackel, auf dem Wege von Athen nach Berlin durch Wien kam, eine offizielle Feier war geplant, die auf dem Wiener-Heldenplatz stattfinden sollte. Der Bundespraesident, die Regierung und das Diplomatische Corps sollte anwesend sein, vorbereitet Ansprachen zu halten etc.

Die Nationalsozialisten - damals im Deutschen Turnerbund organisiert - unterbrachen die Feier mit einer wohl vorbereiteten Demonstration zu Gunsten des Anschlusses (das Singen von nationalsozialistischen Liedern, das Leisten des Hitlergrusses, etc.) , welches natuerlich fuer die Regierung sehr peinlich war, da die Feier ueber den Rundfunk uebertragen wurde. Wie die deutsche Propagandamaschine nach Maerz 1938 zugab, diese Demonstration war mit Beistimmung und Teilnahme von Reichsdeutschen Parteigenossen durchgefuehrt worden. Die Wirkung davon war, das Uebereinkommen vom 11. July 1936 das nur einige Wochen vorher beschlossen wurde und welches fuer die illegale nationalsozialistische Partei in Oesterreich unguenstig war, zu laehmen.

2. Der Besuch von Neurath's in Wien im Februar 1937.
Als Neurath in Wien ankam, veranstaltete die illegale nationalsozialistische Partei unter der Fuehrung Leopolds eine riesige Anschlussdemonstration. Die Teilnehmer standen entlang der Strecke vom Wiener Westbahnhof zum Hotel Imperial. Waehrend dieser Demonstration gab es Proklamationen zu Gunsten Hitlers und gegen oesterreichische Unabhaengigkeit und Regierung (nach Polizeiberichten gab es ungefaehr 30.000 Nationalsozialisten).

Die deutsche Presse legte diese Demonstration als einen Beweis des oesterreichischen Anschlussbegehrens aus; gleichzeitig griff es die oesterreichische Regierung staerkstens an, da dieselbe gegen die Demonstranten eingeschritten war.

3. Die illegale nationalsozialistische Partei mit grossen Summen Geldes zu finanzieren. Grosse Geldsummen wurden nach Oesterreich, fuer die Finanzierung der illegalen Bewegung abgeleitet. Die illegalen Parteifunktionaere (Gauleiter) wurden von Deutschland bezahlt. Leopold zum Beispiel hatte einen deutschen Mercedes.

4. Der Einkauf von landwirtschaftlichen Erzeugnissen nur von bewiesenen Mitgliedern der nationalsozialistischen Partei in Oesterreich. Deutsche Vieh- und Holzkaeufer machten ihre Verhandlungen von der Mitgliedschaft des oesterreichischen Haendlers in der illegalen Partei abhaengig.

5. Trotz der angeblichen Anschaffung der 1.000.-- Mark Sperre, ein weiterer Erlass wurde herausgegeben, der deutsche Besucher hinderte, mehr als 5.-- Reichsmark nach Oesterreich mitzunehmen.

6. Herausforderndes Benehmen von deutschen offiziellen Besuchern nach Oesterreich. Ein Besuch von deutschen Industriellen in Oesterreich unter der Leitung der Partei(NSKK) wurde fuer Anschlussdemonstrationen missbraucht (e. g. in Leoben, Sommer 1937).

Deutsche

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Deutsche Kraftfahrer waren gezwungen die Hakenkreuzfahne auf ihren Wagen ausgestellt zu haben, falls sie nicht Verfolgungen bei der Gestapo bei ihrer Rueckkehr ins Reich nach sich ziehen wollten.

Reichsdeutsche Gaesteredner in Wien missbrauchten die oesterreichische Gastfreundschaft auf abscheulichste Weise (e.g. Buerkel, Oberlindober)

Bei der Gelegenheit eines solchen Besuches oesterreichischer Industrieller in Berlin (1937) ganz oeffentlich verbreitete Anschlusspropaganda.

7. Gebrauch fuer anti-oesterreichische Propagandazwecke in deutschen Zeitungen die nach den Vorkehrungen des Vertrages vom 11.Juli 1936 gestattet waren in Oesterreich zu erscheinen - die Essener Nationalzeitung, Goerings offizielles Blatt.

Die Einstellung der deutschen Presse gegen Oesterreich blieb unfreundlich, zeitweilig wurde sogar widerspenstig: sie enthielt oefters Falschheiten und Angriffe gegen die Regierung.

8. Endlich die erste Uebertretung und Missachtung fuer die Vorkehrungen der Vereinbarung vom 11. Juli 1936 wurde durch die Entdeckung des Tave Planes, welcher Plan von der oesterreichischen Polizei in der Tienfeldstrasse 4 waehrend des Monates November 1937 gefunden wurde, festgestellt. Dieser Plan enthielt Anweisungen von hohen Parteiangehoerigen : stellv. des Fuehrers der Nazipartei, naemlich , Rudolf Hess und war folgendermassen:

1. Die allgemeine Lage in Deutschland weist darauf hin, dass die Zeit gekommen sei, in Oesterreich zu handeln. England ist mit dem Konflikt im fernen Osten beschaeftigt, ferner ist es weder ueber die Krises in Abessinien, noch dem Konflikt in Spanien, der eine Gefahr fuer Gibraltar darstellt, hinweggekommen. Frankreich ist unfaehig infolge von sozialen Konflikten im eigenen Lande, widrigen oekonomischen Verhaeltnissen und die Unsicherheit in Spanien, zu handeln. Die Tschechoslowakei befindet sich in besondern schwierigen Umstaenden zufolge des enormen Wachstums der Henlein -Partei, der Ermutigung der slowakischen und ungarischen Bevoelkerung, hervorgerufen bei diesem Wachstum und die geschwaechte Lage Frankreichs. Jugoslavien wuerde die Wiedereinsetzung der Habsburger in Oesterreich, was den alten Konflikt zwischen Kroaten, Slowenen und Serben erneuern wuerde; und ist deshalb willig, jede Loesung die die Habsburger Frage ein fuer alle mal liquidiert zu bewillkommen. Italien schliesslich ist durch Abessinien und den Konflikt in Spnien zu so einem Grade geschwaecht dass es von dem Freundschaftsvertrag von Deutschland abhaengig ist und nicht ernstlich daran denken kann, sich irgendwelcher Aktionen, die nicht direkt seinem Ueberlebensinteresse zuwiderstehen, zu widersetzen. Es wird angenommen, dass eine verstaerkte Garantie betreffend der Brennergrenze genuegend sein wird, Musolines Neutralitaet zu versichern.

2. Zu diesem Zeitpunkt muessen Schritte gegen Oesterreich unternommen werden.

Richtlinien.

a) Durch gewisse Gruende, die Einzelheiten welche spaeter genannt werden, Unruhen unter den Mitgliedern der nationalsozialistischen Partei werden ausbrechen. Diese Unruhen sollen die Regierung provozieren Truppen im ganzen Land fuer einschneidende Massnahmen anzuwenden.

b) Die deutsche Regierung, nachdem sich vorher die Achsenpartner benachrichtigt haben, praesendiert ein Ultimatum, welche die Eingliederung von Nationalsozialisten in die Regierung und die Zurueckziehung von Truppen fordert.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2994 - PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
CONTINUED

Im Falle einer Weigerung wuerde die deutsche Wehrmacht einmarschieren.

c) Im Falle die oesterreichische Regierung diesem Ultimatum nachkommt, die Eingliederung auf einer Basis der Gleichheit der illegalen Partei in alle Regierungsaemter, in der Vaterlaendischen Front und proffisionellen Organisationen soll in Effekt treten.

d) Man nimmt an, dass die Regierung nicht mehr in der Lage sei, die Unruhen im Land zu unterdruecken.

e) In diesem Falle marschiert die deutsche Wehrmacht in Oesterreich ein um die Ordnung wieder herzustellen.

Kurt von SCHUSCHNIGG

Unterschrieben und geschworen von mir an
diesem 19. Tag des Novembers 1945

CURTIES L. WILLIAMS
Colonel, IGD

CERTIFICAT OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 2994 - PS

November 22nd, 1945

We, FRANK G. WOLF B 313 440, MARCEL HOLLANDER B 303 974, hereby certify that we are thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 2994 PS.

FRANK G. WOLF
B 313 440

MARCEL HOLLANDER
B 303 974

H1237-0212

Doc. 2995-PS

OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL
FOR THE PROSECUTION OF AXIS CRIMINALITY
APO 403, US ARMY

Nurnberg, Germany
19 November, 1945

A F F I D A V I T

I, Kurt von Schuschnigg, being first duly sworn, depose and say as follows:

That at the beginning of the year 1938, Franz von Papen, the then special Ambassador of Germany in Vienna, Austria, mentioned for the first time to me, a precise proposal for me to meet Adolf Hitler at Berchtesgaden. Subsequently and following this first proposal made to me by Franz von Papen, we discussed the idea many times before I definitely made up my mind that I would accept an invitation to go to Berchtesgaden. I further state and say, that, during the latter part of January 1938, I informed von Papen that I was prepared to go to Berchtesgaden and discuss the differences and misunderstandings that had arisen regarding the execution of the agreement reached by and between our two Governments on July 11, 1936, providing that if I should go, the following three conditions must be guaranteed by Hitler

1. I must be invited by Hitler.

2. I must prior to going to Berchtesgaden be precisely informed concerning the matters that would be discussed between Hitler and me, and I must be assured that the agreement of July 11, 1936, would be maintained.

3. Hitler must agree with me in advance about the main points of a communique that each of our two nations would publish at the end of our meeting, and, further, that this communique would again reiterate that the full maintenance of the July 11, 1936, Agreement would be observed by each of our two nations.

I further state that von Papen informed me that he would go immediately to Berchtesgaden and discuss with Hitler my demands and convey to me the reply of Hitler concerning them.

I further state that, during the first week of February 1938, von Papen again came to me and declared that he had had a discussion with Hitler at Berchtesgaden concerning my demands as set forth above, and that Hitler had authorized him, von Papen, to say - "Hitler invited you to a meeting at Berchtesgaden to discuss all the disagreements that have arisen as a result of the July 11, 1936, Agreement between our two nations". He further authorizes me to inform you that "the whole of the Agreement of July 11, 1936, between Austria and Germany, will be maintained and once more underlined". In regard to your demand concerning the communique, Hitler agrees to meet your request and further agrees that both parties shall issue simultaneously a communique containing the same text which will again affirm and quote the provisions of the July 11, 1936, Agreement". Von Papen then added, "Hitler further authorizes me to say to you that at any event, the political situation of Austria will in no wise be worse after the conference of Berchtesgaden than it is now". I further state and say that to conclude the talk between von Papen and me, we agreed and my office prepared a preliminary draft of the proposed communique, the final form of said communique to be completed in Berchtesgaden. Von Papen further informed me on that occasion that I would have "an opportunity to conclude a satisfactory agreement with Hitler, which opportunity would perhaps never be presented to me again, for Hitler has his difficulties in his own ranks and is occupied with some ideas in another direction, and he is therefore desirous of having no further troubles with Austria".

I furthermore state and depose that, on the evening of the 11th of February, 1938, I departed from Vienna accompanied by Secretary of State for Foreign matters, Guido Schmidt, and other members of my staff. During the night of 11 February, 1938, I remained in Salzburg. On the morning of 12 February, 1938, accompanied by Guido Schmidt, I departed from Salzburg for Berchtesgaden, and arrived at the border of Austria and Germany at about ten thirty A.M. According to a former agreement by and between von Papen and my office, I was met at the border by Franz von Papen. Von Papen then and there informed me that I would have a very good speech with the Fuehrer. He further informed me that "the Fuehrer was in a very good mood today!" Von Papen said that the Fuehrer had asked him, von Papen, to inquire of me if I had any objection that by chance some of his, Hitler's, Generals should be present at the Berghof. I inquired of von Papen, who those generals were whom Hitler had present at the Berghof and he, von Papen, replied, Keitel, Sperrle, and Reichenau. Without further conversation of special interest herein, von Papen and my party arrived at the Berghof.

I furthermore state and affirm that, immediately after arriving at the Berghof, I commenced a conference with Hitler. Hitler and I were alone for two hours. Hitler attacked in a violent manner the politics of Austria, both of the past and present. He furthermore informed me that he, Hitler, had"decided to bring the Austrian question to a solution so-or-so, even if he had to immediately use military force". At no time during the first two hours of our conversation did Hitler ever make any precise demands or requests of me, but spent the whole of the two hours accusing me and menacing me as a traitor to Austrian politics. Especially he informed me that, according to his knowledge, Austria could no longer reckon with any assistance from other European Powers, and that Austria now stood alone in the world. He furthermore added - "Schuschnigg, you now have the chance to put your name alongside the names of other famous German leaders, such as Goering, Hess, Frick, Epp, Goebbels, and others" -

I further state and say that at this point there was a pause, or recess in the conversation and we had lunch. After lunch, I was allowed to confer with my Foreign Secretary, Guido Schmidt, at which time I informed Schmidt of my experience of the morning with Hitler. While I was conferring with Schmidt, he, Schmidt, informed me that he had learned that Dr. Kajetan Muhlmann was present at the Berghof, and was now having a discussion with Hitler.

I furthermore state and affirm that I was next called before Joachim von Ribbentrop with my Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Guido Schmidt, and, in the presence of Franz von Papen, Ribbentrop exhibited to me a typewritten draft containing the conditions and demands made by Hitler upon me and Austria. He furthermore added that Hitler has informed me, Ribbentrop, "that these demands that I now offer to you are the final demands of the Fuehrer and that he, Hitler, is not prepared to further discuss them". He further stated that, "you must accept the whole of these demands herein contained". Ribbentrop then advised me to accept the demands at once. I protested, and referred him to my previous agreements with von Papen, made prior to coming to Berchtesgaden, and made it clear to Ribbentrop that I was not prepared to be confronted with such unreasonable demands as he had then and there placed before me. Von Papen, still present, apologized and informed me that he, von Papen, was entirely surprised and not at all informed about the aims of the Fuehrer as here laid down. He further stated, and informed me, that he, von Papen, could only offer his advice that I should now accede to, and sign, these demands. He furthermore informed me that I could be assured that Hitler would take care that, if I signed these demands and acceded to them, that from that time on Germany would remain loyal to this Agreement and that there would be no further difficulties for Austria.

At this point in the conversation, I was summoned again before Hitler, but before going to him, I requested of my Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Guido Schmidt, that he attempt to reach some amendments of the proposed demands made upon me by Hitler through Ribbentrop - his success was limited to a few unimportant points.

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H1237-0214

I further state and say, that I then went before Hitler again. Hitler was very excited and informed me that he would make a final test with Austria, and stated further: "that you must fulfill the conditions of the demands made by me on you within three days, or else I will order the march into Austria". I replied: "I am not able to take over the obligation to fulfill your demands, for I am only the Chancellor of Austria, and that obligation you attempt to place upon me is the duty only of the Federal President, Miklas, I am only able to sign the draft and, when I arrive in Vienna, to present it to the Federal President". Hitler then flung open the door and yelled "Keitel". At the same time, Hitler asked me to wait outside. Keitel then came in to Hitler. After twenty minutes or more I was again called before Hitler and, when before him, he, Hitler, informed me as follows: "For the first time in my life, I have changed my mind. You must sign the demands that I have made upon you, then report them to the Federal President, Miklas, and within three days from now Austria must fulfill the Agreement, otherwise things will take their natural course". I then agreed to sign the demands and, while waiting in Hitler's private room, he, Hitler, in an entirely changed mood, said to Franz von Papen, who was also present, "Herr von Papen, through your assistance I was appointed Chancellor of Germany and thus the Reich was saved from the abyss of communism. I will never forget that". Papen replied: "Ja, wohl, Mein Fuehrer".

I furthermore say and affirm that I, in the presence of Ribbentrop, Guido Schmidt, von Papen, and Hitler, signed the demands, and retained a copy for the Austrian Government.

I further state and affirm that, on the way back to Vienna from Berchtesgaden, Franz von Papen accompanied me and my party. Between the Berghof and Berchtesgaden, von Papen informed me as follows: "Now, you have your own impression of how excited the Fuehrer can get, but that happens very seldom, and I am convinced that the next time you meet him, you will have an amicable conversation with him.

KURT VON SCHUSCHNIGG.

Subscribed and sworn to before me
this 19th day of November, 1945,

CURTIS L. WILLIAMS
Colonel, IGD

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 3147-PS
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

The Archives (Das Archiv)

No 67 Issue for the Month of October 1939
Reference work for

Politics - Economics - Culture

Published by

Alfred - Jugemaz Berndt
Ministerial-Dirigent
Chief of the Department of Publication in the Reich Ministry for Propaganda.

The Administration of the Occupied Polish Territory

The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor has enacted on the 12 October, the following edict concerning the Administration of the Occupied Polish Territory:

Article 2

1. Appoint Reichsminister Dr. Frank Governor-General of the Occupied Polish Territory.

2. Appoint Reichsminister Dr. Seyss-Inquart Deputy to the Governor-General.

Berlin, the 12th October 1939.

Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor
Adolf Hitler

Chairman of the Cabinet Council for the Defense of the Reich
Commissioner for the Four Year Plan.

Goering
Field Marshall

Reichsminister of the Interior
Frick

Fuehrers Deputy
R. Hess

Chief of the Armed Forces High Command
Keitel

Commander in Chief of the Army
Von Brauchtisch

Reichs Foreign Minister
von Ribbentrop

Reichsminister of Finance
Graf Schwerin von Krosigk

Reichs Minister and Chief of the
Reichs-Chancery
Dr. Sammers.

H1237-0215

H1237-0216

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 3147-PS

30 November 1945

I, CHARLES E. BIDWELL, S/Sgt., 13146054, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 3147-PS

CHARLES E. BIDWELL,
S/Sgt.
13146054

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Seyss-Inquart.

The Austrian Question 1934-1938

In order to arrive at a better understanding of the contents of this writing, I am referring, amongst others particularly to one Memoranda "The Right of Self-Determination of Germans", to which I shall refer in the following as the "Memorandum"of short.

I have explained in this the historical foundations for the idea of the Union(Anschlussidee;(Nen.page 3-6), the psychological assumption and preparedness of the Germans in Austria for the Union (Mem.8-15), and the developments and tensions which resulted from the prevention of the will to the union(Mem 7-9). Furthermore, I have described the reasons and consequences which led to the clash between the authoritative regime of Dollfuss and the Social-Democratic parties (Mem. 17-18), as well in short the circumstances which pressed towards the "Putsch"of July 1934, (Mem.18-19). I could deduct from occasional subsequent inquiries- people did not like to talk about this failure- that the intentions behind this July-Putsch was to overpower the Austrian Government while their Ministers were in session, to force them to abdicate and to bring a Government Rintelen into power which had an overwhelming National Socialist influence. An intention of murder against Dollfuss could not have been planned. Eight days before this Putsch I had a discussion with Dollfuss. I have known him from the time immediately after the war, when both of us, who were officers returned from the field, supported endeavors to unify on one stage the Austrian Christain Socialist and Nationalists. Since then I did not trouble myself with politics; however, I was a leading member of an organization for the Union called "Austrian-German Volksbund" which was above party politics and whose chairman was Dr. Neubacher, a comrade in arms and friend of mine. I was inclined to sympathize with the National-Socialist party because of their fight for the idea of the Union(Anschuss) and because of the hostile "Kurs" (Attitude) of the Austrian Government, as it in any case was understood in National circles. I supported it by payments (20 s monthly and once 100 s), but I did not join the Party as a member because I did not wish to take such a binding allegiance upon myself. I was never a member of any party, when "Staatsrat" (counsilor of state) I belonged to the "Vathelandische Front" (Fatherland front) and on the 13th March 1938 I was enlisted in the NSDAP. I had no relations with the leading men of the National-Socialist political organization, In connection with my profession (lawyer) . I did know Dr. Wachter and Dr. Ettinghausen, etc. Dollfuss had asked me to come and see him to discuss the question of the "Aktivierung" (mobilization) of the middle class nationals, apparently to be a kind of counterbalance against the National Socialist. I had to tell Dollfuss that the old National Politicians completely clacked supporters and that, so to speak, all leaned toward the Naxis; it would be advisable to come to an understanding with Hitler. A useful understanding with the latter could alone guarantee to bring about order in the camps of the Nationals or National-Socialists. Dollfuss was reflecting, promised further discussions; however, it never came to this, I spent my summer holidays in my home country (Stannern near Iglau) and I received the news through the broadcast of the "Bundeskanzler Putsch." Two days later I left for Vienna.

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The effect of the Putsch was a complete catastrophy in the National-Socialist camp. Not merely the leaders, but the party members were arrested in so far as they did not escape, the confiscation of their fortunes was announced; the revolt which led to military activities in Steirermark, Karnten and Oberoesterreich did cost victims; the political mamagement was seriously compromised by the Nazis and above all, a most sinister looking situation was created in regard to outer (foreign) politics. In any case, the idea of the Union had suffered a serere setback. I was in agreement about the effect with Dr. Neubacher, and it was our desire to assist easying the tension. Following this situation, I felt urged to take up politics beyond the question of the "Anschluss". At that time, Ing Rheintaller peasant leader in Oberoesterreich, introduced an appeasement action. He is said to have received a direct consent from Hess in order to be covered against the Party in the Reich. As far as I know, Rheintaller was received by Dr. Schuschnigg, who meanwhile had become the "Bundes-Chancellor". The former National delegate to the "Landtag" (land parliament) Langoth in Linz, was working with Reintaler. Dr. Neubacher and myself contacted this circle and met there some other men whose names I have forgotten, but who later on did not play a particular role. After some time, the lawyer-applicant from Linz, Dr. Kaltenbrunner, joined this circle He was said to have been a SS man. The main cativities consisted in organiging an institution to succor the needy families of those arrested or condemned Nazis. The Government tolerated and finally sanctioned thos operation, though they knew that the means came chiefly frm the Reich, and because it was known where the monies went to, and that such activities of succor would considerably cntribute to ease the tension from a psychological and therefore also political point of view; this I was told by Zernatto who later on became the Chief Secretary of tne Fatherland Front. Quite rightly, Langath, the mamager, was met with confidence.

Politically it was a question to procure possibilities and a stage for activities of the people of Austria who were oriented nationally and even at this time already National -Socialistically. Dr. Schuschnigg seened not unsympathetic because he apparently sensed the moments of hate and tension since July 1934 and the narrow basis of the Fatherland Front between the red (socialists) and the brown(Nazis) Also , the foreign political backings (Italy) started to grow weaker. At this time the director of military archives, Oberst von Gleise-Horstenau, appeared as a mediator. He prevented the dissolution of a number of national associations and 3 German clubs an affair of rather a social nature which was under the Presidency of v. Lardolff, who was at the same time chairman of the German people's counsel, a top organization for those national associations whoch were outside parties, such as school associations song clubs, etc. The problem was to provide possibilities for political activities to those Nationalists, respectively National Socialist people in Austria, however, without their immediately falling into organizational dependence of the Reich Partei. It might be tolerated that ideological connections remained, because the same thing also happened within the Social-Democrats etc. Dr. Schuschnigg could not make up his mind even not later on. Perhaps he could also see more clearly the reasons of the Reich-Partei, being an outsider in regard to party and politics.

As matters calmed down, the Austrian National Socialists collected themselves again into an illegal party, the organization was built up for better or worse according to the

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Old schedule, those who returned from the Reich were considered to be more "in the know" and authoritative.

The institution of succor, Langoth, remained outside the arty organization. But there were also men in the Nazi circles who considered an absolute dependence on the Reich as plitically wrong and endeavored for an independent Austrian-National-Socialist Party. In particular Dr. Ramer from Karnten belonged to those, and by his influence the future Gau-leader Klausner, who is now dead; also Globetschnich was in it, though I doubt that he was sincerely convinced, and also others. Dr. neubacher tood a keener interest in political affairs and ertered into relationship with the proper Party circles; here, meanwhile, the former Gau-leader of Niederosterreich aptain (Hauptmann) Leopold had succeeded in becoming the land leader of the illegal Austrian Party; he was killed in action in the East serving as Oberstleutenant (Lt. Colonel).

As time went on, the Austrian government had the leaders of the reformed National Socialist Party arrested, also Neubacher. I for myself did not join the Party because I considered this was to be futile and wrong. Thus the tension again increased, became similar to the situation as it was before July 1934; however, without the inner political dangers because the Austrian Nazis were not interested in terroristic actions any more , whoch may be due to the increasing influence of men such as Klausner, Ramer and others. Yet the outer political influence had altered. Schuschnigg felt the need to normalize the relationship towards the Reich. For this he had to compromise also innter politically. He certainly had to deal under the greatest difficulties with the radical leaders of the "Fatherland Front". In order to understand this, it becomes necessary to shortly explain the Austrian clericals ("Klerikalismus").

The Austrian people distinguished between the exercise of religious faith in the Catholic Church and the domination of public life by the Church. This distinction orginates from century old experiences. At the beginning of the 17th century Austria was 80% Protestant. It became re-catholicised under the rule of Ferdinand II with the assistance of the Jesuits by using extremely powerful means of the state. Thousands of families had to emigrate, to mention only some important episodes. Emperor Josef II 1780-1790 "declericalised" the country--as a parallel happening of the commencing French development--he closed down hundreds of cloisters. In the Year 1854 again a decidedly ecclesiastical regime was in comtrol. The marriage laws and jurisdiction were left to the Church. In the years around 1870 the leberal era came with modern legislation about schooling etc. The Dolfuss regime and the Fatherland front, were regarded as an ecclesiastical reaction , which is also indicated by the Concordat in regard to marriage-law questions. Struggles between ecclesiastic dignitaries were involved, not considered as matters in regard to faith or religious belief, but merely as political disputes. Thus it happened that many believing Catholics belonged to the Nazis despite the fact that the higher " Klerus" (Clericals)undertook continuously stronger opposition against the National-Socialism. The ecclesiastical circles unquestioningly exercised great pressure upon the "Fatherland Front" and De. Schuschnigg as a statesman, in order to prevent any conciliatory attitude toward the Nazis.

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Meanwhole, Herr von Papen appeared on the scene; he is sure to have tried everything to "normalise" the relation between Germany and Austria. He did not have the confidence of the radical Nat. Soc. leaders in the Reich and was therefore and was non-aggressive in inner politics. I do not know if I have met him before 1936. Essentially I kept contact with Glaise-Horstenau. I was informed by him in July 1936 that an agreement was about to be concluded between Germany and Austria which would bring a release from the inner-political tension-amnesties- and the inclusion for collaboration by the National Socialists. Dr. Schuschnigg also expected by collaboration. I assume that the contents of this agreement of the 11th July 1936 is known.

Quite apart from interstate agreements, also consessions of amnesty, etc., this agreement contained the phrase (quoted from memory): "the Bund-Chancellor anticupates to include the national opposition for collaboration". This phrase was the main question regarding Austrian inner policies up th the agreement of the 12th February 1938. During this time, Chancellor Schuschnigg received different men from the National Opposition, radical representatives for instance Capt. Leopold they were called in Fatherland circles the "undaunted" and even "conscientious Nationals". I was classified as one of the latter. The interpretation of the above quoted phrase caused in the Nat. Soc. camp a fundamental difference of opinion. The radicals were of the opinion that the Austrian government was obliged to admit the old NSDAP, which meanwhile had started to reconstitute itself. The "conscientious"like myself, Dr. Rainer, Klausner, etc. with different points of view, were of the opinion that the organization and form (method of activities had to be discussed upon with Dr. Schuschnigg, respectively accepted by him; however, it has to be executed in a manner of an independent Reichs organization. Also, other Austrian official politicans occupied themselves with the question of the National opposition, and I have reason to assume that some, for example Neustadter, Sturmer, encouraged to a certain extent the radicals in order to secure some bac king with the population against the ecclesiastical block of the Fatherland Front. The Austrian "Heimatschutz" became in time insignificant. I was frequently together with the General Secretary of the Fatherland Front, Zeratto, whose lively, intellectual and at times easy manner of conversation overcame difficulties more easily in conversations with Schuschnigg. I then took the point of view which became increasingly more revealing to me myself, that the solution could only be found in so far as the Austrian Nat. Sol. activities in those legal forms and methods which corresponded to the Austrian conditions and that they should partake in the government, in return Hitler was to guarantee the independence of this political movement notwithstanding the ideological leadership by him, being the founder of the movement. Austria on her part, however, was to enter into the chosest relationship with the Reich in so far as it was compatible with international law. The "Union " was thus not an acute and perhaps postponed point in the program and my co-workers--and I also believe to Mr.von Papen thought it was neither necessary nor importantto make the question of the "Union" the object of an acute political controversy. We were firmly convinced--as soon as inner political difficulties were eliminated and the outer political tension was eased--that the "Union" would develop step by step automatically; and already existing atate of affairs would only have to be confirmed in as far as political and legal arrangements were concerned. Reports from foreign countries indicated that there would be not objection to this solution, on the contrary, one would be quite happy to have this some question done away with painlessly. Yet, retrospectively one can say today that all who shared this opinion did anticupate an evolutionary development of the National Socialism from its period of "Sturm and Drang" (youthful enfluence) and that with the satisfaction of its national claims--equality of status and union

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of Germans--the "ationa Socialism would find all its scope in the building up of the inner Reich . Looking at it from today's point of view, this moment might have arrived at about 1939. Even Dr. Schuschnigg inclined toward this point of view. He believed in the idea of "Greater Germany" but had to decline a "Union" under this ational-Socialist regime. When I replied thereupon that then he will renunciate the "Anschluss", he answered most decidely: "One may expect an evolutionary development of National - Socialism". I myself was so absolutely convinced of the urgent necessity of the union of all Germans, that I looked upon this question from an inner political point of view, but never could make it dependent upon the political system as it might be at a time in Germany or Austria. No German must remain an outsid observer if the system does not seem to be the right one, but he must take part in the controversy. The Austrian leader of the Social Democrat, Julius Deutch, expressed himself similarly in the Austrian labor paper under the title "And Yet" (Dennoch) at the time of the election of Hindenburg as Reich President. Herr von Papen whom I know met more frequently, perhaps every six to eight weeks, expressed himself cautiosly. I gained the impression that he did not wish to commit himself until he was fully acquainted with the opinion of Berlin. The radicals opposed vehemently my policy. Quite apart from the fact that they declared it as being against the Fuehrer, they tried defamation in their own way. For example, they spread a rumor that I was pupil of the Jesuit college "Stella Matutina" in the Vorarlberg, where Schuschnigg had studied, and that I intended to commit treason against the National affairs in collaboration with Schuschnigg. A clearing of the situation inside the Reich seemed to have taken place in so far as that State Secretary Keppler was put in charge of all the Austrian matters. Other Party offices, however, were not troubled much by this appointment. The "illegal Landesleitung" (county leadership) of Captain Leopold in Austria had rented two floors in the Tenifaltstrasse, Vienna I from where it officiated. Apparently the Austrian police activities. The "Simple citizen" would see in this a search which would still bring about a solution with the NSDAP, and he was less inclined to accept political cinsiderations. Fernatte urged me to become more active realizing that I would not with success with the Nazis in the frame of the Fatherland Front, the plan, as approved by Schuschnigg was agreed upon: "I shall be appointed Counsellor of State with the task to examine the conditions of the National opposition for their inclusion and submit such proposal while an Innsbruck acquaintance of Schuschnigg's,Dr. Prmbaur of the Fatherland Front, should form a Volk's political council for the preparation of the collaboration of the nationals with the Front."

I immediately expressed the desire to go to the Reich myself, in order to ascertain by contact with the responsible people how far my plans had expectation to find their consent. Keppler negotiated, with Schuschniggs consent, a visit to Hess and Goering. I explained by opinion to these two I made a special point of it that this must not be a question of party successes. With these put into the background the Austrian National Socialists could become active, and Austria could become an important supporting position for the Reich, at the same time this double partnership would offer many advantages as regards international affairs . Hess asked me to see him once more. I assume that meanwhile he had talked with the Fuehrer. Hess was most interested and cordial and said about as follows: "You certainly have good intentions and I shall follow up your wonk with interest, I regret you are not one of the old fighters." I was not quite clear about the meaning of ttis last sentence, forst I thought it meant an acknowledgement, but perhaps Hess intended to express that an old fighter would not have proposed "half mea-

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sures". My visit to Goering was superficially impressive, but as for its contents, there is nothing that stuck in my memory with the exception that Goering was more interested in political activities as a matter of principle, but that what I brought along was too lettle. Incidentally, as far as I know Goering then already had established a direct connection with the Austrian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Guido Schmid. Not too encouraged, yet without a refusal from the Reich, I started my activities, which immediately became the object of strong attacks by the radical section of the Fatherland Front and by the Radical Nazis, who after my visit to Hess and Goering were more opposed to my co-workers than to me personally. I particularly became the wall of wailing for all Nazis who had complaints. Here the "Volks political council"with their at times rather clever representatives from the "Bundeslaender" (Bund countries) was sucessfully interconnected. Despite all, I gained the impression that the administrative and executive authorities incited by the Fatherland Front, did away repeatedly with all that had been achieved on the one side by restrictions, arrests and sidmissing of people, by exploiting the still continued illegality, that is of the decidedly party political activities of the Austrian Nazis. Endeavors to ease the tensions by instituting the commissions as provided for in the agreement of the 11th July 1936, hardly met with success, although Schuschnigg was considerably accommodating in one of my last representations, after the previous negotiations were almost in vain. During this time, Dr. Jury also entered the circle of my assistants, who had taken a decisive distance from the illegal work of Leopold. In consequence of the above described circumstances, the situation grew rather worse than better. It became obvious to me that only a decisive refusal of Hitler to those "Illegals" could produce an improvement, where as activities of the National Socialists had to be permitted within those limits to be agreed upon together with Schuschnigg. I withdrew when towards the end of 1937 the really hopeless legitimate movement was also officially strongly supported, and I wrote a letter to Schuschnigg or Zernatto explaining my point of view. I did not participate in meetings of the State Counsel and I went to Garmisch(Germany) upon an invitation by the Reich Sport Leader Dr. Rammer. I informed Zernatto of this trip. Without being prearranged, I met von Papen in Garmisch. We lamented abo t our troubles whole the whather was muddy. Once again I explained my point of view and took the occasion to mention that a corresponding initiative had to be reached in the Ministry on order to meet the methods practiced by the Administration. The ministry of the interior may have been talked about, but certainly not about me. This time, von Papen was less closed. I believe that he said he would discuss these matters with Hitler. Eight days after this conference, meanwhile having returned to Vienna, I went to Zell an See. From there--I believe--I was called to Vienna by Zernatto. At the same time I was informed by National Socialist quarters--possibly by Keppler--that a meeting between Schuschnigg and Hitler in Berchtesgaden was in the making. In any case, I had this information from Reich German quarters before Zernatto or Schuschnigg told me about it. On the day of my departure I had a long discussion with Zernatto, which was later on joined by Schuschnigg, in regard to details of an inner political arrangement. About 2/3 of my propositions were accepted, the most important ones which were meant to impress Hitler, but not freedom of activities for the Nazis nor participation in the administration and in the conduct of the affairs of the State. I assumed that schuschnigg reserved those for his negotiations

in Berchtesgaden. I informed Dr. Rainer and Dr. Jury in broad lines about the results of my discussion, it is feasable that thus it reached Berchtesgaden. I do not know if it excited interest. On the 12th of February Schuschnigg, together with Schmidt, was with Hitler. As for details I do not know anymore that what has meanwhile been spread at home and abroad. Any how, the possibilities for military actions were demonstrated to him, as I was told by Schuschnigg. Most certainly it was a hard day for him.

On the 13th of February I was informed by State Secretary Schmidt in the presence of Zernatto about the agreements of Berchtesgaden. I assume that the wording of same is known. I can not recollect its wordings. Apart from a general amnesty and reparations, the admittance of the National opposition was renewedly and more clearly confirmed and in a certain was as a guarantee was my appointment as Minister for the Interior and for Public Safty provided, it is true I havetalked with Schuschnigg, Zernatto and von Papen on the necessity of such an adjustment, but never of my candidacy for this. However if it really should take place, it was reasonable that I might be entrusted, I was told that my name was not mentioned by Hitler, but by Schuschnigg on Hitler's questioning whom he recommended for the prospective post of Minister. Subsequently I made a particular point of this to retain in office the former Secretary of State for the Security Department, Strubl, although he was like a red clogh for the Nazis, because I wished to have an experienced expert management. I even included Strubl in my Cabinet of the 11th of March. The further decision that I was to be the liaison officer in charge between the Austrian Government, the National Opposition and the Government of the Reich was of an equal importance to me. The Minister for Foreign Affairs Schmid, designated for this duty, anyhow had declined to have anything to do with these questions, I myself, however, was most limited in my capacity for action by those offices. I was forced to inform first all the different groups and had to take care not to prejudice their attitude by my own stand. Thus on the 11th march, for a certain time, I really felt only as a kind of "girl telephone switchboard operator between Berlin and Vienna.

Making in advance a concluding remark; I want to state: the agreement of February 12th and my appointment as Minister for Interior Affairs could only be looked upon by the National Opposition--which were at that time exclusively only National Socialists which fact cannot be contested. To clear up the position of this opposition was the purpose of all those endeavors that have been made, one may say, for years. If one should say that I endeavored to revive the possibilitess for activitess by the National Socialists in a different form, then one is perfectly right. This I have always expressed openly and clearly and I have already called Dollfuss' attention to the necessity of coming to an agreement with the Nazis, because the National, in the old middle class conception, was no longer a political factor. If one wants to state that I wished to reinstate the Nazi party in their specific form, organization and dependance upon the Reich them one is wrong. That is just the thing I wished to prevent. To achieve this end it was necessary to find new men as leaders, who were politically intellegent and to finally see that Hitler that he, being the party leader, give a corresponding declaration. I believe to have found those men, and I am still to this day convinced, that a large portion ot them, had honest intentions in this matter, for example Dr. Jury, Dr. Rainer, Dengineer Rheintaller, and of course also Dr. Neuvacher. But all of them were in agreement

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that without a direction by Hitler as the leader of the movement , the matter could not be cahieved. Partly the men had an inner feeling for and probalby bound to him by their oath, partly they realized that a success in any other direction would be futile in view of the Nazi followers of Hitler in Austrua. All that mattered in those discussions with Hitler, was to induce him, being the leader of the bovement by appropriate counter offers and to gain the necessary declaration concerning the independence of the Austrian National Socialist. Should this have happened, then I believe, almost even to this day, in a success, because the Austrian Nazis could have been won over to this political way. If they had had the possibilities to try to materianize by legal means the ideas fo "ational Socialism Which did not only consist of their racial point of view, of the principle of dictatorship etc. in a form fitted for Austria, and to exercise real responsibilities, then most important of all, the continuous uncertaintly about arrests, dismissals, confiscations etc., would have subsided, which had made these people so susceptable to radical slogans. These people would again returned, I might say, into an Austrian middle class quietness, which they would not have relinquished so easily in view of the experiences of the past years in favor of political adventure, if the influence of the Reich party would have been excluded. It was my aim to achieve this. I believe that just this has not been discussed in Berchtesgaden. Hitler most probably will have avoided this or superimposed this by his talk, while Schuschnigg probably thoughy to belittle himself if he would discuss inner political questions with the Reich German namely a foreign head of a State.

But in such a situation it is of no avail to play ostrich polich (put the head in the sand). The situation happened to be thus in the camp of the National oppostion. If one asked for satisfaction flong this line, it became necessary to walk along this way or it might have been better, not to commence anything at all , but to have tried to make a clear start with those social Democrats, who would re-admitted into activities. However, such an attempt would have been short liven according to the , at the time interior and foreign political situation. As it is , Schuschnigg only took half measures, he conceded to certain details auch as amnesty, reparation, permission to wear the swastika etc, which in this situation only proved to be stimulants for the radical propaganda without any real political counter offers. He opened flood gates without having any provisions for the steering of the flooding waters. If within the terms of this agreement would have been fixed, respectively confirmed by Hitler, certain possibilities for activities, forms of organization, restrictions as regards realization of the party program, exclusion of the dictatorship principle and responsible independence of the Austrian Nazis, then it might have been possible to control these matters by avoiding political mistakes, If Hitler would have confirmed it. But such a decision was not put before Hitler by Schuschnigg. When I prepared for it later on, the Fatherland Front interfered with the polling plan, which gave Hitler the opportunity to renounce the conditions of the agreement of February 12th. It is only conditionally right if it would be said that my political line of action and its partial realization let to the final result of the 11th of March. My actions were certainly contrubuting causes, but it was not in execution of my idea what also actually had been done on the part of the Austruan State Leadership. Basically the reasons which led to the development of the 11th of March are much deeper. The latter was unavoidable unless my ideas could have been realized. In 1942 I received an expressive confirmation about this.

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An acquaintance showed me a report, which was made by the Chief of the Security Police and S. Towards the end of 1937 and which was presented to Hitler via Himmler. Heydrich describes the Austrian situation and arrives at the conclusion that invariably it must lead to the collapse of the "Austrian System". "The only [illegible] which might become dangerous for the plans of the National Socialist movement" I do not remember the expression of Party or Reich leadership--could be the policy of the State Councilor Seyss-Inquart. This was tuned to suit the Austrian mentality and in time it might be suited to give its own character to the nazis movement in Austria different from the Reichspartei, which could take away the revolutionary impulse."

When I discussed with Schmid and subsequently with Schuschnigg the results of Berchtesgaden and their executions, I immediately declared, that before exercising my functions I had to ascertain by a personal conversation with Hitler, in how far he would be in accord with my plans and would be prepared to give basic declarations. Schuschnigg immediately gave his consent to my proposition for a trip to Berlin, which was arranged as far as I remember by State Secretary Keppler and the Austrian Foreign Office; in any case I traveled with diplomatic priveleges(possport). During those and subsequent conferences with Schuschnigg, Zernatto, Schmid, Strubl and perhaps other Austrian politicians I believe also with the Austrian Land Captain Cleissner I developed my plans as follows according to the clarity as it grew increasingly self evident to me: The "volks political council" should be developed into a kind of head office department "National Community" under the leadership of Dr. Jury, who was to become a member of the State Council, thus enabling the Austrian Nazis to busy themselves within the Fatherland Front; at that time still thought that it could be managed from within the Front, which was of a special concern to Schuschnigg. As a parallel intention, Schuschnigg planed to establish a "Legitimate Work Community", to which I did not object. In this national community the Austrian Nazis were to be roped in. Dr.Fischbach was to be appointed a member of the "Economic council"; he was a personal acquaintance of mine, who was never a member of the Party and nat a proper "Nazi", in order to represent there the national-Socialist aims; and for the same purpose Engineer Rheintaller was to be appointed into the "agricultural economic council". Any political activities outside these organizations were forbidden and were to be prosecuted by the police. Klausner who was looked upon as a kind of Party Leader, by the Austrian Nazis, as far as they had left the redical standpoint, was earmarked to receive a leading position, as soon as the orgainzational preparations permitted. The political secretary of Klausner was Dr. Rainer. The political leadership of the Austrian Nazis was to be exclusively in the hands of those men who were responsible for their activities toward the Austrian government. The proportion of power of the individual now-legalized political groups was to be ascertained by suitable means, and accordingly the distribution of the indivudual functions of public affairs was to take place. In any case, the political leader and Bund Chancellor was to remain Schuschnigg. This system of collaboration had to be carried out for a certain period --I mentioned 3 to 5 years. After that, new arrangements might be entered into after ascertaining the proportion of power, but then also the principle of dictatorship was to be rejected, but each legal political group in Austria was to participate proportionately in their size in the executive power and in the public affairs. I state quite

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clearly that I presumed that the Nazis by their work would gain the confidence of the alrge majority of the people, that meantime the Reich had grown out of their period of youthful exuberance, and that foreign countries would liik upon the political development as an internal Austrian affair, without any crityeal character. I was of the opinion that after that time the moment had arrived, that international questions (for exemple the "Anschluss") would be solved according to the demonstrated will of the Austrian population. The aim of my propositions, however, was to do away with the dictatorship of the Fatherland Front, which was in reality the Austrian clericals. Because, as much the dictatorship of the Nazi regime in the Reich was opposed , the dictatorship of the clericals of Austria was much greater and more unjustifiable because the clericals who really had the conduct of the Fatherland Front, did certainly not control more than 20% of the vote of the Austrian population, but prescribed the remaining 80% their political activities. Obviously the redical "Front" leaders defended their position of power to their utmost against this "Re-democratising", and attempted to influence Schuschnigg with all sorts of political and world philosophical arguments.

In order to explain further developments, I must still mention an event from the time of the 12th of February, which might have facilitated the solution as I had planned. One night I was requested by schuschnigg to come to see him immediately. In his study Glaise, Horstenau, Zernatto, Strubl, and ,I believe, Schmid were assembled. Strubl reported that he got into his hands a plan for a "Putsch" of the illegal Landleadership of Captain Leopold and he had affected the arrest of all the "Landleadership " people. This plan in itself was not a very serious matter, apparently without an attempt of realization, for an organic develppment of Central Europe and for the fulfillment of the Rights of Self-Determination of the Nations as proclaimed by President Woodrow Wilson.

I arrived in Berlin in the morning of February 17. Keppler met me. He drove me first to Himmler; this was not fOrseen in the program shown me. The visit lasted about 15 menutes. Himmler attempted to bring up police matters which I could not discuss with him for I lacked information, having just been appointed a Minister the day before. I finally he advised me to take only very reliable personnell in my Telephone Central Office, which advice I did not follow, for I left everything as it orginally was. I never had any objections to having my phone conversations overheard; they were overheard when I was a Minister, but it probably happened similarly to my other colleagues. I suppose primarily that just Himmler wanted to see me personally. Thereupon I rode to the Reich Chancellory, where I was received with the usual ceremony. During my conference with Hitler, which lasted 2 hours and 10 minutes, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and St. Sch. Keppler were waiting in the antechamber; Hitler did not have them called in. I greeted Hitler with the German salute and immediately offered the explaination that he should not be surprised that I , as Austrian Minister, greeted him with the Hitler salute for I considered him, despite the Treaties of Peace, as the Fuehrer of the German Poeples, who led us out of the discriminations of the peace treaties; besides I was also the Austrian Minister and as such, I was responsible for the leadership of the Austrian State. I wrote a record of the most important parts of our furtner conversation, a copy of which

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must have been found in the port-folio seized at the time I was apprehended. I related to Hitler the situation in Austria since June, 1934 and especially pointed out the ruinous effects of the illegal policy initiated by the Reich upon the Austrian Nazis, upon the foreign policy of the Reich and even upon the idea of Anchluss. Further, I begged Hitler to withdraw the policy of the party and to approve a solution in a common German interest. Then, I presented him with my own program, as I have developed it above, and I underlined a being the most important of all questions, the necessity of rendering the National-Socialist activity lawful in the frame of Austrian contingencies , and I insisted upon the need of an independent leadership, not bound to the party in Germany, and which would be responsible in Austria. That it was a gact that every National Socialist considered him (Hitler) as the promoter and the propagator of the political idea, but the

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developments ought to be carried out according to the possibilities of Austria herself. I gave him my opinion about the principle of totalitarism, the so-called Kulturkampf and told him that the 25 points' program could not be carried out schematically. Twice I pointed out to him that I should be obliged, in my capacity of Minister for Security, to imprison the National-Socialists who would show any illegal activity, and twice HITLER agreed with me. I explained to him the meaning of having a close collaboration between Austria and the Reich in economic, military and foreign political fields, and pointed out the advantages of carrying out the German idea from the two sides. I told him finally that I was not ready to accept being the Fuehrer of a "Trojan Horse." I begged HITLER to approve my suggestions and to issue a fitting approval as soon as the organizational preparations would be initiated. HITLER approved all my proposals, but he told me that he was not quite sure that I would be able to carry out all my plans in Austria. He mentioned SCHUSCHNIGG politely, but reservedly. If I remember well, he told me that he intended to invite Chancelor SCHUSCHNIGG and Reichs Administrator HORTHY to attend the launching of a Cruiser, which was to take place this Summer. He was still uncertain as for the name: Tegelhof would not be good because of Italy, it should rather be Prinz-Eugen. He said also, that there was no reason to worry about the 25 points of the program; one must simply go from the idea of Volksdeutsch (Volks-German) to the idea of Gesamtdeutsch (Whole German). Thereafter he spoke freely of his various plans, such as the Super-highways, the Elbe-Bridge in Hamburg, etc. I finally had the impression that, although HITLER was not rejecting my proposals, he preferred to wait and see if there would be possibilities to carry them out. I thought then that it would be important to settle up, as fast as possible, the preliminaries of the organization necessary for the establishment of the new statute. The realization of the Anschluss was not discussed further than I have reported above. In Berlin, I also paid a visit to Reich Minister FRICK (an exchange of words without importance) and Reich Minister RIBBENTROP, whom I begged to give the contemplated speeches in a friendly tone. On the following night I went back to Vienna.

In Vienna, I contacted ZERNATTO and then went to SCHUSCHNIGG. I gave him a detailed report and urged him to make a decision. During the following days, I was busy with the taking-over of my new departments. I left the charge of the police matters to STRUBL, who gave me his report every evening and I encharged my National-Socialistic collaborators with the task of calling together the National-Socialists in several towns, such as GRAZ, LINZ, etc, to inform them of my plans and of my visit to HITLER. These actions took place with the agreement of ZERNATTO, and the speech in LINZ was broadcasted. I had already spoken over the radio and declared that nobody, in Austria, ought to believe himself an outstanding Nationalist, and that I should decide in the future about the orientation of our national policy. The political life was marked, on one side, by the Nazis still lacking active leaders now showing their Swastikas openly still lacking effective leadership, except that the former illegal leaders came again on the open since they were no longer branded with illegality, and on the other side by the reaction prevailing against the Covenant of Berchtesgaden in the radical spheres of the Patriotic Front, of which I supposed SCHMITZ, Vienna's Burgomaster, to be the leader. Thereafter the speeches took place. HITLER spoke of the intolerable persecutions of the Germans in the surrounding countries on account of their German sentiment, but found the future more promising. SCHUSCHNIGG spoke of the "hard days" in Berchtesgaden and launched the motto: "Up to here, but not further!" I shall mention that SCHUSCHNIGG had previously shown me some parts of his projected speech, but the above-mentioned sentence had not been read to me. That sentence meant a public rejection of my program and that I should be considered by the national opinion as a tattler, whose words were no longer to be taken seriously. From that time on, the National-Socialists began anew to listen to the radical partisans of illegality, but they had the authorization now, thanks to the Covenant of Berchtesgaden, to act publicly for their ideas or at least to show publicly their adhesion to them. Their actions took more and more often the shape of demonstrations. I seriously called SCHUSCHNIGG's attention to these facts and I told him that I was, of course, ready to inter-

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fere, in my capacity of Minister of Security, against single individuals who were trespassing but that I could not take any measures, according to the role assigned to me by the Covenant of February 12, against National-Socialists manifesting their opinions in the above-mentioned way. I told him in one case that I was forced to resign. SCHUSCHNIGG was well aware of the seriousness of the situation, especially after my visit to GRAZ, or rather on account of the motives behind that visit. I told him that it could not go on like this. In consideration of HITLER's readiness, steps should now be taken especially in international questions, to settle the matter definitely. SCHUSCHNIGG mentioned the difficulties he was meeting in his own camp, and told me that my dismissal was not conceivable. He added that he understood my attitude quite well as the Minister of Interior; well, we should just have to see how we could get along with all this. At any rate, nothing positive was achieved in the sense of the execution of my plans, although I repeatedly called the attention of ZERNATTO and SCHMID to this. Of course, there were the nominations of JURY, Dr. Dietbock and Ingenieur RHEINTALLER, who began to build up their spheres of activity, but had to deal, of course, with the most serious opposition from the Patriotic Circles.

One evening, I was called to SCHUSCHNIGG at the Patriotic Front. I suppose this took place on March 8, at any rate on the same day he went to Innsbruck to issue there, on the following day, the plans for a poll to take place on March 13. SCHUSCHNIGG laid down his plan to me: to have a vote taken by the Patriotic Front, the theme of which approximately concerned the provisions of the First paragraph of the Bund Constitution. He begged me however to keep this secret until noon the next day. I promised him to do so, although this was contrary to the tasks of a liaison many, but I kept my promise. The plan was, in my eyes, far too surprising and altogether too important to take a stand immediately on it. I asked SCHUSCHNIGG whether his intention was irrevocable and, as I was told it was, I expressed the most serious objections, for a poll worked out in such a way should inevitably be considered as an insult by the National-Socialists. SCHUSCHNIGG then turned all his attention to conversations with several leaders of the Front, so that I could only converse with ZERNATTO, whom I told of my great preoccupations. ZERNATTO was not very well acquainted with the matter. Later on in the evening, I went to my office, or to my lawyer chancellery, where JURY came to me and explained me anew the plan of the poll with all the details he had learned in the "Front". I told him that I could not say anything about it and that he should come to see me the following day at noon time. One the day after, I presume before the visit of JURY, I wrote a letter to SCHUSCHNIGG and perhaps also to ZERNATTO, in which I explained my position in the matter of the poll plan. In doing so, I perhaps caused a certain prejudice against the Reich's Nazis and against those of Austria, but the matter was so important and urgent! I declared that such a poll was not deserving of this name, for it did not respect the provisions laid down by the Consitution and was neither based upon the system of a public list of voters nor run in the lawful ways, not even being put under the control of reliable public poll commissions. It was contemplated that all public officials (State or town officials and employees) the personnel of the Railways, of the Post-Office, Telegraph, tramways, etc. and also private institutions of a certain importance (I think those with more than 20 employees) were to participate in the voting, so that the elected people would just have to be brought to a table where they have to say only "Yes" or "No." Freedom, secrecy and not even the right to vote were safeguarded. Further, it was evident that no citizen of the Bund could vote "No", for he would have exposed himself to a violation of the fundamental laws and therefore to judiciary prosections. At last, there was then no possibility of expressing one's own political views, and the political purpose of the poll was therefore quite obvious. I asked for the postponement of the voting and for the execution of my own plan; in that way a later vote would be by no way equivocal and would meet general approval, the National-Socialists being given the possibility of defending their ideas by some addition or by any other means. I handed over a copy of that letter to JURY or to another Nazi Fuehrer, asking him to transmit it to KEPPLER or to HITLER. That letter was written in a obliging form, which is my usual way, and further I hoped that some means of escape could be found out of that situation.

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In case I did write to HITLER directly also, I certainly sent a copy to SCHUSCHNIGG or to ZERNATTO. I expressed my point of view verbally in person or by phone to ZERNATTO and to SCHMID. Both of them gave me hope and told me to wait for SCHUSCHNIGG's return. Even the Nazi Fuehrers seemed to be rather embarrassed, but they approved of my device; at any rate I did not have the impression of a "radicalisation" (Radikalisierung) but rather of an "embittering", (Verbitternug). And I was embittered myself too. I,who always had availed myself of any opportunity to speak frankly, resented a delusion from all these doings. They had no influence upon my personal appreciation of SCHUSCHNIGG but I turned from a devoted collaborator to a reserved politician. SCHUSCHNIGG came back but I hardly succeeded in seeing him. He and the Patriotic Front were exceedingly busy

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with the preparation of the poll. In the evening of March 10, SCHMID called me up, after I had a conversation with STRUBL concerning the situation. The former informed me that the political tension was increasing even in the workers' quarters a certain agitation was spreading out, although it could not be ascertained that it was due to a communistic action. He pointed out that the National-Socialists were showing discipline and obeyed the police orders. Collisions had taken place nowhere; he assured me that the Austrian Police had enough experience and ability to prevent the conflicts. I approved his measures and gave him my agreement to his plans, but I told him that I would be obliged to resign at the first collision occurring between the Executive power and the National-Socialists. He understood this in the sense that I intended to do my utmost to avoid such collisions, but that I would resign my functions in the Security Department and leave him a free-hand in the other case. SCHMID declared to me that he considered the situation to be serious, not from the Police point of view, but politically. I agreed. He asked me, whether I did not desire to have a conversation with the Chancelor; I told him that I was awaiting this for several days. SCHMID then arranged a conference for me with SCHUSCHNIGG, which he attended. I do not remember it ZERNATTO attended to it too. I explained all my thoughts and proposals to SCHUSCHNIGG; I told him everything I had learned in the Reich (which meant nearly nothing) and with the Austrian National-Socialists (which meant very little). SCHUSCHNIGG seemed obviously preoccupied too, but rather confident in the foreign political situation. Later on, I happene to hear incidentally (not from official sources), that the Burgomeister of ROME, Prince COLONNA, had been in Vienna and had encouraged SCHUSCHNIGG in his attitude. I suggested to SCHUSCHNIGG to publish my proposals and to arrange the immediate appointment of some National-Socialists into the Ministry; (I was thinking of DICKBOECK, although he was only a technician, JURY, RHEINTHALLERO some others into the provincial Governments (Landesregierungen) etc. In that way I felt I was able to summon the National-Socialists, with the support of thei leaders, to vote "Yes" at the coming poll. SCHUSCHNIGG would have had to postpone the votes for the determination of the intended poll, according to my proposals. SCHUSCHNIGG demonstrated a certain willingness for my proposals concerning the admittance of Nazis; he showed more reserve about the international questions. There he wanted to content himself with a general declaration; he was still more reserved with the question of authorizing a National-Socialistic action within the Front. Thereupon, I proposed to aim a black-brown coalition; SCHUSCHNIGG left the question unanswered, although we all were "on edge" about it. It had become late when I left the Offices of the Bund House and received the invitation to come to the Hotel Regina, where KLAUSNER was with several Nazis. I arrived at the Regina about 12 o'Clock; a dozen men were gathered in a room, among them several from the Bund's counties. Those who I knew were partisans of KLAUSNER's tendency. The spirits were highly tensed with expectation. Present were KLAUSNER, RAINER and GLOBOTSCHNIGG; I told KLAUSNER of my interview with SCHUSCHNIGG. He declared to me and the others that, according to a communication from Berlin, the Reich Government had taken a position, and that a messenger was on his way to bring me a letter from HITLER. He was expected the next morning. He gave me no further details and I had the impression that he personally did not know exactly what position had been taken, but that he only knew that BERLIN was not in agreement with the project of the vote. He summoned the attending Nazis to remain accessible to him during the next day. We decided thereupon to wait for the news from Berlin, for their provisons would be authoritative. I went home. In the early hours of the morning I was called on the phone by STRUBL. An important article had just been published by Dr. JURY in the WIENER NEUESTEN NACHRICHTEN (the National paper) which was a sharp criticism by JURY against the vote and which passed along the motto: Do not participate! I had the text read to me; I did not know about its planning and contents. I agreed with STRUBL that the articl was not an act of hostility against the Government, but of a sharp polemic character. It constituted no reason for the taking of security measures; STRUBL should SCHUSCHNIGG in form; if the latter was to find the article politically intolerable, he could then have the newspapers confiscated.

It was on March 11th. I dressed with the intention of taking a little walk in the streets of Dornbach and of thinking quietly about the question. About 8 a.m. I was at the Western Railroad Station; I had heard that GLAISE (Translator) had been in Berlin and was expected to arrive with the early train, and I hoped to hear some more news from him. As he was not on that train, I went

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to the air-field. GLAISE had arrived by plane and I was told that a messenger, carrier of a letter of HITLER to me, had driven to the German Embassy. I was informed that von PAPEN had been called to Berlin and I did not wish in this situation to get in touch with a German office before I had received the letter. I asked Dr. HUEFER, GOERING's brother-in-law, who had come with the same plans, to fetch the letter for me; he did so and brought it to me. GLAISE and I read the letter in the car. GLAISE told me that the public opinion was highly excited in Berlin, and that military events seemed to be brewing there. In its general contents, the letter reproduced the position I had adopted with SCHUSCHNIGG and contained the demand to postpone the vote by four weeks, and to have one in the form pointed out in my proposals: i.e. with a possibility of a decision to have a National-Socialistic vote. The letter contained some erroneous things, which I explained with lack of orientation, but which I corrected in the discussion with SCHUSCHNIGG. The Reich Government demanded that a decision should be arrived till noon. I went with GLAISE to SCHUSCHNIGG and informed him of the letter I had received, and of its contents. The letter gave to understand that, in the case of its rejection, the Reich Government would abandon the position he had adopted on the basis of the agreement of February 12, and would consequently recover a free-hand for any eventuality. A Military action was to be understood without any possible confussion. This was expressedly ascertained in our conference with SCHUSCHNIGG. As meantime had now come, I begged SCHUSCHNIGG to make a decision before 2 o'clock. Thereupon I went with GLAISE into Dr. FISCHBECK's (Transl.)office, where I had been told that KLAUSNER was waiting for me. I also found there, I think RAINER, GLOBOTSCHNIG and JURY. I informed them of the contents of Hitler's message, of my conversation with SCHUSCHNIGG and of the terms fixed at 2 o'clock for the decision. Then I sent to SCHUSCHNIGG a written confirmation of our interview in the morning. At that time, I went with GLAISE to SCHUSCHNIGG in the Bund Chancellery. As I was in the ante-chamber I was called to the phone: Goering wanted to speak to me. He asked me for information about the situation; I answered him that I was just on my way to see SCHUSCHNIGG. He asked for a telephone answer but SCHUSCHNIGG refused; I transmitted it to Berlin. (I often used to phone to Berlin, especially to GOERING) GOERING told me on the phone that the answer of the Reich Government w was that SCHUSCHNIGG's resignation was requested. I transmitted this to SCHUSCHNIGG with the above described impression of being a switchboard-girl. Thereupon, SCHUSCHNIGG was ready to accept the first request; I spoke about this with SCHMIDT and ZERNATTO; I thought that this step was coming too late; the tone of GOERING's voice in the phone had been too significative. in fact the news arrived from BERLIN of their refusal, and they requested my nomination to Bund Chancellor. I had a new conference with SCHUSCHNIGG in the presence of GLAISE. We were all very excited. Although our ways of politics had parted for some days, the method used here did not please us. I declared that I had reasons to believe the Berlin people would not give up their resignation request, and this opened the way to forebodings of a possible military conflict. SCHUSCHNIGG did not desire to be the pretext to this and he declared that he offered his resignation to the Bund President. The situation was such, that I did not feel very pleased with the idea of becoming his successor, and I told it to him. We parted with a had-shake. For my own part, I declared that I did not wish to partic participate in any discussions the object of which would concern my own person. I did not do it, despite the frequent requests from BERLIN or from the Austrian Nazis, but I left the Bund Chancellery. I was sharply reproached for this later on. BUERCKEL, especially, used this argument to prove the necessity of his functions of Reich Commissary for Reannexation. But I believe that I was right in doing so. I strolled along the streets of Vienna. The agitation was in full swing, on account of the soon occuring vote. Many Nazis wearing swastikas were strolling on the sidewalks. The police was in full controll public order in their hads. I drank a cup of coffee in a cafe and went to my Soliciter's offices. When there, I received news from Berlin, informing me that I had to go to the Bund Chancellery to manage the things there. I refused. Some time after, there was a call from the Bund Chancellery: KEPPLER had arrived in al plane and I was asked to go there right away. I followed this suggestion, in order to help KEPPLER with my advice. He suggested I go with him to NIKLAS, which I refused. I stayed in the Pillars Room (Saeulensaal) near SCHUSCHNIGG's study. NIKLAS

hesitated to accept SCHUSCHNIGG's offer of resignation but it had already been announced on the radio. There after, SCHMID and ZERNATTO came to me and we had a rather long conversation together upon the situation. Both declared that it was quite clear to them, that BERLIN wanted to bring the matter to an end and would do so. The Austrian System was to be liquidated, everybody saw this clearly, even SCHUSCHNIGG. The best course would be that I take over the functions of Bund Chancellor; this solution would be a guarantee for a lawful development of the situation: this was important in the viewpoint of international policy and would give the hope for a "half tolerable" progressing of the matter. I was rather well-prepared for the first eventuality (I still remembered the Putsch of July 1934) but as for the second one, my experiences of the last days had made me skeptical. I declared that I preferred to "let the things come to me" (e.g. not to take steps myself, but to wait and see. (Transl.) After repeated interventions of SCHMID and ZERNATTO, the question was posed who could be taken into such a Ministry? I suggested STRUBL, to retain his functions of St. Sch. of the Security. KEPPLER had shown me the rough-copy of a telegram (a hint of which had stood in HITLER's letter, but I had considered it of no interest to me in which I was supposed to act as "Provisional Government" and to request the invasion of Austria by the German Forces on account of outbroken or impending inner disorders. I told KEPPLER that this would be contrary to my opinion and to my duty: I primarily wanted to deal with this matter to support politically, and in lawful ways, the Anschluss questions, which was here incidentally posed. A provisonal Government never was a lawful Government, and speaking of disorders, which did not exist at all, would only pretend that there was such an opposition against the Anschluss, that it would not help; the Patriotic Front was anyhow unable to hold its position. At about 6 p.m., as I was standing in the ante-chamber, KEPPLER came to me again and told me that BERLIN was insisting. I was ushered into a room apparently to have a converation with SCHMID. KEPPLER told me then: "What shall I do? What shall I say to the Berlin people?" I answered him: "Well, you know my position, do what you want." In the further course of the evening, I no longer

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heard of that telegram and nobody ever mentioned it to me. The matters were apparently decided already. Furthermore, SCHUSCHNIGG's resignation was considered as a matter of fact, and so was the fact that ENDER should not be called into office. ENDER was a "christlich-sozial" Fuehrer of Vorarlberg into whose Ministry I should have entered as Vice-Chancelor, according to an idea of MIKLAS; this idea would not have been so bad, for I appreciated ENDER very much. Later on he was arrested, and I took energetic steps for his being liberated. The overwhelming argument then was a declaration of STRUBL, who declared that he could no longer guarantee the intervention of the Police forces against the National-Socialists; in Vienna, many Police officers had already adopted the wearing of brassards with the Swastika. Even General Schilhasski is said to have declared that a successful use of the Bund Army could not be relied upon. I learned later on, - and this confirmed my opinion about the non-necessity of an invasion of Austria by German forces-, that the Police of the other länder of the Bund and their various administrations had declared themselves for the National-Socialists, and Nazi Fuehrer, had appeared everywhere among the provincial Governments where they really took over functions. About 8 p.m. I spoke of one of these cases with STRUBL; he said that there had been no collisions anywhere in the country; there remains little to be done, only that orders should be given for the maintainence of order. Later in the evening, the impression was that MIKLAS and SCHUSCHNIGG were awaiting some event to be a motive for the resignation of the government and to start it. Apparently they were awaiting the German invasion. About 7:30 p.m. STRUBL came and told that he had just been informed by a frontier-post, that German troops had crossed the frontier. (In fact the crossing took place only half an hour before midnight---I expected everyone to say Well, good "(Na, also)" and the prepared gesture of departure happened: Schuschnigg made his famous speech. He had hardly finished when several gentlemen came to me, (among them SCHUSCHNIGG's political secretary) and SCHMIDT I believe and they insisted upon my going to the microphone and announce that I was taking over the Ministry of Interior and Security and shall provide for peace and order, or else there was the danger of confusion. I thought that the rule was, a resigning Minister was still responsible for the running of the affairs of his province until his successor is appointed, if no other stipulation was decided by the Chief of the State. But the general resignation of the Government was not clearly expressed, so that I urged, in my well known radio-speech, the maintenance of good order. Thereafter MIKLAS promoted me to Bund Chancellor; until then, I had not moved a finger to attain that. Who else could have been chosen? I remembered my talks with SCHMID and ZERNATTO. It was now necessary to build up the cabinet. I contacted my collaborators. MIKLAS, SCHUSNIGG and other present former Ministers present had retired into the small Council room. As I heard that some Nationalists with Swastikas were also going there, I ordered the evacuation of the room and placed sentries of the Bund Army around the room. I went into the room myself. SCHUSCHNIGG gave me his support for my building up the new Ministry: he saw the list I had made, found it useful and advised MIKLAS to accept it. He did so, and the taking of the oath was set for the next day. I invited SCHUSCHNIGG to take him home in my car. The streets were congested with people; emotional explosion of the outsiders was to be reckoned with; SCHUSCHNIGG and the directress of the Ladies Section of the Patriotic Front took a seat in the back of the car. I took a seat in front of them in the additional seat of the close coupe and saw them safely to their home. I still took care of SCHUSCHNIGG later on, although I paid him no visits, for I had soon noticed that my interventions would have been observed distrustfully by someone (HEYDRICH) of the Security Police. My collaborator, Dr. WILMER, visited SCHUSCHNIGG in my place. Besides GOERING also concerned himself with the realization of his wedding intentions. On two occasions, I could also interfere: after the affair of the "Protectorate," HITLER came to Vienna. He asked me about SCHUSCHNIGG; I told him that I saw no reasons for the intended prosecution of SCHUSCHNIGG to take place, for he had only acted in conformity with the duties of his functions, though he always was awkward in his policy, his political attitude could not be a motive for a prosecution. HITLER then said nothing. Shortly after BURCKEL made an unfriendly remark, that the prosecution against "my friend" SCHUSCHNIGG should not take place. On February 1st, 1945, I was in Berlin for a report. I was waiting in an anteroom of the Fuehrer's bunker. Then the Chief

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of Security, DR. KALTENBRUNNER, came to me and told me that he had a proposal to make to the Fuehrer about SCHUSCHNIGG. The latter was in Sachsenhausen, and the camp was to be evacuated. I told KALTENBRUNNER that they ought to take SCHUSCHNIGG to Southern Germany and to let him in the camp, whenever the Americans roll over it, for SCHUSCHNIGG would never do something against Germany. KALTENBRUNNER answered that he would propose this project to the Fuehrer, and tell him that it was mine. As far as I have learned, that is the way it happened. On that night, HITLER came by plane to Vienna; he was received by KALTENBRUNNER, whom I intended to assign to a post in the Police, for he had shown himself always very loyal to me.

On March 12, early in the morning, I called HITLER over the phone. I told him about the invasion by German troops and expressed the opinion that it would be better to make a kind of mutual and common action out of this, even if this had but the character of a mere gesture from the part of Austria, to demonstrate that, from now on, the Germans of both States would be going together. HITLER approved. Thereupon, some Austrian troops marched into several German towns. Then I had a conversation with MIKLAS. I informed him of my talk with HITLER and told him that the latter had begged me to come to LINZ; he wanted to drive there this very day. In that conversation, we both were agreed that the present situation was a transitional one, the definite composition would, of course, depend on HITLER's decision. We talked about the possibility of the approaching consequences for the State, and we recommended the avoidance of taking non-official (illegal) measures in fear of international difficulties. In the afternoon, I flew with HIMMLER to LINZ and drove then to meet HITLER. HITLER entered LINZ in the evening. I never saw such an enthusiasm. The welcome was spontaneous and of no precedence. In my (welcome) speech (Begruessung), I declared that the article 88 of the St-Germain Treaty was no longer binding. (It prohibited the Anschluss, and was a public contradiction of the Right of self-determination proclaimed by President W. Wilson as the basis of future Peace. It was an injustice especially for Austria). The prohibition of the Anschluss was for a great part responsible for the events in Central Europe since 1918. I always insisted openly that this was an injustice, as well when I was Councillor of State and later as Minister in my speech broadcast in LINZ. My position was: I saw in Austria's independence and autonomy the right for the Germans to decide whether they desired to be incorporated into the Reich. After the manifestation, Hitler retired. He told me he would go immediately to Vienna, to discuss the further developments; but he made no allusions. The unanimous, really overpowering demonstrations in all parts of Austria and in all classes of the population were made with the motto: One people, One Reich, One Fuehrer. I believe that HITLER under that influence decided what should be done the next day. I drove back in the night from LINZ to VIENNA with the car.

On March 13, early in the morning STRUBL came to me and begged me to accept his resignation and his quitting of active Police services. I let him know that he had been called into my Ministry by myself, with the approbation of the Bund President, and that he enjoyed my confidence. Besides, I was considering STRUBL as a quite loyal and also well experienced man. I told him that I was not fond of losing my people, but STRUBL begged insistently that his wish be satisfied; he pointed out his resolution was the result of a conversation he had had with HIMMLER. I suppose that HIMMLER would have made a reference to the probable developments of the events, (but STRUBL did not say a word of this), and the consequences he could expect for himself, for he was the man the Nazis hated most. I gained the impression that his own personal welfare was at stake, and that he had no longer the energy to retain his functions. I granted him his wishes. I was, later on, often urged to start in prosecutions against STRUBL or, at least, to suppress his pension, which I refused. Thanks to my intervention with HIMMLER, the only measure which was taken was abatement of 25 per cent, which was the mildest measure against outspoken political opponents. Later on, I once met STRUBL in Kassel, he told me that he was getting along well and was contented. Under the circumstances, the successor of STRUBL could be no other than KALTENBRUNNER. My proposal for his nomination was accepted by the Bund president and KALTENBRUNNER was sworn

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in as St. Sch. for Security. On that occasion, I had a conversation with MIKLAS. The picture was still getting clearer to our eyes, and there would also be state-political consequences. I think that it was then that MIKLAS declared that according to the Constitution legal procedures could be followed to attain the goal and that he would not be an obstacle to them. About noon St. Sch. STUCKART came from LINZ by plane. He was bringing a proposal for a reannexation Act of Austria to Germany and the Fuehrer's wish for a prompt execution of it. This was the adequate clarification of the situation and would have a favorable effect in the international point of view. RIBBENTROP, who was in London, had reported that the situation was looked at calmly there and that any lawful decision would be appreciated. I think that my Foreign Minister, Dr. WOLFF, brought me similar information. I gathered my available friends and collaborators and dispatched WOLFF to inform the Bund President that I would come and report to him as soon as possible. I must say that we all had gained the conviction that the high time for the Anschluss, our goal of long times, had now come. The undeniable enthusiasm among the Austrian population at the arrival of HITLER and of the German troops was a proof that the population had the same thoughts. There only remained to ascertain whether the present situation would cause objections to arise against the realisation. We saw the matter in this light: It was evident that the situation would bring a close relationship and a deep exchange of influence between Germany and Austria. Now already liaison men were coming steadily from the Central Departments of Berlin who contacted the Austrian Ministries and Offices. It certainly seemed better so, that the Reich take formally the full responsibility, as they were at any rate expected to exert their full influence. Very likely this would bring the best results for Austria. In fact, our 600,000 unemployed workers found employment in the shortest time. A rejection would have resulted in a critical situation, and I could not bring myself to it unless I would have been personally convinced that there would have been extraordinary reasons e.g. a danger to the Reich and the denial of the "accomplished facts" would only have brought about greater difficulties instead of preventing them. The allusion of previous Foreign Minister SCHMID on the 11th, that we should keep matters in our hands in the interest of a more favorable development, was also not to be disregarded. The international situation was good, there were no threats of complications and the conditions for a development in lawful ways existed. Anyhow things had not developed as I had expected them to do; they could have worked in an easier and more natural way, I daresay by an automatic development, but there was no reason which could have given us the right, the possibility or the will to deviate from the realization of the deepest national desire of every German in Austria. I called up a Council of Ministers, after having been told by WOLFF that the Bund President would make no difficulties against that realization; he was to return to his home in the meantime and should await me there. On my proposal, the assembled Council of Ministers assembled in the meantime adopted the proposal of the bill to which my law section had made some formal modifications. The votes on the 26th of April had been planned already in the first draft. / According to the provisions of the Constitution of May 1st, 1934, any fundamental modification to the Constitution could be decided by the Council of Ministers with the approbation of the Bund President. A vote or a confirmation by the nation was in no ways provided for. In the case where the Bund President would, for any reason, either have resigned his functions or be for some time impeded in fulfilling them, his prerogatives were to go over to the Bund Chancellor. I went to the Bund President with Dr. WOLFF. The President told me that he did not know whether this development would be of welfare to the Austrian Nation, but that he did not wish to interfere and preferred to resign his functions, so that all rights would come into my hands, according to the Constitution. The possibility of my dismissal or resignation were only slightly mentioned and recognized as quite inopportune in the prevailing situation. I shall mention here that I happened to hear, later on, that it had also been thought, at that time, of a Military Government and that a Reichs German was even considered being appointed chief of the Civil Administration. This man, in fact, presented himself to me a few days later, to tell me that he did not see now the necessity of his taking over such functions, with which I agreed. He did not carry out any functions and hardly

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made an appearance. Then there were some letters exchanged between the Bund President and myself, confirming our conversation and his retirement. Thereafter I drove to LINZ, where I arrived around midnight and reported to the Fuehrer the accomplishment of the Anschluss Law. HITLER was very much impressed by it; for a while he remained quiet, then tears dropped from his eyes down his cheeks. He said then that he was especially happy because his motherland had achieved her annexation to the Reich without any shedding of blood. St. Sch. STUCKART (?) and my Sch (?) of State Dr. WIMMER, were present. HITLER added: "Yes, a good political action saves blood." I had the confiction that this idea has been the very basis of his actions and of his policy in the direction of the State. I begged him then to accept my retiring from my functions, and my returning to my sollictor's duties, as the very tasks of my political wishes were now achieved. HITLER reserved his decision on this. The following morning was occupied with the reception of visitors from the Reich. The Fuehrer came to Vienna in the afternoon. Like in all villages and towns, there were huge crowds of people massed to cheer HITIER wildly. For several hours they filed by in front of the Hotel Imperial. No official, technical discussions took place. On the 15th there was a great manifestation on the Helden-platz: there and in the Ringstrasse, over 500,000 or 600,000 people were massed. The enthusiasm was undescribable. I encountered the Fuehrer at the Hotel; he asked me who was considered to make the speeches? As I told him that I intended to make a welcome speech to him, he asked me to show him the drafts of this speech. I showed it to him; its contents are well-known, they were the true expression of my personal feelings. HITLER declared himself satisfied, gave it back to me and spoke for some time with the persons around him; I think that they were HIMMLER, FRICK, perhaps also LAMMERS and some others. Later on, I was told that he had decided to see me appointed to the post of Reich - Statthalter (Governor). As we were standing on the speaker's platform, he let somebody announce: "Now the Reich Statthalter for Austria will speak Mr. Seyss-Inquart." In the afternoon, after a parade of troops in Austrian and German uniforms, the Fuhrer left Vienna by plane. I was the Chief of the Civil Administration.

Then there were more and more influences exerted from the Reich, and BURCKEL steadily gained more power. He gained hold of the Party and with it the whole politics, together with press, propaganda, church and Youth matters, etc. Later on he was appointed Reich Commissioner for the Re-annexation. I was not personally placed under his command, but I was bound to his decisions in matters of re-annexation; things then went in the following way: the Central Departments of the Reich addressed themselves to BURCKEL's Staff, who in their turn, called the Austrian charge d'affaires (Referent) to them. I had to lead the current Civil Administration as a secondary Department, and to adapt in order to yield more influence my methods after BURCKEL's. His decisions did not reflect technical ideas, but they based on political viewpoints as he understood them, all according to the impression he wanted to make upon Berlin or Vienna. On April 18, I explained my viewpoint about that situation to the Fuhrer, in the presence of BURCKEL, and laid down the unfavorable results of these methods; after a long discussion, HITLER agreed with me and said to BURCKEL: "If things go on so, the joy of the Austrian people for the Anschluss will soon turn into weariness of the Reich." But there was little change later on, however, it became more and more difficult for me to approach the Fuhrer. Evidently this was due to BURCKEL and to HEIDRICH; notwithstanding, the fact that they were not good friends to one another.

This "Gleichschaltung" (litt: assimilation) did not worry me in the long view; I was sure that the genuine Austrian particularities and qualities would find their place after some time infact, although wartime was no propitious time for administrative innovations many institutions were built-up in the whole German Reich based on Austria's example during the war; previously, the very same Austrian institutions had been abrogated in Austria etc, and replaced by Reich's methods! Examples: Social-insurance and educational matters. Of course, such transformations would have been more easily carried out in peace-time. I believe that HITLER expressed himself sincerely when he declared at Helden-Platz, on March 15th, "That the return of Austria

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to the mother-nation would be the greatest realization of his lifetime". But evidently he intended to make still greater ones in the future!

The poll on 20 April showed practically Austria's unanimity for the Anschluss. It would be foolish and false to assert that this was not the real will of the Austrian people. There were enough neutral observers in our country, who could prove the contrary. All arrangements made for the voting (processing, lists, commissions and votes) were quite within the limits of the Constitution; the voting was free and secret. The commissions were composed, not only of "old fighters" but also of State and Town Officials. BRUCKEL had given orders, on April 18th, - at the time when I was on my way from Innsbruck to Graz-, that the Party should collect the results of the polls and report them first to him. As I learned this on April 19th, I demanded the immediate cancellation of these orders, for in the eyes of the Fuhrer I would refuse otherwise to be responsible for the smooth, legal evolution of the voting. BURCKEL cancelled them. It is possible that some contested bulletins (Wahlzetteln) have been interpreted in favor of the Nazis and of the Anschluss by the check-commissioners, but this can only represent a very small percentage. It is true that there was no official counter-propaganda and that our propaganda was overwhelming. Even the high Ecclesiastics had made a positive appeal. The Germans of Austria did not express their vote as much out of Party political reflections as out of their very heart's desire. This desire will always prevail. The annexation of Austria has been recognized by the foreign Nations. Therefore, the events of March 1938 are a finished and acknowledged matter of fact.

Before finishing, I want to put anew the question, whether another solution was possible in the situation of Austria? Even today, I come to the conclusion that my personal plan would have met with success, not as to its final goal, but in its methods and policies, if the Austrian State's leadership would have thought of a solution in the sense of national opposition. They acted in their own responsibility. My removal had no other reason. For my own part, I always played with an open hand; SCHUSCHNIGG was certainly never deceived by me. The reasons why my devices were not adopted are because the Patriotic Front (which meant Austrian Clericalism) would not see Austria going side by side with a Germany under the hated Nazi leadership and bringing her help and advantages; because HITLER did not wish to secure the political existence of Austrian Clericalism by giving his consent. The two above mentioned considerations never worried me, for I thought only of the interests of all the Germans. When the Anschluss was achieved, I felt very thankful towards the Fuhrer.

When I am considering how my own behavior at that time, I recognize that my mind and my actions were always inspired basically by my "all-German" feeling, which ought to have led to a reasonable and passionless policy, and eliminated a disputed question instead of creating a new one. And, of course, I did not like to cease working before my work was finished, this is easy to understand. The disappointing experience I had when I saw how the Western Powers dealt with this question showed me that a great energy was necessary for such a task. I was convinced of the possibility of my plan being adopted. A lawful character was given to the final act. Was there not a desire of "being important"? Whoever is not, more or less, ambitious? Perhaps only he who was born to be a perfect wise man, or he who has already gone through a long and bitter lifetime of experience. I was not born to be "wise" and the era of bitter experience was not standing behind me, but in front of me, just as with every German. I think I can say, at any rate, that a desire of "being important" never overwhelmed my feeling of responsibility.

That is how I have described the events from July 1934 until March 1938, as far as I know them. I had to write them from my memory, without the help of any documents or other means. They may be, therefore, somewhat incomplete, but I wrote them according to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

Nurnberg, 9 September 1945
Signed: Seyss-Inquart

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 3254-PS

16 December 1945.

I, JOSEPH MICHEL, Civilian, X-046319, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 3254-PS.

JOSEPH MICHEL
Civilian
X-3254-PS.

From Mil 703
Read Jan 16, 1946

3270-PS

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3270-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

H1237-0240

GÖRING ON SEYSS INQUART

Grazer Tagblatt
1938, Nr. 86, pp. 1/2

Göring's speech on the 27th of March in Vienna:

At this moment (announcement on the plebiscite in Austria) it has been established that now the decision really came. A complete unanimity between the Führer and the N.S. confidants inside of Austria existed. According to their opinion also the hour of action had come, but they thought they could not use any more democratic methods in negotiations and they took the law of action in their own strong hands and forced the others to retreat. If the N.S. rising succeeded so quickly and thoroughly and without bloodshed, it is first of all due to the intelligent and decisive firmness of the present Reichsstatthalter Seyss-Inquart and his confidants. But this too proved the correctness of the previous continued politics because if our confidants had not been in the government, this whole course of events would not have been possible.

When called by the Austrial government, the first German troops moved in.

Found in Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, VI, 1, p. 183.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 3270-PS

15 December 1945.

I, JULES N. BEAUMONT, Civilian, X-046308, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 3270-PS.

JULES N. BEAUMONT
Civilian, X-046308

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3271-PS

Exhibit No. 700
Filed Jan. 16, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3271-PS
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

At Vienna, 19 August 1939

Reichsfuehrer!

At Munich I delivered to you a copy of the communication which I had addressed to Gauleiter Buerckel and in which, in a friendly and sincere manner, I had attempted to explain to him my viewpoint on the situation at Vienna. I have now received a reply from Buerckel, of which I am enclosing a copy. Upon receipt of this communication, which I beg you to read at once, I immediately sent the following reply to Buerckel: " Gauleiter! I confirm withthanks the receipt of your communication as of the 8 th of this month. Now I at best know where I stand and have stood.

I request that you inform me who is supposed to have been that "very offensive immigrant at Prague" who reportedly received a letter from me this spring.

Heil Hitler
signed SEYSS-INQUART "

As an SS man I hereby inform you, Reichsfuehrer, of this communication of SS Gruppenfuehrer Gauleiter Buerckel. Buerckel is accusing me of anti-Reich and Party feelings. The individual, actual assertions of his writing contradict this accusation, for, in regard to these details, there still remains, in any one, a mistake and misunderstanding as an excuse. However, when a man of Buerckel's political importance accuses me of having anti-Reichs and Party convictions, such accusations must remain neither untested nor unanswered. In keeping with my report I therefore beg of you to take all necessary steps to clearly present the facts in the case and to ascertain the consequent responsibilities.

I am aware that every individual sentence written by Buerckel, is directed against me for a hostile purpose and signifies an attack. His writing therefore requires a minute and thorough examination. However, already at this time, I wish to take a stand against the most important accusation and have marked these points with consecutive numbers, which, already now, I shall enter into.

to 1.) I do not know if a conversation, during which I gave Buerckel an explicit, confidential and personal explanation, took place 3 weeks before my writing. However, I do believe that at the time of the Fuehrer's visit on the 10th and 11th of June of this year, such an explanation was no longer issued on my part, for already then I was aware of the extreme suspicions which were directed against Buerckel, even if I did not yet share them. It is quite possible that I discussed matters of a relevant nature with Buerckel at the time, which, as Gauleiter of Vienna, he will also in the future have to take care of. At any rate, during the time in which I urged Buerckel to accept the position of Gauleiter, I also had the corresponding confidence in him. Without hesitation I must admit that in this case I have made a mistake.

To 2.) The reference to GLOBOCNIK is an apparent shifting of the facts, of which Buerckel must be aware as he knows the state of affairs. I don't know whether Globocnik in his speech at the time had especially declared war against those forces, which were coming to terms with the "Schwartzen" (translators note: Clerical party of Austria). I only know that he spoke against saboteurs in the country even if they were in the highest positions. But it is completely wrong that I urged a change in the office of Regional Leader (Gauleiter), begining at this moment. It is a known fact that

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I have tried in a friendly way to influence Globocnik to remove the misinterpretations which have arrisen, but as I didn't succeed for a considerable time, I withdrew and didn't support and defend Globocnik. But I did not oppose him. It was Buerckel who first called me for a discussion with Globocnik, at which I for the first time expressed my former misgivings. But this happened at the moment when Buerckel himself had already brought up the question of the regional leadership. These are the facts. What Buerckel is attempting is a distortion of the facts in order to imply a prejudice in my attitude for his further statements. For I state emphatically that while I requested Buerckel not to put aside factual considerations with references to separatism he met my representations with exactly, and one might say exclusively, this reproach. In his communication Buerckel refers several times to voices from the other world. For instance an utterance by Klausner on 24 December 1938 at that time, according to my recollection, no Globocnik-crisis whatsoever existed yet, in any case I didn't know anything about it, and above all that speech by Globocnik hadn't been made which later caused my being held back and is assumed by Buerckel as the chronological point of origin of my altered attitude.

to 3.) The speech of Buerckel at the "Ganappel" was no cause at all for me to assume any attitude. Its contents were known to me only through the newspapers and at that time he inveighed against everything as I was told by party members who were in the audience, especially against " Frau Blaschke" (translators note: as we would say "John Doe"), against the gripers and against those who are waiting in the background for their opportunity. I cannot be considered as belonging to any of these three groups not even to the last one, because according to the situation at that time as I remember "the Ganappel" took place after the 1st of May of that year. I didn't expect anything in Vienna anymore.

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OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Vienna, 19 August 1939

The opinion was general that BUERCKEL meant FRAUENFELD and his hangers-on by the third group. In any case MUEHLMANN could not have asked if BUERCKEL meant the governor (Statthalter), for I believe, as already mentioned, that at the time of the "Gauappell" the question of the governorship (Statthalterei)was already eliminated.

to 4.) If the price - lowering activity of BUERCKEL actually had the significance of which he speaks, then I must double my reproach that his kind of propaganda is false. I have above all objected to the nature of his propaganda in Vienna and quoted the lowering of prices only as an example. An impression on the population through the lowering of prices was not noticeable at any rate. When in the course of this disagreement BUERCKEL attributed it to me that I had put skilled workers and former Marxists on the same level and thus contradicted myself, it is wrong and an exact perusal of my letter shows that I have spoken of two separate connections and meant different persons. The conclusions of BUERCKEL in regard to these statements give me the impression of pettifogging.

to 5.) What BUERCKEL tries to present here is a "reversal" I say that openly. It is possible that there are no "Pfaelzer" in the official administrations, but that the Reich Commissioner's office rules everything, especially in Vienna, is known to every child on the street. At any rate these people do everything, and there is no level of authority into which they do not try to talk themselves and do talk themselves and they always call upon the authority of the Reich Commissioner. The directing authority in Vienna, whether region (Gau) or city, is the office of the Reich Commissioner. BUERCKEL now makes one of his usual subtle reproaches to the effect that I had taken too little interest in my administration and could only travel around in the Reich thanks to his people, apparently as he hints, to make propaganda for myself. My activity as a speaker is of no concern to BUERCKEL. Where I appeared I had the best of success, in any case more success than I could notice in connection with BUERCKEL's speeches. I also believe that my activity was very desired by the Party offices concerned, e.g. the regional leader Gauleiter, and was approved by the Fuehrer to whom I sent reports now and then. I used the given situation to make the fellow Germans in the old Reich understand the concept of the Reich and the creation of the Reich through the Fuehrer. I have always not only avoided making my own person conspicuous in this connection but also, if this happened from a third party, fought against it and pointed first of all to the Fuehrer and then to the old fighters. But this is of no concern to BUERCKEL. But the concealed reproach that I and therefore also my office had not functioned is flatly a mockery. If we - and here I think primarily of my very efficient collaborators such as FISCHHOECK, PLATTNER, WIMMER, WAECHTER, etc. - had not been after the things with such eagerness, the unsystematic and sudden decisions of the Reich Commissioner and the senseless interfering activities of his men would have resulted in administrative anarchy. But I ask where BUERCKEL was, especially since he is to fill the very responsible position of regional leader (Gauleiter) of Vienna. I believe that since that time, or the year 1939 on the whole, he has hardly spent 2/5 of his time in Vienna. I do not wish in this connection to argue against his technical suitability for the position of regional leader (Gauleiter) of Vienna, but already the technical supposition is [illegible] if he does not relinquish all his other tasks and is only [illegible] (Gauleiter) of Vienna. If he is not willing to give his whole being to the most difficult regional leader (Gauleiter) post in the Reich, he is basically unfit to carry out this duty here. Thus it follows that he is mostly not here and the Reich Commisariat is administered by his, as a whole mediocre, people who remained strangers here. At the risk of being considered a horror - propagandist again, I mention that in the "Ostmark" and especially in Vienna, malicious jokes circulate which speak of a new branch of the Armed Forces, namely The "Position Huntess"-Regiment of the Pfalz".

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to 6.) From where BUERCKEL has the intelligence that I am for conservation I don't know. I refer to my last letter and the quoted letter to BORMANN where I just pointed to the danger of involuntary conservation and demanded the solution of Austrianism ("Oesterreichertum") but not its strengthening through BUERCKEL - methods.

The lack of understanding that he shows toward my work, knowingly or unknowingly, is documentation of his inability to fulfill this political task. I may point out that it was I who stood most energetically for liquidation at the moment when I realized the eventual dangers in the existence of a "Landesregierung" (state government) - see my letter to BORMANN of the past year - also I have liquidated myself in the conference on the mountain, when the Fuehrer signed the Ostmark- low, and perhaps even accepted a certain alienation from the Fuehrer when I declared my intention of retiring from further activity in the Ostmark. In this connection I wish to emphatically state the following: If today the position of political Catholicism in the Ostmerk is liquidated to a much greater extent than in the old Reich, it is by no means due to the Reich Commissioner, but to the energetic action of my specialist PLATTNER, who has, in agreement with Dr.KRUEGER, who was called in by me against the attempted restraints of other offices, forced through all measures demanded even today as desirable utopia in the old Reich, under my direction, knowledge and signature. At that time BUERCKEL wanted to sign his Austrian concordate against the details of which I raised objections, when I heard about them, insofar as it appeared to me that too great rights with reference to the building up of a new clerical generation appeared to be granted.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3271-PS
(Continued)

Vienna, 19 August 1939

The charge, that I am keeping bad company when I quote the language of the Viennese, leaves me cool, for I am keeping company with the oldest and most deserving party associates-those who performed for the Ostmark a quite different share of work from that performed by Buerckel. You, yourself, Reich Fuehrer, will in the meantime already have confirmed this. It is significant that the State Police (Stapo) declares that it can take strict measures against the complainers ("bleaters"), because, actually, the strongest espressions of discontent come from party circles themselves.

to 7.) Here too a voice from the other-world. I want to ask Globus, however, what was actually wrong there. I don't want to speak about my own belief in regard to this matter; I should, however, like sometime when you, Reich Fuehrer, have the time, to make my standpoint completely clear to you. It will not offer you anything new and surprising. To be sure I am, however, [illegible] conscious of the colossal political significance of confessional religions; yes, I believe that here lies the decisive question for the future, when the movement will no longer be borne by the Fuehrer directly and no longer filled with the passion of the struggle. In this sense I have surely said repeatedly that the conflict National Socialism-Catholicism is the most difficult that there is. If I have ever ventured a personal side in this connection, I have never done so in the sense that my political course should come into question in any way. But certainly however from the human side. That is to be understood thus: Even in the opposing camp there are decent and valuable men because they also are men of German blood. Especially with these one must come to an understanding humanly, never politically, because there I follow unconditionally the directives of the Fuehrer in "Mein Kampf", that the political opponent must be fought under all conditions, and that in this fight, his good qualities must not be recognized publicly. However if one has to fulfill one's task in the border territories of one's own political area as we have to in AUSTRIA (OSTMARK), one comes into personal contact and relationship with the political opponent, and discovers this and that person with character value. Then it does not leave one humanly indifferent, if in the decision one takes an attitude as a matter of course by which these people feel themselves abashed, because they have moved in their own ideas, which one has not contradicted for political reasons. Who never has felt this human conflict in such a situation, is either no politician or an unscrupulous demagogue. This has nothing at all to do with the political attitude, there one coldly goes one's way.

As far as the activists in the Catholic action are concerned, I establish emphatically, that I never signed a declaration for entry into the Catholic action, I even repeatedly refused invitations to give such a signature. Thus if Catholics have taken no other stand than I, and are persecuted for it, then this presents an open blunder by the party. I can claim for myself, based on the established facts, that I was more of and did more as a National Socialist than it appeared.

to 8.) I do not know whatthe question is here. I already have demanded an explanation from BUERCKEL. The final sentence already contains one of the usual, hidden threats with which BUERCKEL works; it is an impertinence that he speaks of an act of mercy in this connection.

to 9.) To present all the events of 11 March of this year and of the preceding days is beyond the realm of this letter. I shall take a stand with regard to all these things, especially with respect to the different descriptions and claims, which also appeared abroad, although these do not worry me in the least. I only want to say in detail: I will talk to Globocnik and Rainer about a memorandum by Globocnik. I have heard, that such a thing exists, however I believe that it has the tendency to emphasize especially the activity of Globocnik and Rainer, because the two did not consider themselves sufficiently honored in the distribution of jobs after the change in March 1938. I have absolutely nothing against it, when the meaning of the activity of these two men is especially pushed into the foreground. It can only be a statement by Buerckel, that I was <u>hardly</u> to be found in the critical <u>hours</u>. I myself went out into the fresh air for a little while for about ½ or 3/4 hours after the presentation of an ultimatum to Miklas at about 1600 or 1615 hours, which, I believe, was limited until 1730 or 1745 in the afternoon. I confess that the hours which had just passed, had affected me somewhat, and I was to regain the usual calm in the fresh air, furthermore, I wanted to observe the situation in the street and in addition, wanted to make a call to Berlin, not from the Chancellery (Bundeskanzleramt), but from a place where at least there was not the certainty, but only the possibility of wire tapping. It was clear to me that I was not needed

Vienna, 19 August 1939

before 1730, because I knew that the people of the system (Systemleute) would not decide one second earlier than when they have to. The talks with Buerckel, supposedly held under extreme pressure, are disproved by the records of the Field Marshal. In any case, I have refrained from going to the telephone after every sentence of our discussions, to prevent the impression, because of foreign political reasons, that we National Socialists in Austria act only on orders from Berlin and not according to our own decision. I have threatened with resignation, and namely toward Miklas, once with resigning as Security Minister, when he did not want to appoint me chancellor at a moment when the actual power already has gone over into our hands, and once as presently appointed chancellor, when he did not want to appoint the cabinet proposed by me.

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10.) I never sent a congratulatory message to DOLLFUSS. It is known to you, that there was in Austria at the time of the black and red coalition a secret society, which was anything but secret, with the name of " German Community " (" Deutsche Gemeinschaft "). Those national and Catholic forces who at that time at least were anti-marxist and anti-semitic in their attitude, met here. Lawyer DR.DOELTER, my Chancellery Chief, was one of the founders and leaders of this society, and through him I also was brought into it. DOLLFUSS was also active there; he was in my age group, and he was extraordinarily active anti-semitically.It is a result of the activity of this society, that the black and red coalition came to naught and that the Marxists never came into the government again. Then, when National Socialism gained a foothold, this society fell apart and was dissolved. The spokesman for the Catholics was HOFRAT HICK of the National Library. It was our practice to make the Catholic faction as insecure as possible. Therefore we kept up our connection with these people. When the first attempt on Dollfuss' life had failed, at a time when there was already the most vehement political fighting, but before the series of constitutional violations and in particular the terrorist activities against National Socialist had started, I wrote to HOFRAT HICK, gave by way of introduction, expression to my satisfaction at the failure, and continued with a recollection of the time when we worked together. I thereby reminded, HOFRAT HICK and, as I know, DOLLFUSS also of the fact, that they themselves were once antisemitic. This was the purpose of my letter.

11.) I do not know, whether this is an inaccuracy or an intentional distortion is involved here. It concerns a letter from SCHUSCHNIGG to the Chief of Police in INNSBRUCK. He defended himself there against the charge that he trusted me. This letter is moreover available. He did not describe me as his reliable man, but consoled the admonisher with the thought, that he had put me under the surveillance of SKUBL, his most reliable man. BUERCKEL, in all his eagerness, should be careful with his propaganda, when it's a matter of such serious charges, should not act as if SCHUSCHNIGG had made this remark after the goal had been reached, that is after 11 March. From the standpoint of SS and party comradeship I consider it very regrettable, that BUERCKEL draws cogent conclusions on the basis of suspicions or at least cherishes suspiscions, which contain such insulting accusations against me.

12.) I dispense entirely with BUERCKEL's concern for me. It goes without saying that the FUEHRER would never have let himself be guided in his political decisions by considerations for my person. It is just as correct, that he never believed the suspicions, which BUERCKEL presents here on the sly. On 17 Nov., 1938 I had a discussion with the FUEHRER lasting more than two hours, and on this occasion set forth my standpoint in detail. As to the further contents of this discussion, I can testify only then, when the Fuehrer permits me to do so. I left this discussion a very upright man with the unspeakably happy feeling of being permitted to be a tool of the Fuehrer. Perhaps it will be of assistance in appraising my attitude, if I can prove in this connection, that I was able to report my discussion with the Fuehrer, in as far as the actual political situation was concerned, to SCHUSCHNIGG word for word and that SCHUSCHNIGG took cognizance of it. The attitude of the Fuehrer, in whose realm of light I stood, was thus so clear and unequivocal.

ad 13.) When BUERCKEL speaks of purely personal, political welfare-wishes (Versorgungswuensche) in reference to me, I can say merely, that the rogue thinks as he is. And that is the case. Everything that BUERCKEL does here in VIENNA is also at least influenced by his political ambitions. The situation would be much easier, if we today knew of a new political task for BUERCKEL, which would not force him to descend from the level of a Minister again to the

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3271-PS
CONTINUED

level of a GAULEITER or REICHSSTATTHALTER, once the position of Reich Commissioner (Reichskommissariat) has expired. As it is the impression arises, that he seeks to hold at least the two functions of GAULEITER and REICHSSTATTHALTER in the two hubs of the Reich, in the West and in the East, to be sure in accordance with his absolute ambition to serve the Fuehrer, the party, and the Reich.
I for my own person can point out only, that I appeared before the Fuehrer after the execution of the annexation law (Anschlussgesetz) on 13 March, reported to the Fuehrer the execution of his order, and requested at the same time to be permitted to return to the ranks and to my private profession. The FUEHRER refused this at once and informed me, that he was thinking of appointing me REICHSSTATTHALTER. I believe that in other ways as well nothing can be found, which would point to special political ambitions on my part. Perhaps there may even exist a certain defficiency on my part in this respect. In any case, however, I had no cause to think about any special provision (Konservierung) in my favor since, aside from the fact that something like that is not in my nature, the Fuehrer wrote me already in April 1938, that he would appoint me Reichsminister effective the 1st of May, 1939.

ad 14.) Here BUERCKEL raises against me in clear words the accusation that I am an enemy of the party.

ad 15.) I know that a group or a labor-association (Arbeitsgemeinschaft) of the Catholic National Socialists was to be created. That is a plan which goes back to the year 1934, at which time I had not yet developed any special, political activity. Thus I do not know, what BUERCKEL refers to.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3271-PS
CONTINUED
at present in Vienna, 19 Aug 1939

16.) As far as my membership in the party is concerned I state that I was never asked to join the party, but had asked Dr.Kier in December 1931 to clarify my relationship with the party, since I regarded the party as the basis for the solution of the Austrian problem. Moreover I had written this to Dr. Neubacher already in 1928 in order to bring his hopes which he had placed in the Austrian-German Volksbund to the correct proportions thereupon. . I paid my membership fees (Beitraege) and as I believe directly to the region (Gau) Vienna. These contributions also took place after the period of suppression. Later on I had direct contact with the Ortsgruppe in Dornbach. My wife paid these fees, but the "block-wart" was never in doubt, considering that this amount-40 shillings per months-was a difficult accomplishment for my wife and myself and I was in every respect treated as a party member. Furthermore, since 1932 I had also been a member of the Styrian home guard (Heimatschutz) Kammerhofer. In this organization, I worked for and contributed considerably towards the amalgamation of the Styrian home guard with the party whereupon, Habicht then announced that the members of the Styrian home guard will become party members. In every way, therefore, I felt as a party member, and considered myself a party member this as stated as far back as December 1931.

It is nonsense that I had intended the dissolution of Austria for a rather long time. First of all I never kept a certain time in mind at all when that would happen, because I did not know that Austria was to be dissolved. The proposal in question, by Buerckel toward this end was turned down in Graz by the Fuehrer in my presence. The fact that Austria was to be dissolved I learned from the decree published by the Reich Commissariat and that was all there was to it as far as I was concerned. That the amalgamation or, as I prefer to say, dissolving beyond the (merely) administrative problems will consume more time is perfectly clear to me, and I can cite an utterance of the Fuehrer who told me that it took 40 years to make Bavaria a part of the Reich and in the case of Austria it would still take longer.

Note to page 17) In this connection I am charged with having made plans for an Austrian Ministry secretly and maliciously against the intentions of the Fuehrer. In hardly any other sense is Buerckel's charge understandable. The fact in this case are very simple.

On 8 November 1938 various political leaders were asked to have supper with the Fuehrer. The Fuehrer called me to his side. We happened to discuss the situation in the Ostmark. I told him that according to his orders we were then about to divide the various authorities (Kompetenzen) of the Austrian State government, partly to the district governments (Gaue) partly to the central agencies, but certain affairs common to all district governments would remain, because 1) because the actual incorporation would not be concluded quickly, 2) because property laws for Ostmark will remain at variance with the Reich'slaw for some time to come. These matters need supervision. Referring apparently to his letter to me the Fuehrer thought that I was here to serve as an expert for the Ostmark. As a matter of fact he repeated this again in March of that year during Buerckel's presence which did not at all please the latter. I sketched a plan according to which, an Ostmark specialist should be appointed in every central agency with the task of the special supervision of Ostmark questions and I in my function as Reich's minister would supervise these specialists. "Yes that's what I have in mind" answered the Fuehrer. On the basis of this conversation I started. Buerckel did not like that and interfered in his own peculiar way and told me that as Reich's commissioner he had obtained directives from the Fuehrer that such a solution was out of the question. I know nothing of the working out of a plan and sending it to a Berlin central agency. I turn to Pg,Stuckart for a clarification of this among other matters (unter einem).

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3271-PS
CONTINUED

Note to Page 18 It is certainly as much a gross exaggeration of the value of Muehlmann as it is likewise an underrating of myself if Buerckel is of the opinion that the removal of Muehlmann were the coup de grace to my intentions. Buerckel, ever so often, jabs the air and fights shadows. It is my impression that the extraordinary initiative, energy etc. displayed by Buerckel in these questions already transgresses the borderline of a clinical complex of hallucinations.

Note to page 19 Far be it from me to call the men who work under Buerckel today in the function of Kreisleiters or Gauleiters ambitious fellow party members (Parteigenossen). On the contrary, they are those disciplined fellow party members who accept Buerckel because the latter was appointed by the Fuehrer. It was especially on behalf of these fellow party members that I intervened and adjured Buerckel with all possible emphasis that he should not carry on a policy against the Party. I believe, Reichsfuehrer, that in the meantime you will have gained sufficient insight into the Viennese situation in order to ascertain that my fears are justified, Buerckel should not count off all the possible months spent in jail. I know that much better because I had experiences with the people in the struggle which had brought me to the very gates of prison, in any case I was suspect to investigations and arrest by the police. Buerckel, however, should recognize for once how many Gauamtsleiter he has already removed permanently or temporarily, or for example how many fellow party members he had detained or arrested, even if only temporarily.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3471-PS
(Continued)

at the time Vienna, 19 Aug 39

to 20) I do not know if I am quite capable of pushing others ahead. One of my main properties which I feel as a drawback is my modesty almost to the extent of bashfulness. I just don't push my way forward, however, I have the misfortune to very often recognize the course of affairs correctly in advance, and when things then happen that way those concerned believe that I had arranged the course of events myself. Anyway I try to defend myself against this Cassandra's fate, but Buerckel can be assured, that in moments where decision really counts I can be very energetic and that I also am right in the foreground of events just as I used to be at the front. Only it takes a little longer before I warm up, because I have a perhaps wrong but great understanding of human weaknesses. Therefore I let people who are energetic step ahead, as for instance Buerckel during the past year. I believe I could have caused difficulties for this Reich Kommissariat with its unsystematic conduct of business affairs so that it could have become questionable if Buerckel would have achieved the political position in Austria which he holds today, or at least believes to hold. But just in this connection I take the liberty, Reichsfuehrer, to refer to our conversation in Munich. Apparently Buerckel thinks, that I want to appoint Neubacher as Gauleiter today. Neubacher is one of my closest friends. But what I had to say about Neubacher as Gauleiter I have told you as well as Buerckel. Concerning Frauenfeld, we also discussed this possibility in Munich, I also mentioned Jury. I have brought forth everything, which speaks for or against the solution, the decision rests with the Fuehrer.

21) In this connection it seems to me as if Buerckel would again use a voice from the Beyond and would in this case misuse it. Buerckel acts as if Hammerschmid had turned against me and my method. If Buerckel wants to claim that, it will be a lie. Hammerschmid stood so close to me that he would never have expressed criticism about me, least of all to Buerckel. The situation is quite simple. I threatened to interfere with my political efforts in Slovakia, approved by the Fuehrer, between two authorities, namely the Field Marshal and Ribbentrop. I may in this connection refer to my detailed presentation of these conditions which I submitted to you during spring of this year after the solution of the Slovak question. Now I didn't play any politics as does Buerckel in such cases, rather I said to myself that the Fuehrer had delegated both of these jurisdictions, the Four Year Plan to the Field Marshal, the Office of Foreign Affairs to Ribbentrop. Therefore I have to supply both with reports to which they are entitled, that means the General Field Marshal in particular with reports of economy, Ribbentrop with reports of foreign affairs. I must call the summarizing explanations of Buerckel in this paragraph just gossip. I don't understand them. I do not know what I should have advised the Field Marshal about or what I did advise him. I did not do anything nor did I attempt anything; rather I merely commissioned Hammerschmid to extend information necessary to them, in the above-mentioned manner, to the Field Marshal as well as to Ribbentrop. In this connection I may recall my great worries, which I have expressed regarding the above-mentioned representation of the Slovak affair, namely that in the Third Reich there exists such a lack of willingness for cooperative work. But if one does such cooperative work, he exposes himself to the danger of being suspected by Buerckel.

In this connection the affair Keppler-Field Marshal appears to me in a new light. I am convinced that Buerckel gave the Field Marshal the inflated report only in order to show the Field Marshal how attentive and anxious he, Buerckel, was, while I stood at least within the light of indifference.

22.) "But you cannot do one thing, replace National Socialism with cleverness". With that Buerckel is insulting my party honor, but also my honor as an SS man.

to 23.) I have never attempted to force any man upon Buerckel. I recommended Muehlman if he had a careful hand in treating people. However he wanted a man from me, namely Dr. Hammerschmid, but the latter didn't want to be with him. I do not make any attempt to introduce my "garnishings" anywhere. I consider it bad anyway, if one introduces "garnishings" anywhere in the Third Reich, because thereby one only plants the seed for future fights of giants. (Diadochen).

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I never talk myself out of difficulties; even if I am not energetic in all circumstances, I still act sensibly. In any event I am also harmless. And sometimes I am surprised that people with unfriendly feelings see something in my actions which one cannot attribute to the action under quiet and unbiased consideration. But then the reproach falls back on the one who, because of his own ill will, wants to brand the harmless act of another as a misdemeanor. I will not be drawn into the discussion of an even better National Socialism, since all of us stand in the immediate experience of the Fuehrer. If Buerckel does that he claims that he would be able to decide what National Socialism is, and not the Fuehrer. However I believe that I may say one thing: the political artist Buerckel cannot be reached by me, which I confess without envy. However the National Socialist Buerckel can still learn something, as experience in this case teaches.

Reichsfuehrer, I have presented to you this letter by Buerckel and my first opinion, because according to my view you as Reichsfuehrer SS have the special task, of supervising the protection of the Reich and the party, and because you in your national functions have been charged with the maintenance of state political security.

My first impulse was to lay the writing of Buerckel before the Fuehrer and I believe now as before that the last declaration on this matter should be spoken by the Fuehrer. But the Fuehrer is so occupied with foreign political questions today that I do not wish to come to him at this moment, even though this affair has a meaning for me, as has no other matter touching me personally. I turn to you accordingly and beg you for the strictest investigation of these things and fixing of the responsibilities which must be borne here.

Hail to the Fuehrer!

1 Enclosure

We, T/3 CHARLES A. MOOSMANN, 12141925, A. FLANDREAU, B-210751, and A. FLANDREAU, Civ. 046305, hereby certify that we are thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 3271-PS.

T/3 CHARLES A. MOOSMANN
12141925
A. FLANDREAU
Civ. 046305
ERWIN COOPER
Civ. B-21075

H1237-0253

Official Gazette for the occupied Dutch territories year 1941,
Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten Niederländischen Gebiete, Jahrgang 1941, part 2, page 19.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3323-PS
OFFICE OF US. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Decree by the Reich Commissioner for the occupied territories of the Netherlands concerning the obligation to register persons who are entirely or partly of Jewish race.
By virtue of article 5 of the Fuehrer's decree dated 18 May 1940 (RGBl-page 77) relative to the exercise of governmental powers in the Netherlands I decree as follows:

Article 1.

Persons who are entirely or partly of Jewish race and who are residing in the occupied territories of the Netherlands are to be registered in accordance with the following regulations.

Article 2.

(1) In this decree a person is considered to be entirely or partly of Jewish race if he is descended from even one grandparent of full Jewish blood.
(2) A grandparent is automatically considered as being fully Jewish if he belongs or has belonged to the Jewish religious community.

Article 3.

(1) If there should be any doubt as to whether a person should be considered to be entirely or partly of Jewish blood as given in article 2, the decision will be made, on request, by the Reich Commissioner for the occupied territories of the Netherlands or the office indicated by him.
(2) The following are entitled to make the request -

1. every German office in the occupied territories in the Netherlands.
2. the registration authorities
3. the person in question

(3) The decision referred to in article 1 is final.

Article 4.

(1) A person to be registered in accordance with articles 1 to 3 , is compelled to register.
(2) If the person who is to be registered is unable to deal with business matters or limited in his ability to deal with business matters, his legal representative or those who actually look after him are compelled to make the registration.

Article 5.

(1) The registration has to be made within four weeks after this decree becomes effective. If registration has to be made at the office of the mayor of the country of Amsterdam this time limit will be 10 weeks.
(2) If the prerequisites for obligation to register are fulfilled after this decree becomes effective, registration has to be made within two weeks after the event which made registration neccessary. However this time limit does not expire before the time limit set in para. one.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3323-PS
(cont.)

Article 6.

The mayor or the chief of the State inspectorate of registers (Hoofd der Rijksinspectie von de Bevolkingsregisters) is responsible for accepting registration (ie is the registration authority) as in those offices the register or residence records are kept in which the person to be registered has been or has to be entered.

Article 7.

(1) Registration must be made in writing
(2) It must indicate

1. First and last name of the person to be registered
2. Place, date, month and year of birth
3. Home or residence indicating name of street and number of house; persons who have immigrated into the European Netherlands territory after 30 January 1933 must also give their last residence within the present territory of the Great German Reich (including the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia) or in the general government of the occupied areas of Poland.
4. His nationality and any nationalities he may have had previously
5. His religion
6. His profession or occupation
7. Whether single, married, widowed or divorced
8. How many of his grandparents are Jewish (article 2)

Article 8.

(1) The registration authorities should make a note of the fact in their registration or residence records if the person registering is of Jewish blood.
(2)The mayor has to notify the chief of the State inspectorate of registers (Hoofd der Rijksinspectie von de Bevolkingsregisters) within one week of the entry referred to in paragraph 1, as well as of any changes and supplementary notes relative to the entries about a person who is registering which are made in accordance with the regulations in force in the Netherlands. The latter may extend the time limit.

Article 9.

(1) The registration authorities will issue a certificate to the registered person, confirming that he has complied with the obligation to register in accordance with this decree.
(2) The registered person has to pay the registration authorities the fee of one Gulden in advance to cover the issue of the registration certificate.
If the person is unable to pay this fee the local Jewish community to which he belongs is compelled to pay the fee. If the person does not belong to any such community the registration authorities may waive the fee entirely or in part. The fee may not be waived in any other cases.
(3) The person to be registered in accordance with article 4, paragraph 2, is responsible in cases where the fee cannot be paid, the regulations given in the fore giving paragraph being used as appropriate to obtain payment of the fee, if he too is subject to the obligation to register.
(4) If the mayor is the registration authority he must remit half the collected fees to the chief of the State inspectorate of register (Hoofd der Rijksinspectie van de Bevolkingsregisters).

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3323-PS
(cont.)

Article 10.

(1) Any person who is due to register and does not fulfil his obligation to register will be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of up to 5 years.
(2) Actions mentioned in paragraph 1 are crimes. (under paragraph 1)
(3) Property of a person, punishable is subject to the terms of regulation number 33 (1940 relative to confiscation of property.

Article 11.

(1) This decree comes into force on the 14 th day after it has been announced.
(2) The general secretary of the ministry of the Interior will issue the regulations necessary for its execution.

The Hague, 10 th January 1941

The Reichs commissioner for the occupied territories in the Netherlands.

Seyss-Inquart.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT nr. 3323-PS

11 December 1945

I, P.O. B. D. RICHARDSON, 66370, WRNS., hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German language; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document Nr. 3323-PS.

P.O.B.D.RICHARDSON
66370 WRNS.

3325-PS

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No 3325-PS
OFFICE OF THE US. CHIEF OF COUNCEL

Translation.

27.

Decree

of the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Dutch Territories referring to Jewish students.

In accordance with section 5 of the Fuehrer's decree referring to the exercise of governmental authority within the Netherlands, dated 18 May 1940 (RGBl. I S. 778), I decree that:

Section 1.

This decree refers to:

1) Persons, who are entirely or partly of Jewish blood, and have to register according to Decree Nr. 6/1941 on compulsory registration; exempt are those who have only one grandparential ancestor of pure Jewish race in the sense of this decree.

2) Persons who adhere to the Jewish religious faith.

Section 2.

The enrolment at Dutch universities and colleges of persons classified under section 1 is restricted by regulations which are issued by the Secretary General of the Ministry of Education, Science- and Cultural administration.

Section 3.

A person, classified under section 1, who did not matriculate in a Dutch university or college can only be admitted for examination in these institutions after permission has been granted by the Secretary General of the Ministry of Education - Science - and Cultural administration.

Section 4.

This decree takes effect on the day of its proclamation.

The Hague, the 11 February 1941.

The Reich Commissioner for the Dutch Occupied Territories

signed Seyss - Inquart.

I, Max Manlin, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of document No. 3325 - PS.

Max Manlin X 046150

H1237-0256

Official Gazette for the occupied Dutch territories, year 1941
Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten Niederländischen Gebiete,
Jahrgang 1941 part 6, page 99.

27.

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Section 4.

This decree takes effect on the day of its proclamation.

The Hague, the 11 February 1941.

The Reich Commissionar for the Dutch Occupied Territories

signed Seyss - Inquart.

I, Max Manlin, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages and that the abov is a true and correct translation of document No. 3325 - PS.

Max Manlin X 046150

H1237-0257

Official Gazette for the occupied Dutch territories year 1941, Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten Niederländischen Gebiete, Jahrgang 1941, part 39, page 785.

H1237-0258

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3326-PS
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

180

Decree

of the Reich Commissioner for the occupied Netherlands Territories, whereby an order is put into effect, issued by the Reich Minister of Economics regarding the blocking of property within the country belonging to Jews, who emigrated to the Netherlands. Pursuant to sections 5 of the Fuehrer's decree concerning the exercise of governmental authority in the Netherlands of 18 May 1940, I hereby order as follows:

Section 1.

The order printed in the appendix - issued by the Reich Minister of Economics, concerning the blocking of property within the country belonging to Jews who emigrated to the Netherlands, herewith takes effect.

Section 2.

Proper Foreign Exchange Control Offices in the sense of this order are those which are considered proper Foreign Exchange Control Offices in the German Reich in accordance with the prevailing regulations.

Section 3.

Failure to comply with this order will be punished, pursuant to the rules of point VI of the law of Dec.12, 1938 (RGBl.I pg.1733) dealing with the control of foreign exchange. It will be considered a punishable act in the sense of Section 2, paragraph 2, of the decree NO.52/1940, which concerns German jurisdiction over crimes in the sense of the decree No.123/1941.

The Hague, September 18, 1941.

The Reich Commissioner for the
occupied Netherlands territories.

SEYSS-INQUART

Appendix

Order

concerning the blocking of property within the country belonging to Jews who emigrated to the Netherlands.

Pursuant to section 60 of the Foreign Exchange Decree, I hereby order the following, to take effedt as of Sept.1st, 1941:

Jews, residing in occupied Netherlands territories, who emigrated from the German Reich after August 3rd, 1931, and who at that time were German citizens - can dispose their property -

H1237-0259

still remaining in parts of the German Reich - only with the consent of the proper Foreign Exchange Control office.

Berlin, August 30, 1941.

For the Reich Minister of Economics

(s) Dr. Landfried.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 3326-PS

11th December 1945

CAITLIN ANNEMARIE, AGO X 046172 hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages and that I am above is a true and correct translation of Document 3326-PS.

CAITLIN ANNEMARIE
AGO X 046172.

3328-PS

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3328-PS
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Official Gazette for the occupied
Dutch territories year 1941

Verordnungsblatt fuer die besetzten
niederlaendischen Gebiete Jahrgan 1941.

part 44 page 841.

198.

Decree of the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Dutch Territories concerning the regulation of the professional activities of Jews.

By virtue of Article 5 of the decree of the Fuehrer concerning the exercise of governmental authority in the Netherlands of May 18, 1940 (Reichsgesetzblatt I S.778) I hereby order:

Article 1.

The exercise by Jews of professional, industrial or other pursuits aimed at profits, may be made subject to permission or to conditions or may be prohibited by administrative orders. Arrangements for the termination and liquidation of work contracts, to which a person affected by this administrative order is a party, can be made at the same time.

Article 2.

1) The administrative orders will be issued by the Reich Commissioner for the occupied Netherlands territories (Commissioner General for Finance and Economics) or by the department, authorized by him. They may apply to groups of persons or to individuals.

2) Administrative orders, applying to groups of persons will be announced in the legal gazette (Verordnungsblatt) of the occupied Netherlands territories, unless in a special case a different way of announcement is ordered.

Article 3.

Administrative orders, decreed by virtue of Section 2 of the decree No.137/1940 concerning the regulation of the lawful and the financial situations of officials, employees and workers and certain persons under oath, remain untouched.

Article 4.

The instructions of the implementation order (No.9/1940) relating to the decree No.8/1940 concerning the work restrictions, in the version of the decree No.64/1940, do not apply to the discharge of a Jew.

H1237-0260

H1237-0261

Article 5.

An employer can cancel a labor contract with a jew, by giving three months notice on the first day of any calender Month, if the notice period is longer on the basis of a law or a contract, or if the contract would expire after January 31,1942.

Article 6.

The Secretary-General of the Ministry for Social Affairs may convert the claim of a Jew, his widow or his surviving descendants for a pension or survivor benefits against the employer, in a claim for a payment of a lump sum to be paid in full settlement, if the employer requests it. The Secretary General may rul rule that the payment, in full settlement of all claims, shall be made in installments.

Article 7.

1) If the labor contract of a Jewish employee terminates and, or account of this termination, the jew or an other persons is entitled to claims against the employer, other than those outlined in Section 6, a compensation in lien of these claims will then be paid in full settlement of all claims, computed on the basis of the salary, to which the Jew was entitled in the lastt month of his activityl The compensation to be paid in full settlement of all claims, in case of on uninterrupted duration of the Contract, amounts to·

1) a maximum of 5 years-one month salary
2) over 5 to a maximum of 10 years-one and a half monts salary
3) over 10 to a maximum of 15 years-2 months salary
4) over 15 to a maximum of 20 years-3 months salary
5) over 20 to a maximum of 25 years-4 ½ months salary
6) over 25 years -6 months salary.

2) The sum in full settlement of all claims is due at the time of the termination of the contract, if it does not exeed the tripple amount of a month's salary.
In cases of part 1 No.5 the balance may be paid in advance in two monthly part payments, in cases of part 1 No.6 in three monthly part payments.

3) The instructions of part 1 and 2 do not apply, if the claim is lower than the compensation to be paid in full settlement of all claims, As far as the sum in full settlement of all claims consists of repeated performences, it is taken for granted, - relative to the settlement in a sum for all claims - that the repeated performances would have been paid for a maximum of 3 years. Interests, accrued for the time in between, will not be considered.

Article 8.

A jew, - in accordance with this decree - is a person, who, by virtue of the instructions of Section 4 of the decree No. 189/1940 concerning the registration of employers - is a jew or is considered a jew.

H1237-0262

Article 9.

b) The Reich Commissioner for the occupied territories of the Netherlands (General Commissioner for Finance and Economy) will take the necessary measures for the execution of this decree. He may delegate his authority to others.

2) The Reich Commissioner (Commissioner General of Finance and Economy) in case of doubts resulting from the application of the instructions of this decree may make generally binding legal decisions.

Article 10.

This decree becomes effective on the day of its publication.

Den Haag, October 22, 1941.

The Reich Commissioner
for the occupied territories of the
Netherlands

SEYSS-INQUART

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 3328-PS

13 November 1945

WEBSTER MARSHALL F., AGO X 046204 hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages and that I am above is a true and correct translation of Document 3328-PS.

WEBSTER MARSHALL F!
AGO X 046204.

H1237-0263

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3329-PS
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Official Gazette for the occupied Dutch territories year 1941.

Verordnungsblatt fuer die besetzten niederlaendischen Gebiete. Jahrgang 1941.

part 47, page 901

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D e c r e e

of the Reichscommissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories, concerning the Netherlands Chamber of Culture (Kulturkammer).

Pursuant to Article 5 of the Decree of the Fuehrer concerning the exercise of governmental authority in the Netherlands of 18. Mai 1940 (RGBl I, p.778) I order:

Part 1

Task and aim of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture.

Article 1

1) Persons, who are active in the field of the plastic arts including architecture and handicraft, music, literature, theatre, films and journalism, will be united in guilds. These guilds will form the Netherlands Chamber of Culture.

2) It is the task of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture to promote the Netherland culture as it is represented by the people and country, by cooperation of its members, who are active in all of its spheres, to direct the technical, economic and social affairs of the cultural professions and to coordinate the different aims of the members of the various groups.

Article 2

The Netherlands Chamber of Culture is an incorporated public-institution with rights and liabilities as defined in Article 152 of the constitution. Its domicile is in the Hague.

Part II.

Membership in the Netherlands Chamber of Culture.

Article 3

Everyone who participates in production, reproduction, intellectual or technical arrangements, the distribution, the maintenance, sale or marketing of goods of cultural value, must be a member of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture, unless his participation consists exclusively of a comercial, administrative, technical or mechanical activity.

Article 4

(1) Objects of cultural value in the sense of this decree are
I/ Every creation or performance of art if it is put before the public.

H1237-0264

2/ Every other intellectual creation or performance, which is put before the public by means of print, film, radio or recording.

(II) Print, in the sense of article 1 No.2 applies also to any-kind of mass reproduction.

Article 5

The production of material necessary for the creation of an object of cultural value is not deemed to be production or manufacturing of an object of cultural value in the sense of this decree.

Article 6.

Participation in the sense of Art.3, exists, irrelevant wether the work was done:
1) with or without compensation
2) by corporations with own jurisdiction of public or civil code,
3) by non-corporate organizations of persons or by individual persons
3) by Netherlanders, Netherland Subjects or foreigners
4) by employers or by persons who are being employed.

Article 7

(1) The president of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture a rule that in cases where performance of the type of work, as meant in article 3, is only of minor importance or only occasional, membership to the Netherlands Chamber of Culture is not required.

(2) Persons, who wish to perform work of this kind, must be in possession of a certificate of exemption issued by the President. The president may rule that a certificate of exemption is not necessary for certain groups.

(3) The issuance of a certificate of exemption can be made subject to payment of a fee appropriate to the intended work. Article 19, second par. is applicable for the collection of this fee

(4) Everyone, who in the sense of par. 1 is exempt from membership in the Netherlands Chamber of Culture, is, as far as his activities in the sense of article 3 are concerned, subject to the decrees and rules of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture to the fulles extent.

Article 8

An agreement, by which a person, who is not a member of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture, is engaged for work which can only be done by a member of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture, is valid only on condition, that such person is admitted as a member of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture, unless art. 7 is applicable.

Article 9

(1) Organizations of persons and foundations, which are members of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture, or which are obliged to be members, must coordinate their statut with this decree and the measures as stipulated in part IV and V.

H1237-0265

As soon as the reorganization in matters of clubs or foundations has been concluded, the following orders have to be observed: Clubs and foundations with regard to the decree Nr.145/1940 concerning the seizure of non-economic clubs and foundations as well as sections 1 and 2 and 4 to 9 of the decree Nr.41/1941; the authorities of the commissioner named in Article 1, section 1, of the decree Nr.41/1941 are then exercized by the president. Until this date, decisions, concerning foundations classified in Section I, are made by the above mentioned Commissioner in agreement with the president, who is entitled to make proposals pertaining to the above.

Article 10.

1) Jews or persons with jewish relatives by marriage can neither be members of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture, nor of an organization of persons, which in turn is a member of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture, or is supposed to be a member. It is further forbidden for these persons:

1) To found or to participate in the founding of an organization of persons, which is a member of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture or is obliged to be a member.

2) To create or participate in the creation of a foundation and also to benefit directly or indirectly from the property of a foundation, if said foundation is a member of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture or is obliged to be a member;

3) To work for an organization of persons as mentioned under I, or for a foundation as mentioned under 2, or to participate as a guest in the management of such organizations for persons or foundations.

2) The Secretary-General of the Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Arts may permit in special cases:

1) That a jew or a person with jewish family ties become a member of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture.
2) That organizations of persons or foundations, which must be a member of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture, be exempt from the obligation to become a member, if its members are exclusively Jewish, or if the foundation's property is used excelusively for the benefit of Jews.

Article 11.

1) Jewish persons in the sense of this decree are.

1) Persons who have more than one Jewish grandparent.
2) Persons other than those mentioned under Nr.1 who belonged to the Jewish religious community on May 9. 1940 or who have been accepted therein after this date.

2) Person with Jewish relatives in the sense of this decree are such persons, who are married to a person as described under 3 c who live with such person in concubinary.

3) A grandparent is considered jewish, if this grandparent has belonged to a Jewish religious community.

Article 12

The president of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture may refuse admission of a person for membership in the Netherlands Chamber of Culture or expel a member from the Netherlands Chamber of Culture, if facts reveal that the person in question does not possess the trustworthiness or aptitude required in the exercise of his activities.

Chapter III.

Management and administrative Structure of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture.

Article 13

1) At the head of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture is the President.
2) The President of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture nominates and discharges his substitute, the leaders of the guilds and the manager.
3) The President represents the Netherlands Chamber of Culture legally and out of court.

Article 14

1) The guilds of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture will be subdivided, according to need, in professional branches.
2) The leaders of the professional branches are nominated by the head of the guild in question, with the consent of the president.

Article 15

1) To accomplish the task of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture, provicial offices may be established
2) The president of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture can decide, that one provincial office shall be competent for several provinces.
3) The leaders of the provincial offices are nominated by the president, after consultation with the guild-leaders.

Article 16

1) The persons referred to in articles 13, par 2, 14, par 2 and 15, par 3 will be sworn in before they take office.
2) The form of oath will be fixed by administrative order.

Chapter IV.

Power of decree by the Netherlands Chamber of Culture.
1) The Netherlands Chambers of Culture possesses power of decree in the sense of article 15 3 of the constitutional document within the framework of its task.
2) This power of decree is exercises by the president of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture.

Article 18

Decrees issued by virtue of art. 17, will be made known in the "Gazette of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture."

H1237-0266

H1237-0267

Article 19

1) An arbitration decree, issued in accordance with the stipulation in art. 17. can prescribe rules regulatin controversies between members of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture.

2) The arbitration decree can rule that no member may bring a civil suit against another member, or inifiate action in cases where a law suit is only possible after complaint before the arbitrationprocedure is finished, unless a member should sustain a loss through lapse of period of grace. The judge will ex officios investigate, whether a law suit brought before him is permissible in conformity with the arbitrationprocedure.

3) The arbitrationprocedure may order that the arbitration bureaus have final jurisdiction in civil law controversies between members.

4) The arbitrationprocedure may decide that par. 1 and 3 are applicable also for arbitration and decision of disputes between a member and a third party, if so requested by both sides.

Article 20

1) The amount of dues, payable by the members to the Netherlands Chamber of Culture, may be stipulated by an order issued in accordance with article 17, regulating contributions.

2) Contributions will be collected in accordance with an order of the President of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture, if not paid in time. This order will be executed immediately by virtue of an engrossment, as preseribed by the Civil Law Code, which engrossment bears the preamble "In the name of Justice".

Article 21.

1) Fines up to a maximum amount of one thousand guilders can be levied in accordance with a decree, issued by virtue of article 17.

2) A fine can only be imposed after he, who has the power of imposition, has heard the accused member of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture.

3) Article 20, par 2, is correspondingly applicable

4) For the rest imposition of fines will follow the rules, which are laid down in an order issued in accordance with article 17, regulating the fines in cases of penal procedure.

Chapter V.

Authority of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture to issue orders.

1)

H1237-0268

Article 22.

1) Both, the president and the excecutive organs of the Chamber of Culture, to which the President has granted license mayrrender decisions in special cases regarding members of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture, within the framework of the task of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture.

1) Concerning their compulsory activities, within the Chamber.

2) Concering their participation in the activities of the Chamber

3) For the rest, as far as stipulated in an order, issued by virtue of article 17.

2) The members of the Netherlands Chambers of Culture must obey regulations, issued in accordance with par. 1.

3) Article 7, par.4, will be applicable.

Article 23.

(1) By virtue of art. 22, the president of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture may exercise specifically the following, powers:

1) Formulating of rules for the opening, management and closing of enterprises which, according to their nature, must bemembers of the Chambers of Culture.

2) Issuing of directives about the contents of collective bargaining agreements, to be concluded between the seperate professional groups will in the Chamber. The rules of decree Nr.217/1940, concerning the regulation of wages, salaries and other labor conditions have to be left intact. The authority of the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Social Welfare is also kept inviolate; it will be exercised, after the president has been heard.

2) Measures, taken by the president by reason of par.1, constitute no claims for indemnity.

Article 24.

All concerned will be notified of measures taken by reason of article 22. Publication in the "Gazette of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture", will also be regarded as notification.

Article 25.

Everyone, who violates an ordinance, issued in accordance with article 22, may be punished by the one, who has issued the ordinancee, by imposition of a fine of a maximum of one thousand guilders, if and insofar as this was specifically mentioned in the ordinance.

2) Par.2 up to and inclusive par.4 of article 21 have to be applied correspondingly.

Chapter VI.

Joint rules for Chapter IV and V.

H1237-0269

Article 26.

1) The President of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture may hear witnesses or have them interrogated, insofar as it is necessary for the preparation of his decisions.

2) It is the duty of every person, summoned by order of the president as a witnessor an expert, to obey such a summons and give testimony or serve as an expert. The paragraphs 217, 218, and 219 of the Penal Code have to be applied accordingly. The witness or expert, who odoes not appear, can be arraigned by order of the president.

3) The President can hear witnesses or may have interrogated under oath, if they have attained the age of sixteen.

The witness is put under oath, to tell the truth and nothing but the truth, the expert is put under oath, that he will conscienciously fulfill his task, The witnesses and experts are compelled to swear this oath.

4) The decrees of the laws of July 17. 1911 (State journal Nr.215 and of April 28, 1916 (State journal Nr.174) have to be applied.

5) If a witness refuses to answer at his interrogation without full cause of law, the questions which are put to him or refuses to render the required oath, declaration or solemn promise, then the president may fine such a witness up to a maximum amount of one thousand guilders, if he deems it beneficial for the investigation. Section 20, § 2 is valid accordingly.

6) The witnesses and experts receive, if so desired, compensation from the Netherlands Chambers of Culture, to be determined by the president in accordance with paragraphs 51, 61, 65 and 66 of the table of rates for expenses and salaries of justice and judiciary civil affairs.

Chapter VII.

Budget and expenses of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture

Article 27.

1) In as much as the Netherlands Chamber of Culture cannot pay for its operation out of ist own revenues alone these expenses will be paid by the State.

2) The president of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture sets up a yearly budget which requires the approval of the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Finance. Teh president is responsible for the proper management of this budget.

3) The year's balance sheets must be submitted every year for auditing to the General Chamber of Control (Algemeene Rekenkamer). The Secretary-General of the Ministry of Finance gives his approval to the president on the basis of the report from the General Chamber of Control.

Chapter VIII.

State Supervision.

H1237-0270

Article 28.

The Netherlands Chamber of Culture is under the supervision of the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Public Englightenment and Arts.

Article 29.

1) Either at the request of a party concernd or ex officio, the Secretary-General of the Minstry of Public Enlightenment and Art may declare void an ordinance issued in accordance with article 17 or a regulation, based on article 22 or any other resolution of the president or of an organ of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture, if there should be a contradiction with any rules in this ordinance or with other laws, or if the general wellfar is endengerd. For the same reason, the Secretary-General may declare temporareily void, at request of a party concerned or ex-officio a decision of the president or of an organ of the Chamber; however, this may not occur but once a year and this only for a certainpperiod, which may not exceed one year.

2) A declaration as mentioned in par. 1 must be motivated and must bemmade public in the same way as the ordinance in question.

Chapter IX.

Determination of coorperation of State authorities in the execution of the task of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture.

Article 30.

The President of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture may ask for copies, free of charge, from the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Justice, concering the penal register kept by this Department and from the court-clerk (griffier) at the district courts (arrondisse, ments-richtbank) concerning the penal register kept by this court. This request must be granted.

Article 31.

The police authorities are obliged, to enforce adherence to ordinnance of sections 3, 7, § 2, and 32, § 2, at request of the president, as well as to measures, taken by virtue of sections 17, 22 and 26.

Chapter X

Penal Code

1) Everyone, who is not a member of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture, in disregard of the regulation of article 3, or, contrary to the regulation of article 7, is not in possession of a certificate of exemption, but who nevertheless exercises an activity within the jurisdictional authority sphere of the Chamber, will be fined up to fivethousand guilders.

2) If an organization of persons, or a fonudation which has to be a member of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture, exercises an activity within the jurisdictional sphere of authority of the Chamber, without possessing a certificate of exemption, or being a member of the Chamber, then the members of the administration will be punished with such penalties as mentioned in paragraph 1; such a member is not punished, if the punishable act has been comitted without his participation.

3) Punishable acts, as meant in Paragr. 1 and 2 are considered misdemeanours.

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Chapter XI

Transitory and final directions.

Article 33.

1) This ordinance has to be applied at the earliest moment to an activity, starting from the time of the creation of the competent guild.

2) Everyone, who wants to continue to work in the sense of article 3 after the creation of a guild in the sphere of his activity, must immediately file an application with the President of the Netherlands Chamber of Culture, to be admitted as a member, the latest within four weeks.

3) He may continue his activity, as long as a final decision on his application in accordance with § 2 has not been reached.

4) In deviation from the rule in article 8, a contract of the kind as mentioned there, which is in force at the time mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article, stays valid as long as the decision to be reaches as mentioned in § 3, has not been rendered. The contract becomes immediately void, if the request, made with reference to § 2, is refused. Otherwise the contract will stay valid, even after expiration of such a period as mentioned in § 1.

Article 34.

1) With the date of the creation of the "Filmguild", the Decree Nr.160/1940 concerning the organization of the filmindustrie becomes void.

2) Effective as of this date the property of the Netherlands Moviethentre-Organization (Netherlandsche Bioscoopbond) is transferred to the Netherlands Chamber of Culture, which also tak over all civil law claims and obligations of the Netherlands Moviethentre Organization.

Article 35.

1) The date for the creation of the guilds will be named by the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Arts, who will announce it in the "Nederlandsche Staats-courant".

2) The Secretary-General may create temporary institutions and, until the creation of the guilds is achieved, may entrust persons or organizations with the temporary work and the exercising of the authorities as guildleaders.

3) The Netherlands-Chamber of Culture is deemed to have come into being as soon as two guilds are in existence. This will be made known by the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Arts by proclamation int the "Netherlandsche Staatscourant".

H1237-0272

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3329-PS
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(cont.)

Article 36.

This ordinance shall take effect as of the day of publication.

The Hague November 22, 1941

The Reichscommissioner for the Occupied
Netherlands Territories

SEYSS-INQUART

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 3329-PS

15th December 1945

MANLIN MAX X 046150 hereby certify that I am thoroughl conversant with the German and English languages and that I am above is a true and correct translation of Document 3329-PS-

MANLIN MAX
X 046150.

3333-PS

H1237-0273

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3333-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Official Gazette for the occupied Dutch territories
year 1940

Verordnungsblatt fuer die besetzten Niederlaendischen Gebiete.
Jahrgang 1940

part 33, page 546.

189

Decree
of the Reich commissioner for the occupied Dutch territories concerning registration of business enterprises.

In accordance with article 5 of the decree of the Fuehrer on exercise of governmental authority dated 18 May 1940 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, p.118) I decree the following:

I. Point.

Enterprises Under Obligation To Register

Article 1.
Definition of an Enterprise.

Enterprises in the sense of this decree are:

1) Enterprises which, according to the law on Commercial registration of 1918 (Handelsregistergesetz - Handelsregister Wet 1918) must be registered in the Commercial Register - General.

2) Enterprises of other associations of persons, furthermore enterprises of non-profit corporations, foundations and others formed for definite purposes insofar as thy pursue economic objects;

3) Farm and forestry enterprises as well as horticultural and fishing enterprises, insofar as a commercial enterprise is connected with them;

4) Enterprises of craftsmen and peddlers not includede.

Article 2.
Obligation to Register.

Under obligation to register is every enterprise that on 9 May, 1940 corresponds or will correspond at a later date to the following definition

1) An enterprise which is operated by a person, if the owner is a Jew

2) An enterprise which is operated by a company (Offene Handelsgesellschaft) or a corporation in which the liability is limited to one or more partners (Kommanditgesellschaft), if at least one personally liable partner (persoenlich haftender Gesellschafter) is a Jew

3) An enterprise which is operated by a corporation or a stock corporation with limited liability
   a) if at least one of the persons appointed to the legal representation or at least one of the members of the board of directors is a Jew;
   b) if Jews own essential interrest in the capital or votes. It is considered to be an essential interest in the capital if more than a quarter of the capital belongs to Jews; it is considered to be an

essential interest in votes, if the votes of the Jews reach the half mark of the number of the total votes; do votes exist which contain preferential voting rights, if suffices if half of these votes belong to Jews;

4) an enterprise which is operated by an association of persons, a non-profit corporation formed for a definite purpose in the sense of article 1, section 2, if one of the definitions according to sections 2 or 3 of this article is applicable;

5) An enterprise, if it actually is under the controlling influence of Jews. the obligation to register will not be eliminated in case the property of the particular enterprise must be registered in accordance with Order No.26/1940 concerning the treatment of enemy property.

Article 3.
Branch Offices.

1) Branch offices must be registerd
1. if the enterprise to which they belong, must be registered itself;
2. if the enterprise to which they belong, does not have to be registered, but if at least one manager of the branch office is a Jew

2) The regulations pertaining to the registration of enterprises apply to the branch offices mentioned in article 1.

Article 4.
Definition of a Jew.

1) A Jew is one who is descended from at least three racially pure Jewish grandparents.

2) As a Jew is also considered one who is descended from two purely Jewish greatparents and
1. either belonged to the Jewish religions community on 9 May, 1940 or will be admitted to it after this date, or
2. was married to a Jew on 9 May, 1940 or marries a Jew after this date.

3) As pure -Jewish is automatically considered a greatparent if he belonged to the Jewish religious community.

Point 2.

Article 5.
Execution of registration.

Persons who are under obligation to register

1) In case of an enterprise which is operated by a person, the owner and the person authorized to manage the enterprise, are under obligation to register; in case of enterprises in the sense of article 2, section 1, number 2-5, every person authorized to represent them.

2) Should all persons, who, in accordance with article 1, are under obligation to register an enterprise, have their permanent or temporary residence in a foreign country or should they otherwise be prevented from executing their powers, all those persons who actually manage the enterprise also are under obligation to register the enterprise.

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Article 6.
contents of the Registration.

L) In making the registration, the total property -at home and in foreign countries- of the enterprise has to be stated, separated according to assets and debits. As property of the enterprise is also to be considered everything which is intended or suitable to serve, directly or indirectly, the purposes of the enterprise.

2) Enterprises which fall under the regulations of article 2, section 1, on May 9th 1940, must in making the registration base it upon the assets. Enterprises which fall under the regulations of article 2, section 1, at a later date, must state the assets as of the last balance set up before that date. The balance sheet in question is to be submitted upon registration.

3) Thould a balance from the enterprise which is under obligation to register, not be regularly set up, the property must be appraised according to its general value, which it had on 9 May, 1940, or in case the enterprise came under obligation to register at a later date, the one which it had on this date. Upon request of the Economy Examination Agency (Wirtschaftspruefstelle) an appraisal by a certified appraiser must be added within a term set by said agency.

Article 7.
Form of Registration.

1) The registration must be submitted to the Agency of Economy Examining, DEN HAAG by 30 November, 1940 on an official form which will be available at the office of the Chamber of Industry and Commerce that has jurisdiction over the enterprise according to its location.

2) Insofar as an enterprise came under obligation to register only after the key -date named in article 2, section 1, the registration must be made within twoo weeks after the obligation to register was incovered.

Article 8.
Obligation to Give Information.

1) Upon request, the Agency of Economy Examining must be given information on the enterprises which are under obligation to register; it can also be requested to submit books and other documents.

2) The Agency of Economy Examining may delegate the powers given by Paragraph 1.

Point 3.

Regulations concerning Penalties.

Article 9.
Penalties.

1) Who intentionally does not fulfill or not on time fulfill the obligation to register and give information according to the above regulations, will be punished with imprisonment or with one of these penalties, insofar the act is not subject to a heavier penalty according to another regulation.

2) Who, by negligence, does not fulfill or not on time fulfill the obligation to register or give information, will be punished with imprisonment not to exceed one year, or with a fine not to exceed ten thousand guilders.

3) The punishable acts, mentioned in article 1 and 2, are crimes.

Article 10.
Confiscation.

Beside the penalty according to article 9, confiscation of the assets to which the punishable act applies, may be ordered by the court.

Point 4.
Final Regulations.

Article 11.
Further Measures.

1) The Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Dutch Territories will take the measure necessary for the execution of this decree and will issue the regulations necessary for its execution or supplementation

2) The Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Dutch Territories may make general legally binding decisions on questions of doubt which may result from the application of the regulations of this decree.
He may delegate the powers mentioned in article 1 and 2.

Article 12.
Time for enforcement.

This decree will become valid on the day of its promulgation.

Den Haag
22 October, 1940

The Reich Commissioner for
the Occupied Dutch Territories.

Seyss-Inquart.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT Nr. 3333 - PS

December 12, 1945

I, ERNEST HUERLIMAN, X 046321, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German language; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document Nr. 3333-PS.

ERNEST HUERLIMAN
X 046321

H1237-0276

H1237-0277

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3334-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Official Gazette for the Occupied Dutch
territories
year 1940.

Verordnungsblatt fuer die besetzten Niederlaendischen
Gebiete Jahrgang 1940

part 42, page 761

231
Decree
of the Reich Commissioner for the occupied Netherland Territories concerning the employment of Germans in Jewish households.

By virtue of section 5 of the edict of the Fuehrer on the execution of governmental authority in the Netherlands of 18 May 1940 (RGBl.I. S. 118) I decree:

Section 1.

(1) German Nationals of German or related blood cannot be employed in households of which a Jew is the head, nor in families of which a Jew is a permanent or temporary member for a non-interrupted period of more than four weeks.

(2) In the sense of paragraph I are considered as Jews, those who according to the regulations of section 4 of decree Nr. 189/1940 concerning the registration of enterprises, are Jews or are considered as such. Employed in a household are those who, in order to work there, are entirely or partially temporarily or continuously a member of the household or those who perform daily household work or other daily work directly or indirectly connected with the household without being a member thereof.

(3) In exception to the regulations set forth in section I, employment based on an existing agreement is permissible:

(1) from the time this decree becomes effective until 1 February 1941;
(2) from the date on which occurs the fact confirming the regulation according to section 1 until the earliest date on which the employer can terminate the contract, however for a maximum of 30 days only.

Section 2.

(1) Contracts are void inasmuch as they contain the obligation for employment forbidden according to section 1.

(2) The fact that the definitions of section 1 paragraph 1 can or will be applied to a contract, does not set forth an important reason for the employer in the sense of article 1639.P, section 1 of the Netherlands civil law.

Section 3.

(1) Employment of German Nationals violating the law of section 1 will be punished with imprisonment up to one year and a fine up to ten thousand guilders or one of these penalties.

(2) The prosecution of a person not of German or Netherland nationality nor stateless requires the consent of the Reich commissioner for the occupied Netherland territories.

(3) Deeds according to section 1 are punishable offences in the sense of paragraph 2 section 2 of the decree Nr. 52/1940 of the German jurisdiction for penal cases.

H1237-0278

Section 4.

The Reich commissioner for the occupied Netherland territories may grant exemptions of the regulations of this decree.

Section 5.

This decree becomes effective on the day of its publication.

The Hague, 19 December 1940

The Reich commissioner for the occupied Netherland territories:

Seysss-Inquart

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT Nr. 3334 - PS

13 December 1945

I, JOSEPH W. SUTTER, X 046328, hereby certify, that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German language; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document Nr. 3334-PS.

JOSEPH W. SUTTER
X 046328

3336-PS

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3336-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Official Gazette for the Occupied
Dutch territories year 1942

Verordnungsblatt fuer die besetzten Niederlaendischen Gebiete Jahrgang 1942
Part 13, page 289

58.
Order
of the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories, concerning the treatment of Jewish property values.

By virtue of article 5 of the Fuehrer's decree concerning the exercise of governmental authority in the Netherlands of May 18 th 1940 (RGBl.I, S. 778) I hereby order as follows:

Chapter I.

Claims and other rights.

Article 1.

Claims of any kind have to be registered in writing with the banking firm of Lippmann, Rosenthal & Co., Amsterdam, if as on the effective date of this order or later, they belong wholly or partially to a person legally or really, who, according to the directives of article 4 of the decree No. 189/1940 -concerning the registration of enterprises- is a Jew or has to be considered as a Jew. This does not concern claims of an enterprise that had to be registered by virtue of the decree No. 189/1940.

Article 2.

(1) With the registration has to be stated:

1) Name and address of the creditor,
2) Name and address of the debitor,
3) Nature and extent of the claim
4) Legal basis of the claim
5) Due date
6) Rates of interest
7) Securities
8) All other important and essential particulars concerning the claim.

(2) Assets under writ of execution as well as promissary notes and other evidence have to be delivered with the registration.

Article 3.

(1) Obliged to register is:

1) the creditor
2) the debitor
3) each person, who is entitled to represent the creditor or the debitor or is authorized to file these claims.

(2) The fulfilment of the obligation to register on the part of the creditor or on the part of another person obliged to register is useful to the persons, obliged to register according to paragraph I, number 2 and 3.

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H1237-0280

Article 4.

The registration of such claims, which exist as of the effective day of this order has to be made until June 30, 1942. Claims which arise only after this order shall take effect, or which the person, who is obliged to register, has been informed of only after that time, have to be registered within one week.

Article 5.

The rules of articles 1-4 are applied accordingly to other legal or real rights, belonging wholly or partially to the property value of persons, mentioned in article 1, which are no claims, especially concerning rights on real properties and tangibles, shares in corporations as well as in companies and other associations, rights of reversion, rights for the protection of trade, copyrights and trade licenses.

Article 6.

The rules of articles 1-5 will not be applied:

1) to claims and rights dealt with in the order No. 148/1941 concerning the treatment of Jewish property values,

2) to such ownership of real property and such equal real property rights, rights of usufruct, let or lease or other rights of utilization, which have been properly registered in pursuance of article 2 of the Dejewfication order of Agriculture (No. 102/1941)

3) to such property like rights and mortgages which by virtue of article 3 of the order No. 154/1941, concerning Jewish real property, have been duly registered; this also applies to the claims secured by mortgages.

Article 7.

Disposals of claims and other rights, which have to be registered according to the rules of articles 1 to 6, made after the effective date of this orde r are void save the directives of par. 2 and 3; as disposals have to be considered especially cessions, pledges, the acceptance of claims as well as renunciations. Any engagement entered into after this order has taken effect, in order to undertake legal transactions, mentioned above, is void.

(2) Only the banking firm of Lippmann, Rosenthal & Co., has the right of disposal of the claims and rights, mentioned in article 1.
The rule of article 1, par. 2, does not apply to this banking firm. The debtor can only pay to the banking firm of Lippmann, Rosenthal & Co.; through such a payment he will have fulfilled his obligation.

(3) Measures, taken by distraint, especially the execution of arrests and other temporary judicial measures against the claims and rights mentioned in article 1 are permissable only with the consent of the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories (Commissioner General for Finance and Economics) or of the office authorized by him Measures taken without consent are void.

(4) The rules of par. 1-3 are applied correspondingly to property-values, which have to be paid in pursuance of article 1 of the order No. 148/1941, or have to be deposited, or have to be assessed. This is retro-active from the date, the order mentioned has taken effect.

Chapter II.

Exemption limit for property value as well as claims and other rights.

Article 8.

(1) The order No. 148/1941 will be changed as follows:

I.

In article 1, par. 1, number 1, the second sentence is rescinded.

II.

In article 1, par. 2, the second half sentence is rescinded.

H1237-0281

Article 4 is rescinded.

(2) The property values not seized in pursuance of the above mentioned former rules concerning the exemption limits have to be paid in, deposited or assessed immediately, latest June 30, 1942, according to article 1 of order No. 148/1941.

Artilcel9.

(1) Article 1, paragraph 1 of order No. 148/1941 in the final draft of article 8 of this order does not apply, if the total value of the cash-amount, checks, stocks, credit balances and deposits, belonging to a person of one household on the date, when this order has taken effect, does not exceed 250 Guilders. Article 1, par. 2 of order No. 148/1941 in the final draft of article 8 of this order does not apply, if the property values, falling to persons of one household, in addition to the property being in the possession of these persons at that time do not exceed 250 guilders within the calendar month.

(2) Claims and other rights belonging to persons of one household, can be disposed of during one calendar month up to the maximum amount of 250 Guilders; article 7 does not apply in this case.

(3) Cash amounts and other property values falling to persons and exceeding the amount of 250 Guilders, have to be paid in, deposited or assessed immediately in pursuance of order No. 148/1941.

Chapter III.

Collections, articles of virtu, articles made of precious metals and jewels.

Article 10.

Collections of all kinds, articles of virtu, articles of gold, platinum or silver as well as cut or raw precious or semi-precious stones and pearls have to be delivered to the banking firm of Lippmann, Rosenthal & Co., if they, legally or really, belong wholly or partially to a person, mentioned in article 1. This does not apply to the property of an enterprise, which has to register in pursuance of order No. 189/1940.

Article 11.

(1) If a person according to the rules of article 4 of order No. 189/1940 is a Jew or being considered a Jew, is married to a person, which is neither a Jew nor that he can be considered a Jew in accordance to the above mentioned rules, then article 10 will not be applied in cases where such articles belong to:
1) the Jewish husband, if there are descendants of this marriage who are not considered as being Jews according to the above mentioned rules;
2) the Jewish wife in case of a childless marriage
(2) The rules of paragrph 1, number 1 are also valid, if the marriage does not exist any more.
(3)The regulations of par. 1 and 2 are not applied to marriages, which took place after May 9, 1940.

Article 12.

Article 10 does not apply:

1) to individual weddingbands and the wedding band of a deceased husband or wife;
2) to silver wrist and pocket-watches being in personal use;
3) to silver-ware in use, with the consideration, that each person belonging to the household of the owner is entitled to keep 4 pieces, namely:
   Knife, fork, table-spoon and tea-spoon.

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4) to artificial denture, made of precious metals, as far as it is needed for personal use.

Article 13.

(1) The articles, mentioned in article 10, have to be delivered also if they belong to a third person. Such rights have to be registered in writing with the banking firm of Lippmann, Rosenthal & Co. within a month after the delivery. The consideration of rights which are claimed after the expiration of this time, can be refused without giving any reason.

(2) The banking firm of Lippmann, Rosenthal & Co. is responsible for claims, which are secured by rights as mentioned in par. 1. The person who is entitled to it can ask for an appropriate compensation for rights, which do not serve as the security of claims. The responsibility of the banking firm is limited to the extent of the selling value of the delivered goods.

(3) Legal security and executable measures which were ordered before this order has taken effect, are considered as being effective against the banking firm of Lippmann, Rosenthal & Co. after the delivery ahs been made.

Article 14.

(1) The obligation for delivery rests with the owner (article 10).

(2) Besides, the following persons are also obliged to deliver:
1) Whoever is authorized to represent the owner
2) whoever in the Occupied Netherlands Territories administers, possesses, keeps in custody or guards articles, which according to the rules of articles 10 to 12 have to be delivered.

Article 15.

The delivery has to be made immediately, latest until June 30, 1942. If the articles have been acquired after this date, they have to be delivered immediately, latest within one week after the acquisition.

Article 16.

Only the banking firm of Lippmann, Rosenthal & Co. has the right of disposal of the articles, which have to be delivered according to the rules of articles 10-12. The provisions of article 7, paragraph 1-3 are to be applied accordingly.

Chapter IV.

Obligatory Information.

Article 17.

(1) Whoever is asked for information by the banking firm of Lippmann, Rosenthal & Co., which is charged to carry out the directives of this order or order No. 148/1941 has to answer the questions completely and truly.

(2) If requested, books, vouchers and other material of evidence have to be presented to the banking firm.

Chapter V.

Horses, land- and water vehicles.

Article 18.

(1) If horses, land- or water vehicles belong legally or really to a person in article 1, they have to be registered with the Central Office for Jewish Emigration, Amsterdam, until June 30, 1942.

H1237-0283

(2) Only the Commissioner General of the Security Servise has the right of disposal of the articles described in par. 1. The rules of article 7, par. 1-3 are applied accordingly.

Chapter VI.

Penal code.

Article 19.

(1) Who purposely violates or evades the rules of this order or who purposely prevents property values, which are subject to seizure according the rules of this order or order No. 148/1941, will be sentenced to prison or fined with an unlimited amount, or both.

(2) If the act was committed by negligence, the penalty is imprisonment up to one year of a fine of up to 100.000 Guilders.

Article 20.

(1) In addition to this penalty a confiscation of the values, concerned by the punishable action, can be decided upon.

(2) If no certain person can be prosecuted or sentenced, the confiscation may be ordered independent of this fact.

Article 21.

(1) The prosecution takes place only upon request by the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories (Commissioner General for Finance and Economics, respectively in the cases of chapter V: Commissioner General for the Security Service).

(2) The sentence proposed can be revoked until it has been pronounced by the highest court without further appeal.

Article 22.

The actions punishable according to article 19 are punishable offences in the sense of article 2, paragraph 2, of order No. 52/1940 concerning the German jurisdiction over criminal acts in the final draft of order No. 56/1942.

Article 23.

(1) The Values concerned by a criminal act according to article 29, may also be confiscated through administrative measures.

(2) In this case, the confiscation will take place by order of the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories (Commissioner General for the Security Service); it is valid by public announcement or by notifying the person concerned. If the confiscation concerns articles or rights which in pursuance of a legal order are registered in a public register, it has to be registered with this register immediately without charge upon request of the Reich Commissioner (Commissioner General for the Security Service).

(3) The Reich Commissioner (Commissioner General for Finance and Economics) respectively in the cases of section V; Commissioner General for the Security Service will decide upon the use of the confiscated property values.

Chapter VII.

Final regulations.

The obligation for registration or delivery as confirmed by this order - does also exist if the property values concerned have been registered in pursuance of order No. 26/1940 dealing with the managment of enemy values, or in pursuance of other orders. Article 6 is not effected by it.

H1237-0284

Article 25.

(1) The Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherland Territories - Commissioner General for Finance and Economics, respectively in cases of section V. Commissioner General for the Security Service) - takes the measures necessary for the execution of this order. He can permit deviations of the rules of this order. Furthermore he can make general legally binding decisions in doubtful applications of this order.

(2) The Reich Commissioner (Commissioner General for Finance and Economics) can transfer the authority which was given to the banking firm of Lippmann, Rosenthal & Co., in pursuance of the rules of this order, or in pursuance of order No. 148/1941. to another party.

Article 26.

This order shall take effect as of the date of publication.

Den Hague, the 21 st of May 1942.

The Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories:

Signed : Seyss-Inquart.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 3336 - PS

I, HENRY E. JACOB, X 046203, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English language; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 3336-PS.

HENRY E. JACOB
X 046203

OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
TRANSLATION OF DOC.NO. 3339-PS

Order of the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories concerning Marriages of Male Persons of German Nationality in the Occupied Netherlands Territories, and Related Matters, February 28, 1941.

(Verordnungsblatt, 1941, page 143)

(Excerpts)

In pursuance of Section 5 of the decrees of the Fuehrer concerning the exercise of governmental authority in the Netherlands of May 18, 1940 (RGBl, I, p. 778), I hereby order as follows:

Section 1.

(1) The marriage of a male person of German nationality shall have validity only if the marriage ceremony is performed by a German official.

. . . . . .

Section 4.

(1) Upon the application of a female person of Netherlands nationality intending to marry a German and requiring for such marriage, in accordance with Articles 92 -96 of the Netherlands Civil Code, the consent of her parents, grandparents, guardian, or guardians, the approval of the Reich Commissioner for the occupied Netherlands territories (through the Commissioner General for Administration of Justice) may be substituted for such consent.

Section 5.

On application of a female person of Netherlands nationality intending to marry a German national,, the Reich Commissioner for the occupied Netherlands territories (through the Commissioner General for the Administration of Justice) may grant dispensation from the observance of the waiting period required in accordance with Articles 91 and 103 of the Netherlands Civil Code.

. . . . . .

The Hague, February 28, 1941.

SEYSS-INQUART

Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories

I, JOSEPH MICHEL, X-046319, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No.3339-PS

JOSEPH MICHEL
X-046319

H1237-0285

H1237-0286

OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO 3340-PS

First Order of the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories concerning Extraordinary Measures of a Constitutional and Administrative Nature, March 1, 1941.

(Verordnungsblatt, 1941, page 137)

Pursuant to Section 3 of the decree of the Fuehrer concerning the exercise of governmental authority in the Netherlands of May 18, 1940 (RGBl, I, p. 778), I hereby order as follows:

Section 1.

The following provisions shall apply to the administration of those communities for which the Reich Commissioner for the occupied Netherlands territories shall deem their application necessary.

Section 2.

(1) The municipal Councils, the Joint Boards of the Mayors and Aldermen, and all other municipal boards or commissions shall be and hereby are dissolved.

(2) The powers, provisions, and duties vested in or imposed upon the agencies dissolved in accordance with subsection 1 by virtue of statute or contractual provisions and the official powers and duties of the mayor shall be vested in a Government Commissioner.

(3) The dissolution of the Joint of the Mayor and Aldermen shall not affect the remaining activities of the Aldermen within the municipal administration unless it shall be otherwise provided in a specific instance.

Section 3.

The Government Commissioner shall, with regard to his official duties, be subject to the supervision of the Provincial Commission and the Secretary General in the Ministry of the Interior who may issue instructions binding on him.

Section 4.

(1) Section I, No. 3, subsection I of Section 2, and Section 3 of Order No. 108/1940 (Fourth Order concerning certain Administrative Measures) shall be made applicable to the appointment and dismissal of the Government Commissioner

(2) The Government Commissioner, at his free discretion, shall appoint and dismiss the aldermen. In provincial capitals and in communities with more than 50.000 inhabitants the appointment and dismissal by the Government Commissioner shall be subject to the consent of the Secretary General in the Ministry of the Interior.

Section 5.

The Government Commissioner shall appoint no less than four and no more than eight persons from among the inhabitants, who shall advise him in the fulfillment of his official duties. They shall be designated as "Advisers of the Government Commissioner."

Section 6.

(1) The Reich Commissioner for the occupied Netherlands territories will by order, determine the municipalities to which the provisions of this order shall apply.

(2) Such order shall be published in the Verordnungsblatt fuer die besetzten niederlaendischen Gebiete.

H1237-0287

Section 7.

Rules and regulations necessary for the enforcement of this order may be issued in the form of an administrative order.

Section 8.

This order shall take effect as of the date of publication.

The Hague, March 1, 1941.

SEYSS-INQUART
Reich Commissioner for the Occupied
Netherlands Territories

I, JOSEPH MICHEL, A-046319, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 3340-PS

JOSEPH MICHEL
A-046319

H1237-0288

OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL
TRANSLATION OF DOC. NO.3341-PS

Third Order of the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories concerning Certain Provisions in Connection with Netherlands Nationality, August 8, 1941.

(Verordnungsblatt, 1941, page 622)

(Excerpts)

Pursuant to Section 5 of the decree of the Fuehrer concerning the exercise of governmental authority in the Netherlands of May 18, 1940 (RBGl.I, p.778), I hereby order as follows:

Section I.

(1) A Netherlands national acquiring German nationality shall not be deemed to have lost Netherlands nationality unless he in person, or, if a minor, his legal representative acting on his behalf, shall renounce by declaration Netherlands nationality within one year after acquisition of German nationality.

. . . . . .

Section 2.

A declaration made in accordance with subsection 1 of Section 1 shall take effect as of the date on which the declarant shall have obtained German nationality.

Section 3.

This order shall take effect as of the date of publication.

The Hague, August 8, 1941.

SEYSS-INQUART
Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories

I, JOSEPH MICHEL, X-046319, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No.3341-PS.

JOSEPH MICHEL
X-046319

Eighth Order of the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories concerning Special Measures Affecting Administrative Organization, August 11, 1941.

(Verordnungsblatt, 1941, page 637)

(Excerpts)

Pursuant to Section 5 of the decree of the Fuehrer concerning the exercise of governmental authority in the Netherlands of May 18, 1940 (RGBl. I, p. 778), I hereby order as follows:

CHAPTER I - Provisions concerning the Function of Representative Bodies and Agencies of Public Law

Section 1.

(1) All functions of the Municipal Councils and Provincial States (Provinzialstaaten) shall be suspended; elections to these representative bodies shall not take place.

(2) The functions of the following bodies shall likewise be suspended:

1. The Joint Councils of Mayors and Aldermen.

2. The Provincial Councils.

3. The Council of the States-General.

4. The Election Boards (Articles 32, 33, and 58 of the Election Statute).

(3) The functions of the Municipal Council shall be suspended, as determined by the mayor; those of the Provincial Councils, as determined by the commissioner of the province.

. . . . . .

CHAPTER II. - Provisions concerning Local Administration

Section 3.

The powers and duties of the Municipal Council and the Joint Council of the Mayor and Aldermen shall be assumed by the mayor. The same applies to the powers and duties of those municipal boards which shall be suspended in pursuance of an order made in accordance with subsection 3, sentence 1, of Section 1.

Section 4.

(1) The mayor shall appoint, for a term of six years, no less than two but no more than six aldermen as his representatives and agents in the administration of municipal affairs.

. . . . . .

Section 5.

(1) The appointment of an aldermen shall be subject to ratification by the supervising authority.

(2) With the consent of the supervising authority the mayor shall be authorized to dismiss an alderman without notice. At the request of the supervising authority the mayor shall dismiss any alderman without notice.

. . . . . .

Section 7.

(1) The mayor shall appoint councilmen from among the Netherlands nationals domiciled in the community.

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(2) The number of councilmen shall be determined in accordance with Section 5 of the Municpalities Act, subject, however, to a reduction by half of the number prescribed there and diminished by one.

. . . . . .

Section 9.

(1) The mayor shall report immediately to the supervising authority any appointment of a councilman that he may make.

(2) At the request of the supervising authority, the mayor shall without delay dismiss any councilman.

Section 10.

(1) It shall be the duty of the councilmen:

1. To advise the mayor and to submit to him suggestions on the administration of municipal affairs.

2. To promote understanding of his measures among the citizenry.

(2) The councilmen shall not receive any compensation for their activities.

. . . . . .

Section 12.

(1) The term of a councilman shall be four years.

(2) It shall terminate before that time: first, if the councilman removes his domicile from the community; secondly, if he is removed from office.

Section 13.

(1) The mayor shall call a general meeting of councilmen in every instance in which, in accordance with the provisions of the Municipalities Act, a resolution of the Municipal Council is necessary.

(2) The mayor shall determine the agenda. The general meetings shall be public whenever the mayor so orders. Such order shall be made public.

(3) The several items of the agenda shall be discussed in the general meetings; no vote shall be taken nor any resolution adopted. The councilmen shall be required to state their opinion if it varies from that of the mayor; such statement shall be made part of the record.

. . . . . .

Section 14.

(1) The supervising authority shall see to it that the administration of the mayor conforms to law and furthers the public interest.

(2) The supervising authority may issue instructions to the mayor. The mayor shall be bound to follow these instructions.

(3) The Secretary General of the Ministry of the Interior shall also be authorized to issue instructions in accordance with subsection 2 to mayors of communities mentioned in subsection 1, No. 2, of Section 15, except in matters relating to the Waterstaat; the Secretary General of the Ministry of Waterstaat shall exercise this authority in regard to all matters relating to Waterstaat.

Section 15.

(1) The supervising power shall be exercised in all matters except those of the Waterstaat:

H1237-0290

1. For the communities of the Hague, Amsterdam, and Rotterdam, by the Secretary General of the Ministry of the Interior.

2. For all other communities, by the commissioner of the provin notwithstanding the authority of the Secretary General of the Ministry of the Interior vested in him by virtue of other provisions of law.

(2) The supervising power in matters of the Waterstaat shall be exercised in all communities by the commissioner of the province notwithstanding the authority of the Secretary General of the Ministry of Waterstaat vested in him in pursuanc of the law.

CHAPTER III - Provisions relating to Provincial Administration

Section 16.

(1) The powers and duties of the Provincial States shall be assumed by the commissioner of the province.

.....

Section 18.

(1) The commissioner of the province shall be authorized to request information from, to submit suggestions and, in cases of emergency, to issue instructions to, all public authorities or agencies in the province unless the authority of such agencies shall extend beyond the limits of the province; the authority to issue such instructions, in case of emergency, shall exist notwithstanding the power of the central authorities concerned to issue such instructions.

Secondly, he shall be authorized to require information from, and to su suggestions to, all agencies whose powers shall extend beyond the limits of the province unless they constitute central authorities.

(2) The commissioner of the province shall have power to issue the instructions mentioned in subsection 1, No. 1, to officials of the Netherlands police force only if the commissioner takes measures within the usual scope of his official duties which these police officials are required to carry out. The commissioner of the province and the director general of the police shall provide each other with such information as they may require for the fulfillment of their official duties. They may submit suggestions to each other.

.....

Section 19.

(1) The commissioner of the province shall appoint, for a term of six years, no less than two but no more than six provincial administrators as his agents and representatives in the administration of provincial affairs.

.....

The Hague, August 11, 1941.

SEYSS-INQUART
Reich Commissioner for th
Occupied
Netherlands Territories

I, JOSEPH MICHEL, X-046319, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 3342-PS

JOSEPH MICHEL
X-046319

H1237-0291

H1237-0292

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3391-PS
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Vienna, 30 September, 1938

My Fuehrer

We all are inspired by your solution of the Sudetendeutschen (Sudeten Germans) question. A year ago, even a few weeks ago, I thought it was impossible that this question could be solved except by using full military force. Not until the last weeks did the directions of your leadership, which for the others is so inexorable and inevitable become apparent. I don't believe that one sane German exists today who does not consider himself more than fortunate if he can help you, my Fuehrer, to finish the job, even though his share in the work, objectively viewed, be very small. We from the Ostmark can hardly contain ourselves because of our twofold happiness and our pride.

The solution of this question and above all the nature of this solution could have been the strongest endurance test and could have made room for further planned action in the direction of the East and the Southeast. My Fuehrer, this letter of mine has actually a different purpose, but first of all I had to give my feelings free play.

I now believe, that after days of greatest strain the time has come again for the consideration of the more beautiful things in life and I beg you now to bring about a decision in regard to the question of the tapestries. I am already annoyed at the fact that men from foreign states were at the Fuehrerbau (Leader's building), at a time when the tapestries were not yet hanging on the walls.

We have in Vienna approximately 700-900 first-class tapestries which are for the most part in depots. We from the Ostmark will be happy and proud, if you, my Fuehrer, decorate your buildings with these tapestries; and it is hard for me, to make even a suggestion concerning the kind and the number. The best thing would be, that we hang up the most beautiful pieces and that you, my Fuehrer, make the selection on the occasion of your next visit to Vienna, which I hope will be soon.

I tried to select a few pieces and I have found two sets. I had pictures made of both. One set treats the history of Decius Mus.; the subject and the size of the tapestries in marked on the back of the pictures. This set is blue-green in tone and subdued in color. It was manufactured according to P.P.Rubens' designs, which can be found even today in the Vienna depots. These tapestries were made in Bruessels in the 17th century. Cross lines can be seen in the pictures. The tapestries were folded up in the depots. If they are put up, these cross lines will disappear in a few days. The set is composed of 5 pictures and to complete it a sixth picture is added, representing a scene from Emperor Augustus' life, the fight of the Romans against the Germans, in approximately the same style as the Decius Mus. pieces.

The second set shows pictures of the history of Alexander the Great. There are eight tapestries. They are rich in contrast, marvellous in color, mostly red-green. Both sets are intended merely as samples and we don't want in any way to anticipate your decisions, my Fuehrer.

I have given instructions that rooms at the Hofburg, which are vacant because of the overthrow (Umbruch), be rearranged for the display of the collections. The rooms in the new wing of the Hofburg, from the balcony of which you, my Fuehrer, made the announcement about the accomplished return of the Ostmark to the German people, shall serve as display room for the most

H1237-0293

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3392-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Dr.S/K

3 Sept 1937

Reguire !

My Dear Mr. Koppler !

It is appropriate in my opinion that you, my dear Mr. Koppler, should remain well informed about details arising from between the action taken by me and the Teinfaltstrasse. In this respect I am keeping the result of the discussion at Mondsee, in mind and I am taking the thoughts of your last communication to heart. I therefore do not take any stand in regard to these individual incidents and above all I avoid any one reaction, insfar as I do not request Dr. Jury to initiate a corresponding clarification.

I take it upon myself to transmit the edition of the " Austrian Observer " (Oesterreichischen Beobachters) of August as an enclosure, and draw your attention to the leading article " Here and There " whose contents probably are intended to be only personal and not objective, anymore.

I refer to the communication - Hitler " Mein Kampf " permitted ! - and believe that I will not have to add anything here, since you are acquainted with the individual incidents which have occurred on the Saturday in question.

Finally I turn back to the report " Law for the Protection of Order " (Ordnungsschutzgesetz). In this case the matter stands as follows. Minister Glaise has attempted to incorporate the emergency decrees (Not verordnungen) into a useful system ever since the first moment of his taking office, and to decrease them to a reasonable extent. When he came with his suggestion, Neustaedter-Stuerner, the comrade-in-arms of the Teinfaltstrasse, had a draft prepared by the Chief Management (Generaldirektion), which can only be considered as an aggravation of the conditions at that time, and which in the meantime has been overcome by the Law for the " Protection of Order " (Ordnungsschutzgesetz). Minister Glaise, then had in turn, a counter-draft prepared by Dr. Mannlicher. In view of the resistance on the part of the Chief Management (Generaldirektion), the chances of the latter's success were little. In early April, when the Federal Chancellor (Bundeskanzler) was negotiating with me about the Bureau (Referat), I on my part made the condition that the draft by Mannlicher was to become the basis of the innovation. The Federal Chancellor (Bundeskanzler) accepted this request and negotiations took place on this basis. When finally nothing came of the Bureau (Referat) and the exchange of ministers took place, the Chief Management (Generaldirektion) again introduced its own suggestion, which did not contain anything new except the lessening of the extent of punishment and the introduction of the right of appeal. Dr. Mannlicher was full of despair because of the continuation of this action. In a renewed conference with the Federal Chancellor (Bundeskanzler), I insisted that the proposition by Mannlicher be accepted finally as the sole basis of the innovation, and that the latter be drawn to a close. Further negotiations on this basis led to an agreement between Minister Glaise, (and) Dr. Skubl under consultation of Dr. Mannlicher. After that I talked to the latter, who remarked that it would be practical to add some further additions to the draft, which however, in view of the final conversation was considered hopeless by him. I now addressed a communication to the Federal Chancellor (Bundeskanzler), requesting that four (4) more additions to

Exhibit USA 702
Filed Jan. 14, 1946

3397-PS

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3397-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Berlin, 8 January, 1938

To

State Councillor Dr. Seyss--Inquart

Vienna
Hof 5.

Through the Foreign Office

Very esteemed State Councillor!

Today I had a visit from Mr. Pl., who gave us a report of the state of affairs and informed us, that you are seriously considering the question of whether or not you are forced, to hand back the mandate entrusted to you.

I informed General (Generaloberst) Goering of the situation in writing, and G. has just had me informed, that I should try my utmost to prevent you or any one else from taking this step. This is also in the same vein as G.'s conversation with Dr. J. before Christmas at any rate. G. requests you to undertake nothing of this nature under any circumstances before he himself has the opportunity of speaking with you once more.

I can also inform you, that G. is furthermore making an effort to speak to Ll., in order that certain improper conditions be eliminated by him.

I am very sorry, that the situation has become so acute and I myself have the feeling, that the above-mentioned request is somewhat awkward for you at the present. However, I must tell you openly, that I really didn't expect any other attitude from G.

With the best wishes,
very truly yours
(sig.) KEPPLER

I, T/3 Charles A. Moosmann, 12141925, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 3397-PS.

T/3 CHARLES A. MOOSMANN
12141925

H1237-0294

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3398 - PS
OFFICE U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Vienna 4 November, 1939

R E I C H F U E H R E R !

A short time ago I asked you to bring about a settlement in the matter BUERKEL. A new occurrence confirms me in my attitude and I therefore repeat my request.

When I was in Lodz, I was informed that a telegram from a secretary of BUERKEL, named TRUM, had arrived in Krakau in which I was requested to contact the Gauleiter instead of the Mayor of the city of Vienna in the future. The content of the telegram was completely unclear to me and I had Dr. LANGOTH of my staff ask TRUM. TRUM informed LANGOTH that Gauleiter BUERKEL had intended to deport Viennese Jews to Poland, but that I had prevented this. Gauleiter BUERKEL had added the remark that I (Seyss - Inquart) should not confuse personal and official matters.

I must protest most strongly against this supposition and therefore feel forced to demand the clearing up of the matter BUERKEL, because I do not doubt but that he (Buerkel) will make similar remarks to other persons in order to create, in the way which I now know to be characteristic of him, the proper atmosphere.

To the subject itself I add that an expert (Referent) in Krakau informed me of the intention of deporting Jews from the Protectorate as well as from Vienna to Poland. Thereupon I gave instructions that such actions could be carried out only in agreement with the SD and through the SD, and that I could not permit wild actions.

I have also given such instructions to the STRECKENBACH'S deputy in Krakau or already to HARSTER.

I repeat my initial request and remain with a

Heil Hitler!

Your always obediant

(signed) D SEYSS - INQUART

H1237-0295

To the

Reich Fuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police

Reich Leader HEINRICH HIMMLER,

B e r l i n SW 11

Prinz - Albert - Strasse Nr.9

I, A.Flandreau, Civ.046305 hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 3398 - PS.

A. FLANDREAU

CIV.046305

H1237-0296

H1237-0297

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3400-PS
OFFICE OF U.S.CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Memorial about the meeting
of 28 December 1918.

Place: Vienna I. An Hof 5.

Present: The Organizers.

After thorough discussion of the available drafts those present agree to immediately take in hand the constitution of the planned Organization.

The NAME chosen is "DEUTSCHE GEMEINSCHAFT" ("German Association").

The present are in agreement regarding the following principles of the organization:

1) The aim of the organization is to liberate the German People from Jewish influences (written in: i.g. to fight Judaism with all suitable means).

2) The organization is to be secret. However, since it cannot be avoided that the organization comes forward publicly, this will have to be done under the pretense of harmless aims without making known its actual institutions.

3) The Association is split up into several degrees, of which the lower ones are subordinated to the higher ones. Their number and their sphere of activities is to be fixed at a later date.

4) In the lower degrees the Association is split up into individual Subassociations, which in order to more easily draw into the Association politically like-minded people and in order to obtain increased effectiveness, may be politically colored but may also neutral. The formation of such Subassociations in one and the same locality is not limited, but depends only upon the sanction of the leadership of the Association.

5) As members can only be accepted such people who are Germans, not Freemasons, and who are of Aryan descent and are not married to a Jewess ..... and who make a vow, the wording of which is to be determined.
The decision regarding admission to membership, which is always to take place in the lowest (1.) degree, rests with the Association. In case of compliance with requirements, which are still to be established promotion into a higher degree may take place.

6) All members are bound

   a) to secrecy regarding all institutions, persons and the aims of the Association not made known to the outside, as well as to the happenings inside the same. This applies as well to outsiders as towards members of the lower degrees;

   b) to obedience towards the instructions of organs to be appointed;

   c) to further the aims of the Assodation and to mutually support its members.

For further accomplishment the following has been decided upon:

The present founders of the Association represent the highest degree They will create further degrees from those becoming members in the future, and will extend the highest degree.

Until the fixing of competence for decisions concerning applications for membership, a unanimous vote of the founding members is to take place in resolutions regarding this question.
They will also determine future institutions of the organization, insofor as they have not yet been stated above.

New Members will be admitted for the time being solely in the lowest (1st) degree of the Association, without more specific regulations by a Subassociation. Only after a greater number of members have been admitted will a splitting up into politically colored subassociations and the constitution of the remaining members of the 1st degree into neutral subassociations take place.

The present members are entitled to solicit members. The recruits, if suitable, may be informed;
that the Association is an organization for the protection of Aryan interests against Judaism, and has for its purpose the mutual advancement of its members,
that all members are bound to secrecy, to obedience and to furtherance of the aims, particularly to support of the other members (in the sense of Par. 6),
that the Association is a secret organization, the institutions of which are always only partially known even to its members, and that qualified organs are called upon to issue instructions,
that anual membership dues are to be paid, the amount of which is to be decided by the leadership,
that only applications can be accepted, but the decision regarding admission will have to be reserved,
that condition of admission must be non-Jewish descent, the applicant must not be married to a Jewess, must not be a Freemason, but a German, and by a solemn promise must admit conformity to these requirements and that he must vow to fulfill the above mentioned obligations.

It is not permissible to mention the names of members when applying for membership, nor is the admitted person authorized to inform third parties of those facts made known to him.

The person who summoned the meeting is charged with the drafting of the vow for membership admission into the lowest and highest degrees.

At the next meeting those present will on their part give the vow.

Next meeting to take place on Thursday, January 2, 1919.

I, ERWIN COOPER, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 3400-PS.

ERWIN COOPER
(B - 210751)

H1237-0298

3425-PS

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3425 PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Exhibit USA 701 - Filed Jan 16 1946

Dr. ARTHUR SEYSS-INQUART

Nuernberg, 10.12.1945

I am a lawyer by profession. I passed my final examinations in law and received my Doctor Jurist degree in 1917. At the time I was serving as a commissioned officer in a Tyrolean Imperial (Kaiserjaeger) regiment of the Austro-Hungarian Army, in which I served from 1914 to 1918 in World War I. In 1921 I began my legal practice as lawyer in Vienna, Austria, where I finally built up a large clientele, including industrialists and Jews. I continued to practice my profession in Vienna until I was appointed Minister of Interior and Security of Austria on 16 February 1938.

In 1918 I became interested in the anschluss of Austria with Germany. From that year on I worked, planned and collaborated with others of a like mind to bring about a union of Austria with Germany. It was my desire to effect this union of the two countries in an evolutionary manner and by legal means. Among my Austrian collaborators were Dr. Neubacher, City Councilor Speiser, the University Professor Hughlmann and Dr. Wilhelm Bauer, Prof. Wettstein, and others. Later, during the rise of National Socialism, Dr. Friedrich Rainer, Dr. Jury, Glaise-Horstenau, Maj. Klausner, Dr. Muchlmann, Globotschnigg and others. I supported also the National Socialist party as long as it was legal, because it declared itself with particular determination in favor of the anschluss. From 1932 onwards I made financial contributions to this party, but I discontinued financial support when it was declared illegal in 1934. From July 1934 until the year 1936 I supported individual National Socialists as lawyer and in collaboration with the Welfare Work Langoth in Linz. From July 1936 onwards I endeavoured to help the National Socialists to regain their legal status and finally to participate in the Austrian government. During this time, particularly after the Party was forbidden in July 1934, I know that the radical element of the party was engaged in terroristic activities, such as attacks on railroads, bridges, telephone communications, etc. I knew that the governments of both Chancellors Dolfuss and Schuschnigg, although they held the same total German viewpoint in principle, were opposed to the anschluss then because of the National Socialist regime in the Reich. I was sympathetic towards the efforts of the Austrian Nazi Party to gain political power and corresponding influence, because they were in favor of the anschluss.

On the day of the unsuccessful "putsch", 25 July 1934, I was at my home in Stannern, near Iglau, Czecho-Slovakia. I learned later that the murder of Chancellor Dolfuss on that day was the outcome of a "putsch" plan, in which SS circles were mainly involved, to arrest the Chancellor and put in an Austrian government with National Socialist participation. Eight or ten days before this unsuccessful "putsch" Chancellor Dolfuss sent for me. We discussed the disturbances and troubled state of affairs created in Austria by the radical element of the Austrian National Socialists. I advised Chancellor Dolfuss to make an arrangement with Hitler because the Austrian National Socialists and even this radical element would obey Hitler's orders. I conjectured - later I found confirmation - that these terroristic activities had a certain support from the Reich. Chancellor Dolfuss told me he would think the matter over and made a tentative future appointment for a further discussion. I informed among other, also acquaintances of this conversation whom I knew had influence among the Austrian National Socialists. About one week later Chancellor informed me that at the moment he had not time for further discussion. Without advising anyone I returned to my home.

Before the Anschluss I worked for the legal, political activities of the Austrian National Socialists under the conditions laid down in the Austrian constitution.

On 10 March 1938 I suggested to Chancellor Schuschnigg as a solution to the difficulties resulting from his plebiscite plan, that the National Socialists be appointed to the Cabinet, after I became in May 1937 State Councillor and then on 16.2.1938 Minister of Interior and Security. After I became State Councillor I discussed several times with von Papen, the German

H1237-0299

ambassador, the possibilities of an understanding between the Austrian Government and the Austrian National Socialists, respectively the Reich. We did not talk of the anschluss as an actual programme. However, we were both of the opinion that a successful understanding would bring about in the course of time the anschluss by evolutionary means in some form. The last time I spoke to von Papen was in January 1938 in Garmisch, where I met him by chance.

My appointment as State Councillor was the result of an agreement between Austria and Germany on 11.7.1936. My appointment as Minister of the Interior and Security was one of the results of the conference between Chancellor Schuschnigg and Hitler at Berchtesgaden. Dr. Muehlmann was also at Berchtesgaden, but not as a member of Schuschnigg's delegation. The Austrian National Socialists must certainly have taken my appointment as Minister of Interior and Security as an indication of their right to activity, still more, however, the contents of the agreement of 12.2.1938, allowed them to demonstrate their convictions. This right they utilized in more and more widespread demonstrations.

After my appointment as State Councillor, Wilhelm Keppler, the German Secretary of State for Austrian affairs, arranged a visit for me with Hess and Goering. I explained my intentions and plans to them, namely the attainment of legal activity for the Austrian National Socialists, independant of the Reich party. Hess expressed his interest and said to me among other things: he regretted that I was not one of the original "old fighters". I believe that at that time Goering had already established direct connections with the Austrian State Secretary, Guido Schmid.

After my appointment as Minister of Interior and Security of Austria I went to Berlin to visit Hitler. I arrived in Berlin on 17.2.1938 where I was met by Keppler who took me to Himmler. This visit was not anticipated in my programme. Himmler wanted to talk over police matters, I informed him, however, that I was not conversant to speak about them. I did not follow the suggestions which he made. I greeted Hiter with raised hand - permissable after the agreement of 12.2. - advised him, however, immediately that as Austrian Minister my responsibility lay with Austria. I explained to Hitler my plans, namely: I had to be the living guaranty for Dr. Schuschnigg of the evolutionary way. The Austrian National Socialists must only conduct their activities according to the Austrian constitution and on those lines find their way to the Reich; they must not make any totalitarian claim nor conduct a cultural struggle. The leadership of the Austrian National Socialists must be independent of the Reich and remain responsible to Austria. I would have as Minister of Security to oppose any kind of illegal activity. Against this the Austrian National Socialists would be permitted full freedom of activity to work for the closest co-operation of Austria and Germany. Hitler agreed to my plans but expressed certain doubts whether Dr. Schuschnigg would be willing to go so far. During my conference with Hitler, Keppler and Ribbentrop waited in the ante-room of Hitler's office. Upon my return to Vienna I reported to Chancellor Schuschnigg the content of my discussion and begged him to make a decision about the Austrian National Socialist question. Then I attended rallies of the Austrian National Socialists, to inform them of the content of my conference with Hitler. This occurred with the knowledge of Chancellor Schuschnigg and Minister Zernatto principally in Graz and Linz. The Linz address was broadcast over the Austrian radio on 5.3.1928.

Chancellor Schuschnigg thereafter planned to hold a plebiscite on Austrian independence. I wrote a letter to Chancellor Schuschnigg and objected to the plebiscite because the way in which it was to be carried out would not allow the Austrian people to express their real desires. A copy of my letter to Chancellor Schuschnigg I gave to the National Socialist leaders according to the agreement of 12.2.1938 which made me liaison man between the Austrian Government and the Austrian National Socialists, respectively the Reich. This copy was given to Hitler in Berlin by Globotschnigg. I conferred with Chancellor Schuschnigg especially on 10.3 in the evening, and we were near to reaching a solution for overcoming the difficulties which had arisen. Thereupon I went to the Hotel "Regina", where I had been told Klausner

H1237-0300

was, to inform him of the result of my conversation with Schuschnigg. There I found 8 - 12 National Socialists, some of whom I knew. Klausner, Dr. Rainer and Globotschnigg had a conversation in an adjoining room in which I did not take part, and the substance of which I was not informed. When Klausner came in I wanted to advise him of the substance of my conversation with Chancellor Schuschnigg. Klausner showed little interest, and informed me that the Reich had rejected the plebiscite and that I should receive on the morrow a letter from Hitler which would inform me more exactly of the situation. He requested those present to be available the next day.

Glaise-Horstenau arrived early on 11.3 in Vienna by plane and informed me that Berlin was greatly excited and that military steps were in preparation. I received Hitler's letter by courier. It contained rejection of the plebiscite and demanded its postponement and a modified procedure. There were several erroneous statements in the letter which I corrected in my conference with the Chancellor. Further, Hitler gave expression to his belief that there would be disturbances in Austria if Dr. Schuschnigg did not relent, and that the Reich was prepared to come to the help of Austria if Austria demanded so. At 10 o'clock in the morning Glaise-Horstenau and I went to the Bundes Chancellery and conferred for about two hours with Dr. Schuschnigg. We told him of all that we knew, particularly about the possibility of disturbances and preparations by the Reich. The Chancellor said that he would give his decision by 1400 hours. While I was with Glaise-Horstenau and Dr. Schuschnigg I was repeatedly called to the telephone to speak to Goering. He informed me, (the demands of the Reich steadily increasing) that the agreement of 12.2. had been cancelled, and demanded Dr. Schuschnigg's resignation and my appointment as Chancellor. I delivered this information verbally to Dr. Schuschnigg and withdrew from the conference.

In the meantime Keppler arrived from Berlin and had a conference in the Bundes Chancellery, I believe also with President Miklas. The latter refused to concede to the demands and sought to find various other solutions. When Keppler arrived from Berlin he showed me the contents of a telegram which I, as leader of the provisional Austrian government was to send to Hitler in which I was to request sending of German troops to Austria to put down disorders. I refused as I did not want to establish myself as head of a provisional government, and there were no disorders in Austria. Keppler repeatedly urged me about the the telegram. Around 6 p.m. I told him that he knew my standpoint and should do what he wished with Berlin. Keppler, as I have been able to confirm from records available, understood my answer and did not send off the telegram at that time. Around 7.30 p.m. a frontier police post announced that German troops were crossing the frontier. Thereupon Dr. Schuschnigg gave his well-known farewell speech over the radio. Upon requests from various sides I followed with a speech over the radio, stating that I was still functioning as Minister of Interior and Security, requesting preservation of peace and order, and gave directions that no resistance should be offered the German troops.

As I am able to gather from the records available, I was again requested around 10 p.m. to give my sanction to another somewhat altered telegram, about which I informed President Miklas and Dr. Schuschnigg. Finally President Miklas appointed me Chancellor and a little while later he approved my list of proposed ministers.

During the morning of 12 March I had a telephone conversation with Hitler in which I suggested that while German troops were entering Austria, Austrian troops as a symbol should march into the Reich. Hitler agreed to this suggestion and we agreed to meet in Linz, Upper Austria, later on that same day. I then flew to Linz with Himmler, who had arrived in Vienna from Berlin. I greeted Hitler on the balcony of the City Hall, and said that Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain was now inoperative. On 13 March President Miklas resigned without any specific request from me and the function of Bund President became mine, according to the constitution. Before his resignation President Miklas had appointed Kaltenbrunner to State Secretary

H1237-0301

for Security. During the course of the day (13 March) the Reuniting Law was adopted in the Austrian Ministry Council; this adoption was constitutionally legal according to the law of 1.5.1934. I then drove to Linz and reported to Hitler regarding the adoption of the anschluss law. At a public demonstration on 15.3 in Vienna he introduced me as "Reich Statthalter for Austria". Hitler put me in charge of the Civil Administration of Austria, while political matters were to be handled by Gauleiter Buerckel. After a short time Buerckel was made Reich Commissar for the Anschluss, to whose directions I, in the Civil Administration, was obligated.

I was happy that the Anschluss of Austria with the German Reich had come at last after so many vain endeavours since 1918, because I was in favour of the anschluss of Austria with the Reich under any conditions. I was aware at least to a certain extent of the harshness of the National Socialist regime, but I was of the opinion that these two German countries belonged together and that the German people should solve their own internal affairs and difficulties. I was convinced that the harshness of the National Socialist regime chiefly because of its achievement of the national aim - cancellation of discriminatory peace treaties and achievement of the right of self-determination - would in time be overcome.

Signed - SEYSS-INQUART.

Nuernberg, 10 December 1945.

Signed - Dr. Gustav Steinbauer
Witness of the signature.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 3425-PS

14 December 1945

I, JOSEPH MICHEL, X-046319, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 3425-PS.

JOSEPH MICHEL
X-046319.

H1237-0302

Exhibit USA 708
Filed Jan. 16, 1946

3430-PS

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 3430-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

FROM: Reichminister Seyss-Inquart, 1944, Vier Jahre in den Niederlanden

PAGE 10

We neither will oppress this land and its people imperialistically nor will we impose on them our political convictions. We will bring this about in no other way - only through our deportment and our example.

PAGE 144 Ibid.

Several times it has been held against me that I have let National Socialism come to the fore in all phases in public life. As far as I am concerned that is no reproach. It is a historical mission which I have to fulfill here.

PAGE 124

I will give my instructions. They must be executed by all. In the present situation a refusal to execute could be regarded only as sabotage. It is also clear, now more than ever, that every resistance which is directed against this fight for existence must be suppressed. Some time ago the representatives of the churches had written to the Wehrmacht commander and to me, and they presented their conception against the executions of death sentences which the Wehrmacht commander announced in the meantime. To this I can only say the following: The moment in which our men, father and sons with iron determination look towards their fate in the east and unflinchingly and steadfastly perform their highest pledge, it is unbearable to tolerate conspiracies whose goal is to weaken the rear of this eastern front. Whoever dares this must be annihilated. We must be severe and become even more severe against our opponents, this is the command of a relentless sequence of events and for us perhaps humanly hard, but our holy duty. We remain human because we do not torture our opponents, we remain by annihilating them.

PAGE 167

I have given orders to suppress all appearances with a severeness corresponding to the brutality of the crime. If in connection with these measures Dutch citizens are affected and have to undergo difficulties and limitations of special nature, then they have to seek the cause therefore solely in these eruptions of the anarchistic mental attitude of a few culprits and the just-as-criminal-tolerance or apathy within their own circles.

PAGE 57

The Jews are the enemy of national socialism and the national socialistic Reich. From the moment of their emancipation, their methods were directed to the annihilation of the common and moral worth of the German people and to replace national and responsible ideology with international Nihilism. The fatal meaning of Judaism became completely clear to the German people during the years of the world war. It was really they, who stuck the knife in the back of the German army which broke the resistance of the Germans, and in the year 1918, it was they who wanted to dissolve and decompose all national tradition and also moral and religious beliefs of the German people. The Jews for us are not Dutchmen. They are those enemies, with whom we can neither come to an armistice nor to peace. This applies here, if you wish, for the duration of the occupation. Do not expect an order from me which stipulates this, except regulations concerning police matters. We will beat the Jews wherever we meet them and those who join them must bear the consequences. The Fuehrer declared that the Jews have played their final act in Europe, and therefore they played their final act.

H1237-0303

H1237-0304

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 3430-PS
CONT'D

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 3430-PS

I, Joseph Michel, X-046319, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpt from Document No. 3430-PS.

JOSEPH MICHEL, X-046319

H1237-0305

EXCERPT

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 3444-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

From Diary of 1939
December 14, 1939
p. 99

The General Governer announces the following order of rank:

1. General Governer
2. Reich Minister Seyzz-Inquart
3A Ministerial Director Dr. Buehler
3B The first SS and police leaders
4. The district chiefs
5. The department leaders of the Office of the General Governer
6. Office Chief and first police leaders of the District Chief

.....

I, Joseph Michel X 046319, herbeby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpt from Document No. 3444 - PS.

Joseph Michel
X 046319

H1237-0306

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 3446-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Reference: RK 19694 B
Berlin 13 October 1938.

1. Note:

The Reich Fuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police submits with letter of 10 August 1938, received here 26 September 1938, 7 inventories concerning property and objects of art confiscated and sequestered respectively in Austria, also 10 albums of photographs, 1 catalogue and 1 certificate. While the albums of photographs and the catalogue are available in the office, the inventories and the certificate are attached.

Of special importance is the general inventory named under 6 of the letter. This inventory lists a total of 162 cases of confiscation. For 49 of them the value is not listed. For the remaining 113 a value amounting to 93.366.358.24 marks is named. Among them are the following properties with a value of 500,000.00 marks and more:

1.	Palace including grounds and forest of the Jew Rudolf Gutmann.	33.000.000.00
2.	7 estates of the family property of the House Habsburg in Lothringen as well as 4 villas and 1 palace of Otto V.Habsburg....	21.077.655.00
3.	Property value of the National Front (Vaterlaendische Front) and its subordinate formations.	8.505.500.00
4.	Cash and valuables confiscated by the State Police Main Office in Vienna.	3.902.319.24
5.	Wholesale business of the firm Wm. Abeles & Co.(non-Aryan).	3.500.000.00
6.	Hotel "Metropole"	2.000.000.00
7.	Chemical factory of the Jew Dr. Ignatz Kreidel	2.000.000.00
8.	Knitting and wool factory of the Jew Altmann	2.000.000.00
9.	Sanitorium Edlach (former priorietors Louis and Marietta Rosen)	1.800.000.00
10.	Leather factory and villa, etc. of Jew Fritz Spiegler.	1.500.000.00
11.	Schwadorf cotton spinning works of the Jew Dr. Pollak.	1.368.000.00
12.	1.700 automobiles.	1.020.000.00
13.	2 hotels, etc. of Jew Stiassny.	1.000.000.00
14.	Palace Leopoldskron (former proprietor Max Reinhardt).	700.000.00
15.	Cash confiscated by the State Police Office Eisenstadt.	651.762.00
16.	140 drilling wells, Joch German Petroleum Co., etc. of Jew Poeller,	658.410.00
17.	55 mountain lodges of "Bergfreunde" formerly "Naturfreunde".	500.000.00
18.	Villa of Jew Reitlinger.	500.000.00
		85.683.718.24

There are to be noted furthermore:

1.	Cash and valuables of Alwine Dollfuss, valued at	8.200.00
2.	Villa of the former Austrian Minister Zernatto.	120.000.00
3.	Villa, etc. of the former Minister of Finance, Dr. Drexler	Value Unkown.

The art objects sequestered in Vienna are included in the inventory described as Vienna album. Most of them are part of the Rothschild property, that is the numbers 1 to 56, 58 to 60, 62 to 69, 79, 112, 113, 119, 123 to 130, 132 to 137, and 139 to 149, while the others are the property of:

Viktor V. Ephrussi, No. 57, 71, 81-87, 116-118 and 120-122
Schenker, No. 61, 74, 75, 80, 108 and 138
Schweiger, No. 70 and 109-111
Pollak, No. 72, 106, 107 and 131
Thorsch, No. 73, 89-97 and 114.
Spiegler, No. 77, 78, 99-102, 104 and 105
Fuerst, No. 150-161.

The art objects sequestered from Max Reinhardt, Palace Leopoldskron near Salzburg, Dr Herz in Villa Herz near St. Gilgen, Moritz Bonn in Villa Bonn in Parsch near Salzburg, and Dr. Hess in Bad Gastein are listed in special inventories.

According to the titles of the inventory the art objects are only sequestered and secured.

Confiscation has been made in favor of various offices: Austria, Reich Fuehrer SS, NSDAP, Armed Forces, Lebensborn and others.

In my opinion a decision of the Fuehrer concerning the confiscated property pre-supposes intensive preliminary work. An office will have to be given the task to make proposals for use. In that respect, 2 questions will need clarification:

a. As a rule, should those offices in whose favor confiscation has been made retain the property assigned to them?

b. Should all works of art which are only "sequestered" so far be confiscated?

Both questions are connected with the intended regulation of confiscation of property of enemies of the people and state in Austria.

2. Submitted to the Reich Minister. I may refer to the note to Rk 20323, submitted simultaneously, (draft of a decree concerning the confiscation of property of enemies of the people and the state in Austria).

(Initials illegible.)

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 3446-PS

18 December 1945

I, JOSEPH MICHEL, X 046319, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpt from Document No. 3446-PS.

JOSEPH MICHEL
X 046319

H1237-0308

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 3447-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

To the Reichsstatthalter in Austria, Dr. Seyss-Inquart,
Vienna 1,
Ballhausplatz 2.

Subject: Letter of 24 October 1938.

Reference: Z1, 43-762-Prot. 1/38.

My dear Reichsstatthalter:

The confiscation of property of enemies of the people and the nation in Austria is to be regulated by a decree to be issued by the Reich Minister of the Interior. The Fuehrer, to whom I have submitted yesterday the draft by the Reich Minister of Interior of a decree concerning the confiscation of property of enemies of the people and state in Austria, has no objections against issuing the decree. I therefore assume that the decree will be issued in the near future.

Heil Hitler!

Yours faithfully,

Signed by: Reich Minister

(Green Pencil) L.

I, JOSEPH MICHEL, X-046319, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpt from Document No. 3447-PS.

JOSEPH MICHEL
X-046319.

H1237-0309

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3448-PS
Office, U.S. Chief of Counsel.

RK 22393 B 30 Oct.38

Vienna 1, 23 Oct. 1938
Ballhausplatz 2
Telephone U 24-5-20

Der Reichsstatthalter

(Various notations)

File Reference Zl.43-763-Prot.1/38

My dear Reich Minister:

May I recall to you myself and the law concerning confiscation of property of enemies of the State? The administration of this sphere is in some disorder and I do not wish to create order with insufficient means since that is useless.

I believe that this law is almost completed and ready for the signature of the Fuehrer, and I hope that you, dear Reich Minister, will have occasion to obtain the signature soon.

With best regards I remain,

Heil Hitler!

Yours faithfully,

(signed) SEYSS-INQUART

To: Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory
Dr. Lammers,
Berlin W 8
Wilhelmstrasse 78.

I, Joseph Michel, X 046319, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpt from Document No. 3448-PS.

JOSEPH MICHEL,
X 046319

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO.3449-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Reich Minister and Chief of the
Reich Chancellory,

B E R L I N ,

January 1939.

File No. RK 2222B

(Various notations)

To the Reich Fuehrer SS and Chief of the German police
in the Reich Ministry of the Interior,
Berlin, SW II

Prinz-Albrecht-Str. 8.

SUBJECT: Sequestration and confiscation of property, of enemies of the people and State in Austria.

Reference to letters of 10 August 1938 - S.V.1 No.2358/38 - 212 - 23 January 1938 - S.V. 1 No.2358 IX/ 38 212 - .

Because of the decree which has been issued in the meantime concerning confiscation of property of enemies of the people and State in Austria of 18 November 1938 the Fuehrer after my presentation limited his personal decision of the use of the property objects confiscated in Austria to the confiscated objects of Arts, and left the decision regarding the other confiscated objects to the offices named in the decree.

On behalf of the Fuehrer I ask to submit the inventory, after completion of the preliminary work, which condenses all objects of Art confiscated so far and of those objects of art only sequestrated as yet the confiscation of which is intended and which is not subject to any legal or other objections. In your earlier letters the objects of Art were for the most part described as only "sequestrated" so that it was not clear if it would be subject to eventual confiscation. The Fuehrer then intends to have the objects of Art inspected by the expert, whom he will name, and to have him and the Reich Statthalter in Austria make proposals on their use in preparation of his decision.

(Signed by the Reich Minister)

I, Joseph Michel, X 046319, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpt from Document No. 3449-PS.

JOSEPH MICHEL
X 046319.

H1237-0310

H1237-0311

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 3450-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

(law of 18 November 1938 concerning the confiscation of property of enemies of the people and the State in Austria).

On the basis of Article 3 of the Law concerning the re-union of Austria with the German Reich of 13 March 1938 (Reichsgesetzblatt I p. 237) the following is decreed:

I

(1) The Reichstatthalter (Austrian Government) in Vienna or the office empowered by him can confiscate for the benefit of Austria property of persons or societies which have promoted efforts inimical to the people of the State, as well as articles and rights which were used for destined to promote such efforts. The Reich Minister of the Interior or office empowered by him to determine which efforts are to be considered as inimical to the people of the State. After conference with the Reich Commissar for the re-union of Austria with the German Reich and with the consent of the Reich Minister of the Interior, confiscation can also be made in favor of another person as defined by the law.

(2) The Reich Statthalter (Austrian Government) in Vienna in consent with the Reich Commissar for the re-union of Austria with the German Reich disposed of the property confiscated in favor of Austria.

* * * * *

(7) Confiscations which were ordered by the Secret State Police before this decree took effect are considered confiscations in the sense of this decree. Instead of Paragraph 6, the rules of Paragraphs 8 - 15 are valid for these confiscations.

* * * * *

I, JOSEPH MICHEL, X-046319, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpt from Document No. 3450-PS.

JOSEPH MICHEL,
X-046319

H1237-0312

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 3457-PS
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel

From: Das Archiv, 1943-1944 p. 720
Dr. Seyss-Inquart, President of the German Academy
SP 21 December 1943

The Fuehrer named, as suggested by Reichsminister Goebbels, Reich Commissioner for the occupied territories of The Netherlands, Reichsminister Dr. Seyss-Inquart, as successor of the late President of the Ministry Ludwig Siebert as President of the German Academy.

Certificate of Translation of Document
No. 3457 - PS

I, Joseph Michel, X 046319, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German language; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpt from Document No. 3457-P.S.

Joseph Michel
X 046319

3460-PS

H1237-0313

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3460-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Gritzbach, E.: Hermann Goering, Reden und Aufsaetze.
Munich, 1938; pp. 348-349

"I must address myself with a serious word to the city of Vienna. The city of Vienna can no longer rightfully be called a German city. So many Jews live in this city. Where there are 300,000 Jews, you cannot speak of a German city.

"Vienna must once more become a German city, because it must perform important tasks for Germany in Germany's Ostmark. These tasks lie in the sphere of culture as well as in the sphere of economics. In neither of them can we, in the long run, put up with the Jew.

"This, however, should not only be attempted by inappropriate interference and stupid measures but must be done systematically and carefully. As Delegate for the Four-Year Plan I commission the Reichsstatthalter in Austria jointly with the Plenipotentiary of the Reich, to consider and take any steps, necessary for the redirection of Jewish commerce, i.e., for the Aryanization of business and economic life, and to execute this process in accordance with our laws, legally but inexorably."

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 3460-PS

December 18, 1945.

I, H.J. HARRISON, All. Exp. F. Permit No. 110609, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 3460-PS.

H.J. HARRISON
All. Exp. F. Permit No.
110609

From USA Ex. 614
Read Jan. 16, 1946

3465-PS

H1237-0314

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3465-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Translation Frank Diary 1940
Volume II, Pages 510 - 511

I am extremely glad, Mr. Reichscommissar and Reichsminister, to assure you in this hour of your departure that the months of our collaboration with you belong to the most precious memories of my life, and that your work in the Generalgovernment will be remembered forever in the building of the rising world government of the German nation. But, without that, your name, Mr. Reichsminister, is shining like a light through the history of the Third Reichs since you are the creator of the National-Socialist Austria, and the thought to have you here with us sounded all the time like a beautiful symphony since we have to see just in you the representative of the Ostmarkic German Nation. My Party friend, Seyss-Inquart, without doubt you have to accomplish in your new great tasks a lot of duties in a broad frame. We know that you will do honor to the call of the Fuehrer through your personal efforts just as you did in the building up of your life. But we have a special right to you. We built up during the most difficult times of the fight of the Third Reichs a beautiful friendly comradeship and successful collaboration. In the construction of the Generalgovernment your name will forever take a place of honor as an originator of this organization and this State system. I express our thanks, Mr. Reichsminister, for your collaboration and for your creative energy in the name of all officers, employees, and laborers of all SS organizations and the whole police force of the Generalgovernment, and in the name of the District Chiefs, the Gau and city leaders, in the name of all otherwise on the order of the Reichs and the Fuehrer here active persons..... During the hard times the common work united us here in the East. But it is, at the same time, the beginning point for a gigantic power development of the German Reichs. Its perfection will show the development of the greatest energy unit which there ever was in the history of the world. In this work you were placed by the Fuehrer very effectively in the most important position. Therefore, Party friend, Seyss-Inquart, your name will already today be immortal..... To prove my friendship I would like to give you, as my old friend and comrade, an old Germanic piece of ornament made from Polish soil.

Reichsminister Seyss-Inquart answered in the following words:.....that I felt myself called to a task which had to be fulfilled in the East. You will understand if I say that, since my early youth, I was a part of the fight for the German Nation. Then came the transit time of the Higher Administration and Administration. I know that at that time somebody expressed the opinion it was impossible to place a Reichsminister under another office.

H1237-0315

When I heard this ridiculous rumor, I immediately told Party friend Hess, the representative of the Fuehrer, that I would of course go any place as a National-Socialist. Furthermore, it would be a satisfaction for myself if I could do that under Dr. Frank. A special memory connects Dr. Frank with us people from the Ostmark. It was at the time when the Dollfuss Regime started the fight against us. At that time Dr, Frank came to Vienna and in Austria his arrival was not expressly desired. For me it was at that time a special pleasure to welcome Dr, Frank in the name of Stririschen Heimatschutzes. I think this was the last great demonstration. All the time after that we lived in the memory of this demonstration. For the whole period of our fight Dr. Frank was for us the conception of the National Socialistic will for leadership. Later, when the Anschluss came, Dr. Frank came to us as Reichsrechtsfuehrer and I was then happy that I was able to fulfill some tasks as a tool of the Fuehrer. I remember there a beautiful demonstration in Vienna..... At the time I was able to be here as representative of the Generalgovernment was one of great significance. I learned here a lot, many things which I did not understand before at all and mainly on account of the initiative and firm leadership as I saw them in my friend Dr. Frank. I always recognized this fact in the instinctive activities of the National-Socialist..... I will go now to the West and I want to be open to you. With a heart I am here because I am inclined with my whole attitude to the East. In the East we have a National-Socialistic mission; over there in the West we have a function; that may be the difference..... In the Third Reichs I never found a better comradeship than with you..... I am glad that I have today still the opportunity on the occasion of your 40th birthday to tell you how close I felt with you... and you will always have me as your dearest friend.....

CERTIFICATE OF PARTIAL TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 3465-PS

18 December 1945.

I, JOSEPH MICHEL, x-046319, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct partial translation of Document No. 3465-PS.

JOSEPH MICHEL
x-046319

H1237-0316

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3467-PS
OFFICE OF THE U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

(Page 311, first Column complete)

R E I C H S G E S E T Z B L A T T

Part I

1933 Published at BERLIN, 30 May 1933 No. 57

Law on the Limitation of Travel to the Republic Austria, 29 May 1933. The Reich Cabinet (Reichsregierung) has resolved the following law, which is promulgated herewith:

Article 1.

(1) A levy of 1000.-- Reichsmark will be charged for every journey which is undertaken by a subject of the Reich with residence or permanent abode within Germany. The levy is to be paid before the start of the journey to the competent visa authorities, who will note the payment in the passport. The levy will go to the Reich treasury.
(2) The regulations of Section 1. do not apply to the small border traffic (kleine Grenzverkehr).

Article 2.

A subject of the Reich, who crosses from the Reich territory into the territory of the Republic Austria directly or indirectly contrary to this law to the executory regulations to be published for it, will be punished with a monetary fine, not below 5,000 Reichsmark, or with imprisonment.

Article 3.

The Reich Minister for the Interior will issue the regulations necessary for the execution of this law; he can permit exceptions for the regulations of Article 1, Section 1.

Article 4.

The law comes into force on 1 June 1933.

Berlin, 29 May 1933.

The Reich Chancellor

A D O L F H I T L E R

The Reich Minister for the Interior

F R I C K

H1237-0317

I, Everett V. Cunningham, B 210795, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 3467-PS.

EVERETT V. CUNNINGHAM
B 210795

Exhibit USA 705
Filed Jan. 16, 1946

3468-PS

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO.3468-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Dokumente der Deutschen Politik

Das Werden des Reiches 1939 Teil 2, Bearbeitet von Dr. Hans Volz, Berlin, 1940.

PP. 674-5

129. First decree of the Governor General Dr. Frank of October 26, 1939 concerning the establishment of the administration of the occupied Polish territories.
On the basis of article 5, paragraph 1 of the decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor of October 12, 1939, concerning the administration of the occupied Polish territories I decree:

Article 1.

The General-Government for the occupied territories includes the territories occupied by German troops, insofar as they are not incorporated into the German Reich.

Article 2.

The Headquarters of the Governor General is in Krakow.

Article 3.

(1) The Chief of the Office of the Governor General and the Senior SS and Police Leader are directly subordinated to the Governor General and his deputy.

(2) Divisions for work on the various administrative branches will be formed in the office of the Governor General.

(3) The Commanders of the Police and the Commander of the SD are subordinated to the Senior SS and Police Leader.

Article 4.

The General-Government is divided into four districts: Krakow, Lublin, Radom and Warsow.

Article 5.

(1) At the head of the districts is the District Chief. The District Chief directs the entire administration of the district in the name of the Governor General.

(2) The Chief of the office of the District Chief and the SS and Police Leader are directly subordinated to the District Chief.

Article 6.

(1) The districts are divided into Landkreise and Stadtkreise . At the head of the Landkreise is the Kreishauptmann. He directs the entire administration of the Landkreis.

(2) Special regulations are issued concerning the administration of the cities and communities.

Article 7.

The General-Government is the holder of special rights and obligations. It is represented by the Governor General and the authorities empowered by him.

H1237-0318

H1237-0319

Article 8.

(1) The hitherto existing Polish law remains in effect, insofar as it is not contrary to the taking over of the administration by the German Reich and the exercising of military rights of sovereignty.

(2) The Law effected by the Supreme Commander of the Army and Offices empowered by him remains in force, insofar as it has not become void of application through establishment of the General Government.

Article 9.

The official language in the General Government is German. The Polish language is permitted.

Article 10.

(1) The decrees of the Governor General will be announced in the official gazette for the occupied Polish territories in the German and Polish languages. The German text is authoritative for the interpretation.

(2) The decrees go into effect, insofar as nothing else is defined, the day after their announcement.

PP. 676-7

130. Degree by Governor General Dr. Frank of 26 October, 1929 concerning the establishment of the judiciary in the General Government.

On the basis of Art. 5, Par. 1, of the decree by the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor of 12 October 1939, concerning the administration of the occupied Polish territory, I decree

Art. 1

In the General-Government German and Polish court procedure exists,

Art. 2

(1) The task of the German court procedure is to punish the attacks on the safety and reputation of the German Reich and its people, as well as on the lives, health, and the property of German national adherents.

(2) The German national adherents are subjected to German court procudure in their entire relations with judicial matters.

(3) The sentences of the German courts are passed in the name of the German people.

Art. 3

Legally enforcable decisions of a Polish court may be subjected to an investigation by the German judges.

The German judge may hand the case over to the German court procedure by voiding the sentence.

Art. 4

The courts shall assume their activity after the territorial borders of the General-Government have been definitely established.

H1237-0320

Art. 5.

The rules necessary for the execution of these decrees are released by the executive of the judicial department in the office of the General Government.

PP. 677-8

131a. Decree of Governor General Dr. Frank of 26 October 1939, concerning the introduction of forced labor among the Polish population of the General Government.

(5) Through Art. 1 of the decree of 14 December 1939, concerning the execution of forced labor among the Polish population in the General Government. (Verordnungsblatt G.G.P.Sp.224), the Chiefs of the district were authorized " to extend the forced labor among the Polish residents in the General Government to youths between the fourteenth and eighteenth year.

PP. 678-9

131b. Decree of Governor General Dr. Frank of 26 Oct 39 concerning the establishment of forced labor for the Jewish population of the General-Government.

On the basis of Article 5 Paragraph 1 of the decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor of 12 Oct 39 concerning the administration of the occupied Polish territories I decree:

Article 1

For the Jews domiciled in the General-Government forced labor, is established, to take effect immediately for this purpose the Jews are to be concentrated into Forced Labor Troops.

Article 2

The regulations required for the execution of this decree are issued by the Senior SS and Police Leader. He can fix territories east of the Vistula where the execution of this decree is not carried out.

P. 681.

134. Decree of the Governor General Dr. Frank as of 23 November 1938, concerning the markings of Jews and Jewesses in the General Government.

On the basis of Art. 5, Par. 1, by the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor as of 12 October 1939, concerning the administration of the occupied Polish territory (Reichsgesetzblatt 1, p. 2077), I order

Art. 1

All Jews and Jewesses who are residing in the General Government and who are over ten years of age are required from 1 December 1939 on to wear on the right sleeve of their clothing a white band at least ten centimeters in width marked with the Star of Zion.

Art. 2

These armbands are to be procured by the Jews and Jewesses themselves and marked with the corresponding sign.

H1237-0321

Art. 3

(1) Violations be punished by imprisonment.

(2) The Special Courts are competent for the trial.

The necessary rules for its execution are released by the executive of the Department of Internal Administration in the office of the General Government.

P. 682

135. Decree of the Governor General Dr. Frank of 23 Nov 39 concerning the specification of businesses within the General Government.

Based upon Article 5, Par. I of the Decree of the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor of 12 October 1939 concerning the administration of the occupied Polish areas (Reichsgesetzblatt I, pp.2077) I decree:

Article 1.

Businesses whose owners are Germans have to be identified as German businesses. They may also carry Polish firm names.

Article 2

Businesses whose owners are Poles have to carry Polish firm names. They may also be provided with a German firm name.

Article 3

Jewish businesses are to be identified with the Star of Zion in such a manner that it will be plainly visible from the street; they are not allowed German firm names.

Article 4

(1) Violations will be punished by imprisonment.

(2) The Special Courts are competent for the trial.

I, Everett V. Cunningham, B 210795, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 3468-PS.

EVERETT V. CUNNINGHAM
B 210795.

H1237-0322

3473-PS

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3473-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Miss Grundtmann

Phone: 165861
settled by tel.
7th Jan 37
(sign) Limberger

Keppler should be told by telephone:

(pencil note) 1.) He should do everything to avoid the resignation of Counsillor of State Dr. Seyss - Inquart and State- Minister (Bundesminister) Glaise von Horstenau. If some difficulties should arise, Mr. Seyss - Inquart should come to him first of all.

2.) Mr. Leopold has already been ordered but has not received the permission to leave his country at the present. The general (der Herr Generaloberst) intends to receive him on the 14th or 15th of January, so that he can give him very definite instructions.

Carinhall, January 6th 1938

(signed) G. Limberger

Berlin W8, January 6 1938
Behrenstr. 39a
Phone. 165861

Main Office
of the
economic political organisations
of the NSDAP

Chief: W. Keppler

Prime Minister General Goering
Secretary General
Arr. (Stamp)
Jan 6 - 1938

To
Prime Minister General Goering

Berlin W 8
Leipziger Strasse 3.

Most honorable General!

Councillor of State Dr. S e y s s - Inq u a r t has sent a courier to me with the report that his negotations with the Federal Chancellor Dr. S c h u s c h n i g g have run aground, so that he feels compelled to return the mandate entrusted to him. Dr. S e y s s - I n q u a r t desires to have a discussion with me regarding this, before he acts accordingly.

May I ask your advice, whether at this moment such a step-entailing authomatically also the resignation of the Federal Minister G l a i s e von H o r s t e n a u appears indicated or whether I should put forth efforts to postpone such an action.

Furhtermore I have information to the effect that Landesleiter Captain L e o p o l d deposed Dr. J u r y his deputy, while the latter was here in Germany.

H1237-0323

Captain L e c p cl d is attempting again and again to make his own policy which is in opposition to the wishes of the decisive authorities in the Reich, and continuously obstructs the pending negotiations carried on by Dr. Se y s s - I n q u a r t , Dr. J u r y and the consultants for national - political affairs (volkspolitischen Referenten).

I take the liberty to pass on to you a copy of a directive of military nature which incidentally came into my hands. It discloses further measures concerning the German border.

May I once more ask you, honorable General, for an audience in order to discuss my further activity in the field of economic politics.

Heil Hitler!

Yours sincerly devoted

(signed) Keppler

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 3473-PS

I, WALTER E. BRILL, 046341, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 3473-PS.

WALTER E. BRILL
046341

H1237-0324

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO.3522-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Konrad Henlein

Hof in Bavaria March 17, 1938

Dear comrade !

It is not possible to express the feelings which the most fortunate turn of events has caused in us all. That you, dear comrade, as a born Sudeten German in one of the most decisive hours in German history , carried out so masterfully the mission given you by the Fuehrer fills us with pride.

I express herewith the gratitude which comes from the heart of the Sudeten Germandom. Your accomplishment, achieved in allegiance to the Fuehrer, will have its effect upon our situation in the next weeks.

I am looking forward to the day when after years I can come to our beloved free German-Austria. I hope then to be able to congratulate you personally.

Heil Hitler !

signed your Konrad Henlein

To the

Reichsstatthalter Seyss-Inquart
Vienna.

I, Everett V. CUNNINGHAM, B 210795, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 3522-PS.

EVERETT V. CUNNINGHAM
B 210 795

H1237-0325

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3523-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

29 Dec 1937

Your Excellency:

My most hearty wishes for the year 1938 to you and your Sudeten-German compatriots! May your way, accompanied by us with the warmest sympathy, be successful!

Yours always obedient

His Excellency
Konrad HENLEIN
Asch in Bavaria

I, Everett V. CUNNINGHAM, E 210795, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of document 3523-PS.

EVERETT V. CUNNINGHAM
E 210795

3588-PS

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3588-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

VERORDNUNGSBLATT FÜR DIE BESETZTEN NIEDERLÄNDISCHEN GEBIETE, 1940, No. I, p. 8

Order of the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories concerning the Exercise of Governmental Authority in the Netherlands, May 29, 1940

By virtue of Section 5 of the decree of the Führer concerning the exercise of governmental authority in the Netherlands of May 18, 1940 (RGBl., I, p. 778), I hereby issue the following order, which shall remain in force for the duration of the occupation of the Netherlands territories by the German armed forces.

SECTION 1. (1) To extent required for the fulfillment of his duties, the Reich Commissioner for the occupied Netherlands territories assumes all power, privileges, and rights heretofore vested in the King and the government in accordance with the Constitution and the laws of the Netherlands.

(2) Should the interests of the Greater German Reich or the safeguarding of public order or life in the Netherlands so require, the Reich Commissioner may take appropriate measures, including the issuance of general orders. These orders of the Reich Commissioner shall have the force of laws.

SECTION 2. (1) The Netherlands law heretofore in force shall remain in force in so far as it is compatible with the occupation and not contrary to the provisions of the decree of the Führer concerning the exercise of governmental functions in the Netherlands. The general orders of the Commander in Chief of the Army issued for the occupied Netherlands territories shall remain in force until further notice.

(2) All rules and regulations shall be submitted to the Reich Commissioner before publication. Publication shall not take place if the Reich Comissioner so requests.

(3) The Reich Commissioner hereby reserves the right of delegating the power vested in him by virtue of subsection 2 to the German authorities which are subject to his orders.

SECTION 3. (1) The Reich Commissioner will enforce his orders through the Netherlands authorities unless the German authorities which are subject to this order take direct action themselves.

(2) The Secretaries General of the Netherlands ministries shall, within their respective jurisdictions, be responsible to the Reich Commissioner for the orderly supervision and administration of official business. They may, in compliance with subsections 2 and 3 of Section 2, issue rules and regulations implementing Netherlands statutes and orders of the Reich Commissioner.

SECTION 4. (1) The Reich Commissioner will exercise his authority through general commissioners, who will operate as members of his staff.

(2) The Reich Commissioner will further appoint commissioners for the several provinces. He will also appoint special commissioners for specified areas or purposes as the need may arise.

SECTION 5. (1) The maintenance of public peace, safety, and order shall be entrusted to the Netherlands police force unless the Reich Commissioner calls on German S.S. or police forces for the enforcement of his orders. The Netherlands police forces shall be subject to the supervision of the German police force and shall be required to comply with its orders.

H1237-0326

(2) The investigation and combating of all activities hostile to the Reich and Germanism shall be the concern of the German police force.

SECTION 6. (1) The judiciary shall be independent.

(2) Judgments shall be entered in the name of the law.

(3) The Reich Commissioner will determine which judgments are to be submitted for his confirmation before execution may be issued.

(4) The Reich Commissioner will designate by general order the crimes to be tried by special courts and the conditions under which Netherlands citizens are subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the German Army or the German police force, respectively.

SECTION 7. Within such period as shall be determined by the Reich Commissioner, judges, officials, and employees who hold public office, as well as persons engaged in full-time or part-time teaching in public or private schools and universities, shall make a declaration in lieu of an oath that they will comply conscientiously with the general and other orders of the Reich Commissioner and the German authorities subordinate to him and that they will refrain from any action directed against the German Reich or the German armed forces.

SECTION 8. All German authorities, agencies, and officials, with the exception of those of the armed forces, shall be subject to the orders of the Reich Commissioner.

SECTION 9. General orders will be published in the Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten niederländischen Gebiete, which will be issued in the German and Dutch languages. The German text will be authoritative.

SECTION 10. This order shall take effect as of the date of publication.

The Hague, May 29, 1940.

SEYSS-INQUART
Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories

- - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 3588-PS

7 January 1946

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 3588-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf

H1237-0327

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3588-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

VERORDNUNGSBLATT FÜR DIE BESETZTEN NIEDERLÄNDISCHEN GEBIETE
1940, No. i, P. 11.

Decree of the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories concerning the Organization and Establishment of the Office of the Reich Commissioner, June 3, 1940.

(Excerpts)

By virtue of Section 5 of the decree of the Fuehrer concerning the exercise of governmental authority in the Netherlands of May 18, 1940 (RGBl., I, p. 778), I hereby decree:

SECTION 1. (1) For the fulfillment of his official duties the Reich Commissioner for the occupied Netherlands territories will act through general commissioners, who are members of his staff and who will head the following sections:

1. General Administration and Judiciary.
2. Public Safety (Superior SS and Police Chief).
3. Finance and Commerce (Economics).
4. Special Matters.

(2) The representative of the Foreign Office and the Custodian for the Netherlands Bank shall be directly subject to the orders of the Reich Commissioner.

(3) The Reich Commissioner will appoint commissioners for the several provinces. He will appoint a special commissioner for specific localities or purposes as the need may arise.

. . . . . .

SECTION 3. (1) The general commissioners shall be authorized (within the scope of their official duties) to require information of all and every description from all Netherlands authorities, agencies, and establishments of a public or private character and to give them the necessary instructions for that purpose.

. . . . . .

SECTION 4. The official duties of the Commissioner General for Administration and the Judiciary shall embrace all matters relating to:

1. General orders and legislation, constitutional law, and the Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten niederländischen Gebiete.

2. Planning.

3. Civil administration, especially the supervision of municipalities with the exception of municipal police forces.

4. The administration of justice with the exception of the Reich police forces.

5. The furtherance of culture (art, protection of public monuments, science, public education, etc.) as well as matters relating to schools and churches.

6. Public health, and the cultural and social welfare of juveniles.

SECTION 5. The Superior SS and Police Chief shall command the units of the military SS and the German police forces transferred to the occupied Netherlands territories, supervise the Netherlands central and municipal police forces, and issue to them the necessary orders.

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SECTION 6. The official duties of the Commissioner General of Finance and Commerce shall embrace all matters relating to:

1. The Ministry of Finance.
2. The Ministry of Economics (Commerce).
3. The Ministry of Waterways.
4. The Postal Administration.
5. The Ministry of Public Welfare, with the exception of the matters enumerated in Section 4 (6).

SECTION 7. The official duties of the Commissioner General for Special Matters shall embrace all issues relating to:

1. The molding of public opinion, and to associations formed for purposes other than private gain.

2. Such duties as may devolve upon him by virtue of special orders of the Reich Commissioner.

SECTION 8. (1) The official duties of the commissioners for the several provinces, appointed by the Reich Commissioner, shall embrace, - with the exception of the maintenance of public safety - all matters pertaining to public administration, economic welfare, and the molding of public opinion within the areas to which they are appointed. They may call, for the fulfillment of their duties, on members of the German police force, in accordance with general rules and regulations issued by the Superior SS and Police Chief.

(2) The Netherlands authorities, agencies, institutions, and establishments of a public and private character, and their officers and agents, shall be required, by virtue of a special order, to report to the commissioners appointed by the Reich Commissioner concerning certain matters without being requested to do so in every instance and to inform them about impending administrative action. Such action shall be suspended on request of the commissioner concerned.

SECTION 9. The authority of special commissioners appointed for specified areas or purposes shall be determined by the duties assigned to them.

SECTION 10. (1) The commissioners appointed for the several provinces by the Reich Commissioner shall have the same official residence as the commissioners appointed under Article 141 of the Constitution.

(2) The official residence of the special commissioners will be designated by the Reich Commissioner.

SECTION 11. The Reich Commissioner alone will establish or abolish German governmental agencies for civil administration and determine their official duties and jurisdiction.

SECTION 12. This decree shall take effect as of the date of publication.

The Hague, June 3, 1940.

SEYSS-INQUART
Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 3588-PS

7 January 1946

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 3588-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf

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SAUCKEL IMT

EXCERPTS
Testimony of FRITZ SAUCKEL, taken at Nurnberg, Germany, on 5 October 1945, 1030-1200, by Major John J. Monigan, Jr., CAC, OUSCC. Also present: Siegfried Ramler, Interpreter, and S/Sgt William A. Weigel, Court Reporter.

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Q. For a moment, I want to turn our attention to Holland. It is my understanding that the quotas for the workers from Holland were agreed upon, and then the numbers given to the Reichskommissar Seyss-Inquart to fulfill, is that correct?

A. Yes, that is correct.

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Q. After the quota was given to Seyss-Inquart, it was his mission to fulfill it with the aid of your representatives, was it not?

A. Yes. This was the only possible thing for me to do, and the same applied to other countries.

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Q. Was the same procedure substantially followed of allocating quotas in the General Government Poland?

A. Yes. I have to basically state again that the only possibility I had in carrying through these matters was to get in touch with the highest German military authority in the respective country and to transfer to them the orders of the Fuehrer and ask them very urgently, as I have always done, to fulfill these orders.

Q. Such discussions in Poland, of course, were with the General Governor Frank?

A. Yes. I spent a morning and afternoon in Cracov twice or three times, and I personally spoke to General Governor Frank. Naturally, there was also present Secretary Dr. Goebble.

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Q. Was the procedure the same regarding discussions and allocations of quotas for the territory of the East with Rosenberg?

A. As far as it concerns the Eastern territory, that was ordered through Reichsminister Rosenberg; yes. My representative was Staatsrat Peukert. Staatsrat Peukert had a very close connection with Rosenberg in his Department of Labor, and at the same time he was working for the Reichskommissar in the Ukraine, and he was also working in the Labor Staff East for General Stapf. This was an economic institution of the Four Year Plan, for the operational functions in the East which have been subordinate to the Army chiefs. In those three instances Staatsrat Peukert was my representative, as leader for the Department of Labor.

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Q. Was it necessary in order to accomplish the completion of the quotas given to have liaison with the OKW?

A. I remember that the Fuehrer had given directives to Marshal Keitel, telling him that my task was a very important one, and I, too, have often conferred with Keitel after such discussions with the Fuehrer, when I asked him for his support.

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Q. It was his task to supervise the proper performance of the military commanders in the occupied countries in carrying out their assigned mission, was it not?

A. Yes. The Fuehrer had told me that he would inform the chief of the OKW, and the Chief of the Reichschancellory, as to these matters. The same applies to the Foreign Minister.

Q. The methods by which the quotas were filled in the occupied countries was the task of the civilian or military commander concerned, as we have just discussed before, was it not?

A. Yes, naturally. Yes, the executive rights naturally rested with him. However, he received advice and technical expert advice from the representative of the labor administration.

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Q I am not talking about this particular Holland situation; I am talking about your whole record in the course of events and your present position.

A I am conscious of the fact that I was a representative bearer of the Great German Reich and that there happened an unbelievable and unthinkable catastrophe, and then one has to wonder to what extent one has contributed himself to it.

Q What are you worried most about? Your activities in Austria, or your activities in Holland?

A In Austria I am conscious that I have contributed to the Anschluss, which had not been achieved as I thought it; but the Anschluss is on the way of my national will or aspiration. In Holland, I had an unusually difficult administrative task. I do believe that I did do certain things with which I am satisfied, as far as I was concerned.

Q How do you feel about your deportation of the Jews of Holland?

A I was against it. We wanted to concentrate the Dutch Jews into their quarters in order to keep them within the country.

Q How do you feel about your transportation of workers out of Holland into Germany, by force?

A The compulsory deportation started towards the end of '44. I then received a letter from Minister Lammers to the effect that we were to send to Germany 250,000 workmen. It was a matter of importance from the viewpoint of war. I wrote Lammers that this was impossible and if this was a matter decided for war, then the war should be fought over. That is written in black and white.

Q You are a trained lawyer. You knew that that was a violation of every principle of international law.

A One moment. Toward the end of '44 and the beginning of '45, the high command of the Army gave an order that all males, ages from

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17 to 42, were to be removed from the province of Holland; deported from the province of Holland to the Reich, where they were to work. This order was issued to General Student, who transmitted it to the Commander of the Wehrmacht, and the action was carried out by the Wehrmacht.

Q Under your direction?

A Well, I can't intervene against the Wehrmacht.

Q You were the personal representative of Hitler in Holland, weren't you?

A In my province, but not in the province of the Wehrmacht, and the action was carried out by the Wehrmacht.

Q Under your direction?

A Well, I can't intervene against the Wehrmacht.

Q You were the personal representative of Hitler in Holland, weren't you?

A In my province, but not in the province of the Wehrmacht, and the action was carried out by a general with his own staff, which had been sent to Holland by the OKW.

Q What did you do about it?

A We consulted on the matter. According to the explanations of the generals, it was a matter indispensable from the military point

of view.

Q That satisfied you, I suppose?

A I took note of it.

Q What do you mean by "I took note of it"?

A I didn't oppose it. I helped to carry it out within my province.

Q What did you do about the shooting of the hostages in Holland?

A In Holland, no hostages were shot.

H1237-0334

Q Oh, I beg your pardon. Are you telling us that no hostages were shot in Holland, while you were there as the Reichskommissar?

A By the shooting of hostages, I understand people who had no connection whatever with an illegal action, were just taken out and shot.

Q That is just what I understand.

A I wish to say the following: according to my recollection, five hostages were shot in Holland in the spring of 1941. There had been an assault on a military train. Thereupon the Wehrmacht asked of the police that fifty hostages be shot. The Supreme Commander of the SS applied to me and I negotiated with the military commander and he reduced the number to five. Then the police carried it out.

Excerpt from Transcript of Interrogation
of ARTHUR SEYSS-INQUART, 18 September 1945,
1430-1600, by Mr. Thomas Dodd, OUSCC.

Q How did you feel about going to Poland as the assistant to Frank, the Governor General for that country which had been taken over by the Germans?

A Well, I would like to state that, first of all, in a war, one has to follow all orders and receive any commands that are assigned to a person.

Q You mean you had to go to Poland?

A Well, I didn't go there against my wishes, but I had an order; I was appointed.

Q The point is that you weren't forced to go. You were merely willing to go when you received the appointment. You didn't refuse it or resist it.

A Why, I was assigned a task, and I accepted this task, and I accepted it because I felt that possibly I could do something good for the Reich.

Q How did you feel when you were sent to Holland to do the same job there?

A Well, the same as for the first -- that is, I wasn't questioned, I was appointed; but I accepted that position because I felt that here, in war time, I was assigned a job to do in the Reich, and I felt that I was going to do as good a job as I could.

Q All right. It must occur to you that it is an interesting feature of your history, that you were a principle figure in bringing the Germans into Austria; and that thereafter, you served the Germans in Austria; and later you served them in Poland; and still later you served them in Holland.

A Yes.

Q Have you any regrets about any of that?

A Well, in Poland, naturally, I was not very active.

Q Well, I don't care to hear any rationalization of how active you were in Poland, or how active you were in Holland, but for whatever part you played, you had something to do with the administration of affairs of Poland, and you were the Commissar, at least, in Holland. Now, my question is, knowing what happened in Poland; and knowing what happened in Holland; and knowing what happened in Austria; do you now have any regrets about your conduct, or would you do it all over again?

H1237-0335

A Well, there I would like to state the following, for naturally every man does commit mistakes, and I don't have any doubt that I made plenty of mistakes, but I would like to state in regard to Austria the following: For Austria, the course of events was such, that if there was any solution at all, then mine, was the best one, but sometimes, I even doubt that there was even a solution, of this problem.

Q So you are satisfied in playing the part that you played in turning Austria over to Germany; you have no regrets for whatever you did?

A I most deeply regret the course that the events took, but I must reserve for myself, the right that I did take the responsibility for the course of events, in the best way that was open to me.

Q And how do you feel about what you had to do with the conduct of affairs in Poland? Do you have any regret about that now?

A Well, for Poland, I can't take any particular position because for me the fact that the war with Poland brokeout, and that afterwards I was placed in that function -- those are things that I view objectively.

Q Well, to put it another way: knowing what happened in Poland while you were there under Frank, aren't you at least regretful that you had even any small part to play in what went on there?

A I don't think that up to May of 1940, within the responsibility of myself and of Frank, were any such things, because then we were just kind of getting ourselves settled and established. Primarily, I helped to establish a German body of administration, that is, in the German section.

Q And would you do that all over again if you had the opportunity?

A Well, that naturally brings up the basic problem of the war, but considering the premises, and assuming that in the war one has to do the job that is assigned to him, I do not feel that I have to be ashamed of anything that I did.

Q All right, let's turn to Holland. You were the Reich Commissar in Holland. Do you have any regret about what happened in Holland during your tenure of office?

H1237-0336

A I am conscious of the fact that I have made mistakes in Holland, possibly grave mistakes. I realize that fully, but with regards to the so-called exaggerations or excesses, for those I cannot consider myself responsible.

Q They went on while you were there, however, as the Governor General.

A Yes.

Q And you knew about them.

A Partly, yes, but for the greater part, I did not know about these events.

Q And you never resigned or refused to serve?

A No, I hold the viewpoint that in time of war one cannot do that.

Q You weren't in the Army.

A In the First World War.

Q Oh, no, I am talking about this last one.

A Well, I tried to volunteer in May 1940, that is, when I was still in Poland, but the answer was that I would not be accepted in the Army, but would be sent as Reich Commissar to Holland instead.

Q Well, the point is that you weren't under the usual requirements of obedience by which a soldier must abide.

A But I felt myself bound at least to the same degree as a soldier.

Q That was your personal viewpoint of it.

A Yes.

Q You could have resigned.

A I have once pondered on the significance that might have had. The most likely solution of that would have been that one would not have acknowledged it, but would have insisted that I remain at my post.

Q In any event, you never tried.

A No, I have not.

Q You issued some orders in Holland, requiring the male population between the ages of 17 and 45, I think, to report for labor in Germany. (Arbeits-Einsatz).

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A That must have been in January 1945.

Q No, earlier than that. 17 to 40 were the ages, by the way, those born between 1905 and 1928. The orders were issued in 1941, were

they not? Do you remember Order Number 42, for the Occupied Netherlands Territory?

A Well, yes, it was the so-called "Call For Duty," I mean, the order for "Call for Duty".

Q That was issued in 1941.

A Well, but '41, it applied merely for work in the Netherlands, and only perhaps '43, I think it was extended to apply for work in the Reich.

Q Do you remember Decree Number 48, issued in the year 1942?

A Well, not from memory.

Q With respect to the obligation to perform labor, and with respect to the restriction on changes of employment?

A Yes, such a decree I did order.

Q Now, in 1945, by virtue of these decrees of 1941 and 1942, all men within this age group were ordered to appear on the streets with a certain amount of equipment, and be prepared to leave their homes and take up work somewhere else.

A In 1945, that was different already.

Q Well, when was this order issued if it wasn't in '45?

A Well, there was a decree in 1945, but the whole thing was somewhat different.

Q Well, I am talking about the orders, based on your decrees, which ordered all these men in this age group, out on the streets as of a certain hour; ordered the inhabitants, women and children, to stay in their houses; and further, that all the doors to the houses were to remain open; and that if any man were to be found in their houses, failing to report on the street, they would be punished. Do you recall

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that order?

A Well, I believe that those were the orders of the Armed Forces.

Q Yes, based on your decrees of 1941 and '42, and put in operation while you were the Governor there.

A Yes, well, yes, it was based on Decree 41; but the entire execution or administration of the law was strictly a function of the military forces, and these great actions made no reference to my orders.

Q They made specific reference to your orders. Do you remember what they looked like? Do you remember the posters that were put up on the streets in Holland?

A Yes, I think that was about the middle of January, and may I say this right now: The big actions of the military forces, to draw the people subject to military service out of Holland, had already passed, that is, it was already settled.

Q They weren't being drawn out for military security reasons, they were being taken out for work in Germany.

A The order was that all men of military age were supposed to be removed from Holland and brought into the Reich, so that they would do work there.

Q And do you remember the last line of that order? It said, "Anybody who tried to escape or who refused to obey, would be shot."

A Well, in a state of emergency, and in a state of Martial Law, if somebody resists the order of the occupying forces, then that would be penalized by the death penalty.

Excerpt from Transcript of Interrogation
of ARTHUR SEYSS-INQUART, 9 October, 1945,
1430 - 1510 by Mr. Thomas J. Dodd, OUSCC.